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Abstract 
This thesis is prompted by the question, what do we mean by ‘the feminine’ and 
how does this relate to women, especially through language and through 
dwelling in a body sexed as female. Further, in what way might women’s 
spirituality be different from those who are sexed as male? Corollary to this 
question, are traditional patriarchal religious forms suited to women? I aim to 
extract thinking from a dependence on the masculine symbolic with its dualistic 
assumptions, and simultaneously expose the necessity for a new identity not 
embedded in it. Throughout, my primary interlocutors are C. G. Jung and Luce 
Irigaray, because they each frame a spirituality and subjectivity for women as 
distinct from both patriarchy and the concerns of men. 
 
In chapter one I interrogate the concept of ‘the feminine’ and ‘women’ through 
such lenses as archetypes, Jung’s anima and animus, and the semiotic. I argue 
that Luce Irigaray’s insistence on sexuate difference provides a fertile possibility 
for inquiry into the nature of the feminine and the experience of women. The 
concept of ‘sexuate’ difference articulates the different modes of being and 
becoming for men and women, in bodily, social, linguistic, aesthetic, erotic, and 
political and religious forms. Further, Luce Irigaray’s genealogy reveals stylistic 
variations of a feminine way, and allows for multiple expressions of femininity. 
Having established sexuate difference as foundational, I begin an in-depth critical 
analysis of how this applies to the body, language and spirituality of women.  
 
In chapter two, I argue that spirituality is available through the senses, through 
the sensible self, and that both body and mind need to be cultivated.  Following 
this point, I argue for Luce Irigaray’s concept of the sensible/transcendental, and 
the cultivation of the senses and the body especially through the breath. For both 
Irigaray and Jung the aim of cultivation is to establish a connection between 
above and below, spirituality and carnality; I equate Irigaray’s use of cultivation 
with Jung’s notion of Individuation. I elaborate other aspects of ‘cultivation’ 
employed by Irigaray to support my emphasis on conscious feminine becoming; 
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namely the cultivation of ethical relations with the other, the cultivation of 
language suited to the feminine subject, and the cultivation and spiritualization of 
the body and the senses, ultimately towards ‘becoming divine’.  
 
In chapter three I argue that phallogocentrism misrepresents the feminine, and 
that women require a transformed language through which they are incarnated, 
in which they might establish a feminine dwelling.  Following a Jungian 
discussion of eros and logos, I put forward erotic logos as a form that operates 
through the means of eros/love, rather than logos/power, and use the tale of 
Sherezade to illustrate this understanding.  
 
In chapter four I reject androcentric projections and attributions of ‘God’, and 
instead argue that the mystical is both dependent on the existence of a female 
deity and the site on which she can be apprehended.  I develop Jung’s ideas 
around the numinosum to argue for a feminine which avoids a dualistic trope, 
because it is outside the Symbolic. I argue that religious doctrine cannot be 
assumed to be gender-neutral. Emancipatory speech about God and about self 
are intertwined; the lived experience of women is essential to their specific, non-
stereotypical feminine theology. 
 
By way of extending my analysis of the feminine, I devote my final two chapters 
to an exploration of myth and fairy tale. I show how this narrative form presents 
the issues raised in the work so far in poetic and allegorical language, which can 
convey more than the text, and present a new horizon. In analysing the tale of 
the Handless Maiden, I employ philosophy, Jungian psychology and theology to 
argue for the necessity of the subjectivity of women, to which I apply key 
elements of Luce Irigaray’s work; specifically the notions of self-affection, 
virginity, solitude and silence, the sensible/transcendental, and sexuate 
difference.  
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In conclusion, I argue that a lack of understanding of ‘the feminine’ has led to an 
impoverishment of not only women, but our entire culture, specifically in how we 
approach and exploit the environment, and in this I relate ‘the feminine’ and 
‘environment’.  Ethics ‘in the feminine’ would encompass both women and 
nature, and result in a revolution in how each is viewed and experienced.  
Throughout, I revisit the question as to whether so-called ‘feminine’ experiences 
might also be available to men, and depart from Irigaray’s position on this point.  I 
do so by appealing to different archetypes or paradigms as operating 
simultaneously, that of sexuate difference and mystical spirituality, for instance. 
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Introduction: 
some part of us always 
out beyond ourselves 
knowing knowing knowing 
are we all in training for something we don’t name? 
Adrienne Rich1 
 
Women have been thinking in and as female bodies within a language-structure 
bequeathed by Western androcentric culture. I intend to discover and express 
that which has been unthought for, or by, women within phallogocentric culture. 
This is the horizon to which I am oriented.  Hence Adrienne Rich’s poem; women 
are “in training for something we don’t name”, and which we are as yet unable to 
name.  Yet we are guided by “knowing, knowing, knowing”.  I aim to translate this 
knowing into thinking and speaking as a female subject, independent of the 
masculine symbolic.  I argue for a new identity not embedded within it.  
 
The questions that prompt this study are, in summary:  
1. What do we mean by ‘the feminine’ - assuming that it has meaning - and 
how does this relate to women, through language and through the body 
sexed as female? 
2. In what way might a woman’s subjectivity and spirituality be different from 
those sexed as male?2  Corollary to this, are traditional patriarchal 
religious forms suited to women?3   
 
                                            
1 (Rich, 1982, p. 45) 
2 My definition of ‘spiritual’ will be revealed accumulatively throughout this work.  A provisional 
definition is that spirituality involves a developed interiority, a relation to or awareness of the 
numinous, and a developed sense of ethics in relation to oneself and others. 
3 In so doing, I contribute to a rectification of past attitudes, and hold, as does Hilde Hein, that 
“matter and spirit are not exclusive, that intellect and spirit are not identical, that neither men nor 
women have a monopoly on spirituality, but an analysis of the relationship of women to spirituality 
is warranted in order to rectify the philosophical biases of the past” (Hein, 1996, p. 310). 
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Context 
What, then, is the most favourable way to inquire into ‘the feminine’, women’s 
subjectivity, and divinity-in-the-feminine? Mary Collins proposes that “one of the 
best gifts for the critical mind and for living tradition is the gift of the new 
question” (Collins, 1985).4 This is the mode I follow, in that I continually question 
received ‘truths’, and attempt a new way to read old texts, as advocated by Le 
Doeuff, for instance (Le Dœuff, 1989). 
 
What suppositions must I challenge? In what ways might women be connected to 
‘the feminine’? Is the very concept of ‘the feminine’ a patriarchal invention, an 
ideal projected onto women by men?5  Could it be that the notion of ‘the feminine’ 
is a depersonalized androcentric abstraction, which functions as a defense 
against the actual presence of embodied women? In order to promote 
understanding of women’s spirituality, an androcentric divine must be challenged, 
and unexamined presuppositions must yield to inquiry. I do not aim to replace 
androcentric projections and attributions of a gendered God with equivalent 
feminine notions, which would merely be another side of the existing dualism. I 
will argue that we need to move beyond the notion of equivalence of masculine 
and feminine attributes of the divine in theology.  In speaking of a feminine 
divine, I do not mean to anthropomorphize God in feminine terms of nurturance, 
for instance, but rather to reveal what can be known of the divine from the point 
of view of the feminine and women. All else is idolatry - the image, or ideal, 
                                            
4 Using the terms true and false self, Donald Winnicott argued that in order to pose a true 
question, we must be situated in the true self. Answers are too easily provided by the false 
(enculturated) self (Winnicott, 1965). An example of the importance of posing the question is 
provided by the Grail myth, where the knight Perceval only has to pose the question, “Who does 
the Grail serve?” (E. Jung & von Franz, 1998). He is not required to provide the answer.  The 
question, however, eludes him.  As I argue in this thesis, women have been offered a false self 
via the masculine/Symbolic, so it is imperative that the (correct) question be asked. “Deliverance 
as the result of the right kind of question is itself a universal, i.e. an archetypal, motif” (E. Jung & 
von Franz, 1998, p. 44). Emma Jung and von Franz equate posing the question to bringing 
something that has been unconscious into consciousness. The situation of ‘the feminine’ and 
women is that which I seek to bring to consciousness.  
5 “Irigaray defines patriarchy as a historical and masculine system devoid of value in the 
feminine” (Martin, 2000, p. 53). It is a system in which certain males are privileged to exploit or 
objectify women, children, and some other males.  
 15 
becomes more important than that which it represents.6  Emancipatory speech 
about God and about self are intertwined; while women’s experience has been 
absent or derided within androcentric theological systems, the lived experience of 
women is essential to their specific, non-stereotypical feminine theology.7  For 
Luce Irigaray, “the ‘divine’ raises the vital question of the continuity between 
nature and culture, the body and spirit, whereas ‘religion’ raises the question of a 
link without necessarily challenging their dichotomous status” (Irigaray, 1996, p. 
223).8 This continuity between nature and culture, between body and spirit, is 
fundamental to my argument. According to Morny Joy, “epistemology has been 
found wanting in its avoidance of the interrelatedness of mind and body, of 
reason and emotion, of abstract and concrete (Joy, 2011b, p. 7). My project 
involves interweaving and interrelating these dichotomous pairs. 
 
My discussion of feminine spirituality includes the difference between male and 
female desire and the relation of this desire to theistic beliefs; how desire and 
knowledge are woven together is about what a woman is. How do we discover a 
woman’s desire?9 For Irigaray, desire and pleasure are “cultivated by and for 
each sex with the intention of accomplishing the perfection of its gender” 
(Irigaray, 1996, p. 28). This perfecting involves “the responsibility to work at each 
instant for our own evolution, transformation, transfiguration or 
                                            
6 Luce Irigaray describes idolatry as  “a paralysis of energy. And, the more the stasis of energy 
takes place at a spiritual level, the more difficult it will be to release it. …no energy remains truly 
free to openly exchange with the other, in search of a future even more spiritual than that in which 
each one believes” (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 356). 
7 According to Patricia Lynn Reilly, “our search for a God who looks like us begins in our own 
lives.  She will be found there” (Reilly, 1995, p. 3). 
8 Luce Irigaray expressly requests that her full name be used in citations, and I have adhered to 
this request throughout. Her purpose is to state her sexuate status as a woman, and thus not be 
subsumed within a neuter position. The importance of this will become clear when I discuss her 
ideas on sexuate difference later in this chapter. 
9 Derrida points out that logocentrism privileges reason while excluding desire.  “Pure theoretical 
reason”, he says, “assumes the exclusion of all that is not theoretical knowledge: the affect” 
(Derrida, 2002, p. 412).  Morny Joy’s critique of Levinas is that he situates women’s desire, 
assigns women their position, rather than allowing them the right to question or to choose their 
‘feminine’ role, to have their own desire (Joy, 2006, p. 67). Pamela Sue Anderson argues that 
“desire will have a different relation to men from that which it has to women [and] what makes 
women’s desire sexually specific [sexual difference] has been repressed” (P. S. Anderson, 1998, 
p. 24). 
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transubstantiation” (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 3).  I demonstrate feminine transformation 
in my interpretation of the fairy tale in chapters five and six. 
 
I will argue for feminine spiritual experience and a feminine divine not tied to the 
logic of belief, or the worship of the father.  A woman’s experience and 
knowledge must be respected, as Luce Irigaray insists, as it is how she relates to 
different sexuate others, including her own children: “The corporeal and spiritual 
experience of a woman is singular, and what she can teach of it to her daughter 
and to her son is not the same” (Irigaray, 2002, p. 60), thus emphasizing that a 
woman responds to her male and female children according to their 
sexuateness.  I will elaborate sexuate difference later in this introduction, but 
briefly it is a term of Luce Irigaray’s that clarifies the difference between men and 
women, which is evident in all aspects of their respective lives. As much as Luce 
Irigaray’s ideas, especially on sexuate difference, have attracted critique,10 I 
employ them here because in my view such vitally creative ideas are still valid in 
this exciting time of transition and exploration of feminism. 
 
I recognize the maleness of prevailing knowledge,11 but also argue for other 
knowledge that will be an amplification of the feminine.12  And, as Jean Byrne 
says, “for women to be epistemological subjects the hidden male subject of 
epistemology must be revealed” (Byrne, 2008, p. 68). A feminine epistemology is 
thus partly achieved through a critique of masculine epistemologies, and the 
underlying unconscious assumptions, for which both psychoanalytic and analytic 
psychological approaches prove useful; that is, by making these epistemologies 
                                            
10 Pamela Sue Anderson’s recent publication, Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion: 
Reason, Love and Epistemic Locatedness, (P. S. Anderson, 2012) gives a contemporary account 
of this critique. 
11 As Elizabeth Grosz says, “the masculinity or maleness of knowledge remains unrecognized as 
such because there is no other knowledge with which it can be contrasted” (Grosz, 1995, p. 38). 
12 When used in a Jungian context, especially in relation to interpretation of dreams, amplification 
means not only to intensify and provide further explanation, but also to think laterally about, and 
discover hitherto unthought, probably unconscious, associations. Jung says: “The amplificatio is 
always appropriate when dealing with some obscure experience which is so vaguely adumbrated 
that it must be enlarged and expanded by being set in a psychological context” (1977, Volume 12, 
§403).  I intend that my amplification will bring to light previously unthought associations 
regarding the feminine. 
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a subject of analysis.13 Most important, in my view, is the establishing of distinctly 
feminine epistemologies, by women and for women, which avoid comparisons 
with masculine styles. Further, according to Grosz, “knowledge is an activity; it is 
a practice“ (Grosz, 1995, p. 37), that is, it is experiential,14 and not merely a 
contemplative or speculative reflection. My approach is twofold:  The first is 
committed to the introduction, analysis, and affirmation of ‘women’ and ‘the 
feminine’ - and the distinction between them - as viable subjects of knowledge, 
and the second is to parler femme, to speak as a woman.  
 
I argue for a feminist epistemological emphasis which focuses on fair and equal 
access of women to, and their participation in, the institutions and processes 
through which knowledge is generated and transmitted.  However, I also 
investigate the possibility that there are specific ways in which only women can 
acquire knowledge, menstruation and giving birth being the most obvious 
examples, which would thus promote a feminine perspective.  Thus I tend 
towards epistemologies that differ from masculine forms of inquiry, or are specific 
to the feminine, female and women.  For Irigaray, feminine epistemology must be 
grounded in the body and experience, because this will firmly anchor a woman in 
her sexuate difference. 
 
From the perspective of analytical psychology, being clear about my own 
perspective before approaching the other is in agreement with Luce Irigaray’s 
ideas around the ethical approach to the other.15 She asks us – she is speaking 
to women - to “discover a relation of intimacy with ourselves that can be called 
                                            
13 The term psychoanalysis is applied when discussing the work of Freud, and the many who 
follow him including Lacan, Kristeva and Luce Irigaray (for a time).  The approach of Jung and the 
post-Jungians is referred to as analytical psychology.  
14 Simone de Beauvoir, for instance, recognized the influence of knowledge in her body. For her, 
knowledge is passion.   In chapter three we encounter parler femme, and in my view one ‘comes’ 
to knowledge as one ‘comes’ to writing, as jouissance. De Beauvoir said “if a theory convinced 
me, it did not remain external to me; it changed my relation to the world, and coloured my 
experience. … philosophy was for me a living reality” (de Beauvoir, 1981). I develop this thought 
throughout this work. She also said, in 1948, “In truth there is no divorce between philosophy and 
life” (de Beauvoir, 1963a, p. 12). She believed that philosophy should be filled with passion. 
15 For Luce Irigaray’s discussion of the ethical approach to the other see: (Luce Irigaray, 1993a, 
1996, 2001a, 2003, 2004c, 2008b). 
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self-affection” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 6). This self-affection, “then, refers to an ability 
to remain within oneself, as in a home before any other sort of dwelling. Self-
affection alludes to a state of gathering with oneself and of meditative quietness” 
(Irigaray, 2010a, p. 6).  This capability for peacefully staying within and returning 
to oneself “allows us to meet with the other as other without losing ourselves nor 
annihilating the otherness of the other” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 6). As a woman 
scholar, I appeal to a reliance on self-affection, which engenders respect for the 
self and the other, and entails not losing one’s-self in the other - including the 
epistemologies of the male other, or even female other.  As I will discuss in 
chapter three, women’s “house of being” might not be language as Martin 
Heidegger proposed, but the ability to “remain within oneself, as in a home 
before any other sort of dwelling,” into which Luce Irigaray invites us, above 
(Irigaray, 2010a, p. 6).    The notion of self-affection as applied to scholarship is a 
unique extension of Luce Irigaray’s concept, and contributes to an understanding 
of feminine subjectivity. 
 
I speak to and among women, but I cannot speak for women, as to imagine that 
all women are going to think the same is a collective fantasy.  My project is to 
articulate a singular female subjectivity. Christine Downing holds a similar 
position (Downing, 1992, p. 19), and claims we cannot “essay anything so 
definitive as a psychology of women, but that we must renounce the very project 
of reducing the plurality of voices to one” (Downing, 1992, p. 21).  However, by 
speaking in my own voice, as a singular subject, I also contribute to the many. 
Kristeva demonstrates a similar position, when she notes that for the feminine 
subject, the focus needs to be on singularity, the particular woman, rather than 
on collectivity, because women are emerging from a collectivity imposed by the 
masculine symbolic (A.-M. Smith, 1998, pp. 86-89).16 Speaking in the singular, 
                                            
16 The terms symbol and symbolic are given a different gloss by the different thinkers to which I 
allude. In Jung's view, for instance, a sign stands for something known, as a word stands for its 
referent. Insignia on uniforms, for instance, are not symbols but signs that identify the wearer. He 
contrasted this with symbol, which he used to stand for something that is unknown and that 
cannot be made clear or precise. “Every psychological expression is a symbol if we assume that 
it states or signifies something more and other than itself which eludes our present 
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“I”, is a most important step towards separating from the collective, and the even 
more insidious ‘other of the same’; Irigaray is concerned with the possibility of 
“’woman-for-herself’ instead of woman simply as ‘other of the same’” (Whitford, 
1991c, p. 159) that is, forever linked to the masculine subject.  I find in Luce 
Irigaray a voice that articulates women’s subjectivity par excellence. 
Luce Irigaray 
The two main theorists with whom I engage in this thesis are Luce Irigaray and 
Carl Gustav Jung.  My primary interlocutor is Luce Irigaray, (born 1932), and 
although she is undoubtedly a contentious theorist for both philosophers and 
feminists today, (for instance Michèle Le Doeuff (2007), Pamela Sue Anderson 
(2007, 2012), Patrice Haynes (2008), and many others), she nevertheless 
provides very useful concepts upon which I frame my argument.  She writes as a 
philosopher, psychoanalyst and linguist and articulates women’s subjectivity, 
sexuate identity and spirituality within the symbolic and the imaginary, as well as 
the living reality of the flesh.17 She incorporates the feminine body through her 
emphasis on the breath and her own practice of yoga; that is, she does not 
artificially separate philosophy and personal experience. For Irigaray, knowledge 
then becomes subjective, embodied and physical.  Thus when she proposes a 
sensible/transcendental,18 I believe that she is giving voice to something she 
knows from her own life to be true and possible. She passes on, through female 
genealogy, strategies for feminine becoming and cultivation. This strategy is 
practical and subjective, differentiating her from the objective approach of 
                                            
knowledge”(Volume 6, C. G. Jung, 1977, §817). An example of a symbol in this sense is Christ as 
a symbol of the archetype called Self. To think symbolically, is, for Jung, a capacity that we 
develop, and is not aligned with logic or rationality. For him, a symbolic process reveals an 
invisible and hard to discern but all important and life-giving tendency in the psyche that is intent 
on creating meaning. For Lacan, who systematically developed Freud’s ideas, the Symbolic is a 
set of differentiated signifiers, including language itself; it is the Real that is unsymbolized, and 
always present, much in the way that Jung thought of symbols and the symbolic. “Lacan's phrase 
‘symbolic order’, refers to the customs, institutions, laws, mores, norms, practices, rituals, rules, 
traditions, and so on of cultures and societies (with these things being entwined in various ways 
with language)” (A. Johnston, 2013).  
17 Luce Irigaray uses the term symbolic to emphasize representation, and the imaginary for 
unrepresented processes. 
18 The sensible/transcendental is as available to men as women, each according to their own 
sexuate rhythms. Thus it is both universal, and particular. The sensible aspect is indistinguishable 
from the flesh.  The transcendental aspect is not opposed to the sensible, but contiguous with it.  
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academia. Luce Irigaray facilitates annual seminars where she mentors doctoral 
students who use her theories.19 These seminars are an exceptional example of 
this dialogue, a transmission of embodied knowledge.20  What Irigaray does, in 
my view, is to initiate and promote “a new mode of knowledge transmission 
which emphasizes both embodiment and experience” (Byrne, 2008, p. 173). 
Sharing knowledge in this way is a “sharing of flesh, of blood, of breath – of life”, 
and in this sharing “the sensible, matter is always already spiritualized” 
(Pluhacek, 2002, p. 54). 
 
This leads me to another most important aspect of her work, namely her regard 
for spiritual life, and women’s relation to the divine as fundamental in articulating 
female subjectivity and corollary to this, sexuate difference - difference is still 
important in a liberated era, and contributes to further liberation.  She regards a 
female divine as necessary for women to go beyond the patriarchal culture that 
excludes them.  Luce Irigaray is careful to define her style of thinking, especially 
in relation to the divine, and with this I concur: “all thinking that misunderstands 
its natural roots and resources is not true thinking but rather a threat to life,” 
rather thinking is valuable providing it “respects nature, and micro and 
macrocosm” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 86).21 I take up many threads of Luce Irigaray’s 
thought, the most important being sexuate difference, the 
sensible/transcendental, cultivation of the breath and application of the modes of 
                                            
19 I was privileged to be included in the 2010 seminar at Nottingham University. 
20 Luce Irigaray’s mode of communication and community follows a long tradition in both East and 
West.  Andrew Cohen puts it this way: “There is something so incredibly life-affirming about the 
kind of joy and fellowship that emerges when many human beings, inspired by spiritual values 
and a higher sense of purpose, come together. The Buddha, when asked if association with like-
minded people was a part of the holy life, is reported to have declared: "Association with like-
minded people is not a part of the holy life, it is the whole of the holy life… The spiritually 
enlivened and awakened life—if it's to have any real impact on the world—is about creating and 
sharing higher values with other human beings… The potential of a new, more enlightened world 
emerges here and now” (Cohen, 2012).  I believe that Luce Irigaray provides a model for the 
“spiritually enlivened and awakened life” for women in the arena of philosophy through her 
seminars. 
21Luce Irigaray is here making a distinction between a notion of the sublime as aesthetic pleasure 
in a masculinised form, which is marked by the male gaze, and a feminine one, which includes 
and respects nature. “Debates over the nature and concept of sublimity gave rise to feminist 
debates over whether one can discern in the history of literature an alternate tradition of sublimity 
that counts as a ‘female sublime’“ (Korsmeyer, 2008). 
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self-affection, virginity, solitude and silence, which I develop through all chapters. 
While I mostly agree with her propositions, I have some argument with the extent 
to which she applies sexuate difference; I believe she takes it so far as to create 
a conceptual rigidity, which leaves very little room for development, and I express 
this concern throughout. 
 
Luce Irigaray utilizes a language of matter, via the elements, which enables her 
to create a continuum between the material and the philosophical.  Thus, as 
Mary Beth Mader says, “it doesn’t make any sense to hold that thinking has no 
material antecedents; ‘matter’ nourishes the thinking body; therefore, matter 
nourishes thinking” (Mader, 2002, p. 33).  There is no dissociation, for Irigaray, 
between the body and thought, which is in accord with my own understanding 
that each holds and fertilizes the other, and a body sexed as female will then 
hold thought differently. A number of male philosophers, among them Edmund 
Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, also take the body and intersubjectivity to 
be fundamental, but I place the additional emphasis on female body, and female 
experience. 
 
Luce Irigaray can be read on many levels and through many perspectives. In 
different texts, (or even the same texts) I read Luce Irigaray as a philosopher, a 
psychoanalyst, a radical theologian, a social and cultural commentator, 
innovator, poet and more.22 Although I engage with various thinkers critical of 
Luce Irigaray, I am primarily focussed on her ideas, because of their range and 
fluidity. Her ideas also provide a modern counterpoint to Jung.  Likewise, Jung 
has a broad range of scholarship, which, although not privileged in the academy, 
provides much thought-provoking material, which I now outline. 
                                            
22 Although Luce Irigaray does not claim to be a theologian, she nevertheless “expects the 
divine”, as she said in her response to Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s In Memory of Her 
(Schüssler Fiorenza, 1995) in Equal to Whom? (Schor & Weed, 1994a, p. 63) In Alison Martin’s 
opinion, she “does not argue as a theologian but as a philosopher, though one prepared to 
advance her own emotional investment in the divine rather than merely subject it to the objectivist 
critiques of philosophy” (Martin, 2000, p. 3).  I read Irigaray as a radical theologian because she 
reviews received concepts, such as doctrines of the Catholic Church and interprets them in a new 
way. 
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C. G. Jung 
My other soloist is Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). My reference to his theories 
throughout this work requires some explanation. His huge body of work 
represented radical thinking at the time, in diverse fields, and he provided an 
alterative voice which went against the general current, and I believe that this 
voice is still worthy of consideration.23  As with Luce Irigaray, I do not attempt to 
take up an extensive critique of Jung’s work, but choose to stay with the essential 
elements of his thought.24 I here enumerate the aspects that I will refer to 
throughout this work.  
 
Jung’s theory of the psychological types allows for both analytic and synthetic 
thinking styles - for imagination, feeling, logic and the sensate; he does not 
privilege logos. Indeed, he criticizes logocentrism, claiming that we have made a 
god of logos. Unlike Freud, Jung claims the unconscious as creative and 
numinous, and not merely a receptacle of the repressed.  He defines libido as 
life-energy, rather than the purely sexual force of Freud.  He persistently criticizes 
Christian teaching for ignoring the gender plurality of the divine, and he insists on 
including the feminine.  Jung claims that the divine feminine is not transcendent 
to the world, thus anticipating Luce Irigaray’s feminine divine, to the extent that 
he figured it as a structure in or of consciousness, and not necessarily goddess. 
Jung’s investigation into mediaeval alchemy, including the Latin terminology that 
he utilizes, provides a means of undoing binary forms through the process he 
termed individuation, and which I equate to Luce Irigaray’s ‘becoming’; both Jung 
and Irigaray argue for the individual extricating themselves from 
collective/Symbolic values and emphasize instead the responsibility of the 
individual. In Irigaray’s words, each individual has “the responsibility to work at 
each instant for our own evolution, transformation, transfiguration or 
                                            
23 In my work as a depth-psychologist, Jung’s thinking removed me from a reliance on Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theories, which structure women pejoratively.  
24 Jung’s writing is indeed dense, voluminous, enigmatic, contradictory, multifaceted, and open to 
many varied analyses and interpretations; I do not claim that these views cited are his only or 
consistent views. I have (mostly) resisted the temptation to rely on secondary interpretation of 
Jung, and have adhered to his original writings.  
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transubstantiation” (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 355).  Jung also offered, as a codicil to his 
theories, that “nothing offers the assurance that they may ultimately prove 
correct” (1977, vol. 13, § 551), indicating an openness to development and 
change, which l define in this work as necessary to the feminine position.   Luce 
Irigaray confirms this when she says “no theory or practice is ever complete” 
(Irigaray, 2002, p. 22), in fact it must not be, if it is to remain alive.  Both Luce 
Irigaray and Jung provide me with the means to pursue a specific methodology. 
 
One of my key discussions is the necessity for separate spiritual paths for men 
and women. Jung is unique because he insists upon sexual difference and 
proposes a separate subjectivity and spirituality for men and women, from within 
masculine theory.25 In some of his most enigmatic writing he provides remarkable 
insights into this necessity. In the fifth sermon of Seven Sermons to the Dead,26 
he described differentiation as an act of creation.27 He deemed necessary a 
differentiation between the sexes, specifically in regard to spirituality and 
sexuality.  He claimed that man and woman must “separate their spiritual paths, 
for the nature of created beings is always of the nature of differentiation” (1916). 
He goes on to say that the “sexuality of man goes to that which is earthly; the 
sexuality of woman goes to that which is spiritual”. According to him, man and 
woman become diabolical to each other if they do not differentiate between their 
two forms of sexuality. Jung continues by applying similar and associated 
definitions to spirituality, namely that the “spirituality of man is more heavenly … 
On the other hand, the spirituality of woman is more earthly”.  He described it as 
“deceitful and devilish” when these two become confused; “each is to go to its 
own place”. Jung’s florid language makes it quite clear that he believed in a 
                                            
25 While traditional philosophy and psychoanalysis fail to think sexual difference, Jung does - at 
least some of the time! 
26 Jung’s Seven Sermons to the Dead were originally published without date and location, but the 
earliest notes discovered are dated 1916.  
27Jung uses the alias “Basilides in Alexandria”, Alexandria being “the City where the East 
toucheth the West”, thus posing a similar fecundation of East/West as Luce Irigaray in Between 
East and West (Irigaray, 2003). Basilides was a historical figure, a writer of Gnostic texts from 
Alexandria in the Second Century AD. He classed himself as a Christian theologian.  Gnosticism 
was characterized by wisdom, Sophia, essentially a divine feminine. (C. G. Jung, 1916) 
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difference between men and women, which is necessary to their spirituality and 
sexuality, at the very least. This differentiation of sexual difference is fundamental 
to the work of Irigaray.  While it is clear that a man’s spirituality has been 
traditionally directed toward heaven and transcendence,28 it would be “devilish” 
or, in Irigaray’s terms a ‘sin’, for a woman’s to be so, because it constitutes a 
flight or dissociation from the body.29  I am not claiming that Jung and Irigaray 
have identical ideas about sexual difference, but the fact that Jung even 
considered sexuate difference is important; he does not privilege masculine or 
feminine modes.   
 
Jung’s discussion is interesting to me for several reasons: firstly, he makes clear 
differentiation between men and women, that is he specifies sexuate identity; 
secondly, he attributes different spiritual identities to men and women, 
notwithstanding other writing where he does not make this differentiation, or he 
does not make it clear; thirdly, he maintains that these laws of spirituality and 
sexuality are “manifestations of the Gods”, thus to posit a masculine and 
feminine divine is possible and even necessary as part of the process of 
differentiation; fourthly, that if separation between the paths of men and women 
is not made, they become “a devil to each other” that is, their becoming or 
individuation is confused or hampered; fifthly, to take the woman’s  case, her 
sexuality is spiritual and her spirituality is more earthly.30  It is this last point that I 
wish to elaborate particularly here. 
 
                                            
28 Barbara Newman likewise proposes that there is a radical difference between the theology of 
the masculine, and the theology of the feminine. “In a theology of the feminine, “male” and 
“female” are understood … as ontological categories that are first distinguished within the divine 
realm and only then embodied in the physical, psychological, and cultural polarity of male and 
female” (Newman, 1987, p. 266). This concurs with Luce Irigaray’s opinion that discovery of 
divinity precedes discovery of subjectivity. 
29 “Irigaray suggests that it is the fundamental duality of the dissociation between human and 
divine which is itself ‘sinful’, in the sense that it errs against the incarnation which she believes 
woman is proposing” (Martin, 2000, p. 178).  
30 This passage of Jung’s invites much further discussion, such as what then would constitute a 
man’s spiritual identity, (with due respect to Luce Irigaray, perhaps the transcendental/sensible?) 
but it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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What would constitute the spiritual sexuality and earthly spirituality for women, as 
directed by these concepts of Jung?  My aim is to avoid that which creates 
duality-schisms of any kind.  I also wish to avoid a subsuming of identity, 
sexuality or spirituality into that which is categorized either as essentialism or 
social construction.  I believe that Jung’s assessment avoids such categorization.  
Jung makes clear that female spirituality is a spirituality of her own, not to be 
confused with or subsumed into masculine parallels. I believe further clarification 
of Jung’s meaning is required, however; does “spiritual sexuality” mean 
‘spirituality experienced through sexuality’, or a ‘spiritualizing of sexuality’?  What 
does ‘earthly spirituality’ mean? Does it mean that the aspects usually thought of 
as transcendent are experienced rather as material or earthly? All of these 
possibilities hover around the terms ‘spiritual sexuality and earthly spirituality’, 
and thus Luce Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental.  It is however, the 
sexuality/spiritual convergence that interests me most here, in the experience of, 
and discovery of, a specific feminine divine.31  What form then, will my enquiry 
take, which will be most suited to the subject of the feminine, and the feminine 
subject? 
Methodology 
The style of philosophical inquiry which I adopt is one of sympathetic 
understanding and development of my subject, where resonance with, and 
amplification and consolidation, might lead to something suited to a feminine 
being, or, as Luce Irigaray would say, becoming.32  Rather than a linear 
argument, I prefer a method that is open and fluid, with answers that are implicitly 
                                            
31 I choose to read Jung as thought provoking on this point, rather than pejorative and merely 
reinforcing the feminine/earth and masculine/spirit trope. I prefer to set aside the possibility that 
his comments could be read as reflecting the social constructions of the early 20th century, rather 
than, as he claims, as differentiation between masculine and feminine attributes, firstly because 
Jung himself was ambiguous on these issues, and secondly because to take up Jung in this way 
provokes a fertile reading of him, and brings his scholarship into contemporary debate. 
32 Since the acquisition of knowledge, including “scientific knowledge, is always based on an 
imaginary understanding, and since the imaginary is always bodily and material, in [Luce 
Irigaray’s] view it is important to imagine the body and the imaginary in terms appropriate to the 
female.  She thus articulates the feminine in relation to the female body, which is always an 
imaginary reality in a pre-given form“ (Martin, 2000, p. 151). The notion of pre-given form 
anticipates my discussion of archetypes in chapter one.  
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provisional.33  I believe that going deeper is in accord with my project, and might 
well lead to an understanding of what philosophy and its ethics might look like 
when sexuate difference is established. I write, or hope to write, from a non-
oppositional stance,34 and in this I follow the style Luce Irigaray adopts in her 
later work, particularly The Way of Love and Sharing the World, (Irigaray, 2004c, 
2008b).  Any other style would misrepresent my subject and myself.  For my 
work, the adversarial approach is not acceptable. Janice Moulton critiques ‘the 
adversary method’, the style of philosophy which subjects views to the strongest 
possible counter-arguments (Moulton, 2003). She claims that the use of this 
method limits and distorts the range of philosophy, because it works best in well-
defined areas, and isolated arguments, thus narrowing the scope of philosophical 
concerns. Moulton argues that as a style among many, the adversary method is 
a useful strategy, but as a paradigm of philosophy it excludes too much. She is 
also skeptical of the ideals of ‘value-free’ reasoning and objectivity contained 
within the adversary method (Garry, 2011).  I utilize philosophical methods that 
are compatible with my enquiry into the feminine, where the rational intellect is 
not held apart from the experiencing body.35 I do not mean that I take an anti-
rationalist stance, but rather that which includes the sensuous and the mind, the 
sensible and the transcendental.36 I intend to apply a method of critique, which is 
respectful of difference, while simultaneously rigorous in approach. 
                                            
33 This style is evident in Eastern philosophical tradition, where linear argument is replaced by a 
circumambulation around the subject: each section adds to the whole. This is evident in The 
Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory (Yuasa, 1987), for instance. 
34 By non-oppositional I mean positioning my arguments for women and the feminine in their own 
right, rather than by comparing and contrasting with, masculine norms. Sexuate difference, which 
speaks for each sex individually, rather than woman as ‘other of the same’ is one way of 
achieving this. I do not mean to suggest that either Luce Irigaray or I do not, at times, use 
deductive reasoning. 
35 Such as those demonstrated by philosopher David Abram, in The Spell of the Sensuous: 
Perception and Language in a more-than-human world, (Abram, 1997) and “All Knowledge is 
Carnal Knowledge” (Abram & Jardine, 2000). Following a similar thread is David Jardine in 
“Birding lessons and the teachings of cicadas” (Jardine, 1998). 
36 Apart from insinuating yet another dichotomy, to abandon rationality would be to ignore the 
historic advances which rationality has made in attempts to modify a chaotic world. 
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One of the methods I use, in chapters three, five and six is that of narrative, 
specifically the narrative of myth and fairy-tale.37 These chapters consist in an 
epistemological style that engages the emotions and entices through a form of 
discourse that I have called ‘erotic logos.’ Narrative is important to philosophic 
writing because it introduces the subject-position, which I elaborate in these 
chapters.38 Outside of literary criticism and the psychological sciences, narrative 
as a basis of research has been underutilized, perhaps because methods of 
‘masculine’ acquisition of knowledge have been favoured over ‘feminine’ 
cognitive styles.39 Adriana Cavarero in Relating Narratives: Storytelling and 
Selfhood claims that the split between narration and philosophy, between 
logos/mythos is itself an affect of masculine phallocentrism.  She argues that “the 
tragedy of the ordinary scission between the … discursive order of philosophy 
and that of narration – is an entirely masculine tragedy” (Cavarero, 2000, p. 53).  
 
Another method I employ is to cross-fertilize fields of study, and to compare and 
contrast their epistemologies, for example, that of philosophy and 
psychoanalysis/analytical psychology. For me, cross-fertilization has been a life-
long approach, which has led to a study of psychoanalysis, as well as analytic 
psychology, for instance. In my practice as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist this 
has been invaluable. Additional philosophical and feminist studies have brought a 
fresh approach to my understanding of the psychologies, and continually 
                                            
37 Narratives as inquiry into life’s dilemmas arguably precede philosophical formations; each 
provides a distinctive way of ordering experience. Paul Ricoeur’s lengthy investigation (Ricoeur, 
1984-1988), and C. G. Jung’s analysis of myth in order to understand the human soul, are 
notable examples.  
38 Martha Nussbaum likewise argues for the inclusion of emotionally engaging “good” literature in 
developing narrative imagination, which informs ethics. She argues that “certain truths about 
human life can only be fittingly and accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of 
the narrative artist” (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 5). She links narrative with moral philosophy (Kallhoff, 
2001; Nussbaum, 2001) and I will argue that the specific narrative of fairy tale educates us in 
ethics.  
39 I hesitate to use ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ in this context, but they have been categorized thus 
by others. I prefer that we aim for a society in which we have ceased to categorize logic, 
conceptualization and rationality as ‘masculine’, but not one from which these virtues have been 
expelled altogether as ‘unfeminine’.  
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promote new questions and analysis.40 I do not adhere to any one school of 
thought, and gather concepts and ideas and put them together to shed new light 
and bring vitality to existing problems, especially in regard to the feminine and 
women. I am aware that this approach of cross-fertilization might well attract 
criticism, especially from those who are specialists in the various epistemologies 
I employ. However, I take this risk because I believe the various epistemologies 
constitute specialities that might well gain by taking note of each other rather 
than defending their own approach. I am therefore drawing upon each 
epistemology as a filter or lens rather than an absolute perspective.  
 
Another risk inherent in taking a broad approach is that terms and words have 
different meanings and applications in different epistemologies, an example 
being the different use of ‘symbol’ and ‘symbolic’ by, say, Jung and Lacan. I have 
anticipated this difficulty by applying footnotes and definitions to allay confusion. 
One of the problems for researchers who use a multi-disciplinary approach, is 
that it might be unclear which discipline they are referring to. For example, I 
believe the multi-disciplinary approach explains some of the confusion in relation 
to Luce Irigaray, when she uses a term such as withdrawal of projections, which 
is a term borrowed from psychoanalysis. A further criticism I anticipate is that my 
approach is not (sufficiently) ‘feminist’. Indeed, I believe that feminism runs the 
risk of becoming a dogma, or a credo and this I wish to question and challenge. 
My thesis can even be approached as a promotion of ‘the feminine’ and women, 
rather than of feminism per se. I believe that feminism in general runs the risk of 
employing masculinist psychology,41 which position I will challenge. Finally, one 
might ask if the approaches of analytic psychology and feminine spirituality are 
compatible with philosophy and feminism. While there might be some confusion 
of terms, which I attempt to clarify, drawing upon these differing epistemologies 
                                            
40 Iris Marion Young likewise does not align her “theorizing with one systematic school of 
thought”. Rather, she treats “the conceptual frameworks and ideas of others as tools for building 
an account or solving a problem” (I. M. Young, 1997, p. 5). 
41 Masculinist is a term I use to denote an anti-feminist position, as does Grace Jantzen in 
Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion (Jantzen, 1998) 
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serves a major purpose of avoiding a closed approach to knowledge, or 
knowledge as an absolute. 
 
Morny Joy (Joy, 2011a), specifically addresses the dual disciplines of 
comparative philosophy and comparative religion, and such inclusion reflects my 
own need to cross disciplines. I do not presume to privilege a Western approach, 
although this work has taken place within a firmly Western institution. My own 
polyvalent and pluralist approach demands I acknowledge non-Western religions, 
philosophies and traditions, which are relevant to my argument, for example the 
philosophy of Yasuo Yuasa and the Arabian tale of Scherezade. My belief is that 
“appropriation” is only to be interpreted pejoratively when seen from the 
perspective of a mono-truth, into which other things are incorporated, or to which 
others are beholden. A notion of plurality, in my view, avoids appropriation by 
according otherness and other traditions and perspectives their own sovereignty.  
 
My method is postmodern in that it does not privilege rationality, objectivity and 
the belief in stable self-identity.42  Instead I rely on multiple voices, a choir, a tutti.  
Made of fragments, a chimera perhaps, flexible, diverse, slippery and hard to 
catch, except in sideways glances, nothing too head-on, lest it melt from too 
much insistence that it reveal itself.  This position gives me the flexibility to 
critique the theorizing of women contained within masculinist philosophy, whether 
implicit or explicit.43 However, I also claim, in contrast with postmodernist 
deconstruction, that a sexed, stable subject is possible, at least for long enough 
to discuss what new paradigms of the feminine might be.44  
                                            
42 While ‘postmodern’ might be essentially undefinable, its methods are used to destabilize 
concepts such as presence, identity, certainty, progress and univocity of meaning (Aylesworth, 
2012).  
43 For example, when I discuss Heidegger’s ‘handedness’ of thinking in chapters five and six, an 
understanding of the sexuate difference of corporeality enables me to argue for the sexuate 
difference of thinking: Heidegger himself takes a sex-neutral position. 
44 Luce Irigaray puts it like this: “Does not deconstruction, including through its recourse to 
innumerable linguistic ruses, remain trapped in a secular manner of know-how, and does it not 
imprison there reason itself, to the point of leading it to a nihilistic madness as the ultimate 
Promethean gesture? Would it also be too mental, too exclusively mental, wanting to ignore that 
the sensible-intelligible and corporeal-spiritual dichotomies are one of the reasons for the 
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Because my subject is ‘the feminine’, I inevitably draw on feminist scholarship of 
many kinds.  However, Luce Irigaray decries the term ‘feminist’, because this 
does not truly represent her project - she does not wish to be subsumed by an 
‘ism’.45  I select from the many feminisms those that support the diversity and 
open-ended exploration that is essential to my project.46 I acknowledge the 
diversity of feminist approaches, and that “feminist philosophers are readily 
aware that contemporary feminists continue to disagree about their own self-
definition”, as stated by Pamela Sue Anderson. “Nevertheless, a common feature 
of every form of feminism is ultimately to remove the patriarchal structures which 
oppress women’s lives; eradicate the structures which devalue women’s acting, 
thinking, feeling and …writing their own ideas” (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 5). 
These specifics differentiate a feminist (or even feminine) text from a patriarchal 
one.47  My central focus is the concerns of women.  My methodology differs from 
patriarchal scholarship, or male-dominated research, and as such I believe it 
contributes to the development of feminist theory.48 Feminism is a major and 
continuing revolution; I will examine existing research, and develop my own 
contribution.  Like Mary Daly, I aim to contribute to  “an ontological, spiritual 
revolution, pointing beyond the idolatries of sexist society and sparking creative 
action in and towards transcendence.  The becoming of women implies universal 
becoming.  It has everything to do with the search for ultimate meaning and 
reality which some would call God” (Daly, 1973, p. 6). That the ongoing 
                                            
disturbing character of man and his world? And does not the technical cleverness of the 
deconstructor risk accelerating, without possible check or alternative, a process that appears 
henceforth almost inevitable?” (Irigaray, 2002, p. 5). Luisa Muraro, Irigaray’s Italian translator and 
a philosopher, says: “The deconstruction of received cultural forms is never one of Irigaray’s 
aims” (Burke, Schor, & Whitford, 1994, p. 323). 
45 Alison Martin proposes that Irigaray “be understood as a French thinker who supports a form of 
universalism - divine universalism” (Martin, 2000, p. 5). 
46 P.S.Anderson identifies the five streams of feminism as socialist, radical, liberal, difference and 
poststructuralist (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 8) 
47 Elizabeth Grosz argues for the notion of feminine knowledge in her chapter “Bodies and 
Knowledge”, (Grosz, 1995). 
48 Many advances for women have come about within patriarchal scholarship and male-
dominated research. I believe both female-centred and male-centred scholarship is relevant and 
to maintain otherwise would be to create the kind of duality-schism that I am trying to avoid.   
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revolution articulates a space for the divine, specifically a feminine divine, is 
intrinsic to my inquiry. 
 
Feminism, especially as characterized by Mary Daly, (Daly, 1973) has identified 
a feminine that is wounded by the male, because of the male or because of the 
patriarchy,49 and this can no doubt be construed as accurate, but it is an 
assessment that is dependent on the patriarchy. My intention is, where possible, 
to find ways of elucidating the feminine without recourse to comparisons with, or 
reactions to, the patriarchy and the masculine.  Michèle le Dœuff, for instance, 
claims that we can use philosophy to undo or rethink the very same “masculine-
feminine divisions that philosophy has helped to articulate and define” (Le Dœuff, 
1989, p. 101). Indeed, much of Luce Irigaray’s earlier work does this, especially 
through mimesis, or taking on androcentric forms and reframing them in a 
feminine voice.50  This informs my premise that transformation can and must 
occur from both within and without (language itself, philosophy as a practice, the 
institution, etc.)  My aim is to discover interiority and experience, in the feminine 
subject, which has not been subsumed within, or seen through, the masculine 
Symbolic.  
 
Although this work is cross disciplinary, in the areas of philosophy, feminist 
philosophy of religion,51 women’s studies, theology, psychoanalysis and analytical 
                                            
49 As Carol Christ says, “we seek to heal the wounds of patriarchy” 
http://www.goddessariadne.org/carolwords.htm 
50 Luce Irigaray takes on Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Irigaray, 1993a), and, through mimesis 
resubmits women to stereotypical views of women held by men, in order to call the views 
themselves into question. In mimesis she uses the methodology of psychoanalysis, where 
negative views can only be overcome when they are exposed.  I cite a specific instance of 
Irigaray’s use of mimesis in chapter one.  
51 Some thinkers, such as Morny Joy, question whether “philosophy of religion, as it has 
functioned within a normative and solely rational perspective, is no longer appropriate or even 
viable” (Joy, 2011b, p. 3).  She argues that Continental philosophy (since Kant) has not 
categorized philosophy of religion as a separate discipline, but “rather boundaries between 
disciplines and their ideas are much more fluid” (ibid., p. 2). But “in the English-speaking domain, 
philosophy of religion is principally identified with analytic philosophy, where the universal 
presumptions of an abstract reason” (ibid., p. 1).  Based on this evaluation, my references to 
philosophy of religion tend more to the Continental and ‘feminist’ styles, rather than analytic 
philosophy and abstract reason.  
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psychology, these disciplines both inform and critique each other.  Inevitably, 
because of my background in several of these fields I apply them in a somewhat 
idiosyncratic way. For instance, psychoanalysis and analytical psychology 
challenge philosophy through promoting the unconscious and its effects on the 
subjectivity and experience of an individual.52 This has influenced my discussion 
on the nature of experience in chapter one. Likewise psychoanalysis and 
analytical psychology must submit themselves to a postmodern deconstruction in 
order to understand the unchallenged presuppositions inherent in their structures.  
This is evident in my discussion of ‘the feminine,’ especially in regard to Jung’s 
notions.  The intersection of psychoanalysis with philosophy is a particularly 
fruitful one, and a good reason why each discipline would do well to know 
something of the other; Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray - all of 
them both philosophers and psychoanalysts - have explored this interface.  
 
I assume that my cross-disciplinary perspective can achieve an integration, which 
will open a discourse that avoids exclusion and duality. I argue that a dialogue 
between these fields is needed in order to continue to dynamically re-think and 
re-situate ‘women’ and ‘the feminine.’ I hold that it is possible to claim a female 
subject, without reaffirming essentialism on one hand, or claiming allegiance to 
social construction on the other.  I will take a middle position, and in this I follow 
Kristeva and Irigaray who undermine the distinction between biological 
essentialism and social construction.53 
 
                                            
52 Luce Irigaray says, of the unconscious of philosophy, that “we need to pay attention to the way 
the unconscious works in each philosophy, and perhaps in philosophy in general. We need to 
listen (psycho)analytically to its procedures of repression, to the structuration of language that 
shores up its representations, separating the true from the false, the meaningful from the 
meaningless, and so forth” (1985, p. 75). 
53 The essentialist/social constructionist debate is one that I acknowledge as an important 
discussion of the last few decades.  Luce Irigaray’s work has been received by some as 
essentialist, which position she categorically rejects.  Labelling a thinker as essentialist is 
tantamount to dismissing their work. I believe the debate has taken on such force as to constitute 
a new duality.  
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I need to address the question of duality, and put borders around my use of it. 
‘Dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought, but I am using the term to 
mean a situation where there are two fundamental paired opposites, such as 
Good and Evil in theology (Robinson, 2012, p. 101).  Each of these two requires 
the other - or the repudiation of the other, to define itself. Therefore in a dualistic 
system, men and women are seen as these opposites, which both define and 
repudiate each other.  This is the situation that I am attempting to avoid and 
replace, and Luce Irigaray’s sexuate difference provides one way for me to 
explore this, somewhat provisionally, and I address this provisionality in my 
Conclusion.  The fundamental question is whether I can discuss ‘men’ and 
‘women’ without relying upon, or repudiating, the other. Especially when I speak 
of woman I aim to speak of her as herself, not as adjunct to man, which has a 
long history in Western theology and philosophy.  How can I think of woman 
alone, without having as background her creation out of Adam’s rib, so to speak, 
and therefore the presumption that she occupies a secondary position? This 
question has many precedents, including Lucrezia Marinella who was a Venetian 
author of the sixteenth century, who published philosophical polemics 
(Deslauriers, 2012). Her work The Nobility and Excellence of Women, published 
in 1600, was one of the first treatises written by a woman as part of an ongoing 
debate about the nature and worth of women. She rejected the idea of the 
inferiority of women, and argued vehemently for their superiority.  This is not my 
project, but she does initiate the debate of sexuate difference, by claiming the 
evidence from bodies that the sexes have different natures, thus the sexuate 
argument has an antecedent of at least 400 years. In chapter four I refer to the 
work of Jean Byrne on non-dual thinking as a feature of mystical experience. 
Does my work rely upon philosophy of religion, or is it theological?54 In order to 
attend to a recurring theme in this work, namely Luce Irigaray’s 
                                            
54 Philosophy of religion examines the central themes and concepts involved in religious 
traditions, using metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics and value theory, the philosophy of 
language, philosophy of science, law, sociology, politics, history, and so on. It also includes an 
investigation into the religious significance of historical events, the laws of nature, the emergence 
of conscious life, widespread testimony of religious significance, and so on. It is fundamentally 
belief-neutral (Taliaferro, 2011). Theology is a study of the question of God and the relation of 
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sensible/transcendental, I will intentionally move fluidly between these 
disciplines.  I prefer to use the term ‘spiritual’ rather than ‘religious’, when 
investigating feminine spiritual experience, because the former allows for 
experience outside an established religious framework, while the latter relies 
upon it. Speaking of her own spirituality, Irigaray emphasizes that her spiritual 
progress and becoming is informed by the “idea that I was born a woman but 
must become the spirit or soul of this body I am” (Irigaray, 2007b, p. 116).  The 
borders between the spiritual and psychological are blurred for Luce Irigaray. 
When I do use a theological approach, I do not intend to align myself with a 
patriarchal theological position, but rather aim to articulate that which would 
reflect the specific subjectivity of women, and direct her towards a feminine 
divine. When I use various terms, such as transcendence, I will do so in order to 
explore and develop this in feminine terms, in contradistinction to the existing 
masculine ones. Indeed, I introduce my own term, embodied transcendence as a 
working definition of women’s spiritual experience.  How will I elaborate my 
methodological and theoretical approach to make clear the ontologies I utilise?55  
 
First, I will argue for a return to a pre-linguistic, pre-gendered position, through 
which a new identity both outside and within the symbolic might be forged. This 
pre-linguistic position has been termed the ‘Father of pre-history’ (Freud), or the 
                                            
God to the world of reality. It is a branch of philosophy, i.e., a special field of philosophical inquiry 
having to do with God. However, the term is widely employed to mean the theoretical expression 
of a particular religion. Theology need not have any necessary reference to religion; it may be a 
purely theoretical discussion about God and God's relation to the world on a disinterested plane 
of free inquiry. 
55 I agree with Jung who said, “philosophical criticism has helped me to see that every psychology 
- my own included - has the character of a subjective confession… I know well enough that every 
word I utter carries with it something of myself - of my special and unique self with its particular 
history and its own particular world.  Even when I deal with empirical data I am necessarily 
speaking about myself  … I try to free myself from all unconscious and therefore uncriticised 
assumptions about the world in general” (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 4, § 774). Descartes’s 
methodological text also reminds us “that we must - at least once in our lifetimes - question all our 
convictions.  The point is not to become involved in criticizing others; rather, the aim is to question 
one’s own preconceptions, to take responsibility for one’s own beliefs and convictions through 
self-criticism” (Heinämaa, 2003, p. 5).  I would however, describe this process as self-analysis 
rather than self-criticism. Having read Simone de Beauvoir’s extensive autobiographies, it is clear 
to me that The Second Sex is the result of her own examination of uncriticised assumptions about 
the world, the place of women, and her own complicity. 
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‘semiotic’ (Kristeva). I will utilize this approach as a means to posit a feminine 
identity, which can be founded prior to the phallogocentric Symbolic. However, 
both men and women have access to a pre-gendered, pre-symbolic semiotic, 
and so equally have the possibility of accessing this position outside the 
symbolic.  Because the masculine/symbolic is the site of women’s dereliction, I 
investigate how the semiotic position might be seen to trace a nativity for women. 
 
Second, I will argue against the notion of sameness; that there has been to date 
a pretence that only one gender exists, the masculine, by which women’s 
subjectivity - ‘this sex which is not one’ - has been eclipsed.56 This is the 
mainstay of Luce Irigaray’s critique.   Another version of the idea of sameness is 
that only among women can women have either parity or true intimacy.57  On 
each count, I will argue for the otherness of both the other who is sexed 
differently, following Luce Irigaray, and the one who is sexed the same, 
somewhat departing from Luce Irigaray. I also specify that to redefine one gender 
necessarily redefines the other.  
 
Third, I will argue against the idea of complementarity, where one gender seeks 
the other gender for healing, completeness and wholeness.  I will repeatedly 
disassemble this idea in my discussion of the development of distinct and whole 
subjectivity of not only both sexes, but also each person. 
 
Fourth, I will argue against the idea of hierarchical difference, which depends 
upon a dualistic trope of inferior/superior along sexual lines. This in turn relies on 
a predilection for antithetical thinking.  In contrast I argue for parity between the 
sexes, and this theme is continuous throughout all chapters. My project is to 
                                            
56 This Sex Which Is Not One is the title of Luce Irigaray’s book (Luce Irigaray, 1985) 
57 “Any single explanation for “woman's” status is simply another instantiation of so-called 
“phallogocentric” thought: that is, the kind of “male thinking” that insists on telling as absolute truth 
one and only one story about reality. Women must, in the estimation of postmodern and third-
wave feminists, reveal their differences to each other so that they can better resist the patriarchal 
tendency to centre and congeal thought into a rigid truth that always was, is, and forever will be. 
To become themselves, women must embrace conflict, even self-contradiction; they do not have 
to follow any script, including a self-imposed one, throughout their lives” (Tong & Williams, 2011). 
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discover a voice beyond dualism.  Dualism has been convenient to the notions of 
Christianity where a presumed split (between carnality and spirituality, human 
and divine, for instance) is reconciled, through redemption.58  I discuss 
Christianity because it specifies our cultural particularity of a divine ideal, and 
refer only occasionally to other cultural divine ideals.59 Although I make use of 
Christian doctrines and dogmas, my project is not primarily theological.  
 
I affirm the project of sexuate difference, and in so doing acknowledge the failure 
of the past to provide a space and time for women as women, which has resulted 
in prevailing forms of knowledge representing only males.  Thus, my project is 
dedicated to other ways of knowing, other ontologies and epistemologies, which 
conceptualize a feminine subject’s relation to the world, beyond the phallic, 
beyond the patriarchal, and beyond the paradigm of hierarchies of the sexes as 
they have been - and still are - upheld.  Luce Irigaray explains that we need to 
recognize that “the other is forever irreducible to me or to mine because he or 
she is different from me. Different must not be understood, this time, as 
quantitative evaluation - the other is neither superior nor inferior to me - but as 
the fact that the other dwells in a different world from mine” (Irigaray, 2007a, pp. 
358, emphasis mine). Much of this thesis develops specific aspects of feminine 
sexuate difference, in language and spirituality for instance. 
 
Fifth, I argue for diversity, which acknowledges the difference between men and 
women, without hierarchical evaluation and also accords more attention to the 
differences within sexes.  Diversity “celebrates plurality, variety, polyphony” 
                                            
58“Irigaray’s method is to reverse and reclaim many Christian concepts rather than merely reject 
them.  Thus, along with Nietzsche she rejects the Christian notions of sin and redemption if they 
assume a duality of worlds in which salvation from the inherent errors of this world is promised in 
the form of redemption in the beyond” (Martin, 2000, p. 177). Instead, Irigaray’s project depends 
upon a transcendental that is contiguous with the sensible, which in turn is available in the here 
and now. Like Irigaray and Jung, I prefer to reconsider Christian concepts, rather than reject them 
as being so androcentric as to prejudice feminist concerns. However, I too “reverse and reclaim” 
the Christian concepts to which I refer. 
59 Julia Kristeva, in New Maladies of the Soul, writes: “We should read the Bible one more time.  
To interpret it, of course, but also to let it carve out a space for our own fantasies and interpretive 
delirium” (1995, p. 126). I believe that women need an “interpretive delirium” in order to re-vision 
subjectivity and divinity. To this end I apply religious tradition, myth and fairy tale. 
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(Downing, 1992, p. 38).  This fifth idea more clearly defines my overall project, 
and informs my argument at every turn. In general, I regard myself as a pluralist, 
because I place some emphasis on multiple categories, as I have already alluded 
to in these six different methodological paradigms that I employ in this work. My 
use of archetypes, for instance, supports polyphonic variation, because 
archetypes promote multiple possibilities, which do not cancel each other out, but 
rather coexist. I find the archetypes of a masculine and feminine divine 
specifically enable me to discuss different divinities without engaging a dualistic 
trope. Further, plurality refers not just to gender-difference but to theoretical 
approaches in general.  Thus, although I focus on the work of Luce Irigaray and 
Jung, I contrast and support their ideas with the work of other theorists.60  
 
Sixth, I argue for the idea of a human continuum, at least in part.61 The continuum 
maintains that we share our humanity, before we distinguish ourselves as women 
and men.  Because I rely on female morphology, I will argue, following Luce 
Irigaray, that the thinking, feeling and experiences, which arise from this 
gendered morphology are distinctly feminine.  However, I will also argue that 
some ‘feminine’ experiences are also possible for men, should they acquire a 
particular position in their own psychology which would enable it; in this way 
‘feminine’ is not dependent upon morphology. That women take on ‘masculine’ 
characteristics is also clear, but not without problems: I will discuss Jung’s 
concepts of anima and animus in this context.  I do not believe that this weakens 
my development of the feminine, but rather precludes the forming of another 
duality and hierarchy, which would privilege women at the expense of men.  
 
In my discussion of male hegemony throughout this work, I occasionally use 
‘patriarchy’ (the rule of the fathers), but more frequently ‘androcentric’ (man at the 
                                            
60 As Bertolt Brecht commented: “A man with one theory is lost. He needs several of them, four, 
lots! He should stuff them in his pockets like newspapers … If you are to get on, you need to 
know that there are a lot of theories” (quoted in Fuegi, 1987, p. 174). While it is possible his 
remark is ironic, I believe that the many theories to which I refer preclude philosophic 
fundamentalism, and allow for polyphonic variation. 
61 Mary Daly, however, would not agree; she equates “human being” with a patriarchal mono-
voice. http://www.enlightennext.org/magazine/j16/daly.asp?page=2 
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centre of things), and also ‘phallogocentric’ (the phallic signifier, the logos, which 
insists on the one and only truth), and even ‘masculine paternal’ (the grouping of 
ideas around male dominance).  I acknowledge there are historical developments 
at work in these terms – Mary Daly for instance used ‘patriarchy’ exclusively - but 
also that each reflects a different nuance. Androcentrism, for example, has been 
critiqued in the area of science and research, for privileging entrenched 
practices, which then marginalize other sources such as diaries, oral tradition, 
personal papers, and the like.  This is somewhat countered by feminist 
standpoint theory,62 which modifies the ‘view from nowhere’ by introducing the 
situatedness of the knower/researcher which includes sex/gender difference.  
Having established my methodology, I now introduce key terms and fundamental 
assumptions that I rely upon throughout this work. 
Key Terms and Fundamental Assumptions 
My investigation of the feminine does not hinge upon the essentialism/social 
constructionist argument; I discover in both Irigaray and Jung a middle position.  
An example is Jung’s notion of archetypes and I discuss the interface between 
them in relation to the category of ‘experience’, which is necessary for my 
discussion of feminine spirituality in chapter four.  It is clear that difference is a 
problem from the standpoint of essentialism because it relies on an inherent 
essence that we are born with, and because difference, between and within each 
sex, is crucial to my argument, essentialist theory has little to offer. 
 
The difference in philosophical positions between essentialism and social 
construction can be summed up by the question: “Is woman born or made?” For 
an essentialist, woman is born not made; “for an anti-essentialist like Simone de 
Beauvoir, woman is made not born” (Fuss, 1989, p. 3). That is, for Beauvoir, 
woman “is not a fixed reality but a becoming” (de Beauvoir, 1989, p. 66) And 
likewise for Luce Irigaray, she becomes a woman: “I am born a woman, but I 
must still become this woman that I am by nature” (Irigaray 1992, 168). She 
                                            
62 Feminist stand-point theory has been developed by Nancy Hartsock (Hartsock, 1983), and 
Sandra Harding, (S. Harding, 2004). 
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further proclaims “the transformation of ourselves into a work of art” (Irigaray, 
2010a, p. 15). This is clearly a non-essentialist perspective - women are not 
already made.63  Irigaray is alluding to her idea of cultivation, and development of 
what it is to be a woman. So, definitively for me, “it is not nature that defines 
woman; it is she who defines herself by taking on nature in her affectivity” (de 
Beauvoir, 1989, p. 69) ‘Becoming’, an activity, overcomes the particular 
dichotomy of essentialism/social construction. Women must “renounce the 
[socially constructed] environment that has constituted and bound us” (Irigaray, 
2008b, p. 127), and be contiguous with our own affect. In that the constructions 
of the social are indistinguishable from the patriarchal/symbolic, Irigaray is calling 
for a removal from this symbiosis.  
 
I need to set some predicates for my use of the terms ‘feminine’, ‘female’ and 
‘women’, at least provisionally, as much as these terms seem to resist definition. 
Is it possible to imagine or discuss ‘male’ and ‘female’, (including when they are 
conflated with ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’) without invoking the pairs of opposites 
that have been present in western philosophy since Pythagoras? 
 
Let me attempt a definition of ‘feminine’ first.  Margaret Whitford suggests that 
Irigaray's work should be seen as "philosophy in the feminine," (Whitford, 1991b) 
actively opposing the complicity of philosophy with other social practices which 
exclude or marginalize women. How do I discuss ‘feminine’ and ‘the feminine’ as 
subjects of philosophy without entering a kind of colonization and appropriation, 
which has already been done (Whitford, 1991b, p. 29)? Does a woman, speaking 
in and of ‘the feminine’, speak intrinsically differently than a man? Would a 
female view of ‘the feminine’ render it as unrepresentable as it is presumed to be, 
historically, for a man? That is, can a woman speak of a feminine not founded in, 
                                            
63 In Conversations, Luce Irigaray strongly disagrees with the charges that she is essentialist.  
She says, “the relations between the two subjects [masculine and feminine] are found from their 
different ways of relating to the self, to the other(s), to the world. They then exclude the existence 
of immutable values or essences which could be shared by all people”.  In answer to the specific 
attribution of strategic essentialism, she continues: “I search for specific ways of cultivating a 
feminine identity. Could it be this task that is confused with essentialism by some people? It was 
realized in order to reach the possibility of being two” (2008a, pp. 78-79). 
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or incorporated into, a male imaginary?  In other words, is it possible to speak of 
‘feminine’, and ‘the feminine’ without assuming masculine representations, in a 
male hegemony?  On the other hand, does ‘the feminine’ refer to a specific 
‘feminine’ libido?   Does ‘feminine’ return us to the feminine-maternal, as specific 
drives pertaining to the female body? Do ‘feminine’ or ‘femininity’ signal a 
stereotypical perception of how women might behave and how men should not? 
Is it a mistake to even try to define ‘feminine’?  Is ‘feminine’ a ‘natural’ definition, 
or a political one? I aim to answer these questions about the feminine by opening 
‘her’ to new imagination, to new images, and to ‘air’64 the current and past 
associations and attributions of and to ‘feminine’. 
 
Many feminists have understood ‘woman’ as a gender term that depends on 
social and cultural factors. In so doing, they distinguished sex (being female or 
male) from gender (being a woman or a man).65  So sex/gender theories, and 
essentialism/social construction, are intimately intertwined.  In regard to 
sex/gender theory, I tend to agree with Toril Moi, that it is “simply irrelevant to the 
task of producing a concrete, historical understanding of what it means to be a 
woman (or a man) in a given society” (Moi, 1999, p. 4). By contrast, Luce 
Irigaray’s argument of sexuate difference relies on articulating two distinct 
subjectivities, which do not rely on gender distinction, which I discuss further 
below.  
 
The category of lived body is an attempt “to liberate the word ‘woman’ from the 
binary straightjacket that contemporary sex and gender theory imprisons it in” 
(Moi, 1999, p. ix).  The ‘lived body’ avoids the essentialism/social construction 
debate, and moves us towards sexuate difference; it “is the unified idea of a 
physical body acting and experiencing in a specific sociocultural context; it is 
body-in-situation” (I. M. Young, 2005, p. 16). For Young, the lived body means 
                                            
64 By ‘air’ I intend a reference to Luce Irigaray, and her insistence on ‘air’ as the element that 
gives life, to women and to philosophy itself (Irigaray, 1999, pp. 5-6).  I give a full account of this 
association in chapter three. 
65 For a concise discussion see Mikkola Mari’s excellent article (Mikkola, 2012). 
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that we are considering “a specific kind of body and the meaning that concrete 
body has for the situated individual.  This is not the equivalent of either sex or 
gender” (I. M. Young, 2005, p. 18).  I prefer the notion of the lived body because 
it avoids the sex/gender dichotomy - the lived female body is different to the lived 
male body, both in biology and life-situation.  Young indeed clarifies this:  
 
The idea of the lived body thus does the work the category ‘gender’ 
has done, but better and more.  It does this work better because the 
category of the lived body allows description of the habits and 
interactions of men with women, women with women, and men with 
men in ways that can attend the plural possibilities of comportment, 
without a necessary reduction to the normative heterosexual binary of 
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ (I. M. Young, 2005, p. 18).  
  
Thus theorizing a lived body allows for individual difference of every kind, in itself 
and for itself, without recourse to binary comparisons, or to post modernism, 
where it is erased.  I have some caution, however, about the use of the terms 
‘body’.  Luce Irigaray prefers to use the term ‘flesh’, because there is confusion 
as to which body we are talking about; the body of discourse, the political body, 
the body of scientific investigation; the female body.  When using the term ‘flesh’, 
there is no doubt that a fleshly subject has a sexuate body. 
 
Rather than a sex/gender distinction in order to discover what ‘feminine’ and 
‘women’ might be, Luce Irigaray proposes sexuate difference, which “represents 
the most basic and universal place of otherness, and it has to be respected in 
order to respect the other kinds of otherness becoming possible” (Irigaray, 
2010a, p. 19).66 Luce Irigaray makes a distinction between ‘sexual’ and ‘sexuate’, 
and Rachel Jones puts it this way: “‘sexuate’ signals the way that sexual 
difference is articulated through our different modes of being and becoming, that 
is, in bodily, social, linguistic, aesthetic, erotic, and political forms” (R. Jones, 
2011, p. 4).  Further, sexual difference is that which “western culture has 
forgotten and which Luce Irigaray seeks to recover, while the sexuate involves 
                                            
66 I will refer to identity that is not based on gender assumptions in the work of Jean Byrne, and 
the necessity for sexuate difference in the work of Luce Irigaray. 
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taking up a positive relation to sexual difference by acknowledging it as the 
irreducible difference which inflects every aspect of our being” (ibid.) As such, 
sexuate difference does not map onto pre-existing biological difference, nor onto 
linguistic or other human structures of culture.  Thus, Luce Irigaray’s sexuate 
difference avoids either the essentialist or the social construction argument. 
Sexuate difference is a concept that I rely on throughout this thesis, and in 
chapter one I discover in Jung support for this view in his ideas of sexual 
difference.  A logical question to ask, as does Anne-Marie Mulder, “is how the 
irreducible difference of each member of a couple or the distinction between 
each pole of a conceptual pair can be guarded and maintained when they enter a 
relationship” (Mulder, 2006, p. 209). How is this done without a duality, which I 
aim to avoid? My answer is that when a duality operates, the two are presumed 
to constitute two halves of the whole; each is required to make up that whole.  In 
sexuate difference, the between, the copula for Luce Irigaray, that place of air, 
creates a breathing-space where projections are withdrawn, and the other is 
seen as other, not as complement (opposite/dual) to ones-self.  In my view this 
creates a new paradigm for same-sex relations as well, because it is in the 
opening of sexuate difference (and then to all other difference, as emphasized by 
Luce Irigaray), that psychic growth, flexibility and love can actually arise. 
 
Patrice Haynes critiques Luce Irigaray’s vision of sexual difference and argues 
that this “results in a gulf between male and female subjects such as that the two 
are unable to work towards the mutual recognition necessary for love and social 
transformation” (Haynes, 2008, p. 279). Haynes’ further critique regards 
transcendence, as she believes that by posing an ontologically based sensible 
transcendental, Irigaray unintentionally creates the same gulf (ibid., p. 281). I 
cannot agree with Haynes, because although Irigaray does not develop the male 
side of sexuate difference as fully as she does the female, (arguably this should 
be done by men for themselves, rather than by women for men), nevertheless 
Irigaray develops the relation ‘between’, and details how each can approach the 
other (both sexuate other, and same sex other), particularly in Sharing the World, 
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The Way of Love, and Ethical Gestures Towards the Other. I also argue that 
‘relations between’ extends to our attitudes towards the natural world. That men 
and women would experience and cultivate the sensible/transcendental 
differently is approached through my discussion of the difference between male 
and female spirituality and sexuality posed by Jung.  
 
While I argue that the categories ‘women’, ‘female’ and ‘feminine’ need to be 
open-ended, and allow for the possibility of change, is there a point at which 
these categories become so unstable as to destabilize women subjects in their 
personal and social identities?  While deconstructionist questioning might help to 
disenchant us from received ideas of femininity, the “anti-essentialism of 
deconstruction” (Schor, 1995, p. 45) can “make the word woman slim down to 
nothing” (Moi, 1999, p. 7) and eliminate the category ‘woman’ entirely.67 Where is 
the line between flexible identity and loss of identity? I argue that it is easier to 
dismantle that which maims, mutilates and misrepresents, than to represent 
one’s self independently. The first is a repudiating, reflexive action where the 
reacted-to other is pivotal, in the second the pivot is one’s self.  My project is the 
promotion of feminine becoming, rather than a reflexive critique of androcentric 
structures.  
 
However, there are some advantages in deconstructive approaches to feminist 
theory, which have opened greater possibilities for thinking a plurality, thus 
destabilizing rigid categories of both biological sex and gender identity. For 
example, Penelope Deutscher (Deutscher, 1997) underscores the usefulness of 
deconstruction for interpreting the function of gender in the history of philosophy, 
which is an important prelude to extracting ourselves from philosophical 
sex/gender presumptions.  But I argue that deconstruction is only useful if these 
theories do not take us further away from embodiment, from lived experience in 
the body.  I agree when Christine Downing says “there is something false about 
                                            
67 While this question has been posed before, for example by Denise Riley in 1988 in Am I that 
Name? Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in History (Riley, 1988), it needs to be asked 
repeatedly. 
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deconstructionism” (Downing, 1992, p. 34), and what is false is that it moves us 
away from the body. Phenomenology, however, ideally remains true to the body. 
Toril Moi suggests that we refer to the lived body of existential phenomenology 
because it promises to tell us something of a lived feminine life, rather than a 
category that precedes it and provides a theoretical structure (Moi, 1999).  
Having established my key terms, I now provide an overview of this thesis, and a 
summary of each of my chapters. 
 
Chapter Overview 
My thesis, in summary is: that ‘the feminine’, notwithstanding androcentric 
projections, has contemporary meaning, including - although by no means 
exclusively - for women as sexed-female subjects.  Furthermore, I argue that 
female spirituality differs from male spirituality, and my contribution to the 
development of a feminine divine is the notion of mysticism as feminine divine, 
namely that mysticism is both dependent on the existence of a female divine and 
the site of the experience itself. A provisional definition of mysticism is needed 
here; by mysticism I mean the response of an individual to immediate divine 
presence, a non-rational state which is often a response to the numinosum, 
namely that which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and 
unfamiliar. I propose that Poïesis and erotic logos are forms of language more 
suited to a feminine speech and becoming, and I argue that these forms escape 
the dominance of logos. Theoretically, a position outside the symbolic is also 
possible for men, if they discover in themselves a liminal capacity, rather than 
identify with phallogocentrism. I use liminal, from the Latin word limen, meaning 
"a threshold", to mean a quality of ambiguity and disorientation, a departing and 
an arriving.  In this way, both poïesis and erotic logos are liminal. 
 
In Chapter One: “Interrogating ‘the Feminine’” I differentiate between ‘the 
feminine’, both historically and in the present, and women as sexed female 
subjects. I consider whether archetypes might be a form of essentialism, an a 
priori claim on (one’s) being, but conclude that they nevertheless contribute to a 
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contemporary understanding of women and the feminine.  I explore the notion of 
women’s experience, and women’s religious experience specifically.  I argue for 
the inclusion of all women’s experience, while I simultaneously allow that 
experience might be contaminated by patriarchal beliefs, structures, and 
language.  
 
In Chapter Two: “Cultivating the Feminine Body” I ask how our notions of body 
and experience in the body would change if we were to put aside the body/spirit 
trope, that is if we did not separate bodily experience from spiritual experience. I 
demonstrate that a woman’s experience of/in/as her body should be understood 
as a body/spirit continuum when viewed through the lens of Luce Irigaray’s 
sensible/transcendental. I argue for the importance of cultivating the body, which 
enables me to reinstate (and restate) the divinity of carnality, or the 
spiritualization of the flesh, and this position further supports my use of Luce 
Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental. 
 
In Chapter Three: “Language” – It Takes My Breath Away”, I propose that women 
find a language that provides a free dwelling, (Heidegger) rather than a prison 
(Simone Weil). I challenge the idea of dualism in the philosophy of mind, that is 
the posing of body and mind as opposites, so I take female morphology, in both 
the linguistic and biological sense, and argue them as a continuum. That is, the 
form and structure of the human being sexed as female influences the structure 
and process of the language she uses.  This chapter elaborates this theme. I 
discuss erotic logos as a language for women, and investigate the story of 
Sheherazade and the Thousand and one Nights to discover how women might 
speak, and still remain alive (in the symbolic). I am dedicated to (finding and 
using a) language that is not ‘disembodying’ but ‘incarnating’. I argue that 
language needs to arise from myself and not merely though the logos of another, 
especially a sexuate other. While language is a product of the Symbolic Order, I 
follow Lacan in asserting that language can critique (or undermine) itself, in a 
similar way that one has an ego but at the same time one has to withstand the 
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demise of its (psychotic) supremacy.68 Lacan claimed this as the ‘feminine’ 
position. I demonstrate ways in which Luce Irigaray achieves this position; she 
poetically inhabits the elements, for instance, to demonstrate how philosophy has 
ignored the material, especially air, in favour of the metaphysical. 
 
In Chapter Four: “Mysticism as Feminine Divine”, I discuss mysticism as a direct 
response - or access to - the numinous, and propose this as a means by which 
women (or, possibly, men) can avoid the constructs of meaning of the symbolic.  
I define, discuss, and amplify what mysticism might be for feminine spirituality, 
both past and present.  I contrast the possibility of a feminine divine apprehended 
and experienced in the mystical with a masculine divine enclosed within the 
symbolic and codified in religious dogma/theory. I take a position that equates 
feminine jouissance with divinity in the feminine. As I define it, mysticism is a 
body/spirit confluence, an experience of Luce Irigaray’s 
sensible/transcendental.69 My argument for the mystical as feminine divine avoids 
the need for the Christian paternal God.  I am not arguing for a theist God (or 
Goddess) at all, but rather for an experience which does not automatically 
become translated through a priori assumptions about God, (including ‘his’ 
existence) and the rational foundations of true belief.  I claim that a contemporary 
philosophy of religion does not need a loyalty to the notion that religious belief 
must be rationally justified as true, as in the phallogocentric system.   
 
In my last two chapters I show more clearly the points for which I have been 
arguing by applying them to the narrative of a fairy tale.  
                                            
68 I will use the term ‘ego’ sparsely in this work, partly because of the slippery and contentious 
nature of the term, and partly because Eastern and Western notions of ego differ considerably.  
Luce Irigaray avoids the term, through utilizing the notion of ‘breath’. For example, rather than 
imagine egos communicating with each other, she claims that it is “the breath, as vital or spiritual 
matter of a human being, corresponds to (a) third ground from which we can appear as humans 
and relate between us” (Irigaray, 2000, p. 20). This strategy also enables her to bypass the 
projections of a masculine imaginary proposed by Lacan as implicit in the formation of ego 
(Lacan, 1977). 
69 The association I am making here with jouissance is apt in several ways, including, as Jean 
Byrne puts it, that Irigaray “wants the mother and the father to be able to engage in imaginary 
intercourse, and this meeting of the two is the sensible/transcendental” (Byrne, 2008, p. 88). 
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In Chapter Five: “The Handless Maiden: Femininity Derogated”, I take up a fairy 
tale and apply a contemporary analysis. Husserl’s idea of philosophy was a 
“radical inquiry that proceeds with the help of imagination and fiction” (Heinämaa, 
2003, p. 15). This fairy tale aids our imagination, and as such it enables a 
development of philosophy.  I argue that the handless state of the young woman 
represents the position in which all women find themselves.  Without recourse to 
philosophy, theology or psychology, the particular genre of fairy tale proposes a 
cause, amplifies the details of her/women’s predicament, and most remarkably, 
proposes a course of action not only for the young woman herself, but also for 
those around her and in contemporary culture.  
 
Chapter Six: In my final chapter “The Handed Maiden: Femininity Restored”, I 
continue an interpretation of the fairy tale, and we shall see how, through the 
image of her hands growing back, she demonstrates the retrieving of female 
subjectivity and spirituality.  Through the young woman’s sojourn in the cottage in 
the forest, accompanied by the virgin white as snow and the angel, through 
solitude/silence, I imagine her discovering her virginity/self affection.  It is 
important to include this discussion of a fairy tale, because many, if not all the 
subjects of my argument in earlier chapters are demonstrated in this story. As 
such, the last two chapters constitute a summary and amplification of the thesis.  
 
I now begin by interrogating ‘the feminine’, and discussing various ways in which 
it is construed.  
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Chapter One: Interrogating ‘The Feminine’. 
 “The significant problems we have cannot be solved at the same level of thinking 
with which we created them” (Attributed to Albert Einstein, 1879 - 1955). 
Introduction 
In this chapter I investigate some of the key ideas around ‘the feminine’, female 
and woman. I do this in order to understand the cultural, spiritual, psychological 
and philosophical assumptions upon which these ideas are built. I claim that ‘the 
feminine’ is undeveloped, resists definition and can be difficult to access.  This is, 
at least in part, because the categories of ‘the feminine’ and ‘woman’ have 
historically been predicated upon the category ‘the masculine’ and ‘man’ in a 
dualist trope.70 It has been argued that theories (and the beliefs which subtend 
them) about the feminine, and women, influence women’s experience of 
themselves. As an example, the ‘otherness’ of women has been concealed in the 
patriarchal Symbolic, through the simple device of woman as man’s Other. As 
Luce Irigaray says, “the other then remains imperceptible, not because of 
otherness, but because of that which conceals otherness” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 
126). For theorists such as Luce Irigaray, this is a problem.  Following Irigaray, I 
undertake to think ‘the feminine’ and ‘woman’ in a different way. In other words, if 
the category ‘woman’ is based on an androcentric ‘other of the same’, as 
suggested by Irigaray in her reading of Freud, it might be argued that the claims 
around the idea of the other of the same need to be undermined; this position 
underlies the following discussion. 
 
I first examine some of the more universal ways in which the feminine is 
construed, such as ‘the eternal feminine’ and the ‘feminine principle’ as well as 
Jung’s concepts of anima and animus.71 Jung adheres to the notion of 
                                            
70 Placing ‘the feminine’, ‘eternal feminine’, ‘feminine principle’ and ‘woman’ within quotations 
allows me to mark them as the provisional subject of my inquiry; they may not, as we will see, 
prove to be reliable terms, and therefore subject to change, or even deconstructive erasure.  
71 While animus is not strictly a feminine construct, Jung nevertheless held that animus is a 
contra-sexual part of a woman’s psyche.  He described it as corresponding to “the paternal 
Logos” (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 9ii, §29). On the other hand, he said the animus “gives to 
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archetypes as a foundation for his work: I examine archetypes to discover if they 
are a relevant form through which to explore ‘the feminine’.  Are archetypes a 
form of essentialism, for instance, and therefore an a priori claim on (one’s) 
being? I propose that an archetype of ‘the feminine’ might be interpreted 
differently in different cultures, and thus offer a useful category differing from both 
essentialism and social construction, but carrying inflections of both.  
 
I then argue for the personal and particular notions of women’s experience. In 
order to re-imagine woman as subjects, I pay some attention to Luce Irigaray’s 
ideas concerning a transformed genealogy for women, and the need for a 
women’s Imaginary to be founded on feminine rather than masculine 
morphology.  
 
Departing from Irigaray’s ideas, I raise the question as to whether men might 
access ‘feminine’ experiences.  Irigaray disagrees that ‘the feminine’ is 
accessible to men, because her insistence on sexuate difference would preclude 
this possibility. I, however, will argue that other issues influence experience, in 
addition to sexuate difference. 
 
The notion of the Eternal Feminine is my first inquiry, of which both de Beauvoir 
and Mary Daly have made an extensive critique. 
The Eternal Feminine 
An exact delineation between the ideas of Eternal Feminine and Feminine 
Principle is difficult to determine, as the terms often appear to be interchangeable 
and hard to define, illustrating, in my view, how fundamentally problematic these 
ideas have become. We can think, for example, of The Eternal Feminine as 
captured in images such as Sophia, the wisdom behind all life. Let me linger on 
the figure of Sophia. Plato places Socrates as the quintessential philosopher who 
is both a lover of wisdom (sophia) and discussion (logos) (Reeve, 2011). For 
                                            
woman’s consciousness a capacity for reflection, deliberation, and self-knowledge” (C. G. Jung, 
1977, pp., volume 9 part two, §33). 
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Aristotle, Sophia was one of the five principles of thought (Parry, 2008). Judah 
Abrabanel (1437-1508) constructed a dialogue between Philo, an accomplished 
philosopher who is the male character and Sophia, the student of philosophy, the 
female character.72 Le Doeuff will have something to say about this particular 
male/female relationship shortly. Their discourse is on the nature of love as both 
a sensual and cosmic principle. Sophia contributes substantially to the 
development of the philosophical ideas in their discourse, and is placed as both 
lover of Philo himself, as well as of philosophy (Hughes, 2008). In this discourse, 
Sophia is given a strong and arguably equal voice. In chapter three, we will see 
Sheherazade similarly placed, as both lover and philosopher when she creates a 
subject-position for herself in and through discourse. The question must be 
asked whether this is a true subject-position, or an instance of “erotic-theoretical 
transference … and is therefore “an equivalent to an absence of any direct 
relationship of women to philosophy” (Le Dœuff, 1989, p. 104), as Le Dœuff 
poses in relation to Elizabeth and Descartes.  
 
If women’s access to philosophy is indirect, and “only through the mediation of a 
man” (ibid.), how does a woman gain direct access to theoretical discourse? Le 
Dœuff laments that women have been subject to “a massive exclusion that has 
caused philosophy to remain the prerogative of a handful of the [male] learned” 
(ibid., p. 100). She asserts that it is a mistake to imagine that this long 
suppression is overcome by contemporary rhetoric to the contrary.  An even 
greater mistake, in her view, is that women voluntarily choose not to engage with 
the philosophical realm because it is riddled with masculine values. In this 
regard, Le Dœuff argues that a feminism of difference presents a danger in that it 
may be “produced by the very structures against which it is protesting” (ibid, p. 
101). The problem, as Le Dœuff articulates, is to know whether we want to 
remain within those structures “and be dominated by them, or whether we can 
take up in relation to them a critical position, a position which will necessarily 
                                            
72 Plato's dialogue The Symposium, is a possible model for Judah Abrabanal’s work. 
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involve the deciphering of the basic philosophical assumptions latent in 
discourses about women” (ibid.).  
 
Le Dœuff argues that if “women are necessary to their masters” (ibid., p. 107), in 
this transferential philosophical arrangement, then they are being used as 
commodities, a situation which Luce irigaray argues is a mainstay of the function 
of the patriarchy (Luce Irigaray, 1985). In chapter five I argue that the handless 
maiden/every woman is able to, and indeed must, resist commodification. 
Psychologically speaking, the removal of this transference is akin to the 
dismantling of the Oedipal complex, when one no longer operates through or 
against the other, but for ones-self. Le Dœuff firmly rejects any idea of 
separatism, and in particular ‘difference’ as a basis for her feminism, and argues 
rather for open-endedness in debate instead of the presumption of a closed 
system of knowledge. I believe the removal of separatism is a necessary adjunct 
to philosophy, but that there is still a need for Luce Irigaray’s sexuate difference, 
or two separate subjectivities, which allows women to operate for themselves, 
notwithstanding their position within masculinist institutions and paradigms. 
Irigaray takes this further, to propose a philosophy in the feminine (Whitford, 
1991b). This is heavy labour, however, not merely theoretical maneuvering, and 
has some relation to the idea of women accepting masculinist projections and 
then transforming them and asserting their own position. In chapter five, my 
discussion of Heidegger’s notion of the ‘handedness’ of thinking develops this 
debate.  
 
A further question must be approached, and that is whether the academy itself, 
that is the university and its philosophy school, acts as a substitute for a man, or 
indeed the means by which a masculinist view might be enforced upon women. 
Is subjugation in this way the ransom for amateurism or exclusion, as protested 
by Le Dœuff? For Le Dœuff, “overinvestment of the desire to philosophize in the 
‘academic’ or ‘institution’ is no solution to subjugation, for her (Le Dœuff, 1989, p. 
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128). Do women feel obliged to take on the academy because it can “appear as a 
conquest, when an institutional relationship to philosophy has been forbidden for 
so long” (ibid., p. 120)?  I argue that rather than exhibiting a love of philosophy by 
the woman, such a struggle might well be yet another way in which she finds 
herself as a commodity for the patriarchal mill. If so, her love (of philosophy) has 
been commodified.73 Le Dœuff challenges the patriarchal institutions by avoiding 
a closed approach to knowledge, or knowledge as an absolute which is owned by 
the (patriarchal) institution, and instead seeks a “new rationality, in which 
relationship to the unknown and to the unthought is at every moment 
reintroduced” (ibid., p. 128). This approach accords with my own contention that 
open-ended thought is needed for development of a feminine epistemology. 
 
I now continue with a brief historical account of the use of the feminine. In the 
Romantic movement of the 18th and 19th centuries, ‘the feminine’ was exalted. 
In the final lines of his second Faust, Goethe celebrates redemption through the 
“eternal feminine”:74  
 
that which cannot be described, 
here finally completes itself. 
It is the eternal feminine,  
always attracting us to the higher (Goethe, 1839, p. 207). 
 
These examples demonstrate that which is seen as the feminine.  I point out that 
in both cases the speaker is a man. Is this idea of the eternal feminine equally 
potent for a feminine as well as a masculine subject? If so, why is this sense of 
the absolute, that which draws man to “the highest”, seen as feminine?  Is this 
the foundation of the projections by men upon women?  To attempt to answer 
these questions I engage with Jung and his ideas. 
 
                                            
73 Commodification within or by the institutional system is not, of course, gender specific and 
therefore confined to women.  However, in this context I relate it specifically to women, and 
women in philosophy in particular. 
74 Sometimes translated as ‘ever feminine’. 
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For Jung, the “Eternal Feminine” is “the ultimate principle of the unconscious” (C. 
G. Jung, 1977, vol. 18, §237), and a prenatal realm of “immemorial archetypal 
possibilities” (C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 5, §508). “At a certain level, therefore, 
woman appears as the true carrier of the longed-for wholeness and redemption” 
(C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 14, §500). Here we see an elision of eternal, unconscious 
properties attributed to, or projected upon, women.  But Jung has more to say; 
for him, integrating this prenatal realm is a way of bypassing dominance of the 
ego/culture in one’s conscious personality, a way of evading logocentrism.  But 
as this is a process he deems necessary for both men and women, is it related at 
all to embodied women, or to ‘female’ as sex or gender? Is the naming of 
principles as masculine and feminine a projection of human sex/gender roles 
onto processes that are sex/genderless?  If so, are these primordial ‘feminine’ 
processes associated with (or even synonymous with) embodied women? If not, 
how are they related?  
 
Contrary to the idea of human projections of sex/gender difference onto divinity 
or principles, Jung had strong ideas on sexuate difference, and claimed that one 
does “not possess spirituality for oneself or sexuality for oneself; rather one is 
subject to the laws of spirituality and sexuality”.  He regarded them as “mighty 
demons, manifestations of the gods” (C. G. Jung, 1916). In this view, these 
ontological categories of male and female are initially patterned within the divine 
realm and only then embodied in the physical, psychological, and cultural polarity 
of men and women; thus, for Jung, the divine is male and female and human 
beings are patterned upon this divinity.75  Is this conception of Jung's of the 
eternal feminine innate and given, and 'there' in all women, regardless of culture?  
I return to the notion of divine patterning shortly when I discuss archetypes. 
 
How is the ‘eternal feminine’ related to embodied women? Simone de Beauvoir 
includes a criticism of the ‘myth of the eternal feminine’ in The Second Sex, and 
                                            
75 Whether we then take the divine realm to be within, without, or dependent upon human 
interaction is a point I take up later. 
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specifically rejects the notion of it being an unchanging timeless essence.76 For 
Beauvoir, the eternal feminine is not related to the primary question, “What is a 
woman? If her functioning as a female is not enough to define woman, if we 
decline also to explain her through ‘the eternal feminine’, and if nevertheless we 
admit, provisionally, that women do exist, then we must face the question” (de 
Beauvoir, 1989, p. xxi). Beauvoir claims that when she uses the terms woman 
and feminine in the context of her question “what is a woman”, she refers to “no 
archetype, no changeless essence whatever” (de Beauvoir, 1989, p. xxxvi).  But 
is an archetype a ‘changeless essence’? In the project to remove women from 
essentialist suppositions, do we need to remove her from archetypal ideas 
completely? I discus these questions shortly.  
 
For Jung, ‘the feminine’ was a pivotal principle, and his discussion of it is vast 
and contradictory. In my reading of him, his references to ‘the feminine’ are often 
ambiguous, sometimes referring to embodied women, and sometimes to a 
feminine principle.  Useful to my inquiry in this thesis is his claim that ‘the 
feminine’ had been culturally repressed over centuries, and he defined this 
repression as neurotic. Much of his emphasis on the feminine is an attempt to 
counter the masculine, Logos-dominated world.  Fundamentally for him, ‘the 
feminine’ represented a style of being and relating, as expressed through eros. 
Eros was held by Jung to convey more than expressions of love, including carnal 
love, and full emotional involvement, which also encompasses spirituality (C. G. 
Jung, 1977, vol. 7, §31-33). Eros, the guiding style of ‘the feminine’, is often seen 
as the balancing force of thanatos, the death drive; (C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 7, 
§33) and this dichotomy is at work in the thanatos-orientation of androcentric 
religious forms, including Christianity, where redemption is accomplished through 
death. Because it better represents their sexuate identity, I argue that, for 
women, feminine gynocentric religious themes where natality and birth 
predominate would be better able to create a new feminine imaginary based on 
                                            
76 In chapters five and six, I elaborate on the nature of myth, and investigate its deep meaning.  In 
this chapter I leave de Beauvoir’s dismissal of myth unchallenged. 
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birth, life, and potentiality. For Jung ‘the feminine’ is also available to men, but he 
held it to be more naturally or completely available to, or representing, women, 
because it constitutes their ego-identity (C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 9ii, §29). Here 
again, he elides ‘the feminine’ and women, and exhibits a phallogocentric view, 
because his claim for a different path for women and men is not maintained, and 
he imagines their capacities are more or less the same.  I merely note this for the 
moment, and we will discover how important it proves to be. 
 
I find support in my insistence on plurality of the divine in Jung, as he argues that 
divinity encompasses a feminine element. He is critical of Christian teaching for 
ignoring the feminine. He explores Mediaeval Alchemy, because the alchemists 
placed the feminine at the centre of their opus, because it is unknown, or at least 
undiscovered. Jung interprets what alchemists practiced in terms of 
psychological processes, and holds that ‘the feminine’ is equivalent to the 
unconscious.  In other explorations of the feminine, Jung takes the doctrine of the 
Assumption of Mary77 as a demonstration of both the achievement of a feminine 
divine, and the timeliness of the feminist movement.78 Jung argues that “the 
logical consistency of the papal declaration [of the Assumption of Mary] cannot 
be surpassed, and it leaves Protestantism with the odium of being nothing but a 
man’s religion which allows no metaphysical representation of women. …The 
feminine, like the masculine, demands an equally personal representation” (C. G. 
                                            
77 The importance of Mary as an archetype for women has been amply developed by Luce 
Irigaray, and Tina Beattie (Tina  Beattie, 2004). This has drawn criticism from P.S.Anderson, who 
argues that Irigaray’s basis for gender ideals “arguably derives from pre-modern theology, 
especially Roman Catholic Mariology” (P. S. Anderson, 2007, p. 363). Perhaps this is because 
Anderson is more interested in reframing the “social identity” of women who lack “rational 
authority” (ibid.) beginning with Eve. Anderson, “as an avowedly Protestant and Kantian feminist 
philosopher of religion” challenges “any mysterious, potentially mystifying statements about Mary 
as the moral exemplar for women in becoming divine” (ibid., p. 366). By contrast, I argue for the 
mysterious (although not the mystifying), the poetic and evocative, which cannot be found in 
rationality, but which help “the philosophical capacities for reflective, imaginative and interactive 
under- standing”, so passionately desired by Anderson (ibid., p. 364). The figure of Mary can, I 
believe, be revisioned both outside and within Catholic dogma, both outside and inside the 
Western rational model. 
78 “The Assumption is really a wedding feast, the Christian version of the hierosgamos [sacred 
marriage]… Alchemy throws a bright light on the background of the dogma, for the new article of 
faith expresses in symbolical form exactly what the adepts recognized as being the secret of their 
coniunctio” (C. G. Jung, 1977, Vol. 14, § 664 ).  
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Jung, 1977, Vol. 11, § 753). Here Jung exhibits a view which is not 
phallogocentric, and with which I can agree, because it allows for a 
“metaphysical representation of women”, and therefore a feminine divine, and 
moreover it affords both the feminine and the masculine “equal representation”, 
thus positing a sexuate, rather than hierarchical difference.  
 
Much of Jung’s theorizing centres on notions of the opposites, and this dualism, 
where ‘the feminine’ is in a binary trope with ‘the masculine’, is what I seek to 
avoid.79 However, in rejecting the binary trope, how then do I approach both 
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’? The Jungian theorists Anne Ulanov and Marion 
Woodman discuss the notion of the feminine from a Jungian perspective. Ulanov 
defines ’the feminine’ as “a distinct category of being and a mode of perception 
inherent in all men, all women, all culture” (Ulanov, 1971, p. 13). But do women 
have a chosen and privileged relation to ‘the feminine’ - does the feminine 
principle specifically promote women? Woodman agrees with Ulanov when she 
claims that “the word ‘feminine’… has very little to do with gender, nor is woman 
the custodian of femininity” (Woodman, 1985, p. 10); this definition of the 
feminine clearly separates it from female and woman.  She too follows Jung in 
this principle being equally available to men as to women.   
 
Woodman also elaborates the connection between ‘the feminine’ and the 
unconscious.  She says, “what we now call the unconscious is in psychological 
reality a consciousness that has simply been underground for too long" 
(Woodman, 1982, p. 80) She goes on to say the unconscious also includes the 
Dea Abscondita, the hidden ‘feminine’ in matter, returning us to Jung’s claims.  
Of this feminine, she says:  
We already know God in his outward manifestation, by his laws, his 
                                            
79  Luce Irigaray questions the notion and construction of opposites.  She says that prior to and 
including Socrates, opposites referred to natural differences such as day and night, hot and cold. 
These could be seen as part of a continuum, however, as these concepts also include dawn and 
dusk, and coolness and warmness - the intermediate states.  After Socrates, the supposed 
opposites became more and more artificial, and were used to contrast between things.  She 
suggests that difference, rather than opposition, is a more useful proposition, which includes both 
rather than an either/or (Irigaray, 2010b).  
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commands, his works. That is the Logos, the masculine side of God. 
What we await in the Second Coming is what we lack: God’s inner 
dynamic or process. This - God in his creativeness rather than in his 
creation - is the essence of the feminine, traditionally enacted in the 
ancient Mysteries. The return is, therefore, the emergence of the 
feminine side of God, which has been gradually taking shape for 
centuries in what we call the unconscious (Woodman, 1982, pp. 80, 
emphasis mine). 
 
In this reading, we see no reference to women, but rather to a hidden process 
that has been developing gradually, and which is thought of as a feminine face of 
God. We see something that is framed as a “return”, or “a Second Coming”- but 
not of “Logos, the masculine side of God”.  In a word, the advent of a different 
way of seeing and being, a different perspective, a feminine perspective, which is 
an inner dynamic.80  
 
To further develop the notion of ‘the feminine’ as principle, and how, or by whom, 
this might be accessed, I refer again to Jung who held that we have access to 
two sources of knowledge; the Lumen Dei, which light proceeds from the 
unmanifest Godhead, the other is Lumen Naturae, the light hidden in manifest 
matter and the forces of nature (C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 12, § 356). He argued that 
humanity must redeem nature, through psychological alchemy and a change of 
mind and heart, to liberate the light inherent in physical creation, in matter.  In my 
reading of Jung, this redemption is not merely an acceptance of the miracles of 
nature per se, but a spiritualization of nature or more particularly the spiritualizing 
of our attitude towards it.  That is, instead of seeing nature as a commodity and 
resource, that we see it as a source of ‘the feminine’ light, Lumen Naturae.  In 
this view, it is clear that matter and the body are by no means to be equated with 
evil and darkness (or women), in the traditional trope, but rather that it is a light 
which is hidden from rational view.  For Jung, the Lumen Naturae includes the 
elements fire, air, water and earth, “the elements which untiringly render service” 
(C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 13, § 198) and nature’s light, a soft or ‘moon’ light, is 
released or accessed when the elements are properly attended; this dark light is 
                                            
80 In chapter four I argue that this different perspective is mysticism as a feminine divine. 
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that which illuminates itself. For Jung, “the Lumen Naturae is [a] source of 
mystical knowledge” (C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 13, § 256).  Thus one is able to “act 
in the Light of Nature and to rejoice in it as divine despite being mortal” (C. G. 
Jung, 1977, vol. 13, § 148).81 I argue that this divine/mortal is what Luce Irigaray 
has framed as the sensible/transcendental and introduces grounds for my 
argument for mysticism as feminine divine in chapter four.  It also embellishes 
Irigaray’s celebration of nature via the elements, of which more later.   
 
Archetypes, which include archetypes of the feminine, have been considered as 
a way of understanding how things are since at least the time of Plato. I will now 
explore how useful this idea might be to promote an understanding of ‘the 
feminine’ and women. 
Feminine Archetypes 
Many, if not most, feminist scholars dismiss archetypes,82 as we have already 
discovered in de Beauvoir. In my view, archetypes, of which Jung is a proponent, 
offer a non-dual position between essentialism and social construction. 
Archetypes are a foundational concept in Jung’s theories, and have become a 
mainstay of the method of inquiry sustained by contemporary Jungians. Jung 
claimed that “the archetypes of the unconscious can be shown empirically to be 
                                            
81 I contend that Luce Irigaray’s philosophical attendance upon the elements thus leads us 
towards a spiritual view of the natural light of nature, and to celebrate a mortality that is also 
divine. 
82 Feminist scholars such as Naomi Goldenberg have examined Jung’s use of archetypes, and 
dismissed them as Platonic disembodied forms, which only serve to distance women from their 
bodies (N. R. Goldenberg, 1989, p. 249). However, in my view archetypes do not have to involve 
separation of mind from body, and it is a mistake to apply the notion of archetype to metaphysics 
only. Nevertheless, Goldenberg called for feminists to undertake a formal critique and revision of 
the Jungian archetypes, because in her view everything is thus predetermined, and we no longer 
have freedom to create new images for ourselves as women. Goldberg later returned to Jung and 
his notion of archetypes, and recommends that women can use Jung's practice of active 
imagination, which involves a creation of images or "dreaming the dream onward", to form a 
satisfying psycho spiritual community (N. Goldenberg, 1992, p. 226). Susan Rowland, speaking 
of archetypal psychologists, says that they “reject the idea of the prior existence of the 
archetypes.  The image alone is real.  The archetypal image (which can be any psychic image) is 
the archetype and is the primary reality” (Rowland, 2002, p. 77).  From this point it is clear that 
image is archetype, not metaphysics, and from this we can say that even the images that arise in 
active imagination have an archetypal basis. Further, that archetypes have an existence, which is 
brought to our attention through images. 
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the equivalent of religious dogmas” (C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 12, §20). However, 
dogmas are not stable; elsewhere, he argues, “the ultimate fate of every dogma 
is that it gradually becomes soulless. Life wants to create new forms, and 
therefore, when a dogma loses its vitality, [we must discover a new form] to 
express the mystery of the soul” (C. G. Jung, 1977, vol. 14, § 488).	  There are two 
points to make from these last two quotations; first, that archetypes arise from 
the unconscious, and second that they become dogmas, and as dogmas, they 
lose their vitality, and must be re-thought.  What I am doing here is first of all 
defining archetypes and then determining if they have vitality, and finally 
proposing new and more vital ways of understanding them. Jung described 
archetypes as having a fascination “that emanates from them” (Abram, 1997; C. 
G. Jung, 1977, volume 18, §547), suggesting that we are in their thrall, or at least 
identify with them.  He regarded it as a mistake to deny the existence of 
archetypes, or to “treat them as if they were mere images and forget that they are 
living entities that make up a great part of the human psyche” (C. G. Jung, 1977, 
vol. 18, §596). For him, the foundation of consciousness is the archetypes (C. G. 
Jung, 1977, volume 10, §656). With specific reference to the “archetype of the 
feminine”, Jung said that “the anima first appears in the mother and then 
transfers itself to the beloved” (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 5, §514).  
 
Jung was no doubt influenced in his understanding of archetype by ‘idea’ in 
Platonic usage, which was developed by The Cambridge Platonists; among them 
Henri More (1614-1687), who believed that knowability in the world is enabled by 
archetype and ectype, form and copy. Thus, the divine archetype is the form of 
which the material world is a copy, reflected in his view that humans follow a 
divine archetypal form (Hutton, 2008). Likewise, the human mind is the ectype of 
the divine mind.  For Jung, then, ‘knowability’ is informed by archetype. He took 
up the notion of archetypes as a means of understanding both personal 
 61 
psychology, and the repeated patterns in the external world.83  His first use of the 
term is in 1919, having previously employed the term “primordial image”, an a 
priori form (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 8, §270n). However, in his description of 
the function of archetypes, he claims that without them, important foundational 
elements of consciousness would be marginalized and overlooked, in a 
dangerous one-sidedness (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 9i, §276-277). For Jung, 
that which has been excluded inevitably returns, through the action of the 
archetypes. (The heroine in “The Handless Maiden”, my subject in chapters five 
and six, can be seen as the means by which that which has been excluded - the 
feminine/women – is returned (or discovered).  That is, the archetypes of the 
feminine help to redress the emphasis on the masculine in patriarchal culture.) I 
have already claimed that ‘the feminine’ is undeveloped, resists definition and 
can be difficult to access.  I argue that my discourse on ‘the feminine’, woman, 
and female, is founded on an imbalance which has resulted in both psychological 
and social distress, for both men and women, and which I (and many others) 
seek to redress.  Jung’s idea is that it is the feminine archetypes that are behind 
this inquiry into the inferior position currently afforded the feminine and women, 
which prompt humanity to steer towards a balance between, in this case, men 
and women, and male and female.  
 
The contemporary post-Jungian, James Hillman, in his development of 
Archetypal Psychology, has taken up archetypes. In Hillman’s view, we see 
archetypes because we expect to see them - we view things archetypally 
(Hillman, 1977). We thus try to make sense of the world through recognizable 
patterns, or archetypes. For Northrop Frye, the Canadian literary theorist and 
critic, an archetype is a “recurring image”, and a “social fact” (Frye, 1957, p. 99), 
constructed by culture.  For him, then, archetypes are purely socially constructed 
– culture constructs them, rather than being based on them.  His method was to 
view a text as pointing to an (unacknowledged) archetype behind it, as a way of 
                                            
83 The mythologist Joseph Campbell, influenced by Jung, traced archetypal patterns in the 
mythologies of all cultures. (Campbell, 1988) In 1959 Campbell published an articulate defense of 
Jung’s ideas on the archetypes (Campbell, 1959, pp. 50-131). 
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discovering how a society indoctrinates its citizens.  Using his method, I argue 
that we can interrogate archetypes of ‘the feminine’, and anima, among others, in 
order to discover the ways in which our culture indoctrinates, and to propose a 
more vital way of expression.  In this way, although archetypes can be seen as a 
tool of social construction, we can examine and deconstruct them, to unmask 
their unconscious influence upon us, and proceed to build conscious change.  
 
In a similar way, although with a very different application, Marie-Louise von 
Franz wrote several volumes on the archetypes, arguing, as did Jung, that an 
understanding of the collective unconscious as demonstrated in archetypal 
images enables interpretation and understanding of dream-images, and the 
structure of the psyche.84 The archetype of ‘the feminine’ is one of the most 
prominent.85 Nevertheless, although Jung too holds that archetypes have always 
existed, he is emphatic that archetypes “develop through the ages“ (C. G. Jung, 
1977, Volume 9 Part II, § 142) and, departing from the Cambridge Platonists and 
Fry, he regards it “a mistaken notion that an archetype is determined in regard to 
its content” (C. G. Jung, 1982, pp. 122, my emphasis).  
 
Are archetypes,86 then, a relevant form through which to explore women and the 
feminine, or are they, as Frye suggests, a means of deconstrution?  Or are 
                                            
84 Von Franz’s works include: Archetypal Patterns in Fairy Tales (1997), Animus and Anima in 
Fairy Tales (2002), and The Feminine in Fairy Tales, (1993) 
85 Barbara Newman, speaking of the archetype of the divine feminine, states that “there never 
was when She was not” (Newman, 1995, p. 1).  She cites women in the Old Testament who had 
their own feminine deity, and resisted the patriarchal insistence that they change allegiance. 
86 Jungian archetypes refer to nuclear underlying forms from which emerge images and motifs 
such as the mother, the father, and the trickster. It is history, culture and personal context that 
shape these manifest representations or images, giving them their specific content. However it is 
common for the term archetype to be used interchangeably to refer to both the action or contents, 
and archetypal images. I will be referring to both aspects of the archetypes in this discussion. For 
Jung, archetypes are not “essentialist”, because “it is not … a question of inherited ideas but of 
inherited possibilities of ideas” (Volume 9i, C. G. Jung, 1977, §136, my emphasis). Therefore “we 
are confronted, at every new stage in the differentiation of consciousness to which civilization 
attains, with the task of finding a new interpretation appropriate to this stage, in order to connect 
the life of the past that still exists in us with the life of the present, which threatens to slip away 
from it” (Volume 9i, C. G. Jung, 1977, §267).  I contribute to an interpretation of the feminine 
appropriate to contemporary times. Lacan, representing relatively contemporary thinking, 
disagreed with the aspect of "the thought of Jung, where the relation between the psychical world 
of the subject and reality are embodied under the term archetype" (Lacan, 1994, pp. 152-153). 
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archetypes a form of essentialism, an a priori claim on one’s being? But Jung 
stressed that an “archetype is an inborn potential” rather than ‘essence’. Thus we 
see that Jung’s use of archetypes combines an a priori claim, or a frame of one’s 
experience, but is also subject to history, culture, the individual and time 
(Rowland, 2002, p. 29). Archetypes are interpreted differently in different 
cultures, and by different individuals.87 ‘Woman’ as archetype is therefore open to 
both personal and cultural difference and development in an open-ended act, or 
ever-becoming, to use Luce Irigaray’s phrase. It contributes to who a woman is, 
or at least who she perceives herself to be, and the as-yet unknown of whom she 
can become.88 As such, I have shown that archetypes span the essentialist/social 
construction argument, by incorporating elements of both. Therefore, at this point 
I can say that the notion of archetypes is useful to my inquiry into the feminine, 
because some of the essentialism/social construction debate can be bypassed.  
This point is provisional however.  It depends upon the possibility of new or 
hitherto unexpressed archetypal forms, such as the mystical archetype,89 which 
would allow for women to not only critique past archetypal feminine forms, but to 
experience or imagine new ones. 
 
                                            
He argued that "Jungianism - in so far as it makes of the primitive modes of articulating the world 
something that survives, the kernel, he says, of the psyche itself - is necessarily accompanied by 
a repudiation of the term libido" (Lacan, 1994, p. 153). Lacan is saying that because he interprets 
the Jungian archetypes as a kind of essentialism, governing the centre of the psyche, that this 
conflicts with libido. Jung’s view of libido, however, differs from the Freud/Lacan libido, in that it 
encompassed a totality of life energy, of volition, rather than being confined to sexuality. Thus I do 
not see a conflict between archetype and libido, in the way I apply both of them here. 
87 According to Jung, an archetype is a powerful autonomous process, and a human being can be 
overwhelmed by it (‘archetype- possessed’) and lose one’s humanity. He argues, for instance that 
when “Mary is elevated to the status of a goddess… [she] consequently loses some of her 
humanity” (C. G. Jung, 1977, Vol 11 § 625 ). Also, according to James Hillman “we burden 
ourselves when we identify personally with archetypal figures” (Hillman, 1989, p. 10). 
88 There is a clear difference in meaning between stereotypes, and archetypes: a stereotype is an 
oversimplified category of behaviour, verging on caricature; an archetype is part of the collective 
unconscious and is an unlearned tendency.  
89 By mystical archetype, I am referring to the ‘Unitive/Transcendent and Shamanic/Animism’, 
which Mike King argues as one of the five spiritual archetypes in the human psyche, both 
historically and in the present (King, 2009). I elaborate this theme later in this chapter. 
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Classical Greek culture provided a multiplicity of feminine forms - many 
archetypes of the feminine - in the form of Goddesses.90  This multiplicity enables 
me to argue for “plurality, variety, polyphony” (Downing, 1992, p. 38), which I 
promoted in the Introduction. So, I can ask, “Through what goddess [or archetype 
of the feminine] am I looking? when confronted with this ‘multidimensionality of 
the female point of view” (Downing, 1992, pp. 28, my interpolation).  I argue that 
these goddesses are not “objects of worship but figures through whom we might 
discover the varied archetypal aspects of the feminine” (Downing, 1992, p. 7 ), as 
does Downing. 
 
Jean Shinoda Bolen (Bolen, 1984), is among those who have made a detailed 
analysis of the psychology of these variations by taking up seven portraits of 
Greek goddesses. Others have also covered the subject of the multiplicity of 
feminine psychological and spiritual archetypes in some detail.91 I provide a brief 
over view of these archetypes here: 
 
• Penelope, Odysseus’ patient wife, “sitting by the hearth and weaving, 
saving and preserving the home while her man roams the earth in daring 
adventures, has defined one of the Western cultures basic ideas of 
womanhood” (I. M. Young, 2005, p. 123). It is notable that Penelope 
provides the most visible archetype of the feminine in our culture.  
• Demeter represents the celebration of the fusion of the mother-daughter 
bond, for whom separation is unthinkable.  
• Persephone is the mother’s daughter and venturer into the underworld, 
the explorer of the liminal.   In Persephone the mother-daughter bond is 
refigured, and she gains her autonomy. 
• Hestia represents hearth, temple, wise woman and aunt, autonomy and a 
virginal quality. Hestia represents one of the ‘stylistic variations’ 
(Heinämaa, 2003, p. 85) of the feminine archetype, in this case a woman 
who does not have children . 
• Artemis celebrates the feminine as a natural biological reality not 
dependent on social context or definition, and thus represents the 
essentialist position. 
• Athena disparages all that is conventionally feminine.  She calls women 
to identify with traditionally masculine pursuits and attributes. 
                                            
90 This discussion of the Greek goddesses also appears in my joint paper with Zeena Elton, 
(Elton & Gersch, 2012) although in a different form. 
91 (C. G. Jung, 1977), (M. E. Harding, 1990) (Downing, 1992) 
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• Aphrodite’s concern is for relatedness, for that which occurs between 
individuals in relationships.   
 
The purpose in including this brief reference to the Greek Goddesses is to claim 
a polyvalent interpretation of feminine identity. These archetypes allow a 
possibility of discovering many ways of female embodiment, and I argue that they 
add further nuances by allowing for multiplicity, without displacing sexuate 
difference. 
 
However, because Christian monotheism has excluded the multiple possibilities, 
and the figure of the Virgin Mother dominates ideas of female subjectivity, I now 
interrogate one specific archetype, that of mother, to clarify the relationship 
between an archetype (a collective, albeit unconscious idea) and an individual. 
Jung insisted, and Emma Jung reiterated, that the biological necessities of 
childbearing did not obviate the necessity of a woman giving birth to herself in 
individuation.92  In other words, a woman’s role as mother should not define her, 
and she can live other archetypes additionally, and maybe even simultaneously. 
However, patriarchal culture has defined and colonized the mother’s body, so 
one task for a woman is to avoid “the male-defined mother’s body” (Tilghman, 
2008, p. 48).93 Emma Jung says that archetypes “will never really coincide with 
an individual…individuality is really the opposite of the archetype” (Emma E. 
Jung, 1957, p. 11).  I emphasize that an archetype informs a collective ideal, but 
individuation and becoming involve specifically personal variation.  I argue that 
the mother archetype informs us as to this particular role for women, (there are 
other possible roles as well) but how an individual woman lives it is subject to 
infinite variation. 
 
                                            
92 A woman giving birth to herself is given voice in Luce Irigaray’s insistence upon self-affection 
and virginity.  I develop these themes in chapters five and six. 
93 The figure of the mother often looms large in the dreams of both men and women. Jung said he 
attributes “to the personal mother only a limited aetiological significance.” He attributes the 
influences to that of “the archetype projected upon her … which gives her authority and 
numinosity” (C. G. Jung, 1982, p. 126).   
 66 
Other philosophical and psychological theorists also attempt to clarify ‘the 
feminine’, and the notion of mother as archetype. How might they respond to 
Jung’s ideas?  I begin with Julia Kristeva, and her notion of the semiotic.  For 
Kristeva, the semiotic is not ‘the feminine’, but is defined as that which is 
marginalized by the patriarchal symbolic. (Although, in my view, ‘the feminine’ is 
marginalized by the patriarchal symbolic.)  The resolution to this disagreement is 
partly met by the development in Kristeva’s work. In her earlier work, (Kristeva, 
1974) Kristeva posits the feminine as not sexually specific to women but 
available to either sex. For her, upon our entry into the symbolic, the semiotic is 
repressed, yet it remains within to disturb and challenge symbolic 
representations. I argue that ‘the feminine’ does indeed disturb and challenge 
symbolic representations, and that this is both the purpose and definition of what 
‘the feminine’ might be. To further add weight to this proposition, Kristeva holds 
that non-linear women’s time is ‘time in the feminine’ ('Womens' Time', in 
Kristeva, 1995, pp. 201-220).94 That is, linear time as depended upon by 
rationality/the Symbolic, is not that which is relied upon by ‘the feminine’.  Note 
that Kristeva does identify “women’s time” with ‘the feminine’ in this instance, 
although in her later work she most often turns her attention to elaborating the 
difficulties of identity/subjectivity for real women, rather than theorizing the 
semiotic. This highlights a confusion between, or elision of, ‘women’ and the 
‘feminine’, which I am attempting to unravel in this chapter. I propose that it is this 
position of the semiotic that Jung theorized as the prenatal realm of the ‘Eternal 
Feminine’, and which therefore has, as both purpose and definition, that which 
disturbs and challenges the Symbolic and with it patriarchy. In chapters two, 
three and four, I return to the notion of the semiotic as a site of renewal 
independent of the Symbolic, which undermines the monoculture of the 
patriarchy.   
                                            
94 Jung associates the feminine (and the anima) with non-linear time; as he said, “anima is 
outside time as we know it” (C. G. Jung, 1982, p. 161).  Jung associated ‘non-linear’ with 
circularity. So, following Jung, we can connect the feminine with circularity. Circularity is 
associated with the notion of ‘wholeness’ for Jung, so we can say that ‘the feminine’ is one aspect 
of, or must be included for, ‘wholeness’. This discussion on the circular and its connection with 
‘feminine’ is developed further in chapter four, under the section “What is ‘natural’ to women?” 
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Kristeva moves from theorizing the semiotic to the subjectivity of fleshly women 
and the role of mother. In “Stabat Mater” she says “we live in a civilization where 
the consecrated (religious or secular) representation of femininity is absorbed by 
motherhood. If, however, one looks at it more closely, this motherhood is the 
fantasy that is nurtured by the adult man, of woman” (Kristeva, 1987, p. 234). In 
the terms I am using here, this fantasy is the action of the archetype.  Kristeva 
also reminds us of the impersonality of an archetype when she says “the 
humanity of the Virgin mother is not always obvious” (ibid., p. 235, emphasis 
mine). And she also asks: “is there something in that Maternal notion that ignores 
what a woman might say or want” (ibid., p. 236)? I conclude that the archetype is 
not, in effect, based on what an individual wants. Kristeva also comments that 
the Virgin Mary “is one of the most powerful imaginary constructs known in the 
history of civilizations” (ibid., p. 237).  I equate ‘powerful imaginary constructs’ 
with archetype - and a masculine imaginary, as I will discuss further below. 
Kristeva also noted that in Freud’s analysis Christianity comes close to “a 
preconscious acknowledgement of a maternal feminine” (ibid., p. 254), and to my 
mind, this preconscious (Jung would say unconscious) acknowledgement is an 
archetype, in this case, that of the mother.95 The main problem here is that an 
archetype represents a typical or idealized pattern, but not the individual lived 
lives of particular women, that is their subjectivity.   My focus here is not on the 
pattern but how the individual woman lives it. 
 
My aim is to stress the subjectivity of women, as I develop fully in chapters five 
and six, and I argue that it is not just the mother archetype that can pose a risk 
for the subjectivity of women. Cynthia Eller comes to the conclusion that to “the 
extent that a woman becomes the embodiment of ‘the feminine,’ she gains an 
archetypal identity but loses a human one” (Eller, 2000, p. 67) Eller’s claim 
emphasizes my view that ‘the feminine’ is an archetype into which women can 
                                            
95 On the other hand, Patricia Berry claims that “an archetypal idea per se is an over-valued idea 
that must be seen through and placed in perspective” (P. Berry, 2008, p. 40). Downing, like Berry, 
is critical of the notion of archetypes proposed by Jung and Esther Harding on this count. 
(Downing, 1992, p. 18) 
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collectively disappear.  Conversely, however, Sara Heinämaa suggests that each 
woman contributes as much to the archetype as she receives, when she writes 
as follows:  
Thus every individual woman is a singular stylistic variation of 
‘feminine existence.’ As such, she both realizes the feminine way of 
relating to the world, and modifies it. And accordingly, we can speak 
about feminine eroticism and feminine literature.  Similarly, every 
individual man is a variation of ‘masculine existence’, and contributes 
to the constitution of the general [arche]type. And together, these 
variations form the general mode of human life (Heinämaa, 2003, pp. 
85, my interpolation).  
 
Heinämaa situates an individual woman as a ‘stylistic variation’ of a ‘feminine 
way’ thus suggesting there is an archetypal pattern, but each woman lives it her 
own way, and my discussion of the multiple forms of the Greek Goddesses 
informs these variations. I discuss this further below when I introduce Luce 
Irigaray’s notion of genealogy, when women appropriate and rework existing 
cultural interpretations of femininity.  
 
As an example of the feminine at work in an archetypal way, as the feminine 
principle, I turn to the Indian physicist and ecofeminist, Vandana Shiva, who 
maintains that the death of the ‘feminine principle’ in Western patriarchy results in 
‘mal-development’. For her, the feminine principle’ is an expression of a dualistic 
trope with the masculine/patriarchal, and is integrating, motivated to life, 
promotes women, is based on the preservation and non-exploitation of nature, 
supports diversity and is cooperative.  She asserts that the modern model of 
development being imposed by the West is inherently patriarchal because it is 
fragmented, ‘anti-life,’ opposed to diversity, exploitative, dominating, and delights 
in ‘progress’ based on nature's destruction and women's subjugation (Shiva, 
1988, pp. 14, 219). Does the feminine principle, in these terms, offer an ideal, 
perhaps an imaginary, which includes women and natality, and which promotes 
life-force - libido - through the preservation and cultivation of all forms of nature? 
Shiva’s ideas about a feminine principle are close to Jung’s, as we shall see.  
Yet, could it be that ‘the feminine’, especially as ‘principle’ is a depersonalized 
 69 
abstraction, figured dualistically with ‘the masculine’? Does this leave women to 
be a ‘divine other’ for men, rather than being-for-themselves, both as divine and 
carnal?  
 
 Let me now direct our discussion of archetypes along different lines.  I do so 
because it could be argued that the paucity of archetypes active in our culture is 
problematic, rather than any issue with archetypes themselves. As I argue for 
diversity, including religious diversity, then one way of liberating theological 
debates from both gender and sectarian bias is to recognize different archetypes 
of spiritual life.  P.S.Anderson argues that a feminist philosophy of religion 
perspective “more often than not allows for religiously diverse solutions” (P. S. 
Anderson, 2012, p. 222), an idea which is encompassed by multiple archetypes 
of spirituality. 
 
 Mike King argues for five different spiritual archetypes, which he posits as being 
both historic throughout culture, as variants within any one culture at any time, 
and also possible valences within a single individual. He claims that these five 
archetypes are “powerfully different spiritual impulses, recapitulated within all 
people at all times.  Like the Jungian archetypes, they are conceived of as 
universals, but which may come into play more in one individual than another 
and more in one culture than another,… they are five personal spiritual impulses, 
or five modalities of the spirit” (King, 2009, p. 154).  These modalities of the spirit, 
five different archetypal forms, are Goddess polytheism, Warrior Polytheism, 
(Abrahamic) Monotheism, Unitive/Transcendent and Shamanic/Animism, which 
he claims are all “present in our psyches today” (ibid., p. 155).  In this way, 
Jung’s idea that archetypes steer us away from one-sidedness is given form.  For 
King, these modalities of the spirit are not drawn on sexuate lines, but both Jung 
and Irigaray’s insistence on sexuate difference especially in regard to spirituality, 
would undoubtedly influence the direction of these spiritual impulses.  But 
sexuate difference would provide only one nuance among many.  Perhaps we 
can say then that sexuate difference is an archetype in and of itself, but that if it 
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were to be the only referent, it could become, like monotheism, a form of 
intolerance of difference, and unable to account for diversities of all kinds. Here 
the spiritual archetypes move from one (monotheism) to two (sexuate difference) 
to many.  In my view, King’s position enhances my own in terms of so-called 
’feminine’ experience being available to men, because it allows for fluidity in 
spiritual and religious approaches, between and within both men and women, 
without discounting the benefits of Irigaray’s sexuate difference.   By benefit I 
mean specifically that sexuate difference removes women from being the other of 
the same.  Jung interestingly develops the theme of the ‘other of the same’ in his 
notion of anima and animus. Let us see how this works. 
Jung’s Anima and Animus 
A central idea of Jung’s is that of a contra-sexual other in men and women. For 
him, the anima or soul of men is feminine, and the anima is an unconscious 
aspect of a man’s psyche.  Similarly, animus, referring to spirit or mind, is an 
inner masculine part of a woman’s psyche.96  However, I question if this 
reinforces a distorting dualistic trope. Jung acknowledges this when he claims 
that “most of what men say about … the emotional life of women is derived from 
their own anima projections and distorted accordingly” (C. G. Jung, 1982, p. 
57).97 Thus we might attribute the unsustainable cultural prejudices within Jung’s 
writing to the distortions of his own anima. The contemporary Jungian writer, 
Claire Douglas, is critical of the terms anima and animus, and argues that they 
carry the early twentieth-century gender roles encoded in their descriptions by 
Jung (Douglas, 1990).  Following this point, I argue that the most immediately 
real feminine available to men might not be women themselves, but the distortion 
of their own anima. This raises the question as to whether anima consists in 
immutable feminine characteristics, any more than the animus consists in 
                                            
96 For Jung, both anima and animus are archetypes. 
97 Jung readily acknowledges how women’s conceptions of men are derived from their own 
animus projections and similarly distorted.  Of this distortion, Jung writes: “The assumptions and 
fantasies that women make about men come from the activity of the animus, who produces an 
inexhaustible supply of illogical arguments and false explanations” (C. G. Jung, 1982, p. 57). If we 
take up this view, women might well become aware that they project patriarchal attributes upon 
individual men. 
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immutable masculine characteristics (Ulanov, 1971, p. 123).  To imagine so 
would be a reifying of ‘the feminine’ through the patriarchy, rather than a 
development of what the feminine might be or become, for women themselves. 
As it stands, anima risks being the projection by men of patriarchal attitudes - 
both idealized and denigrated - onto women.  
 
Other contemporary Jungians offer a further critique of anima/animus 
assumptions, based on theories of different psychological development in men 
and women.98 In Jung’s theorizing, the animus was far less developed than 
anima. He relied on women such as Emma Jung, Toni Wolff, and Marie Louise 
von Franz to develop these ideas (E. Jung, 1957; von Franz, 2002; Wolff, 1956). 
Ruth Anthony El Saffar claims that Jung’s idea of animus is gynophobic for a 
woman, because it “pulls her away from herself, and it is only by heroic efforts” 
that a woman extricates herself (El Saffar, 1994, p. 14).99 She argues Jung’s 
concept constitutes “yet another captivated and diminished expression of 
women, one that is nothing more than a reflection of a male psyche” (ibid., p. x).   
El Saffar is so convinced that Jung’ concepts reinforce a patriarchal culture that 
she is “led to call into question the process of individuation described by Jung, at 
least as that process is applied to women” (ibid., p. 5). Likewise, Frances Gray 
questions “the gendered nature of individuation” (Gray, 2008, p. 38). In her view, 
“women can be individuated only if they are able to establish a speaking position 
that is genuinely their own” (ibid., p. 155). If the animus is merely the parroting of 
a patriarchal voice, it cannot reveal women as subjects.  Hence, we can see that 
much of Jung’s theorizing reflects a patriarchal perspective.   
 
If we admit the existence of anima/animus distinctions, and the properties of 
each archetype that render them masculine and feminine, we have a problem. 
                                            
98 For Instance, Christine Downing claims that women “experience the encounter with the anima 
as the rediscovery of what is already our self rather than as the discovery of an unknown ‘other’ 
within” (Downing, 1992, p. 6 ). 
99 Yet in Jung’s schema it is the animus itself, which “gives to a woman’s consciousness a 
capacity for reflection, deliberation, and self knowledge” (C. G. Jung, 1977, Volume 9 part 2, 
§33). 
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Briefly, in this traditional trope, the ‘feminine’ is seen to be passive, aligned with 
the moon, diffused, soft, irrational, relational and adaptive; ‘masculine’ is seen to 
be aggressive, focussed, aligned with the sun, hard, penetrating, rational, 
directional; anima is based on feminine qualities, and is also said to be moody 
and petulant; animus is conversely based on masculine qualities.  I argue that if 
men’s view of the feminine and women is founded on distortions of their own 
anima, then it follows that women’s view of man and the masculine is based on 
distortions of their own animus, an animus that consists, according to Jung, in 
“the sum of conventional opinions” (C. G. Jung, 1982, p. 196), about men and 
presumed to be held by men. This is a doubly-serious situation for women; if 
patriarchal culture itself is a distortion of what men and the masculine might be or 
become, when women ‘develop their animus’  - a contentious point in itself - they 
would be internalizing that culture, a culture in the masculine. Is it possible to 
make a distinction between masculine symbolic/patriarchy as it currently stands, 
(“the sum of conventional opinions”) and a re-imagined and transformed 
masculinity, based on the sexuate difference of Luce Irigaray? Until that future 
time, Irigaray’s approach is to attempt to remove women completely from 
patriarchal influence, while at the same time promoting a respect for sexuate 
difference, in effect a bilateral development.  This leads me to engage both 
Irigaray and Kristeva’s ideas of ‘the feminine’. 
 
Is Irigaray right to be “extremely suspicious of any use of the term ‘feminine’ by 
men and its ascriptions to women?  She understands these associations as an 
inevitable symptom of a male ordering of the world” (Joy, 2006, p. 66) Many 
Jungian writers agree with Irigaray’s position; Christine Downing, Esther Harding 
and Irene Claremont de Castillejo argue that the ‘soul image’ of women is 
feminine, not masculine, (that is, not animus) and James Hillman attempted to 
disconnect anima/animus from contra-sexuality.  For both Harding and Luce 
Irigaray, the conscious ego-orientation of both men and women may be  
‘masculine’, and thus aligned with patriarchal culture, “and both men and women 
may need to struggle to access their more undeveloped and unknown ‘feminine’ 
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potential, their anima” (Downing, 1992, pp. 5, my emphasis). However, Luce 
Irigaray disagrees that ‘the feminine’ is accessible to men, as will become clear. 
Luce Irigaray acknowledges that the dominance of phallogocentric culture might 
be as damaging to men as it is to women, when she frames an ethical relation 
between men and women not founded on male supremacy.  However, she firmly 
advocates sexuate difference as a constant difference between men and women. 
The idea of anima and animus are far from her discussion.  I now put 
anima/animus aside, while I consider other theorizing around the notion of the 
feminine, and I begin with feminine identity.  I then move on to consider a 
feminine genealogy, the feminine imaginary, and feminine experience. 
Feminine Identity 
What do I mean by ‘feminine identity’, and identity as woman? Irigaray does not 
think she can say what a woman is or what femininity is (Zakin, 2011). Although 
woman and women are central to Luce Irigaray’s work, she does not attempt a 
definition. Similarly, Beauvoir does not mention feminine ‘identity’ once in The 
Second Sex. A discussion of the merits of using identity as against subjectivity 
has little use for my purposes here.100  Rather, I argue for a notion of feminine 
subjectivity that is multiple, shifting and changing, and possibly at odds with fixed 
notions of culture, language, race, class, sex and gender, or even sexuate 
difference.101  In the following exploration, I do not expect to discover a fixed 
feminine identity. 
 
This section would not be complete without mention of Jaques Lacan, and his 
notions of a ‘feminine position’. I will elaborate this idea in chapter three, when I 
                                            
100 Briefly, the concept of identity has its roots in a modernist discourse where the core of an 
individual is seen as stable – an accomplished fact - and is founded on developmental 
psychology. Subjectivity on the other hand is founded on a postmodern and poststructuralist 
discourse and focuses on the making of the subject, who knowingly expresses meaning.   
101A Buddhist approach to the question of identity engages Luce Irigaray’s 
sensible/transcendental where the limited self of the body (the sensible) and the unlimited not-self 
(the transcendental) are held to coexist. The Buddhist terms of ‘self’ and ‘not-self’ are not 
oppositional but rather co-existing. And, as Jean Byrne points out “our true nature is therefore 
understood as not tied to notions of male and female, but as interdependent, unconditioned and 
nongendered” (Byrne, 2004, p. 6).  This disengages us from a dualistic trope, and gives us a 
broader and inclusive language to discuss both identity and spirituality.   
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discuss language in relation to the Symbolic, and give the case of Schreber who 
in Lacan’s view took the feminine position, that is a position outside the Symbolic. 
In a patriarchy which remains stable, or tries to remain stable and fixed, through 
establishing credo in the Symbolic, I argue that it is women, or those taking the 
‘feminine’ position, (such as Schreber) who try to find a new way through, to 
frame being by means of freedom rather than the constraints found in language, 
the Symbolic, credo. Those who take the feminine position are willing to take the 
risks of change because the symbolic, the status quo, does not preserve or 
secure their identity in the same way as those taking the masculine or patriarchal 
position.   According to Lacan, those who take the feminine position know what 
the phallic position is but they see through it. This alludes to the story of the 
Emperor’s clothes.  Recognizing that the emperor is naked is not a good thing (or 
even possible) for those who adhere to the patriarchal/Symbolic order, but it is 
necessary for - ‘and natural’ to - women.102 From my perspective, this opens an 
immense possibility for women; why crave definition (or a position) if it is 
conferred by the Phallic, for it’s own purposes?  The ‘feminine position’ is also 
related to jouissance, which I will elaborate in chapter four. 
 
In summary to this point, although my definition of ‘the feminine’ is no longer 
provisional, (the point at which I began this chapter) I have not been able to 
discover a stable or absolute definition, but multiple possibilities.  Nevertheless, 
‘the feminine’ clearly has to do with bodies, and flesh, that is, embodiment.  A 
more elaborate definition will emerge as I proceed. Another way of positing the 
feminine, with multiple possibilities, is through the notion of a feminine 
genealogy. 
                                            
102 Lacan, in his Seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, makes the point that in the symbolic 
the Emperor wears clothes, but that women see his nakedness ‘under his clothes’ - under the 
symbolic. Women are the not-duped ones.  Psychoanalysis also unmasks, in a way that women 
already know (Lacan, 1992, p. 231; 1998).  According to Lacan, psychotics are also not-duped 
ones (along with mystics).  From Lacan’s point of view, that is the point of view of the 
masculine/symbolic, the non-duped err because they do not come under the Name of the Father.  
From the perspective that I am arguing here, that is of the feminine, the not-duped one does not 
err, but escapes the imprinting of the patriarchal/Symbolic.  This is, of course, a threat to the 
cohesion of the masculine/symbolic and the authority of the Name of the Father. 
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Genealogy  
A further exploration outside the essentialism/social construction debate 
proposed by Luce Irigaray, is that of a separate genealogy for women. Recall 
Heinämaa’s situating of an individual woman as a ‘stylistic variation’ of a 
‘feminine way’. It is Le Doeuff who encourages women to recognize their part in a 
collective feminine history (Le Dœuff, 2007, pp. 126-133, 193-194, 224-230), 
rather than focus on a narcissistic singularity.  P.S. Anderson urges us to be 
aware of this collectivity as a necessity in cultivating “the appropriate spiritual 
dispositions”, which in her view include “hope, love, and joy in their liberation” (P. 
S. Anderson, 2012, p. 183). The recognition of collective history can be seen as 
a genealogy. For Irigaray, a maternal genealogy needs to take its place 
alongside and in conjunction with, the traditionally recognized paternal 
genealogy, where “women’s desire could be represented for itself” (Whitford, 
1991c, p. 28). Firstly, a woman would situate herself with respect to her mother 
“in order to mediate relationships between themselves”.  Further, “the divine and 
maternal genealogy, are conditions for ending women’s status as sacrificial 
objects” in androcentric culture, through paternal genealogy (ibid., p. 159).  
Women would, through having a genealogy of their own, not sacrifice their own 
name and lineage, and would no longer be attached to the male genealogy. 
Ultimately, women’s lineage would extend to a feminine God, just as men’s is to 
a masculine God. While this idea represents Irigaray’s earlier work, the two 
genealogies continue to be essential to sexuate difference.  
 
One of the thinkers who has developed Irigaray’s concept of genealogy as a way 
of interpreting femininity for women is Alison Stone, who places it in the context 
of the essentialism and anti-essentialism debate. When women “have a 
‘genealogy’, women always acquire femininity by appropriating and reworking 
existing cultural interpretations of femininity, so that all women become situated 
within a history of overlapping chains of interpretation” (Stone, 2004, p. 135, my 
emphasis). Stone argues that all women are located on this ongoing chain, and 
the genealogy arises because the process is both a “history of concepts of 
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femininity, but is also, simultaneously, a history of women themselves, as 
individuals who become women by taking on and adapting existing concepts of 
femininity” (ibid., p. 150). Such adapting of existing concepts calls to mind Jung’s 
idea of archetypes, which change through the ages, and are adapted by the way 
we live. For Stone:  
each reinterpretation of femininity must overlap in content with the 
interpretation that it modifies, preserving some elements of that pre-
existing interpretation while abandoning others.  Through the 
resulting process of attrition of meanings, each woman will find 
herself in a series of gradually diminishing connections with women 
of previous generations. Moreover, within a single generation, each 
woman’s reinterpretation of femininity will overlap in content, to 
varying degrees, with other women’s reinterpretations (ibid., p. 150).  
 
Here, “women remain connected indirectly by long chains of reinterpretation of 
femininity” (ibid., p. 152).  Each woman is then aware of interpreting the culture in 
her own way, mediating it.  Thus women are able to experience themselves as 
agents of change, to “undertake transformative reinterpretations of the meanings 
of femininity that have become sedimented within their own cultures” (ibid.). The 
major contribution of this approach for women, and as women, is that women can 
experience themselves both as individuals and as a collective. In other words, 
within this model of genealogy, a singular woman does not misrepresent other 
women when she speaks ‘as a woman’, and as herself.103 However, Luce Irigaray 
herself is cautious about the genealogical relation because it can rely on the 
sustaining of family dynamics, (albeit within a group of women) in the form of 
‘umbilical’ attachment, and argues that women need to move beyond this 
(Irigaray, 2010b).  Irigaray’s proposal of a feminine genealogy re-imagines 
women in a context that removes them from patriarchal genealogy.  Let us now 
interrogate the imaginary itself for further understanding of how this might serve 
feminine becoming. 
                                            
103 For Irigaray, female genealogy represents a stepping-stone where she elaborates culture 
inherited from the feminine line.  She believes that we cannot stop with this elaboration, lest we 
remain children and must therefore move outside a genealogical relation, but respect it even as 
we leave it behind. It constitutes a vertical axis, and her further development of sexuate difference 
develops a horizontal axis. (Irigaray, 2010b) 
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Feminine Imaginary 
As a further inquiry into ‘the feminine’, I turn to the feminine imaginary.104 Luce 
Irigaray employs the Lacanian imaginary body in her discussions about Western 
culture’s bias against women. She argues that cultures project dominant 
imaginary schemes, which then affect how that culture understands and defines 
itself. According to Irigaray, in Western culture, the imaginary body that 
dominates is a male body, and therefore a feminine imaginary needs to be 
developed which privileges women’s morphology, in both the anatomical and 
linguistic meanings, which I will discuss later.  As it stands, according to 
traditional psychoanalysis, women are regarded as defective men, reflecting the 
defectiveness and poverty of the imaginary itself.  The imaginary is a prelude to 
the symbolic, and thus women are inadequately symbolized, or symbolized only 
in male terms.  Irigaray works towards stimulating the social imaginary to display 
feminine representations, which she also intends will alter the Symbolic. Although 
Irigaray asserts that there is a female imaginary, she does not outline exactly 
what the female imaginary is because, "this is something which women still have 
to create and invent collectively” (Whitford, 1991a, p. 9).  The concept of 
genealogy, which I just discussed, is one way of developing a feminine 
imaginary, and if we view it in this way it still has value.  My chapter four, 
“Mysticism as Feminine Divine”, also contributes to a feminine imaginary. 
 
I argue that women have primarily relied upon a masculine imaginary, based 
upon the ideals of men, including their divine ideal. Thus woman, conceived in 
this way, is a product of man’s ideal, not of her own ideals, or her own becoming. 
So our understanding of what ‘woman’ is, is based upon an appropriation of her 
subjectivity. Corollary to this, what we can recognize as an extreme 
‘masculinisation’ – the patriarchy - equates the image of God in man with male 
supremacy, and women with derogation.  This patriarchal assumption of 
                                            
104 Lacan’s work centred on a triad of ideas: the Symbolic is a set of differentiated signifiers, 
including language itself; the Imaginary serves as a mediator between internal and external 
worlds, and is oriented towards cohesion; the Real is that which is unsymbolized, always present, 
and outside language.  For Lacan, all of these can be seen as spaces in which certain aspects of 
subjectivity operate. 
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supremacy lives on the human imagination (Daly, 1973, p. 19), and I emphasize 
that it is through the imaginary, and the images on which we rely, where change 
begins. 
 
How, in this context, are Jung and Luce Irigaray connected? As I flagged in the 
Introduction, I will now discuss how Luce Irigaray proposes that through mimesis 
she resubmits women to stereotypical views held by men, in order to call the 
views themselves into question. In mimesis she uses the methodology of 
psychoanalysis, where negative views can only be overcome when they are 
exposed; she takes on androcentric forms and reframes them in a feminine 
voice. This inevitably alters the discourse - and the relationship - between men 
and women, which she intends as therapeutic.  As Jean Byrne puts it, “her idea 
is that by receiving and interpreting the male unconscious women/Irigaray can 
help man to know himself and break free from his narcissistic imaginary” (Byrne, 
2008, p. 59). 
 
Naomi Schor (Schor & Weed, 1994b, pp. 40-62) discusses Luce Irigaray’s use of 
mimesis, describing her strategy as an instance of Derrida’s term, paleonomy, 
“the occasional maintenance of an old name in order to launch a new concept” 
(ibid., p. 51). Margaret Whitford sympathetically defends Luce Irigaray’s use of 
mimesis because the feminine role must be assumed deliberately. Thus by 
mimesis a form of subordination is converted into an affirmation, and thus begins 
to thwart it (Whitford, 1991b, p. 71). When questioned about the value of 
mimesis, Luce Irigaray said it was a strategy useful to her past thinking (Irigaray, 
2010b).  Although mimesis is no longer useful to Luce Irigaray, I nevertheless 
argue that it has specific value in the instance I am defending here. When Luce 
Irigaray uncovers “what she calls the ‘feminine imaginary,’ the repressed [i.e. 
unconscious] underside of masculine subjectivity and rationality” (Hollywood, 
1994, p. 168), she is revealing what Jung termed the anima, in other words, the 
way the imaginary functions in Western androcentric culture.  Thus, in my view, 
Luce Irigaray’s repressed feminine imaginary correlates to Jung’s anima. This is 
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the way that men have imagined women, (as a feminine ideal, the anima) and 
projected this imagination upon women. As Jung says, “the effect of projections 
is to isolate the individual from his environment, since instead of a real relation to 
it, there is now only an illusory one. Projections change the world into the replica 
of one’s own unknown face” (C. G. Jung, 1982, p. 190). The replica of one’s 
unknown face, for a man, is the anima, or his inner concept of how a woman 
should be. (And conversely, if we allow this argument, the unknown face of a 
woman would be the animus.) Jung continues; “every beloved is forced to 
become the carrier and embodiment of this omnipresent and ageless image...It 
belongs to him, this perilous image of Woman” (ibid., p. 194). This is the 
‘narcissistic imaginary’ and it is this “omnipresent and ageless image” that man 
(and, it must be said, patriarchal culture in general) projects upon woman, which 
must be challenged in two ways.  First, by becoming aware of the projection and 
withdrawing it, and second by resisting and transforming the projection.  Women 
can do this by living an authentic life of their own, in response to their individual 
embodiment, rather than a collective ideal, as I will outline shortly.  
Fundamentally the authentic life is individuation for Jung and becoming for Luce 
Irigaray.   
 
For Luce Irigaray, individuation is also the foundation for the “horizontal couple”. 
She stresses that men and women “have to discover a new way of differing as 
human by entering into communication as two different subjectivities” (Irigaray, 
2004b, p. xii).  This requires that neither men nor women project upon the other, 
but allow not only a sexuate becoming, but also a specifically individual 
becoming.105 One of the essential ways in which this can be done is by becoming 
aware of anima/animus projections, either given or received, for one’s own 
freedom, as well as the freedom of the sexuate other.  As Irigaray says, 
“solicitude for the other thus partly amounts to suspending all projections or plans 
                                            
105 Equally, I believe that women project anima upon each other, notwithstanding Jung’s 
argument that the anima is only projected by men upon women (C. G. Jung, 1982, p. 205). 
 80 
about them” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 79, my emphasis). ‘Projections’ here would, in 
my view, be unconscious, and ‘plans’ conscious. 
 
In refusing the anima-projection of men, women subvert the role prescribed for 
them in patriarchal culture, via the masculine imaginary. Irigaray, has more to say 
in this regard.  She proposes that, through the strategy of mimesis, women 
temporarily occupy the male unconscious because she believes that men need a 
person to 
enable them to understand themselves and find their limits. Only 
women can play this role… In their role as analyst of the male 
imaginary, women have temporarily to occupy - but just as a technique 
this time – the unconscious position of the male psyche.  Just as the 
analyst first receives and then interprets the unconscious projections 
of the analysand, women have to be for men what they cannot be for 
themselves (receive the projections) and then interpret their 
phantasies (Whitford, 1991b, p. 36). 
  
It is through this device of mimesis that Irigaray believes that women could 
transform “women's masquerade, her so called femininity into a means of 
reappropriating the feminine" (Schor, 1995, p. 53). However, reinterpreting a 
narcissistic imaginary is a perilous activity for an individual’s subjectivity.  
According to Irigaray, the ‘holding of one’s own breath’  
allows us to pay attention to the other in a suspension of our own 
becoming.  Because if such a task were to be the only one to which 
one devotes oneself, one would soon stop being. Holding one’s 
breath in order to listen to the other without a project or an a priori, 
other than to help the other to be, exceeds our possibilities as living 
beings if such a gesture intends to be permanent and univocal. In the 
meeting with the other, it belongs to each one to keep on hold one’s 
own becoming in order to lend assistance to the other’s becoming. 
…We have not yet reached such a coexistence with the other, or we 
have already forgotten it (Irigaray, 2008b, pp. 128-129). 
 
I argue that this “holding one’s breath” would mean initially accepting the anima-
projections of men, and Luce Irigaray stresses that this can only be done for a 
short time. Accepting the projections implies that one recognizes the projections 
as projections, and Jung poses this as “a moral achievement beyond the 
ordinary” (C. G. Jung, 1982, p. 189).  The next stage is, as Jung argues, the 
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“requirement that projections should be dissolved” and that by doing so we are 
“entering upon new ground” (ibid., p. 200), and that we must be prepared for “the 
moral and intellectual exertions that are needed to dissolve them” (ibid., p. 202). 
Ultimately, according to Irigaray, “woman has to separate off from the world that 
is imposed on her”, the anima projections, and then “found a world of her own”; 
furthermore, she must find “the means of coexisting with a world irreducible to 
her own”, lest she still remain “dwelling in and subjected to the world of the other” 
(Irigaray, 2008b, p. xvii). So, women must not only transform the projections 
upon them, but also not impose animus projections upon men, thus achieving 
Irigaray’s ideal of coexistence. In so doing, a woman is transforming projections 
into something that truly reflects her rather than a counterfeit, and then educating 
the man’s notion of the feminine/anima through the life she lives, and thus 
changing his ‘ideal’, and living her own.  My concern is that this is a very 
circuitous way of developing a subject-position for women, via a woman 
transforming the way the masculine views her.  However, given that the 
unconscious projections/imaginations of both sexes are internalized by the other, 
it is perhaps starting with the situation as it currently stands.  
 
An example of Irigaray’s use of mimesis in transforming androcentric forms is 
virginity.  Taking the phallocentric valuing of literal virginity (an intact hymen), she 
refigures female virginity not only as the basis for female sexuate rights, but also 
as a concept of feminine integrity, which is physical and even spiritual. I develop 
the theme of virginity fully in chapters five and six, where, through the fairy tale of 
the Handless Maiden, I demonstrate the transformation of the projected 
androcentric ideal into a feminine value of self-realization. 
 
In the following chapters, I will argue for women’s lived experience in body, 
language and spirituality.  But what do I mean by experience?  
 
Genevieve Lloyd, in “The Man of Reason” summarizes experience thus: 
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Experience is always mediated by the location of experiencing 
subjects within a certain time, place, culture and environment, and it is 
always shaped as much by unconscious considerations and 
motivations.  It is, arguably, also shaped by the gender of the 
experiencer.   But stereotypes constitute a particular sort of knower-
overlay upon these structures, of whose effects one can become 
aware, and which one can work to rethink and restructure (Lloyd, 
1989, p. 160).  
 
This passage brings to our attention the problem that experience is always 
mediated by situation. Likewise, unconscious considerations and motivations will 
both affect and effect lived experience.  Further, that experience is sexuate, 
shaped by the sex of the experiencer.106  I point out that we can become aware of 
stereotypes, and differentiate them from genuine, or creative experience. I will 
later consider experience as intersubjective, and question how authoritative we 
can assume experience to be.  But before I examine these questions in more 
detail, I define the two aspects of experience. 
 
There are two complementary accounts of experience; namely the ‘first person’ 
stance, which is subjectively lived, phenomenologically described, and felt rather 
than explained; and the ‘third person’ stance, which is impersonal, explanatory, 
and discursive (Kruks, 2001, p. 141).  These two accounts bring to mind the two 
strands of feminist theory I mentioned in the Introduction, namely as parler 
femme, to speak as a woman, namely the first-person (libido) stance of primary 
experience, and women as viable subjects of knowledge, that is the third-person 
stance (credo) of interpretation and theorizing. 
   
                                            
106 That experience is socially constructed by a male hegemony, and awakening into the sexuate-
specific women’s experience is conceived by Patricia Lynn Reilly thus: “Whether shouted at 
women in the religious institutions of their childhoods or whispered to them in the culture, the 
religious words and images of Father God, of judgement and punishment, of unworthiness and 
shame, of a sinful Eve and an obedient Mary linger in women’s memories.  Whether recited 
weekly in Sabbath School or experienced daily in the design of their parents’ relations, the 
religious myths of the exclusively male God, of Original Sin, and of the necessity of a male 
saviour are deeply ingrained within women’s lives.  These remnants of our religious past pursue 
us into adulthood and interfere with the development of a self-defined spirituality.  In the company 
of women, our imaginations will be freed from the crippling effects of these childhood myths and 
our courage will be awakened as we name our own gods and design our own women-defined 
spirituality” (Reilly, 1995, p. 3). 
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I will rely on these two positions - libido and credo - in chapter four, libido being 
the primary experience, and credo being cultural-linguistic interpretation. The first 
person stance represents the libido aspect, because it is phenomenological, it is 
lived.   As part of lived experience, there are modalities that elude speech and 
“which we come to ‘know’ through non-intellectual, embodied, cognition. For we 
experience not only what is unspoken but even unspeakable” (Kruks, 2001, pp. 
13-14). Knowing through the body is something I consider in the next chapter.  
This leads me to privilege the lived feminine body, as does Kruks, and to 
consider “’female experience’ as an irreducible given grounded in female 
embodiment” (Oksala, 2004, p. 100).   
 
As we have already seen, experience is ‘situated’, and the working of the 
representational system in which women’s experience occurs is part of that 
experience (Scott, 1992).  That is, our interpretation of the experience will be 
influenced and informed by the culture in which it occurs.   It is also informed by 
archetypes and stereotypes, of which we can become aware.  I argue, however, 
that finding new terms, a new imaginary, new language - inflected with the 
feminine rather than the masculine/Symbolic – is as important as knowing the 
limitations of the cultural interpretations of experience. 
 
One way in which a ‘feminine inflection’ is discerned is through the possibility that 
women arrive at knowledge differently to men, as discussed by Luce Irigaray and 
Carol Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982) and that women’s direct experience, in 
contradistinction to women’s belief, is a source of that knowledge.  In an attempt 
to retrieve women from invisibility, 1970s feminist theorists held that experience 
was the irreducible starting point for understanding the situation of women, and 
differentiating it from the situation and experience of men.   
 
Let us see how a differentiation between the experiences of men and women 
might be made, keeping in mind the sexuate difference so important to Luce 
Irigaray.  Does the appeal to the authority of both sexuate and personal 
 84 
experience promote discussion, or halt it, if the experience of each is held to be 
absolute and unquestioned? Can this result in a kind of tyranny of experience?  
In contrast, should any experience be precluded from the production of 
knowledge?  Does one run a risk in appealing to experience as the ultimate test 
of all knowledge, as the most reliable way in which knowledge is received? Does 
experience overlook the many mediations involved in the process, through belief, 
culture, gender, body and personal psychology?  One of the benefits of post-
structuralist thought is that through it experience can be examined.  As Fuss 
says, “the category of ‘female experience’ holds a particularly sacrosanct position 
in Women’s Studies programs, programs which often draw on the very notion of 
a hitherto repressed and devalued female experience to form the basis of a new 
feminist epistemology” (Fuss, 1989, p. 113).  This is understandable, because 
‘female experience’ has hitherto been derogated and subsumed in a masculine 
hegemony.  In critiquing the cultural influences on experience itself, we must 
nevertheless maintain respect for the category of individual experience, and not 
demolish or diminish it entirely.  Does the social constructionist argument “shift 
from the singular to the plural in order to privilege heterogeneity and to highlight 
important cultural and social differences” (Fuss, 1989, p. 4)?  I argue that if it 
does, then the heterogeneity becomes that ideal/God, a multiplicity to whom the 
individual is oriented.  Does heterogeneity refute biological determinism, and 
promote infinite variation?  Toril Moi, is vigilant to expose ideological dangers, 
from which “no one word can serve as talismatic protection” (Moi, 1999, p. 32).  
She is warning that elements of biological determinism and social construction 
are concealed or embedded in most concepts we use, and merely getting the 
terms right will not absolve us of the task of examining our confusion.  She 
argues that individual women’s experience will be influenced by more than 
sexual difference (Moi, 1999, p. 35). 
 
A further consideration in discussing women’s experience is that of women’s 
standpoint, which enables women to view their position in relation to the 
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collective that they are critiquing.107  Sandra Harding (1991) developed this 
distinct approach and stresses the embodied personal perspective rather than 
‘the-view-from-nowhere’.  Feminist standpoint theory emerged from a need to 
distinguish the production of knowledge from the practices of power (S. Harding, 
2004). Luce Irigaray, however, claims that this position is exclusionist and 
essentialist in that it proposes women’s standpoint in contradistinction to that of 
men.108  For Irigaray, certainly in her later writing, the place in which a successful 
future will blossom is between these two sexuate distinctions, in all fields, from 
personal relations to scientific research.   
 
I recognize, as does Genevieve Lloyd, that there are two “central, interconnected 
tasks that face feminist philosophers working in theory of knowledge”, namely 
“that of finding appropriate ways of knowing women’s experiences and the 
structures that shape them; and that of developing theoretical accounts of 
knowledge that retain continuity with those experiences” (Lloyd, 1989, p. 157).  
That is, by valuing accounts of both poles of experience.  I ask the question 
again, can ‘only women understand feminine experience’, as held by Luce 
Irigaray for instance? Is exclusion a necessary part of sexuate difference? 
Feminists are “unlikely to tolerate a theory that rejects or denies personal 
experience” (Schemen, 1996, p. 29).  The idea of genealogy, which I have 
already discussed, where each woman represents a variation on a feminine 
style, allows for both sexuate difference and the primacy of individual experience, 
and thus avoids the stereotyping of experience.  Likewise phenomenology, which 
relies on lived and individual experience. 
 
                                            
107 The work of feminist philosopher of religion Pamela Sue Anderson offers a good example of 
the feminist standpoint theory approach to religion and gender (P. S. Anderson, 1998). She sets 
out to revise and reform philosophy of religion by using feminist standpoint epistemology as 
developed by Sandra Harding in philosophy of science. A feminist standpoint is not the same as a 
woman's experiences, situation, or perspective. Applied to philosophy of religion, feminist 
standpoint epistemology involves thinking from the perspective of women who have been 
oppressed by specific monotheistic religious beliefs (Frankenberry, 2011).  
108 Seminar discussion with Luce Irigaray (Irigaray, 2010b). 
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 Central to Luce Irigaray’s work is relationality; she proposes an ethics-between, 
rather than an ethics toward.  In this view of experience, an ‘other’ who is forever 
outside my grasp, is always present. Michèle Le Doeuff is concerned that by 
arguing for sexuate difference one agrees “to the exclusion of reciprocal equality 
for each and every human being”, which is the conclusion reached by 
poststructuralist difference feminists, specifically Luce Irigaray. (P. S. Anderson, 
2012, p. 183). Anderson fears either “an extreme altruism, or on the other hand, 
debilitating narcissism; each ultimately render the ethical perspective of 
intersubjectivity impossible” (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 183). What I am arguing 
here is that it is through difference that a space between is created so the other 
can be approached. Child psychiatrist Donald Winnicott was prominent in object-
relations theory. For him intersubjectivity and experience go together.  He 
situates human experience "in the space between inner and outer worlds, which 
is also the space between people - the transitional space - that intimate 
relationships and creativity occur” (Winnicott, 1953, p. 150).  For Winnicott, the 
in-between is a relational space - relations with one’s self, and outer relations 
with the other.109 Here, one learns to “keep inner and outer experiences 
simultaneously separate and interrelated” (Thandeka, 1997, pp. 87-88). In this 
model, it is in the experience of the in-between that self and other are 
discovered. Thus the two subjectivities in a couple, heterosexual or otherwise, 
are both preserved and discovered in the “in between”. Luce Irigaray takes this 
further and places the relation with self, and between self and other, as 
constituting the divine, which is realizable in the present moment rather than in 
an ever-deferred future.  The important emphasis is that this divinity is 
discovered in the between, it is relational. 
 
This brings to mind the copula of Luce Irigaray. She uses the notion of air, as 
copula, to posit the shared space of a couple without loss of identity of either.  
Here air is "indispensible matter for life and for its transubstantiation into spirit” 
                                            
109 Winnicott also subscribed to the mediating aspect of air: For him, “this space is best conceived 
of as an environment, the self’s oxygen, its breath of life.  Without it, the psychoic health of the 
baby is asphyxiated; its emotional life becomes contorted” (quoted in Thandeka, 1997, p. 88). 
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(Irigaray, 1996, p. 148). In her exultant hymn of praise to the air, Irigaray 
attributes to it a maintaining of boundaries: “you who flow between one and the 
other but without destroying either’s boundaries proper.”  And that you “always 
keep yourself between us, whose distance allows us to approach each other” 
(Irigaray, 2001, p. 116).  It is this distance, this interval, which allows for ethical 
relations. 
 
An important consequence of a woman accepting her own experience is that it is 
a prelude to accepting otherness. As Luce Irigaray articulates, a hitherto 
unrecognized part of our truth  “can be revealed to us thanks to the other, if we 
are willing to partially open our own horizon in order to perceive and welcome the 
other as other without intending to dominate, colonize, or to integrate this other” 
(Irigaray, 2008b, p. 132).  This is not only a concept of openness, but is 
experienced. This two-fold acceptance gives women an authority, according to 
Anne Ulanov, which “engenders respect for other’s experiences and allows us to 
be open and at the same time clearly defined” (Ulanov, 1971, p. 133).  This 
relational framework  - relation with the self, relation with the other - is a means of 
“conceptualizing women’s experience in a more open-ended, historicized 
manner”, as Serene Jones comments (S. Jones, 1997, p. 38).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued for the feminine and woman in categories of their 
own, outside the normative phallogocentric poles of masculine and feminine. I 
relied on Luce Irigaray’s work on sexuate difference, through which she 
effectively erases the most persistent dogma of androcentrism, where the female 
has been subsumed in the male.  
 
I conclude that although women’s experience is subjected to, and a product of, 
cultural influences, women’s experiences are the fundamental ground of their life 
as women, biologically and spiritually. Elizabeth Grosz refers to the ‘primacy of 
corporeality’, that is, moving the body from the periphery of woman-as-subject 
and making it the “very stuff” of subjectivity (Grosz, 1994, p. ix). This category of 
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feminine embodied cognition might well elude the discursive upon which the 
masculine symbolic relies.  
 
In the next chapter, “Cultivating the Feminine Body”, I ask how might women’s 
embodied cognition be cultivated so as to incorporate the ‘becoming’, which is so 
important to Luce Irigaray, including ‘becoming divine’. My emphasis is that 
becoming is a project unique for each woman, which involves fleshly subjectivity 
and the spiritualization of that flesh.  In chapter four I will build on this point 
further to develop the notion of spiritual experience as a fleshly mysticism. My 
argument centres on the application of Luce Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental in 
the embodied life of women.  
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Chapter Two: The Feminine Body as Transfigured Flesh 
Introduction 
My purpose in this chapter is to discuss various ways in which the feminine body 
can be cultivated. According to P.S. Anderson, “a crucial feminist challenge in 
philosophy of religion is to free minds to affirm their bodily life within an ever-
greater perfection” (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 140), thus the necessity for me to 
argue for the affirmation of bodily life. I argue for the fundamental assumption 
that what all women share is female morphology,110 in both the linguistic and 
biological sense.111 In the biological sense, female morphology deals with the 
form and structure of the human being sexed as female, and in the linguistic 
sense, morphology relates to the structure and process of language.112  For some 
theorists, such as Luce Irigaray, language and its morphology is sexuate, which I 
discuss in the next chapter.113 
 
In this chapter, I interrogate various epistemologies to discover some of the ways 
that the feminine body is theorized and experienced.114 ‘The’ body and ‘my’ body 
already position some of those differences.115 I argue that women have been 
                                            
110 Is it essentialist to suggest that all women have the same body or that women share particular 
physical features (breasts, vagina, etc)? I am by no means inferring that women are then all the 
same in terms of other characteristics.  That women are ‘embodied’ is important, because the 
world is, arguably, experienced and known only through bodies.  However, the fact that all bodies 
are positioned constitutes part of the infinite variation.   
111 Elizabeth Spelman, in the chapter “Now you see her, now you don’t”, (Spelman, 1988, pp. 
160-187) asks, “Is there something all women have in common despite (or maybe even because 
of) their differences?” (ibid., p. 160).  She goes on to propose many answers to this question, but 
not the one that I would give, that is, their fleshly bodies as female in variable details of race, 
biology, physiology, endocrinology, life-stage, etc. 
112 Merriam-Webster dictionary on-line. 
113 Luce Irigaray conducts linguistic experiments, the purpose of which is “to demystify the 
seeming neutrality of linguistic forms by uncovering the different, sexuate relations that inform the 
use of language by men and women respectively” (Hirsh & Olson, 1995, p. 343). “Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is interested in the body as a ‘speaking body’. The real body and the textual body 
are of a similar nature insofar as they are embodied in language” (Prud’homme & Légaré, 2006). 
114 Morris Berman asks “how is it then, that things such as emotions, or more generally the life of 
the body, gets left out of academic history?” (Berman, 1988, p. 108). 
115 Diana Fuss notes the difference between ‘the’ and ‘my’ in relation to the body: “The body 
connotes the abstract, the categorical, the generic, the scientific, the unlocalizable, the 
metaphysical; my body connotes the particular, the empirical, the local, the self-referential, the 
immediate, the material” (Fuss, 1989, p. 52).  
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encouraged to abstract themselves from the body, beginning with Plato.116 
Furthermore, the feminine body is deprecated in the masculine-symbolic.117  I 
give only passing reference to those epistemologies which abstract the female 
body, because I am concerned with the experiences of fleshly, bodily women. 118 
 
 I want to argue for a cultivation of the body based on the immediate experience 
of that body, so the body is my starting point.119 P.S. Anderson reminds us of 
Amy Hollywood’s endeavour to introduce feminist philosophers of religion to the 
development of subjectivity through bodily and ritual practices, rather than 
through a focus on belief (P. S. Anderson, 2012, pp. 183-184).  Thus I argue that 
it is through the body and body practices that a woman’s subjectivity is 
developed. I focus on the cultivation of the breath as spiritual practice and its 
relation to the sensible/transcendental as a way of reinstating the carnality of the 
divine. I develop Luce Irigaray’s ideas on cultivation because they represent a 
practical strategy for women’s becoming and are directly related to an experience 
of the sensible/transcendental.   
 
                                            
116 The “reification of disembodiment, not surprisingly, influences the extent to which philosophers 
of religion are able to see the realm of the body as of any real philosophical interest” (P. S. 
Anderson & Clack, 2004, p. 151). 
117 Much scholarship has been devoted to these subjects. See Luce Irigaray Speculum of the 
other woman (1985); Elizabeth Grosz Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (1994) and 
The Force of Sexual Difference (2006); Margaret Whitford Irigaray's Body Symbolic (1991a); 
Jean Byrne Enlightenment Between Two: Luce Irigaray, Sexual Difference and Nondual Oneness 
(2008).  
118 That the corporeal body might provide a stable foundation from which to examine the body is 
discussed by Susan Rowland as follows: “Theorists suspicious of the anti-foundationalist stance 
of post-modernism have often turned to the body as a source of secure meaning. Surely the body 
provides grounds for some truths now that the mind and subjectivity are no longer reliable?  
Feminisms can be tempted to resort to the sexed body as an unproblematic source of truth.  The 
corporeal is so self-evidently fixed in contrast to the instabilities of postmodern gender” (Rowland, 
2002, p. 133). 
119Feminist theological inquiry must, I believe, include the body/flesh.  For example, Janet 
Soskice asks “why should disengagement from the society of the emotional and sensual world be 
our path to spiritual excellence?” (Soskice, 2004, p. 215). Here the emotional, sensual world and 
the ‘animal’ responses of the body are claimed to be important guides to spiritual development.  
Irigaray also contributes to this position when she says: “It is significant in our cultures man thinks 
or prays by estranging himself from the body, and that thinking or praying does not assist him in 
becoming incarnate, in becoming flesh.  Yet if thinking means becoming aware of one’s natural 
immediacy, that does not mean that it has to be sacrificed” (Irigaray, 1996, p. 40). 
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I pause to consider the word ‘cultivation’ itself, because it is a key concept in 
Luce Irigaray’s work. ‘Cultivation’ has an agricultural back-ground, so to speak, 
with implications of preparation, development, improvement, tending and caring; 
the metaphors associated with it are those of nature, thus fulfilling Irigaray’s own 
requirement that metaphor reflect the natural world. Cultivation implies ‘to come 
to have gradually’, and thus avoids reaching “too quickly to the highest summit” 
(Irigaray, 2007a, p. 364), as Irigaray cautioned.  Hence its suitability for what I 
have argued as a feminine mode, that of a process and ‘becoming’, rather than 
positing and achieving a fixed goal. 
 
Beginning with Western cultivation practices which support this view, I then move 
to Eastern ideas as does Luce Irigaray in her ‘Eastern turn’, represented by her 
text Between East and West (2003). 
Cultivating the Feminine Body  
In Simone de Beauvoir’s scholarly analysis of the situation of women in history 
and her own time, The Second Sex, the experience of the feminine body is 
considered in its entirety; changing hormones, pregnancy and childbirth make 
women’s experience of body entirely different to how a man experiences his 
body. For Beauvoir it is clear that men’s theories either assume that women live 
their bodies in the same way as men, or that women’s mode of experience is 
seen as a deviant form of the male. Beauvoir is not satisfied with Merleau-
Ponty’s claim, in Phenomenology of Perception; “so I am my body, in so far, at 
least, as my experience goes, and conversely my body is like a life-model, or like 
a preliminary sketch, for my total being”.120  For de Beauvoir, there is a 
dissonance between her intentions and the female body, which is “dominated by 
fatality and shot through with mysterious caprices” (de Beauvoir, 1989, p. 598), 
namely hormonal changes, which make her body seem unreliable and an 
obstacle to her own purposes. Neither is Beauvoir satisfied with Heidegger’s idea 
of body as “an assemblage of implements…intermediate between [a woman’s] 
                                            
120 Quoted by Beauvoir as a footnote (de Beauvoir, 1989, p. 29). 
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will and her goals” (ibid.).  She makes her point that “woman, like man, is her 
body; but her body is something other than herself” (ibid., p. 29).  In de 
Beauvoir’s view, Heidegger’s being-in-the-world revealed a masculine view of 
usefulness and suitability, a practical world ready to hand, not experienced by 
women. 
 
So, in Beauvoir’s view, a woman's body is different from a man's and thus gives 
rise to a different kind of experience of the world. For Beauvoir, specific bodily 
experiences constitute a different bodily consciousness for men and women, who 
live in their different ways the strange ambiguity of existence made body. For, as 
Beauvoir says, “the body being the instrument of our grasp upon the world, the 
world is bound to seem a very different thing when apprehended in one manner 
or another” (ibid., p. 32). Thus the body sexed as female apprehends the world in 
a very different way than one sexed as male.  So woman's body is her starting 
point and man's his. The biological differences are constitutive of different 
experience and its expression in the world.  I argue that a woman’s body, through 
such hormonal mediations as menstruation, pregnancy, lactation and 
menopause, introduces her to a specific female way of “becoming divine.” Later, I 
will argue that Beauvoir’s notion of the world being apprehended differently in 
“one manner or another” can be applied not only to the sexed body, but also to 
the ‘cultivated’ and ‘uncultivated’ body. 
 
Building on Beauvoir, feminist thinkers such as Betty Friedan propose that 
women will be liberated when “they choose the painful growth to full identity” over 
‘femininity’, and when they are allowed and encouraged to do the things that men 
have done, and which avoid tasks done by or for the body in traditional women’s 
roles (Friedan, 1963, pp. 181, 338-378). Friedan represents those feminists 
whose attitude to the body was what we might think of as quite traditional 
masculinist views. An extreme example of this view, aligned with Plato’s, is 
expressed by Shulamith Firestone, whose whole work centres around claims that 
woman’s essential self lies in her mind, and not in her body, thus privileging mind 
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over body and freeing her from the tyranny of the body (Firestone, 1970). She 
argued that technology could be assigned tasks previously performed by the 
body.   
 
Adrienne Rich provides a view to the contrary, and points out that a woman’s 
distancing herself from her body, and the body/mind distinction itself, prevents an 
adequate description of women’s experience. Her emphasis is not liberation from 
one’s feminine body, but liberation within one’s feminine body.  Rich argues that 
rather than being seen through the patriarchal view of being “pure Nature”; 
women can regard their physicality as “resource, rather than a destiny”.  Rich 
argues that in order to live a fully human life “we require not only control of our 
bodies (though control is a prerequisite); we must touch the unity and resonance 
of our physicality, our bond with the natural order, the corporeal ground of our 
intelligence” (Rich, 1977, p. 39). In this view, bodily life and bodily tasks are 
neither insignificant nor undignified.  Rich’s approach sees a woman’s path as 
separate to and distinct from patriarchal assumptions.121 I argue that this 
approach allows for the possibility that the body can be celebrated, rather than 
denigrated, and in a specific feminine way.  In this regard, Rich’s work presaged 
that of Luce Irigaray.  
 
The French philosopher Simone Weil, a contemporary of Beauvoir’s, was 
influenced by Eastern Philosophy, and in this way anticipated the work of Luce 
Irigaray.122  She tries to reconcile the despised body of Western philosophy and 
culture, with the idea of redeeming the body through spiritual practice. Weil 
wishes to “construct a philosophy of bodily, or somatic, practices” based on a “life 
                                            
121 This has very specific application to somatophobia, or ’flesh-loathing’, which is expressed in 
Western thought since Plato. Here the body or flesh, is loathed, by men of women, (and 
consequently by women of themselves) or where the wearer of one colour flesh is loathed by the 
possessors of another colour of flesh.  Luce Irigaray claims that if a respectful for sexuate 
difference is cultivated, then other body-based difference such as race will be accepted without 
prejudice, and somatophobia thus loses its power (Deutscher, 2002, p. 187). 
122 In this analysis of Simone Weil, I rely on the paper by Ann Pirruccello, “Making the world my 
body: Simone Weil and Somatic Practice”, (2002), whose research links Weil’s work to Eastern 
philosophy and practice. 
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lived in wakeful attentiveness” (Pirruccello, 2002, p. 480). Her aim is to 
“understand which practices might break open the human perspective and free it 
from a history of mediocre moral and religious conditioning” (Pirruccello, 2002, p. 
480). This “mediocre moral and religious conditioning” I later refer to as what is 
learned by the body unconsciously, the uncultivated body.  Weil’s perceptual and 
conceptual lives were linked closely with the practical activities of everyday. Her 
approach is important because her particular interest is “in epistemology and the 
importance of knowing with or through the body” (Pirruccello, 2002, p. 481).  Weil 
thinks, “the body is a lever for salvation.  But in what way?  What is the right way 
to use it?” (Weil, 1970, p. 330). She concludes that a “certain quality of attention 
is linked with effective movements, without effort or desire” (Weil, 1956, p. 170).   
Her idea of attention already posits a kind of cultivation. Her notion of “paying 
attention” (Weil, 1973, pp. 146-147) is so central to her thought that she 
experiences paying attention to another, or nature, as co-creating their very 
existence. She believes that there is a rhythm to life, bound up in the seasons; 
“through this rhythm we remain linked with the sun and the stars.  We must feel 
them through the medium of this rhythm, as through the stick of a blind man” 
(Weil, 1956, p. 22).  
 
Weil’s need to keep herself anchored in nature is reflected in Irigaray, who 
requires that women do not divide themselves from the seasons, from nature, for 
in nature “the body becomes spirit and the spirit body, or, rather, they both 
become flesh, and each by the other” (Irigaray, 2004a, p. 30).  However, when 
Weil describes a mystical experience she achieved while reciting the Lord’s 
Prayer, she relates that “the very first words tear my thoughts from my body and 
transport it to a place outside space” (Weil, 1973, p. 72).  If this is the ecstasis 
that Luce Irigaray equates with a distancing from her body,123 rather than an 
experiencing in and of the body, then it represents a flight from the body.  If, 
however, an ecstatic experience is a move from ego-identity to that of the 
                                            
123 Ek-stasis, or ecstasis comes from the Greek to stand outside one’s self.  Irigaray is suspicious 
of ecstasis because it takes one away from embodiment.  For her enstasis, staying with the body, 
is preferable.  
 95 
liberated self, this is not flight from the body but a radically different experience of 
the body, which I discuss further in chapter four.  
 
Weil's thought is useful because of her insistence that any change in one's 
manner of thinking is an illusion if the body has not participated.  The profound 
change of perspective that requires more than reflection or intellectual work 
alone, has resonance with my notion of cultivation of the body (Weil, 1956, pp. 
23-24).124  There is however, one very specific difference in Weil’s conception of 
how this body-cultivation might be achieved, and my view. For her, the 
involvement of the body is inevitably based on suffering and asceticism – “carnal 
privations” (Weil, 1956). There is no hint of the need for suffering in the Eastern 
approach,125 or in Luce Irigaray’s, as we shall see.126 In spite of her emphasis on 
body-based practices, Weil assumes that the “body is separate from, and inferior 
to, spirit and ideas” (Pirruccello, 2002, p. 497).  
 
I believe Weil’s attempts to place her own body in a spiritualized position was 
ultimately, at least in practice, thwarted by entrenched Western attitudes of the 
abnegation of the flesh.127  Yet Weil gives us a paradigm for a somatic practice, 
which enables body and spirit to intermingle.128 Her notion was that bodily 
practices, disciplines, and a certain kind of attention were necessary to provide 
tranquility and receptivity. How might these ideas be applied to Luce Irigaray’s 
notions of cultivation?  
                                            
124 This notion of intentional practice and body movement is met in the practice of yoga, but there 
is no evidence that Weil was a yoga practitioner. 
125 It must be pointed out, however, that one of the precepts of Buddhism is that life - specifically 
the uncultivated life - is suffering. 
126 According to Irigaray, “suffering does not in any way constitute a perfection, it is merely a 
means of restoration... Suffering, if it lasts more than a redemptive moment, is simply a denial of 
the divine” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 66). She links suffering to an androcentric ideal, inappropriate to 
women. 
127 Hildegard of Bingen likewise demonstrated an oscillation “between a joyful affirmation of the 
world and the body, and a melancholy horror of the flesh” (Newman, 1987, p. 21). 
128 “Nothing acts more immediately on the soul than the body” (Clément, 1994, p. 29), says 
Clément, articulating the influence of the body. 
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Transfigured flesh 
First, let us consider why cultivation is so important to Luce Irigaray.  For her, 
sexuate difference is the difference between men and women and constitutes the 
most fundamental difference, which extends to the way that sexual difference is 
evident in bodily, social, spiritual, linguistic, aesthetic, erotic, and political forms.  
Her emphasis is on ethical relations between men and women, based on sexuate 
difference.129 Fundamental to this view is her notion of the 
sensible/transcendental. How does the ‘sensible’ aspect, via the lived female 
body, better evade the phallogocentrism of language, and the male specular 
emphasis embedded in the patriarchy? How does this inform the argument?   
Luce Irigaray proposes the cultivation of the body as spiritual practice.  For her, 
this practice relies more on Eastern traditions than the West, although I will later 
give examples of some Western traditions, for instance Jewish Hassidic ecstatic 
prayer - where the body is cultivated in a similar manner.130 Let me begin with an 
exploration of Luce Irigaray's idea of the cultivation of the body as a contrast to 
the idea of leaving the body through repression and sublimation.131  
 
Luce Irigaray prefers to focus on growth, on cultivating the possibilities of what 
women might become (Irigaray, 2003, p. vii) rather than to accept identities 
already discovered in history, psychology and sociology.  It is with this purpose 
that she directs us towards eastern philosophy and practice, towards a 
“spiritualization of the body and the senses” (Irigaray, 2003, p. ix).  In taking up a 
                                            
129 See The Way of Love (Irigaray, 2004c); Sharing the World (Irigaray, 2008b); “Ethical Gestures 
towards the Other” (Irigaray, 2010a). 
130 For all the benefits of the framework of Eastern mind-body cultivation, and the inherent lack of 
gender bias in this process itself, the social reality is that it has been historically difficult for 
women to pursue a traditional Eastern path of training.  In the East, as much as in the West, 
women have had to insist upon their inclusion, with much resistance from the patriarchal powers.  
131 One way in which the body is derogated, is through the notion of sublimation. Freud defines 
sublimation as the turning of sexual and aggressive impulses toward ‘higher’ and more socially 
useful goals, and we can see the influence of Plato in this thinking.   I follow Norman O. Brown, 
however, who argues that sublimation is a bogus category, and that it is not a substitute for 
repression but a continuation of it (Brown, 1959, p. 307). The idea of sublimation — moving from 
something ‘lower’ to something ‘higher’ - involves shunning the potentialities of the body, and 
privileging the ‘higher’, thus reiterating a hierarchy between mind and body, and even more 
problematic for my argument, an orientation beyond the body and embodiment.  
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developmental perspective, she departs from classical psychoanalysis, which 
looks backwards into our past, and instead has more in common with Jung’s 
emphasis on future possibility.132 
 
Luce Irigaray’s notion of cultivation is multifaceted; namely cultivation of sensory 
perception and the body; of breath; of relatedness; of virginity and self-affection; 
of one’s self as woman; and ultimately ‘becoming divine’.  The aspects of 
cultivation that is most important here is cultivation in and of the body. Irigaray, in 
proposing the sensible/transcendental, returns us to our senses as a matter of 
priority. Before proceeding with the ‘sensible’ aspect, I focus on the 
‘transcendental’ aspect.  This is an integral part of my own term, embodied 
transcendence, which I introduced briefly in the Introduction. 
 
My term, embodied transcendence is intentionally ambiguous, and encapsulates 
a number of ideas appropriate to, or appropriated by, women’s spirituality. It 
seeks to counterbalance “one of the problems of modern theologies of 
experience that all the eggs of the theological basket are in a transcendental 
ground of human experience” (Briggs, 1997, p. 176), where the embodied aspect 
is overlooked or undervalued. Here is an overview of ideas on transcendence 
and embodiment which support my use of the term: First, that “God cannot be 
seen apart from matter, and He is seen more perfectly in the human materia than 
in any other, and more perfectly in woman than in man” Ibn Arabi (Quoted by 
Schimmel, 2011, p. 431). This opinion accords with my own emphasis, that in 
arguing for the material body, I simultaneously argue for the spiritual.  I do not 
privilege female embodiment over male embodiment, but rather argue for the 
divinity of human materiality, or embodied transcendence. This gives us grounds 
to imagine that humanity is not subject to transcendence, but rather a subject of 
transcendence, or belonging to transcendence in their materiality.  
                                            
132 Jung, for instance, in discussing dreams says: “Unconscious thinking would be quite 
inadequately characterized if we consider it only from the standpoint of its historical determinants.  
For a complete evaluation we have unquestionably to consider its teleological or prospective 
significance as well” (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume four, §452).  While Jung is not proposing an aim 
in advance, he clearly advocates a forward-looking perspective, informed by the unconscious. 
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Feminist philosophers of religion, such as Nancy Frankenbury, take a similar 
view; “contemporary women’s articulation of a relation between God and the 
world depicts the divine as continuous with the world rather than as radically 
transcendent ontologically or metaphysically. Divine transcendence is seen to 
consist in total immanence” (Frankenbury, 2004, p. 11). Thus the immanence of 
embodiment is simultaneously transcendent. It follows that divine 
‘transcendence’ does not take us away from our embodiment, but rather situates 
us within it. As Patrice Haynes argues, “material immanence is thus the 
revelation of divine mind in the realm of finitude: time, limit, and history. This 
means that the material world is shot through with divine transcendence” 
(Haynes, 2009, p. 71).  This brings to mind the terms “resurrection of the body” 
used by Norman O Brown, (Brown, 1959, p. 307), and “the resurrection of the 
flesh” (Adorno, 1973, p. 207), the intention in both cases being to advance the 
focus on the body rather than focus on absolute transcendent spirit. The notion of 
embodied transcendence also subverts the past tradition of associating women 
with body and immanence, in opposition to transcendence.   
 
‘Transcendence’ (going beyond the present and that which is known) and 
‘transcendent’ (a regulating principal) are often conflated in modern usage, “and 
have come to stand for the principals of thought or symbols of authority that 
organize the way we think about and experience the present as well as the way 
we project ourselves into the future” (Howie & Jobling, 2009, p. 2). Luce Irigaray 
and others create a further complexity by introducing both ‘horizontal’ and 
‘vertical’ transcendence. It is problematic that the very term ‘transcendence’ 
enters into the binary immanence/transcendence of patriarchal Christianity, and 
is held to be an attribute of ‘God’, rather than an aspect of experience. Mike King 
argues that women’s spirituality needs a “broader language of the spiritual than 
monotheism can provide” (King, 2009, p. 153), and for this reason I find this trope 
limiting.  Regarding transcendence, Luce Irigaray says: 
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the gods are far away - in us.  It is not by searching for them far 
outside that we will discover them.  To be sure, we will perhaps 
discover in foreign lands traces of gods that we are lacking.  But 
without a journey in ourselves, to celebrate with them will not be 
possible… It is in the intimate of ourselves that a dwelling place must 
be safeguarded for them, a dwelling place where we unite in us earth 
and sky, divinities and mortals (Irigaray, 2004c, p. 51).133   
 
Here she also emphasizes the centrality of interiority in spiritual life.  This is 
echoed in Karl Jaspers, who says, “The transcendence before which I stand is 
the measure of my own depth” (Jaspers, 1969, p. 45), particularly if we hold that 
‘interiority’ and ‘depth’ are conceptualizing the same thing.  Jaspers notion 
certainly bridges the human/divine split, as does my term, embodied 
transcendence. 
 
Having thus established the foundation for my use of transcendence, I now detail 
Luce Irigaray’s understanding of the sensible, and also note other thinkers who 
have examined some of the possibilities around her viewpoint.  It is through the 
body that we perceive sensual awareness, through vision, hearing, touching, 
smelling and tasting, as well as other more subtle sensory perceptions.134 As a 
means of returning to one’s senses, Irigaray advocates the practice of yoga, 
which “has brought me back to the innocence of my natural perceptions” 
(Irigaray, 2010a, p. 15).  She relies on yoga sutras to teach “that cultivating 
sensible perceptions can be a path to reach concentration, contemplation, and 
even Samadhi”. When she claims the same sutras teach that “listening to the 
song of birds can represent a help for the one who is in search of one’s spiritual 
becoming” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 15), she indicates that she values a heightened 
use of the senses, cultivated towards a spiritual aim.  For Irigaray, the cultivation 
                                            
133 Irigaray is here employing an explicitly Heideggerian stance, namely the concept of fourfold 
and dwelling place, as developed in his later writings; “the caring-for (of dwelling) is fourfold” and 
involves earth, sky, gods and mortals (quoted in J. Young, 2002, p. 100). 
134 Coming to our Senses is the title of a 1998 book by Morris Berman, which advocates a return 
to the sensate self (Berman, 1988).  Prior to this, Merleau-Ponty introduced the idea of the return 
to the senses in The Visible and the Invisible, (Merleau-Ponty, 1968b), and the Phenomenology 
of Perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1968a). Merleau-Ponty shifted the prime focus of subjectivity from 
the human intellect to what he called the “body-subject” or “the flesh” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968a, p. 
267).  His ideas overcome the Descartian mind-body split. 
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of sensible perceptions assists “reaching autonomy, for spiritual becoming and 
better relations with the other(s)” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 16) and being ‘touched by 
grace’ (Irigaray, 2010b). Thus we have established that there are practices that 
involve the body and sense perception, which can assist in the development of 
women's consciousnesses as women, in both sensible and transcendental ways. 
 
Irigaray extends her ideas on sensory perception to include the bodily perception 
of the other, and the relation between. She emphasizes that one  
essential if we are to achieve a universal ethic is respect for the 
perceptions of every man and woman as conditions of physical and 
spiritual life.  If we lose the use of our senses, we die … Without the 
senses, thought is impossible, it becomes pure automatism, 
heedless of liberty or of intention (Irigaray, 1993b, pp. 145, my 
emphasis). 135  
 
Thus, for Irigaray our senses mediate our humanity; they “stand at the juncture 
between the individual and the social, the private and the public” (Irigaray, 1993b, 
p. 145). 
 
Is there a conflict here, between Irigaray’s reliance on phenomenology through 
the sense, and her aims of cultivation?  Cultivation of ethical relations with one’s 
self, and the other, are for her, not achieved “through this only phenomenal 
dimension” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 16). She argues that the phenomenological, is, by 
itself, not enough, and requires the addition of an ethical dimension. I have 
further concerns that Western phenomenology runs the risk of detailing a 
morphology of the untransformed or uncultivated self. If we were to ask, for 
instance, “what is a woman?” from the perspective of the ‘transformed’ self,136 the 
answer would be different from that of the “ego-consciousness which functions 
actively toward the world” (Yuasa, 1987, pp. 63-64), that which is oriented to the 
patriarchal/symbolic.  I argue that the cultivated self achieves, or is intrinsically 
oriented to, a radically different perspective than the uncultivated self; this will 
                                            
135 Heidegger’s friend Medard Boss asked him why he ignored the phenomenology of the body, 
and he answered, “because this is the most difficult thing” (Craig, 1988; quoted by Hunt, 2003, p. 
206). 
136 As proposed by Jean Byrne (Byrne, 2004). 
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become clearer as we proceed, in this and later chapters.  De Beauvoir’s critique 
of women and the position in which they find themselves is a critique of the 
culture, rather than of the cultivated self, argued for by Irigaray, which is not 
tethered to social norms.  
 
For Luce Irigaray the goal of cultivation is women’s liberation from the very things 
that de Beauvoir critiqued; through prolonged, assiduous cultivation one 
conditions oneself to achieve spiritual freedom and aesthetic creativity. Likewise, 
representing an Eastern tradition, Yuaso Yuasa demonstrates exceptional 
personal development or cultivation by exemplary individuals in the achieving of 
body-mind confluence, resulting in liberation (Yuasa, 1987, p. 2).137 Another way 
of framing this is to say that one’s psychology needs to be sufficiently mature to 
enable non-dual thinking. “Cultivation is a practice that attempts, so to speak, to 
achieve true knowledge by means of one’s total mind and body” (Yuasa, 1987, 
pp. 25-26). The relationship between the body and mind changes through the 
process of cultivation, which is reflected in the lived experience of the cultivators 
themselves.  
 
Emphasis on the body and touch is important, because it evades logos, and 
includes the carnal self (Irigaray, 2001, p. 94).138  It grounds my term, embodied 
transcendence, and provides the basis for Luce Irigaray’s 
sensible/transcendental.  Yuasa too, stays with the primacy of the body because 
the “essence of the self as human subject disappears in the rarefied atmosphere 
of a logic that disregards the body” (Yuasa, 1987, p. 59). The presence of the 
body is required because it allows for the presence of the carnal feminine 
subject, and also for cultivation of that carnal feminine subject.  
Irigaray’s argument for cultivation of sensory perception ultimately incorporates 
                                            
137 This liberation is “psychophysically attained” (Yuasa, 1987, pp. 9-10), according to Yuasa, 
emphasizing the mind-body experience.  
138 “The traditions of logos …run the risk of repressing our bodily and sexuate existence, and our 
sensible or carnal relationships” (Irigaray, 2004b, p. 99). 
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“becoming divine” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 68).  Some spiritual traditions are very 
body-focussed, and work on cultivating the body toward divinization.139 This 
dwelling in and use of the senses, is supportive of the feminine project towards 
becoming divine.140  However, I agree with Luce Irigaray that in Western culture 
the “body is not educated to develop its sensible perceptions with a spiritual aim 
in mind, but to detach itself from the sensible dimension, to overcome it for a 
more abstract, more speculative, more sociological culture” (Irigaray, 2010a, pp. 
15, emphasis mine).141  To counter this cultural tendency, Luce Irigaray 
commends the “practice of respiration, of diverse kinds of breathing” because it 
“grants more attention to the education of the body, of the senses” (Irigaray, 
2003, p. 7), with a spiritual aim in mind. As she says, spiritual progress “is 
therefore not separated off from the body nor from desire” (Irigaray, 2003, p. 9).142  
I will attend to the cultivation of the breath later in this chapter. 
The Japanese philosopher Kukai (774-835), emphasizes that cultivation is 
toward the goal of ‘becoming a buddha in this very body…the ‘body your parents 
gave you’, that is, ‘in the flesh’”(Yuasa, 1987, pp. 148-149, my emphasis).143  He 
also claims that a particular attitude is required - that of wonder.144  A sense of 
                                            
139 Fabrice Dubosc makes an important point when he compares Islamic and Christian traditions 
in relation to the body. He observes that “in Islam …theophanic manifestations, revelations of the 
divine nature … express a radical divine awakening in the reality of bodily experience” (Dubosc, 
2000, pp. 79, emphasis mine). He compares this with the central theme in Christianity, where the 
dimensions of the body are heroically transcended, and that this begins with “the control and 
denial of the senses” (Dubosc, 2000, p. 83). 
140 Through the bodily senses and direct engagement with nature the senses can be so 
heightened as to “blaze.” There is no ascent in this “ecstasy”; all of life is sacred, not just 
“heaven” (Berman, 1988, p. 311). 
141 For Jacob Needleman, the real Christianity that got lost in the first century AD was “the 
experience of yourself, not the experience of God” (Needleman, 1980, p. 310), and that this 
experience of self requires one’s bodily, sensate self. 
142 Hood and Hall, in their study of mystical and erotic experience note that there is a difference 
between the experiences of highly developed ‘self actualized’ people, and those who are not.  For 
the developed people, the connection between bodily senses and spiritual/mystical experience is 
clear - “erotic experiences were common triggers of mystical experience for highly self-actualized 
persons” (Hood & Hall, 1980, p. 197).  Thus cultivation and development result in a more highly 
awakened sense of both erotic response and spiritual experience. 
143 Kukai’s philosophy may be termed “metapsychics, which has a theory of the body as its pivotal 
point” (Yuasa, 1987, p. 156). 
144 I use ‘wonder’ in the sense of astonishment, admiration and rapt attention.  Merriam-Webster 
dictionary on-line. 
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wonder is necessary in order to exceed the limits of our imagination, and 
wonderment turns the mind to the “generosity of the bodhisattva” (Quoting Kukai 
in Yuasa, 1987, p. 152), to a further developed spiritual sense.  I can argue then, 
that wonder leads to the divine, to “becoming divine”, a divine that is 
experienced,  which is my theme in chapter four. 145  
 
To summarize my argument to this point: the body, and the sense-perceptions of 
the everyday self, are tied to conventions, and thus the Symbolic, the very 
orientation where women are denied subjectivity. I argue that Beauvoir’s critique 
was of the everyday self, which is tied to the conventions, to social construction.  
Cultivation, therefore, is required for a woman’s subjectivity, to become intimately 
aligned with her freedom, her liberation.  She begins with the every-day, which is 
framed in the social norms, and then, through the senses and through inquiry 
and practices of cultivation, develops an individual and conscious cooperation 
between the senses and the transcendent, towards a sensible/transcendental.  
Ethical relations toward self and other are part of the spiritualization of the 
senses, which I develop fully in my exposition of the tale of “The Handless 
Maiden” in chapters five and six.  
 
To accept cultivation, therefore, is to choose a way of life not oriented to social 
norms. This is the same aim as Jung’s idea of individuation, because he likewise 
advocates an orientation toward an individual development, rather than 
                                            
145 Many philosophers prioritize wonder, for instance Descartes, who said that “it appears to me 
that wonder is the first of all the passions” of the soul (Descartes, 1955, p. 358). Caroline Bynum 
Walker Bynum, concludes her paper on Wonder with the statement claim that “every view of 
things that is not wonderful, [full of wonder] is false”(Bynum, 1997, p. 26). (Walker Bynum, 1997, 
p. 26). For Luce Irigaray wonder is “indispensible not only to life but also or still to the creation of 
an ethics” (Irigaray, 1993a, p. 74). It is, or allows for “the advent of the other”, as she frames it 
(Irigaray, 1993a, p. 75) She situates wonder as a necessity or precursor to the 
sensible/transcendental when she says wonder is  “still in the world of the senses (‘sensible’), still 
physical and carnal, and already spiritual. It is the place of incidence and junction of body and 
spirit” (Irigaray, 1993a, p. 82). We must cultivate wonder - it is a process which is accumulative, 
and is a cultivation which never ceases (Irigaray, 2010b). Marguerite la Caze maintains that 
“people should regard each other as ‘irreversible,’ or not mirrors of each other” (La Caze, 2008, p. 
119), in order to cultivate wonder. Arguably the last word on wonder is provided by Rudolph Otto, 
who describes the encounter with the numinous as “sheer absolute wondrousness that 
transcends thought” (Otto, 2004, p. 81). 
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adherence to social norms. As long as we are in the everyday mode, it is 
“natural” that “we dominate the body through the spirit” (Yuasa, 1987, p. 119) and 
therefore enquire into existence in this way.  I argue that the (Western) idea that 
the mind ought to dominate the body is based upon the fact that the mind does 
dominate the body under ‘normal’ circumstances, when one is oriented to the 
conventions.  
My Flesh Shouts with Joy:  
“My heart and my flesh shout with joy” (Rav Kook Orot #61, in Orot, p 208, 
quoted by Michaelson, 2007). 
 
Can Luce Irigaray's notion of the sensible/transcendental be intentionally 
cultivated in the sense outlined above? I argued in the introduction for the 
cultivating of the body as spiritual practice, notably through the breath, which 
enables me to reinstate (and restate) the divinity of carnality, and this supports 
my reliance on Luce Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental.  
 
Let us look at an example of a Western religious tradition in which the body is 
celebrated in the form of prayer as embodied practice.  In Hassidic prayer, it is 
said that ‘the flesh shouts with joy’.  Jay Michaelson proposes prayer as an 
embodied practice, which 
is hidden in open view … its liturgy uses the body as a focus, and, 
when done in an ecstatic way, its manifestation is a highly energetic, 
embodied experience. It’s not yoga in the narrow sense of a 
systematic series of precise movements.  But ecstatic prayer is yoga 
in the wider sense: an embodied spiritual practice (p. 21). 
 
He argues that “the body affects the mind” (ibid, p. 22) through the body-position 
taken in prayer. He contrasts this with a purely intellectual point of view, where 
prayer is considered in a disembodied way, in which case body-position would 
make no difference.  Michaelson advocates that one become a “connoisseur of 
the minute fluctuations of your body. Davening [he is referring to a particular 
healing prayer of Moses] is not reciting, not reading, and not worshipping. It 
involves the yearnings of the heart, the words of the text, the realization of spirit, 
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and the movements of the body” (ibid, pp. 22-23, my emphasis). Here we see the 
flesh, the actual body and bodily organs and structure, the carnal being, as an 
integral part of prayer, which includes ‘the realization of spirit’.  
 
Michaelson speaks of the bowing rhythmic prayer, the shuckling, as a 
demonstration of ecstatic activity, not as ecstasis - out of the body, but as 
enstasis - in the body and as the body (ibid., p. 26).  Irigaray‘s concern is that 
ecstasy is an escape from the body, but here the flowing, sensual, dancing 
movements of Hassidic ecstatic prayer is experienced in the feminine mode of 
the circle.146 This body-practice of prayer, which dates back at least two thousand 
years, is close to that of the jouissance of (female) Christian medieval mystics, 
who we will meet in chapter four.  In the meanwhile, I can argue that there are 
forms of spiritual experience and practice, which could be designated as 
feminine, whether practiced or experienced by men or women, which constitute 
embodied spirituality.  I will continue to address the apparent contradiction of 
‘feminine’ modes being available to and expressed by men, as I proceed, and will 
propose a resolution both later in this chapter, and in future chapters.  
 
My argument thus far has been a preparation for a discussion of the cultivation of 
the breath.  I have been relying on the notion of ‘learning with the body’, which is 
developed by Bourdieu; although this approach is implicit in much of my previous 
discussion, I will make it explicit here.  There are two opposed aspects of 
‘learning with the body’; the first is an unconscious learning, which, Bourdieu 
claims, is “not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, 
but something that one is“ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 73).  He discusses habits and 
                                            
146 In positing the circle, and especially a circular dance, as evoking the feminine, I recall Luce 
Irigaray and her observations that the little girl creates a circle around herself, by spinning, 
whirling and dancing.  I relate this circular, rhythmic dance to the semiotic. “A sort of ‘dancing 
body’ (from the Greek khoreia, meaning ‘dance’), the semiotic chora is in perpetual motion. … 
Just as dance allows the dancer to explore an infinite chain of body movements, the semiotic 
chora is an infinite potential for creating signifying movements” (Prud’homme & Légaré, 2006).  In 
this way, movements of the body evoke a semiotic space, the means by which renewal is 
discovered which is not already founded in language.  As such, these experiences of a semiotic 
space would be available to both men and women. 
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patterns that have been established since childhood, that have been acquired 
more or less unconsciously and which tie us to our culture. I will argue that by 
cultivating the breath, (among other methods) one can overcome patterns that 
have already been learned, unconsciously, by the body.   The second mode of 
learning with the body is familiar with practitioners of conscious cultivation 
practices, including breathing techniques, where the body learns in a way that 
bypasses, or precedes the mind, which I have already touched upon in my 
discussion of the semiotic.    So we see that there are at least two different 
accounts of “learning with the body”: the first is unconscious and automatic, and 
reflects the everyday cultural norms and is without conscious choice; the second 
is via conscious choice and assiduous cultivation. An especially important 
conscious cultivation for Irigaray is that of the breath; here, she is able to 
incorporate the unconscious and automatic (the natural breath, which sustains 
physical life) into the cultivated breath, which sustains spiritual life. P.S. 
Anderson takes up what I agree is a timely emphasis “to focus on the roles of 
incarnation and intersubjectivity” (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 185), specifically 
through body practices.  I believe the emphasis on the spiritualization of the 
breath, as advocated by Luce Irigaray and outlined by me here, fills these 
requirements for both men and women, and the in-between. 
Cultivating the Breath 
As I have already acknowledged, Luce Irigaray advocates many aspects of what 
she terms “cultivation”.  For her, cultivation is not collective, but an individual 
pursuit. The cultivating of human perception enables the body to be educated to 
develop its sensory perceptions with a spiritual aspect in mind. Cultivation of 
one’s own breathing is an opening into spiritual life. For Irigaray, the breath 
corresponds to the first autonomous action of life, taking charge of one’s life, 
cutting the umbilical cord, so we live well, rather than creating another placenta 
through which one breathes through the group, the collective, the Symbolic 
(Irigaray, 2010b). Taking charge of one’s breath undoes the “umbilical 
attachment”, or unconscious conditioning.  For Luce Irigaray, the cultivation of 
the breath is the cultivation of the soul.  The forgetting of breath leads to 
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separation of body and soul; conversely, cultivation of the breath leads to 
integration of body and soul (Irigaray, 2010b). Thus breathing becomes the 
interface between the corporeal and the spiritual, namely the 
sensible/transcendental.147 Luce Irigaray summarizes my approach:  
The divine appropriate to women, the feminine divine, is first of all 
related to the breath. To cultivate the divine in herself, the woman … 
has to attend to her own breathing, her own breath, more even than to 
love … Why want to eat the forbidden fruit to gain knowledge, instead 
of cultivating one’s own breath? Breathing itself invites to an 
awakening, and the divine knowledge is in me (Irigaray, 2004b, p. 
165).   
 
The close association between ‘feminine divine’ and ‘divine feminine’ is 
demonstrated here by Irigaray, as she articulates - in the same breath so to 
speak - a “divine appropriate to women, the feminine divine”, as well as directing 
a woman to “cultivate the divine in herself”, that is the ‘divine feminine’.  My own 
emphasis is that these two processes are indeed inextricably related. 
 
Although Irigaray does not state the antecedents to her emphasis on the 
breath, the idea of spiritualizing the breath, or the Sacred Breath is found 
in several traditions. Within the Christian tradition,148 Neil Douglas-Klotz 
reads the sayings of Jesus through the original Aramaic and discovers the 
centrality of the breath (Douglas-Klotz, 1990, 1999). He traces meditation, 
breathing practices and “body prayers” to traditions established in the 
Middle East, which link body, breath and spirit (Douglas-Klotz, 1999, p. 
8).149 In one practice, “Breathing with the First Beginning”, the breath is 
focused on returning the meditator to the beginning of existence and to all 
                                            
147 Cixous’ notion of voice is a “as a pre-symbolic fusion of body and breath” (Walker, 1998, p. 
138), in the semiotic.  Luce Irigaray’s cultivation of the breath can be read, then, as a 
rediscovering of one’s individual (semiotic) voice, and a confirmation of body as site and 
necessity of subjectivity. 
148 A further example is St Teresa of Avila, in The Interior Castle, “This magnificent refuge is 
inside you. Enter. Shatter the darkness that shrouds the doorway. Be bold. Be humble. Put away 
the incense and forget the incarnations they taught you. Ask no permission from the authorities. 
Close your eyes and follow your breath to the still place that leads to the invisible path that leads 
you home”(quoted on St Teresa of Avila, my emphasis). 
149 Incidentally, these Middle Eastern practices link the Jewish, Muslim and Christian traditions. 
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created beings, where one is “one creature among many, not the dominant 
force… feeling community with every other being” (ibid., pp. 38-39). This is 
not the narcissistic self-absorption claimed by P. S. Anderson. Following 
Douglas-Klotz’s reading, when one meditates upon the breath in this way, 
it is with the understanding that “Holy Spirit” equals “Holy Breath”. Here 
“the separations between spirit and body, between humanity and nature… 
begin to fall away” (ibid, p. 42). In this way, awareness of the breath, or the 
sacred breath, connects us with the element of air, which supports all life. 
It connects us irrevocably with others. Indeed, “to breathe with an 
exclusive focus on one’s small self – the individual ‘I’ disconnected from 
the sacred “I”…is the definition of egotism” (ibid., p. 45). Douglas-Klotz 
goes so far as to claim that egocentric breath is the ‘unforgivable sin’, and 
the ‘sin against the Holy Spirit’ (ibid.). This sin occurs when we “fail to 
breathe with a sense of connection to other people and our surroundings” 
(ibid., p. 46). Douglas-Klotz calls upon “one of the earliest Jewish mystical 
practices where practitioners try to re-experience the descent of spirit and 
breath into form”, which is what I pose as the transfigured body.   
 
Douglas-Klotz provides several “body prayers”, the aim of which is to 
“celebrate the connection of your breath to all that breathes, and to the 
Sacred Breath itself” (ibid., p. 53). It is therefore an interpenetration, or 
“continuum that connects the ‘heavenly’ or vibrational aspect of being with 
the ‘earthly’ or particular aspect” (ibid., p. 116). This spiritualization of the 
breath is, I believe, why Luce Irigaray develops the breath as a direct and 
achievable application of the sensible/transcendental. While the criticism 
could be made that this does nothing to release women from oppression, 
historically these techniques were, in fact, used in order to transform the 
effects of discrimination, inequality and class distinction, by connecting 
with the inner life rather than outer conditions (ibid., p. 52).  From a 
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psychological point of view, this orientation to the inner life undoes the 
oppression, at least from the perspective of the oppressed. When one side 
of a dynamic is changed, this will to some extent effect change in the 
other. This of course does not absolve us from striving to change all 
instances of oppression and injustice in outer life, but that is not the topic 
of this thesis. 
 
P.S.Anderson is critical of Luce Irigaray’s emphasis on the breath as a means 
towards self-affection, autonomy and the sensible/transcendental. She says that 
Irigaray’s account of breathing, “excludes all questions of social and historical 
relations making up the real oppression of a woman’s situation. …How many 
women would agree that a woman’s bodily subordination to men and to a 
masculine divine can be completely sorted out by learning to breathe differently?” 
(P. S. Anderson, 2009, p. 41). My perspective is that social constructions and 
conventions must be challenged in order to maintain and create freedom, by both 
men and women, as a constant vigilance. Anderson too easily dismisses, 
however, the importance of a woman centring her locus of action in herself, 
rather than attributing it to an outside agency. In the defining and achieving of 
sexuate difference, a woman’s position is in relation to herself, initially, rather 
than to another. Anderson determines self-affection as ‘narcissistic’, which runs 
the risk of isolation, whereas Irigaray establishes virginity, self-affection, the 
breath and silence as modes that extricate a woman’s energy and orientation 
from the masculine/symbolic as well as masculine subordination. 
 
The breath negotiates the relation between the ego and the Self, in Jungian 
terms, and this is a subject worthy of further inquiry, which would develop Luce 
Irigaray’s emphasis.  This has been taken up by Judith Harris, in Jung and Yoga: 
The Psyche-Body Connection (Harris, 2001), and her discussion on the Kundalini 
is especially relevant to Irigaray’s work. Jung is sceptical of the benefits of yogic 
practice for Westerners however, and cautions against it, because he associates 
it with an emphasis on transcendence at the expense of body awareness.  He 
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says, “the great mistake which Western people make is imitating the Eastern 
yoga practices, for they serve a need which is not ours; it is the worst mistake to 
go higher and higher.  What we should do is to establish a connection between 
above and below” (C. G. Jung, 1997, p. 598). He maintains that, “if I remain so 
critically averse to yoga, it does not mean that I do not regard this spiritual 
achievement of the East as one of the greatest things the human mind has ever 
created. …My criticism is directed solely against the application of yoga to the 
peoples of the West” (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 11, §876).  Jung believed that 
“the split in the Western mind … makes it impossible at the outset for the 
intentions of yoga to be realized in any adequate way” (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 
11, §867). Thus he makes it clear that it is not the practice of yoga itself which he 
sees as a problem, but the application of an Eastern approach to the Western 
psyche.  His further reservations refer to the proclivity of Western man “to turn 
everything into a technique” (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 11, §871). His fears that 
yoga suppresses the activity of the ‘dark’ psych or the unconscious, are 
countered by the work of Yuasa, who espouses the view-that ‘dark’ 
consciousness is primary.  It is not only Jung who cautions against the possible 
negative effects of yoga practice, as “the dangers of such a path [Kundalini yoga] 
are enumerated throughout yogic texts. A relation to the body must be 
maintained at all times.  Missing the link with the physical level is both 
uncomfortable and potentially dangerous” (Harris, 2001, p. 116).  Irigaray, too, 
cautions against reaching “too quickly to the highest summit” (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 
364), through the awakening of body energies. 
 
How might we understand a relationship between breath and the “highest 
summit”? Integral to Irigaray’s approach to feminine becoming is her discussion 
on air, and the breath, pneuma.150 Pneumatikos is a suitably ambiguous word of 
Greek origin, containing as it does the element of air, the human inspiration of air 
                                            
150 Irigaray’s discussion on air is predominant in her interrogation of the elements (Irigaray, 1999).  
Her other elemental discussions are: water (Irigaray, 1991a) and earth (Irigaray, 1992).  In all 
cases she is the interlocutrix of the unconscious, or dismissed aspects of the element, which 
philosophy has overlooked, beginning with the Greeks, specifically Plato. 
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as in breathing, and to be filled with holy air, the divine spirit.151 There is also an 
historic connection.  The Gnostics of the first and second centuries divided 
people into three classes, which represented different modes of being.152  One of 
these classes was the pneumatic, which were thought to be the bridge between 
the temporal and the eternal, between body and spirit.  The pneumatic class 
were not religious in the sense that we would refer to a clergy, but were 
individuals who were intrinsically led to a particular way of being.153  They were 
the gateway between carnality and spirituality, in Irigaray’s terms, the 
sensible/transcendental.  Thus, in this way, we can see the breath as the 
gateway between the carnal and the spiritual, integral to both. 
 
Irigaray has further use for cultivating the breath, which she attributes to the 
becoming of women.  For her, breathing can engender virginity - her view is that 
women “become virgins” as part of cultivating their lives - where women are 
capable of “autonomous and free breathing, a breathing …which always includes 
a spiritual dimension” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 96).  She says this free breathing “is 
equivalent to taking charge of our life… in order to respect and cultivate life for 
ourselves and for others” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 4).  Here we see the uniqueness of 
Irigaray’s vision, which simultaneously allows for love-of-self and being with the 
other.  Autonomous ‘breathing’ enables both the becoming of women in their own 
sexuate identity, as well as cultivating respect for, and awareness of, the true 
                                            
151 There is also the Hebrew precedent, nephesh. It is noteworthy that the breath of life – 
neshamah – in breathed into man, and as a result he becomes a living soul, that spiritual life is 
not a given, but a becoming.  Some of the Jewish references to this are: “The world was created 
with breath-the breath of God. Divine breath is the sustainer of life.  If breath is lacking, life is 
lacking. Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, Likutei Moharen 1, 8:1. Our sages said, let every soul 
(neshamah) praise God (Psalm 150}-this means praise Him with every breath (neshamah). Or 
HaGanuz HaTzaddikim.p 45 Translated by Buxbaum in Jewish Spiritual Practice p 109. Kol 
haneshama t'hallel yah-every breath praises God; it's not necessary to force it or make it special 
(all quoted by Michaelson, 2007, p. 38). 
152 (Singer, 1990) 
153 The three classes for Gnostics, as discussed by June Singer, were: the hylic class, derived 
from the Greek word hyle, meaning matter, fleshly, or earthly.  The second was called psychic, 
and referred to the soul or mind.  The third state or class was the pneumatic.  The people in this 
last category were considered to be the bridge between the temporal and the eternal (Singer, 
1990). 
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otherness of the other.154  For Luce Irigaray, to be virginal would be “to keep the 
chakra of breathing free and alive, to keep a part of breath available for a relation 
of interiority with the self and for a language of communication and exchange” 
(Irigaray, 2004b, p. 162). This breathing is not just the means of survival, but “can 
become the medium of love and grace [when] the flesh is transformed into the 
place of a divine incarnation of love” (Irigaray, 2004a, p. 48). We are left in no 
doubt that for Irigaray breathing is a form of cultivation which enables the 
senses/body to be infused or suffused with divine mysteries embedded in the 
flesh, for embodied transcendence.  I argue that the cultivation of the breath 
towards a spiritual aim can be just as true for men as it is for women, but Luce 
Irigaray focuses upon it as a specifically feminine task.  This does not weaken my 
endorsement of sexuate difference, because, as Irigaray emphasizes, each 
person, both the male and female sexuate other, engages in “this cultivation of 
the senses and consciousness” (Joy, 2009, p. 111).  Later I will demonstrate how 
this cultivation is also available to men, and how Irigaray relies on the cultivation 
of each person, in order to create a bridge between two. 
 
Irigaray goes further, and more controversially, to claim that woman, in 
contradistinction with man, “rests in greater harmony with the cosmos, and this 
allows her to more easily inhale or exhale that which nourishes the vital breath: 
air” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 5).  So women, according to Irigaray, intrinsically have 
access to, and an innate understanding of, the quality of air, pneumatikos, 
because she “rests in greater harmony with the cosmos”.  Even more radically, 
Irigaray claims that woman can  
lead the breath of the man, as her own, from natural vitality to a more 
subtle breathing at the service of the heart, of listening and speaking, 
of thinking.  Thus love, including carnal love, can be a spiritual path for 
humanity, the flesh becoming soul and spirit thanks to the body itself, 
                                            
154 I understand Luce Irigaray to be speaking metaphorically in relation to autonomous breathing, 
but also to be observing a profound change in psychological position, where women gain their 
own libindinal flow, rather than receiving it via a man, or the symbolic. However, this autonomy is 
relational, rather than narcissistic, that is, it is ‘between’ independently autonomous individuals, 
beginning with men and women  - whether in fact or in principle - and extending to, or including, 
all relations.  
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as body respected and loved in its difference(s), especially at the level 
of breathing (Irigaray, 2010a, pp. 5, my emphasis).155 
 
Irigaray is stating that woman is more ‘naturally’ inclined to situate herself in the 
sensible/transcendental, and, through cultivating her breathing, can lead the way 
for men.  This is a radical reversal of the situation where the spiritual/man and 
carnal/woman are situated in the patriarchy.  However, it poses some risk to 
suggest that either man or woman would lead the other, because of the 
hierarchical and dichotomous undertones.  Moving from the patriarchal situation 
where man is presumed to have primary, if not exclusive, access to the 
spiritual/transcendental, to presuming that woman might in fact lead, runs the risk 
of privilege in favour of woman. It would be preferable that each sexuate identity 
progresses in their own way as insisted by Jung and Irigaray, as I have already 
noted above.   
 
I cannot agree with Irigaray’s claim that a women can – and maybe should – lead 
the breath of a man, and argue that a woman leads herself via the cultivation of 
her own breath, which would be more in accord with Irigaray’s own project for 
women.  Does such a contentious claim on the part of Irigaray weaken her case 
for sexuate difference?  Is she not arguing for sexuate (women’s) privilege? 
Irigaray appears to contravene her own insistence that it is the between, the 
copula, which constitutes relatedness, for a couple.  And further, that each 
person in the couple has “the responsibility to work at each instant for our own 
evolution, transformation, transfiguration or transubstantiation” (Irigaray, 2007a, 
p. 355) rather than rely on -  or lead - the other.	  	  My contention is that cultivation 
is a necessity required of both men and women, and that neither can claim 
exemption or privilege.  I develop a notion of what might be ‘natural’ to women, 
which avoids such hierarchical suppositions, in chapter four. 
 
                                            
155 Jung was likewise clear that, “as far as we can discern, the sole purpose of human existence 
is to kindle a light in the darkness of mere being” (C. G. Jung, 1963, p. 326), that is to move 
towards a spiritualization of being. 
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Irigaray has further proposals for the cultivating of the breath, when she intimates 
the possibility that ‘flesh becomes soul and spirit’ in relation with the other, 
through a loved and loving body, through a loved and loving breath, a bodily love 
based on sexuate difference.  However, Irigaray claims that the full realization of 
this ethics of sexuate difference remains in the future, that “we have not yet 
reached such a coexistence with the other, or we have already forgotten it” 
(Irigaray, 2008b, pp. 128-129). Yet she directs us to this ethics to come.  She 
says that we must tend to our own breathing while simultaneously attending to 
the needs of the other, through reserves of “pure breath? Of which the reserve - 
the soul?” (Irigaray, 2008b, pp. 128-129), that is, through spiritual reserves.  
 
Irigaray continues this thought, when she clarifies that the cultivation of breathing 
moves from that which is completely natural to the body, (in this sense 
biological/carnal) the ‘vital’ breath of survival, to that which cultivates to a level 
which can at this point only be imagined:  
Our task would be rather an assumption of our nature as it is and a 
progressive transformation, transubstantiation of this nature by a 
cultivation of breathing that, from being firstly a vital breath in the 
service of survival, becomes the vehicle for love, for speech, for 
listening, for thought (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 358).  
 
Furthermore, this concept of breathing engenders autonomy, which frees us from 
a collective ‘placenta’.   If we are “breathing in a conscious and free manner… we 
no longer form with others a sort of mass in which each individual has not yet 
conquered one’s personal life” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 4).  In this section on the 
breath, we have seen a particularly clear demonstration of Luce Irigaray’s 
emphasis on cultivation of a vital function required for survival, so it becomes a 
vehicle of transformation. 
Conclusion: 
In this chapter I argued for ‘coming to our senses’, and cultivating the bodily 
intelligence of the female body through intentional practice. This enables me to 
position women outside of a binary trope in which she is seen as deficient, to a 
divinity of carnality, which is essential to the sensible/transcendental. By retaining 
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a connection to the rhythms of the natural world, and through focus on her own 
senses and the cultivating of them to reach concentration and contemplation, a 
woman can then achieve an active realization of Luce Irigaray’s 
sensible/transcendental, that is, in ‘becoming divine’.  The cultivation of the 
breath, a specific cultivation that evades theorizing, is the link between the 
sensible and transcendental.  Is it possible that language could likewise be 
cultivated to represent women’s subjectivity and divinity? 
 
In the next chapter, I propose a discourse that is linked to and arises from, the 
body, which incarnates the possibility of vital communication through and with the 
body, rather than a discourse that makes the body disappear. This discourse will 
challenge the dominance of a phallic signifier, and one way in which I do this is to 
introduce the notion of erotic logos to intentionally marry two concepts, logos and 
eros that have previously been seen as intrinsically separate. Thus erotic logos 
can occupy the same paradoxical position as Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental, 
that is, embodied word. 
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Chapter Three: Language - It takes My Breath Away.  
Epigraph 
As I read do I experience a homecoming or an exile? Reading is not a cool, 
detached thing, but something hot, sometimes almost unbearable. Reading gets 
right into my body, I eat it, it enters my bones.156 I can’t tell right away if this is 
nourishing or perhaps poisonous, so I keep this uncomfortable thing inside 
myself long enough for my body to decide.157 I am woken up, as if from a long 
sleep; this is the kind of writing that satisfies me, when the wheels catch fire from 
their own motion, to adapt Coleridge's phrase.158 Sometimes I just can’t read one 
more word, or have to skip to another writer.   My thoughts are trimmed or grow 
overnight when I read, so I hardly recognize the landscape.  The landscape of 
my body. In palimpsest.  And deeper.  Deepest. Where do I house my thoughts, 
these new thoughts, which gained entry? I ask again, is this a homecoming or an 
exile? I have a Jungian residence, dignified and well known, but I only inhabit it 
now on weekends and special occasions.  The rest of the time I’m on the road, a 
gypsy, itinerant, of no fixed address - as often as not, not knowing where I will 
spend the night. I can’t retrace my steps, they are erased, the only movement is 
onward.159 So I walk… (Personal reflections on researching this thesis, Kaye 
Gersch, 2011). 
Introduction 
Is it possible for a woman to speak and write as a woman? If so, what would that 
mean? If the structure of language itself is phallogocentric, that is to say that 
language is tethered to a phallic signifier, the logos, which insists on the one and 
only truth, and stable meaning is anchored and guaranteed by the phallus, then 
isn't everyone who uses language taking up a position as ‘male’ within this 
structure? Is there such as thing as a ‘feminine voice’? Are “women’s voice” and 
                                            
156 Terry Threadgold is referring to Barthes when she says that “to read is to make our body work 
(psychoanalysis has taught us that this body greatly exceeds our memory and our 
consciousness) at the invitation of the text’s signs, of all the languages which traverse it and form 
something like the shimmering depth of the sentence” (Threadgold, 1997, p. 31). 
157 Luce Irigaray says, “we need to discover a language that is not a substitute for the experience 
of corps-a-corps as the paternal language seeks to be, but which accompanies that bodily 
experience, clothing it in words that do not erase the body but speak the body” (Irigaray, 1993b, 
p. 91).  
158 “The wheels take fire from the mere rapidity of their motion” (Coleridge, 1983, p. 72). He is 
attributing power to the words of the poets, rather than the incidents described. 
159 Julia Kristeva, in Stabat Mater, laments the loss of a position in the Law, which is the price of 
jouissance thus: “I yearn for the Law…. In sensual rapture, I am distraught.  Nothing reassures, 
for only the law sets anything down.  Who calls such a suffering jouissance? It is the pleasure of 
the damned” (Kristeva, 1987, p. 250).  
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“the feminine voice”, the same thing? Could it be that poetry, or more correctly, 
poïesis carries the feminine voice? Can poïesis bring forth from that which is 
unsymbolized, a language that serves the feminine? Or is poïesis the feminine 
voice itself? Can language, via poïesis, carry libido (life energy) rather than be an 
exclusive vehicle for credo/Symbolic? When Lacan says, “the function of 
language is not to inform but to evoke” (Lacan, 1977, p. 86), can we speculate 
that poïesis caries this evocative aspect of language?  
 
In this chapter, I will attempt to answer these questions.  My purpose is to break 
open phallogocentric discourse to explore the possibility of a feminine discourse. 
Through this radical rupture might women find a free dwelling rather than the 
prison spoken of by Simone Weil?160 I argue for a language in which women can 
recover themselves, a place of liberation. This language is not ‘disembodying’ but 
‘incarnating’; it does not disregard or ignore the body, but rather imbues it with 
spirituality, thus evoking an embodied transcendence. 
 
I propose erotic logos as a language for women, which provides a coniunctio 
between eros and logos. I follow Irigaray, who “believes that, in academia, 
abstract logos rules”, and my proposition challenges the authority of this logos. A 
single logos “deprives writing of its life-blood and breath, which, for Irigaray, are 
representative of the visceral, emotional and imaginative dimensions of existence 
that she wishes to incorporate in her work” (Joy, 2006, p. 2). I argue that a 
marriage between eros and logos will enable visceral, emotional and imaginative 
dimensions in writing and speaking. I believe erotic logos answers the lack 
voiced by Drucilla Cornell, when she lamented   
 something is missing in both the limited formal equality for women 
found in the United States and in the social equality provided women 
in the socialist states… What has been missing is the protection of 
each person’s imaginary domain, that psychic and moral space in 
which we, as sexed creatures who care deeply about matters of the 
heart, are allowed to evaluate and represent who we are (Cornell, 
1998, p. x).   
                                            
160 “At the very best, a mind enclosed in language is in prison" (Weil, 2000, p. 89). 
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The imaginary, moral domain that includes matters of the heart is framed by 
erotic logos.  
 
I take Sheherazade, in The Thousand and One Nights, as a mistress of erotic 
logos.   This language - born from a deep encounter between eros and logos - is 
a child carrying the genes of both parents.  I argue that such a position carries 
the same valence as Luce Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental, because it 
encompasses the body and the word, the sensible and the transcendent.   
 
Throughout this chapter, I use the phrases ‘language in the feminine’, or feminine 
language, to discuss a style of language which could be used by men or woman, 
referring for instance to poetry, and to the idea of a feminine principle which I 
discussed in chapter one. ‘Women’s language’ I use to denote language by 
anatomical women, not men, referring to exclusive language-use as required by 
Irigaray along sexuate lines. 
 
If we take the biological body as distinct from the culturally nuanced body as pre-
discursive, and the body as a fundamental expression of sexuate identity, then it 
is clear we can differentiate male and female bodies. I argue, therefore, that this 
is a very important variable in terms of both experience and expression. In other 
words, the feminine body is both pre-discursively and discursively feminine. So 
an incarnating language is one that which will enable women to constitute 
themselves as subjects, in the flesh.  As such, I join in Cixous and Clement’s 
“dream of a transformed language/literature” (Cixous & Clément, 1986, p. xviii).  
My argument for a transformed language is twofold: on the one hand, a language 
arising from female flesh, from feminine morphology, and on the other a 
language arising from cultivation in the sense which Luce Irigaray proposes, 
which I have discussed in chapter two, and which I will attend to further on. 
Briefly, language can either be an every-day conveyance, or “the exceptional 
uses achieved by poets and religious figures” (Yuasa, 1987, p. 3). This 
exceptional language witnesses our coming into being, and is, “at the bottom of 
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each word, [where] I am a spectator at my birth”, (Bosquet, cited in Bachelard, 
1971, p. 27) and is thus the language through which my project speaks; the birth 
and becoming of ‘women’. 
 
In what way can language be used for women and their becoming? To begin, is 
the category ‘woman’ an eternally compromised noun, (Riley, 1988, p. 98) or is it 
an eternally changing becoming? Would ‘woman’ be better represented by an 
adjective, which qualifies the noun/woman, or a verb, which asserts something 
about the subject/woman? In this way, Luce Irigaray’s claim about ‘becoming’ a 
‘woman’, when becoming is used as a verb, is pertinent, in that it implies that 
woman is perpetually ‘on the way’, rather than arrived. I argue that language-in-
the-feminine must reflect this becoming. The form of feminine enquiry must not 
close a question reductively. It must keep questions open, even as they are 
answered. Kristeva, for instance, consistently insists “upon keeping ambiguity 
alive in her work. …  (She refuses) the simple binary logic that would settle the 
matter for all time” (Walker, 1998, p. 124).  The binary logic which is essential to 
the functioning of the technical world, or that of commerce is not the specific use 
of language upon which I am focussing here. A number of feminist theorists have 
explored the idea of a feminine language, such as Daly, hooks, Cixous and 
Clément (Cixous, 1993; Cixous & Clément, 1986; Clément, 1994; Daly, 1973; 
hooks, 2008).  My primary focus, however, is on Luce Irigaray's work.  
 
I begin by engaging with Heidegger, and his notion that language is the house of 
being. 
 
A fundamental question, especially important for women, is whether language 
shapes experience or experience shapes language. How does the way we speak 
about human bodies shape our experience of them? If women use 
phallogocentirc language, that is, language relying on the phallus as a universal 
signifier, does this effect how they experience themselves as women? Heidegger 
firmly believed that "language remains the master” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 215), 
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even while we think that we are the shapers and masters of language.  For 
postmodernists, the problem is, “put simply, language constructs ontology: 
language establishes the conditions of being. … Not only does language 
construct ontology, but the limits of language are set by our ontological 
understandings and commitments.  Language is a condition for the construction 
of ontology, which is in turn a condition for language” (Gray, 2000, p. 231).  Is 
this a double bind and a self-referential paradox, or an attempt to understand and 
interpret linguistic and non-linguistic expression, and even more fundamentally, 
an interrogation of human life and existence as such?  
 
Heidegger claims “language is the house of being. In its home man [sic] dwells. 
Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this 
home" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 193).  It follows that bringing being into manifestation 
through language is compromised when the language itself is inadequate. This is 
specifically true if the language women use is morphologically misrepresenting 
them.  While language has the task to manifest the unmanifest at any time, this 
has particular importance for women: their coming into being is deficient if 
language is unable to speak to and from a woman’s position. When Simone Weil 
says that, “at the very best, a mind enclosed in language is in prison" (Weil, 
2000, p. 89), is she speaking as a mystic, or as a woman constrained by 
phallogocentrism? Both could be true, but the point I make here is that Weil 
maintains that one is capable of more than language can offer. For Weil, the 
fetter is language. 
 
Irigaray takes up Heidegger’s notion of dwelling161 when she argues that as 
mortals abiding on earth, we already dwell, that “dwelling is the fundamental trait 
of Being” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 67) and therefore prior to, or independent of 
language.  Thus, for Irigaray, we do not need language in order to dwell.  She 
explains Heidegger’s associating of language with dwelling as maternal by 
                                            
161 “To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell” (quoted in 
Wisnewsk, 2013, p. 156). 
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saying that “language would exist as a substitute for the mother, or rather as a 
substitute for the relation with the mother. Hence, the fact of comparing it to a 
shelter, a house” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 122).  If Irigaray is situating “the relation 
with the mother” in the semiotic, then she is placing language as pre-discursive, 
and this converges with Kristeva’s view. 
 
In regard to his idea of language as dwelling-place, Heidegger goes on to say 
that “guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring 
the manifestation to language and maintain it in language in their speech” 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 193).  According to this argument, women are their own 
guardians and create their own dwelling. The establishment of an ethics of 
sexuate difference is prerequisite to a woman’s access to her own language. 
This language in turn challenges all structures of the Symbolic, including binary 
oppositions.   A move from logos to poiesis might well be part of this changed 
structure, in our task of renovating language.  The work of Irigaray’s angels 
intersects here; Tilghman claims that their “gestures herald the embodiment of a 
multiplicity of ideas and figures that will never be contained by ordinary language 
or orthodox representation” (Tilghman, 2008, p. 47), thus proposing a renovation 
of language. 
 
For Irigaray, the current structure of language “is phallogocentric to the point 
where there can be no feminine subject in language at all, and ‘this sex which is 
not one’ is also a (grammatical) subject which is not one” (Threadgold, 1997, p. 
86).  Irigaray believes that the gendered nature of language reveals sexuate 
difference. For her, to speak is never neutral (Irigaray, 2002). Her recourse is 
linguistics ”when she argues that the patterns of speech favoured by men and 
women bear witness” to sexual difference in our culture (Deutscher, 2002, p. 
142).162 
                                            
162 However, the question remains as to whether girls and women are acculturated to use 
language differently, or naturally use language differently. With her insistence on sexuate 
difference extending to language use, is Irigaray suggesting that men and women should use 
language differently? 
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Rather than accept a phallogocentric language-house built without consultation 
to its suitability, which “consists of an intertwining of meanings which constitute a 
sort of prison,” Luce Irigaray proposes a “world that each of us could consciously 
build for oneself and the world … while respecting our respective otherness.  
‘Together’, then, no longer means participating in a common world that is already 
there and imposed on the two” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 9).  So Irigaray calls for a 
discursive system in which women could ‘dwell’ within their bodies, which would 
not alienate them from themselves. Irigaray’s proposal achieves two aims; first, it 
allows for sexuate difference which extends to a use of language specific to 
women, and second, it enables the future not to be a replication of the past, 
although Irigaray admits that this new house “is not yet built” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 
7). She writes us examples of parler femme, women’s language, in a number of 
her books, specifically Elemental Passions, where she uses grammar and syntax 
not conventionally used, intentionally to disrupt and to evoke a feminine voice 
(Irigaray, 1992). 
Phallogocentrism 
Arguably, phallogocentric language creates a certain permanence of existence, 
but is it an aid in becoming?  Because “outside of his language there is nothing” 
(Irigaray, 1999, p. 39), must women choose that nothing, and take the risk that 
they will then be able to “translate fluid realities into discursivity” (ibid., p. 3)? 
Must women evade, again and again, the “single language, the one he has 
already appropriated, and that he reappropriates for himself endlessly” (ibid., p. 
37), as Luce Irigaray says of the masculine nature of language?  Even the 
“uncontrolled exploitation of air by language and by systems of representations” 
(ibid., p. 10) in philosophy itself, must make way for a breathable future, where 
air is freely available.  In order to create a breathable future, the notion of a 
universal signifier, the phallus, must be challenged.  
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For Saussure, language is understood as a system of signifier and signified, 
which gain meaning from their relation with each other; that is, there is no 
universal signifier that is more important than the rest. He explains: “In a sign, 
what matters more than any idea or sound associated with it, is what other signs 
surround it” (Saussure, 1962, p. 118). While Lacan agrees with Saussure that all 
signifiers in language are related, he holds that the signifier that quilts them all 
together is the phallus: “The phallus is the privileged signifier of that mark in 
which the role of the logos is joined with the advent of desire.  It can be said that 
this signifier is chosen because it is the most tangible element in the real of 
sexual copulation” (Lacan, 1977, p. 287). However, it is clear that this desire is 
expressed from the point of view of male desire. Thus the conclusion that 
language is phallogocentric.  I agree that, if we take sexuate difference as a 
starting point, the phallus as the universal signifier represents only the masculine.  
What woman would propose this? How, then, can women find a place in 
language?  One way is to bypass Lacan and return to Saussure, who argues 
against any universal signifier.  We can then allow that phallus is a dominant 
signifier in our culture, but not a universal one, as Grace Jantzen argues. “A 
dominant signifier can be resisted and perhaps dislodged; whereas if the Phallus 
really were a universal signifier, there would be no hope” (Jantzen, 1998, p. 52). 
When the position for women is not foreclosed by the phallus, movement in 
language is possible.  Indeed Luce Irigaray speaks of a chain of signifiers, rather 
than language being constructed around a universal ‘male’ signifier thus:  “A 
world that language ceaselessly would construct and reconstruct, of an 
architecture incapable of completion” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 124).  
 
Irigaray argues that women’s language is crucial because, “women have no 
language sexed as female, they are used in the elaboration of so-called neuter 
language where in fact they are deprived of speech” (Irigaray, 1993a, p. 107), 
and thus their place - or displacement - in language is a sign of their dereliction 
and lack of subjectivity.  Further, according to Irigaray, the “essence of language 
[langage] should thus be understood as a shelter for man’s essence” (Irigaray, 
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1999, p. 91), but it does not shelter a woman, it is not her house of being.  
Instead, “she is like a still-living tissue connected to the production of his 
language [sa langue] … and feeding this language, but herself being used in line 
with a project of his own, and, by passing through his technology, losing the 
movement of breath and life” (ibid., p. 92) Irigaray asks: “What if he who gives 
you air…gives you death? …The vacuum that they create by using up the air for 
telling without ever telling of air itself” (ibid., p. 7). For Irigaray, then, women need 
a language that does not take our breath away, but which fosters breath and life. 
 
I have already referred several times to Luce Irigaray’s use of the word air.  For 
Irigaray, air is “this unthinkable that exceeds all declaration, all saying. No 
wonder philosophy dies - without air.  Did Being, at least, keep some in reserve?  
Hence: the clearing of the opening.  This field, or open space, where air would 
still give itself” (ibid., pp. 5-6). In her terms, the challenge to philosophy is not to 
kill being, especially the feminine being, by forgetting air and by disappearing into 
metaphysics, thus neglecting the elements that constitute our flesh.  She asks, 
“what if he who gives you air…gives you death? …The vacuum that they create 
by using up the air for telling without ever telling of air itself” (ibid., p. 7).  
Language in the feminine, including in feminine philosophy, requires air and 
spaciousness, in order to “say differently”.  “This saying cannot be already said or 
foreseen by a previous discourse” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 12), as Irigaray clearly 
states, and demands another way of speaking, which is “without the screen of a 
language foreign to dialogue” (Irigaray, 2008b, pp. 14-15).  Irigaray plays with 
language, syntax, grammar and style in order to rework meaning, or retrieve 
meaning, to more adequately represent a feminine subject.163 
 
Irigaray is unequivocal, as Anderson puts it, “that sexually specific discourses on 
female desire are expressed strictly by women” (P. S. Anderson, 1998, p. 109). 
Like Kristeva, Anderson imagines that this discourse might emerge “from the pre-
                                            
163 “The question of language arises for Irigaray because of the central significance she attributes 
to language as a cultural medium for the constitution of the subject and of identity” (Martin, 2000, 
p. 15). 
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oedipal position. Problematically, this position may only break through the 
symbolic in holiness or hysteria, mysticism or madness, in the form of what 
‘returns’ but should be repressed” (ibid.). We can also see that it is problematic, if 
we try to establish a connection between a discourse arising from the semiotic 
and women, that this ‘breaking through’ is as likely achieved by men as women - 
women do not have a monopoly on madness, for instance.  
 
One use of language that concerns Irigaray is metaphor.  Clearly, both men and 
women use metaphors, but some feminist thinkers distrust the use of metaphor, 
because it takes language away from the subject at hand, in ever-increasing 
distance ”through all sorts of comparisons and images supposedly able to do 
better than life itself and which turn into poison for body and soul” (Irigaray, 
2004a, p. 49). Thus, for Irigaray, metaphor refers back to the symbolic, to the 
interpretation rather than the source. It is preferable, she says ”to receive words 
from nature itself, listening to what it really says” (ibid., p. 35).  With respect to 
nature, which she advocates as the source of metaphor, “it would be better to 
avoid metaphors and allegories which assimilate it to our world” (ibid.).164  
Towards this end she recommends the use of words that are “closest to the real. 
Words that respect sensibility, movement, and that work to espouse it without 
distortion” (ibid., p. 43).165  Irigaray prefers metonymic rather than metaphoric 
terms; both figures involve the substitution of one term for another, but in 
metaphor a substituted term is based on similarity, whereas, in metonymy, the 
substitution is based on contiguity (Kruse, 1991, p. 457).  
 
Caroline Walker Bynum comments on the use of metaphor in the second century 
as being close to nature. “Their metaphors were naturalist images of return or 
repetition: the cycles of the seasons, the flowering of trees and shrubs, the 
fertility of seed” (Bynum, 1994, p. 219). Since then, much metaphor which has 
                                            
164 Carolyn Merchant says that “a society’s symbols and images of nature express its collective 
consciousness” (Merchant, 2010, p. 19).  Even to construe nature as a commodity, rather than as 
the source of life in which we are embedded, demonstrates a very different world-view.  
165 In her earlier work, Luce Irigaray referred to the Lacanian Real, but later, her use of the real is, 
as here, referring to the natural world, in contradistinction to the constructed world. 
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become imbedded in language is associated with mechanics and science, or 
even war, and not suited to Irigaray’s intent of staying close to nature.  For Luce 
Irigaray, woman’s place in language is a sign of her dereliction, and must be 
replaced “through a language and an ethics that is ours” (Irigaray, 1993a, pp. 
129, my emphasis).  
Parler Femme 
How would language embody women's subjectivity and spirituality? I argue for 
ways that include the body, which “incarnate the body and the flesh”, as Irigaray 
requires (Irigaray, 2004c, p. 15). In this way discourse can incarnate, rather than 
annihilate, women. In arguing for embodying, incarnating discourse for women, I 
make several points. First, as Luce Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental is 
foundational, the connection between word and the flesh must be maintained, 
and Word/logos as exclusively metaphysical must be challenged. Second, Logos 
as fixed certainty – logocentricity – must be questioned.  Third, that parler femme 
and ecriture feminine be developed as practices of speaking and writing as 
women, in defiance of the patriarchal logos that harnesses and suppresses for its 
own conceptual and theoretical purposes (Martin, 2000, p. 13).166 
 
My concern here is a specific use of language that can carry women’s 
subjectivity and spirituality. Luce Irigaray proposes a way open to women and 
men, of remaining alive in the symbolic by finding air, “the still silent space of 
speech. Where the voice of things can be heard” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 73), the 
space where life has not been already codified, as I have discussed above.  Luce 
Irigaray puts it this way: “But the word is also what can incarnate the body and 
the flesh that one wants to say to the other. …Not a part of the body but a flesh 
that goes beyond the body without destroying it, amputating it” (Irigaray, 2004c, 
p. 15).  
                                            
166 Notwithstanding the above, I acknowledge that in western intellectual and theological history, 
the incarnating Word has already been pivotal; for example, Yahweh speaks existence into being. 
The tradition of incarnated word/discourse also emerges in the Annunciation when Mary says 
“may it be done to me according to your word” (Luke 1:38), and further, in reference to Christ, 
“the word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us” (John1:14). My emphasis does nothing to 
diminish these traditions of the Word as embodying. 
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We see that Irigaray advocates the freeing of language for both men and women; 
she has specific concerns that women’s language be related to their bodies.  
Irigaray tells us “as a woman, I ought to discover and cultivate a language of my 
own, and to create bridges between this language and my body.  I do not believe 
that passively receiving the word(s) of the other will suffice to incarnate myself” 
(Irigaray, 2004b, p. 145). It is a birth, in which no one can substitute for one’s 
self, for one’s body, and I demonstrate this through “The Handless Maiden” fairy 
tale in chapters five and six. In speaking of incarnating ones-self, Irigaray 
addresses the personal, rather than collective action of language, used not to 
convey culture, commerce and community, but the incontrovertible singularity of 
individual being.167  In order to refashion language, Luce Irigaray’s parler femme, 
based on female morphology, will undermine the patriarchal assumptions of 
western thought.168 So what might parler femme, speaking as woman, actually 
be?  How can women display themselves in linguistic forms, which demonstrate 
the experience of a woman’s body? What identifies women’s language, and “how 
                                            
167 Kristeva also says that “ethical values will be resolved in smaller and smaller groups”, and “it 
may be the individual discourse which will acquire greater importance” (Kristeva, 1984, p. 85), 
emphasising the individual and personal importance of language over the collective uses (and 
abuses) of language.  
168 Irigaray unveils these patriarchal assumptions (Irigaray, 1999).  She “criticizes Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the principle of identity as instantiating the same neglect of sexual difference that 
has been inscribed throughout the history of Western metaphysics” (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 111). 
Irigaray’s critique of Heidegger is that he has conflated human identity with the identity of a single, 
neutral and thus univocal being. From this univocity, discursivity is conflated with a mono-logical 
or homo-logous understanding of language: a potentially dia-logical exchange is reduced to a 
tautology, ‘‘a monologue in two voices’’ (Irigaray, 2004c, p. 8). As Irigaray tells us, “the two beings 
and Beings of the human species have become the two poles of a single human being who, in 
fact, does not exist. Invented by a masculine thinking and according to its necessities, this more 
or less ghostly being presents rather the characteristics of a masculine subject” (Irigaray, 2004c, 
p. 107). It is against this background that she proposes parler femme. As Leeuwen argues, 
“Being is always already stripped of its carnal vestiges, then the possibility of interrogating the 
meaning of Being in terms of carnality or materiality has been disallowed from the outset” 
(Leeuwen, 2010, p. 120).  Thus follows the necessity for Irigaray to insist upon sexuate 
difference, a difference which is not specified in Heidegger’s notion of dwelling. 
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is the gendered and differentiated body implicated in the relation between text 
and context?” (Threadgold, 1997, pp. 97-98). 
  
In chapter two, I argued for continuity between word and body. For Luce Irigaray, 
there is a wedding between words and the body, which is fruitful if the words are 
appropriate for the body. Women must cultivate the right language; to take care 
of the tone of voice, and the choice of words that will aid the becoming of the self 
and the other. She advocates choosing language which is non-judgemental and 
non-hierarchical (Irigaray, 2010b).   
Following Irigaray, we could argue that the kind of language that she requires for 
transcendence or feminine spirituality occurs “before or beyond any word” 
(Irigaray, 2004b, pp. 15, my emphasis).  Irigaray claims that ‘she’ ”cries out from 
where there are yet no names” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 50), that is from the pre-
symbolic, pre-discursive. Sonia Kruks is also searching for “an account of the 
subject which acknowledges that it exceeds the boundaries of the discursive”, in 
modalities of experience that elude speech, which we come to ‘know’ “through 
non-intellectual, embodied, cognition. For we not only experience what is 
unspoken but even unspeakable” (Kruks, 2001, pp. 13-14).  In this sense, much 
of mystical experience is ‘unspeakable’, as I will maintain in chapter four.  
Hildegard of Bingen, for instance, “insists on bringing art or symbolic expression 
into all that she did and wrote. … She is aware that words cannot bear the weight 
of the treasure of her deep experience.  Thus she turns to symbols - music, 
paintings, poetry – to express her truest self” (Fox, 1987, p. xviii), cultural forms 
which are not discursive.169 However, these forms are non-discursive, rather than 
pre-symbolic, that is, while they do not rely on logos, they have meaning. 
Are there, then, modalities of experience and expression that elude speech, 
which nevertheless we know through non-intellectual, embodied cognition?   Can 
there be an account of the female subject that acknowledges that it exceeds the 
                                            
169 Foucault argues that discourse does not underlie all cultural forms. For him, forms such as art 
and music are not discursive (Foucault, 1967, p. 284). 
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boundaries of the discursive?  Merleau-Ponty, for instance, says that “bodily 
expressions do not form a linguistic system but rather give the basis for all such 
systems” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968a, p. 203). So for Merleau-Ponty, the body is 
being posited as the prediscursive zone. Catherine Keller, too says that the 
“nondiscursive zone of sentience, sensation, and sentiment presents itself at any 
given moment as the prediscursive zone of human consciousness” (C. Keller, 
1997, p. 74). 
One speaks with one’s body before one opens one’s mouth. Male and female 
bodies constitute a prediscursive (but nevertheless embodied) difference, which 
results in a difference in the discourse by and between them.  In Irigaray’s later 
work, she emphasizes that speaking as a woman is not as important as speaking 
between subjects.  I argue that the two projects are complementary however; as 
we shall see with Sheherazade, for there to be a dialogue between, there must 
be two subjects, and for there to be two subjects there must be sexuate 
difference, and for sexuate difference to be achieved, women must be able to 
speak as themselves, rather than in the monologue of patriarchy. The challenge 
of Irigaray’s model is that the two sexes must share love and language to enable 
exchange between them, but love and language must take different forms for 
each sex if absolute otherness is to be recognized and respected. For Irigaray 
language is central because she sees it as the medium through which 
subjectivity and identity are achieved.   
 
I will now approach language through the notion of feminine jouissance, which 
has been taken up as ‘coming’ to writing and speech, by Irigaray and others 
(Cixous & Clément, 1986).  To do this I interrogate Lacan and his ideas around 
foreclosure and jouissance. 
Foreclosure and Jouissance 
For Lacan, femininity is a position that can be taken by men as well as women, 
so this does not serve Luce Irigaray’s project of sexuate identity as extending to 
linguistic use. Indeed, Lacan postulates the feminine position, including 
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jouissance, as existing outside language (Moi, 2004, p. 844). Lacan’s feminine 
position, related to feminine desire, is “the attempt to once again become 
unviolated and complete within ourselves by merging back into the real” 
(Schroeder, 1998, p. 292).  Lacan frames the ‘not all’, the ‘not-yet’, the 
‘something-more’ - that is the real - as that which “might be briefly glimpsed by 
taking on the position of the Feminine” (Schroeder, 1998, p. 289).  One may 
infer, then, that the feminine position can be both accessed and recovered in or 
through the real.  However, Lacan argues that, through the mechanism of 
foreclosure, we all repudiate, reject and preclude the very possibility of the 
existence of certain things, by way of the absence of the signifiers, which would 
enable us to say ‘not that.’ Through his notion of foreclosure, I raise a problem 
that is central to both psychoanalysis and philosophy. As language is 
masculinised, or is designed for - and situates - a masculine subject, and 
feminine signifiers are missing, where can a woman find herself?  Would this 
mean, then, that she is excluded from, or (doubly) negated by, the very language 
she uses, or cannot use?  But what of the feminine position that Lacan places 
outside language? 
 
The famous case of Schreber will help us here. Schreber, a High Court judge, 
fantasized that he was becoming a woman, psychologically and bodily.170  In his 
psychosis he believed that only by doing this would he be able to hear God’s 
word directly, and even to become a conduit for God’s word, and thus redeemed. 
That which was foreclosed (for Schreber and the Symbolic), according to Lacan, 
was the feminine position, which would enable direct access to the divine, 
through jouissance,171 or specifically feminine enjoyment. Thus Schreber, through 
                                            
170 Michelle Walker comments that “the contradictions of the symbolic are inscribed on the body, 
but whose body?” (Walker, 1998, p. 110). I argue that Schreber exhibited these contradictions.  
While the body that exhibits them is usually the feminine body, the feminized body of Schreber 
did the same. 
171 Etymologically, jouissance is related to the French verb jouir, which translates into English as 
“to enjoy, to revel”. Contemporary French idiom uses jouissance as a common term for orgasm. 
Its connotations have been developed by various French theorists to explore the relationship 
between meaning, pleasure and language (Graybeal, 1990, p. 15). This includes Cixous’ 
emphasis on women “coming” to/in writing (Cixous & Clément, 1986). 
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his fantasy, was attempting to access, or ‘to come’ to meaning outside of the 
phallus.  Jouissance may be thought of as the fulfillment of desire in the sense of 
the breakdown of the (phallogocentric) subject/object distinction. “Jouissance is 
the experience of the feminine object for herself, as opposed to the feminine 
object as the object of exchange of masculine subjectivity” (ibid., p. 288). 
 
Jouissance, then, is breaking out from the symbolic and of achieving direct, 
unmediated contact with the real.172 Although anatomical men are capable of 
jouissance, jouissance requires one to take on the position of the feminine, that is 
it requires them to give up their (implied) place in the Symbolic, and become 
(temporarily/impossibly) unsymbolized (Lacan, 1982, pp. 144-145). Thus 
jouissance - the experience of the real - is by definition not symbolic and 
therefore is outside language (Schroeder, 1998, p. 288) 
 
So, what relevance does the case of Schreber have for a vivifying language for 
women? Schreber, prior to his psychosis, was an enforcer of the Law and jurist, 
and ensconced in a multifaceted phallic position, where he operated exclusively 
through the masculine/Symbolic where access to the real was denied, as it is for 
everyone in this position.  His access to logos was unquestioned, but his access 
to eros was problematically foreclosed.  His feminized body was a radical way of 
undoing the foreclosed access to eros/jouissance. Women, in their own feminine 
bodies, can likewise claim a radical access/excess.  My emphasis here is the 
recovery of a feminine position for women, not via psychosis or hysteria - which 
are both ways of trying to claim legitimacy in an economy which proclaims them 
as illegitimate (the Symbolic) – but by ‘redeeming’ or lifting the foreclosure. My 
issue with Lacan is that he posits this as possible only through madness.  
Kristeva, in her critique of Lacan, and development and of his ideas, extends this 
to mysticism and poetry, via eruptions from the semiotic. 
 
Lacan viewed the repudiation of signifiers as the cause of psychosis, and this is 
                                            
172 I employ jouissance as access to a feminine divine in the next chapter. 
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the feminine position.  This would seem problematic.  However, Schreber’s 
repudiation of signifiers gave him access to the real, through eros/jouissance. I 
maintain that Lacan’s theory can be applied to Schreber’s delusions as access to 
a necessary (eros)-speech for women; that is, the Lacanian ”Name of the Father” 
(the Phallus) as chief signifier can be seen as the patriarchy which women (must) 
refuse in order to claim a subjectivity not predicated upon masculine desire. 
Schreber achieved this, albeit in a delusional way.  Anything that is outside the 
Symbolic will tend to be seen by those within it as delusional and those without it 
as freedom. Such is the paradox for someone outside the Symbolic - the ‘not-
dupter’ of Lacan.  Much remains to be explored at another occasion on the fertile 
subject of foreclosure and the feminine position.  Relevant to my exploration of 
language is that for Lacan, psychotics have a different relation to language (and 
the symbolic) in that they speak more than they say, because their speech has 
the same relation to the unconscious as a dream.  My point is that woman’s 
language requires such valence for their embodiment, for their own legitimacy. In 
other words, while remaining in the phallic/Symbolic, although not acknowledged 
by it, women (and those who take up the feminine position, like Schreber) also 
intrinsically have access to the real, which then informs their relation to the 
Symbolic. It enables them to see through it, because they are not quilted within it. 
How might language convey the position of the ‘not-dupter’, of those taking the 
feminine position, if language itself is already presumed to foreclose that very 
position? 
Poïesis as Revelation of Self 
In this section I argue that the feminine position is evoked through poïesis. 
Poïesis from the ancient Greek term ποιέω, means ‘to make’, and infers an 
action that transforms and continues the world beyond the temporal. Heidegger 
used poïesis in the sense of ‘bringing forth’ in its widest sense; (Heidegger, 1977) 
in all begetting and bringing forth upon the beautiful there is a kind of 
making/creating or poïesis. He explained poïesis as the blooming of the blossom, 
the emerging of a butterfly from a cocoon, the plummeting of a waterfall.  
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Mary Daly stresses that language is “potentially alive with meaning”, (Gray, 2000, 
p. 232) but I argue that language in the feminine is alive with potential meaning. 
Once meaning is attributed, hasn’t it lost its potential now it is fixed in the 
Symbolic?173  I argue that it is necessary to retrieve and open language to 
potential once again, to remove foreclosure, to retrieve the real at the bottom of 
the word.  There is a place for the mutable in language, so that language can 
change in our mouths, between our lips (Irigaray) and speak itself ever new.  
Then we can speak ourselves into becoming.  This sort of speech “would flower 
because it flowers”, and would have no care to ensure consistency, or “upright 
conduct in a permanent posture”, but speaks for “all growth and flowering that is 
still in silence” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 143). 
 
While Ralph Waldo Emerson considered that “every thought is a prison; every 
heaven also is a prison”, he also maintained that “therefore we love the poet … 
who unlocks our chains, and admits us to a new scene“ (Emerson, 2010, p. 76).  
Emerson is alluding to a universal, rather than sexuate condition, which operates 
as a foreclosure from which we need to be unlocked. It is the poet, and the poetic 
voice, which opens language - and undoes the foreclosure - so that it actually 
says something, clears and loosens something “in language itself in order to 
allow the appearance of that which prevents language letting loose in new 
utterances.  To let rise the yet unspoken. The yet to be revealed” (Irigaray, 1999, 
p. 132). Thus every ideal needs to be open-ended in order to access renewal, to 
create a radical rupture in which a new form of discourse for women might 
emerge, and continue to emerge. 
 
Poetry was for Heidegger more important than the other arts. He was especially 
fascinated by the works of Hölderlin. "Poetry proper is never merely a higher 
mode (melos) of everyday language," Heidegger wrote in his essay 'Language', 
dealing with Georg Trakl's poem 'A Winter Evening'. "It is rather the reverse: 
                                            
173 Language use and development is necessarily a continuously evolving process.  What I am 
arguing for here is a vivifying language, which counters Irigaray’s lament, that “nothing is able to 
be seen through language any longer” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 131). 
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everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there 
hardly resounds a call any longer” (Heideggger, 1971, p. 208). If everyday 
language is a mere dried husk, then our house of being is indeed impoverished.  
Irigaray emphasizes the discovery of hidden meanings in the equivocal terms (or 
symbols) of ordinary language. Lockhart suggests that it is not the language 
which has lost is vitality, but “it is we who have failed the word, we who have lost 
contact with the imaginal realm beneath and beyond the exterior of the word” 
(Lockhart, 1983, p. 89). Poiesis and erotic logos bring us to the interior, to the 
imaginal world. 
 
I now argue that poetry is an expression of the unconscious, which therefore 
evades castration by the symbolic, and is thus suited to a woman’s voice. 
 
When Luce Irigaray asks if “the philosopher [has] become the poet he has 
always disdained?“ (Irigaray, 1999, p. 9), she is undoubtedly speaking of herself, 
especially in her later work, which includes Everyday Prayers (Irigaray, 2004a), a 
collection of poetry. It is through this poetic language that she seeks to speak the 
spirit as flesh and the flesh as transcendental, through retrieving the neglected 
flesh in philosophy and marrying it with spirit.  Thus the poet keeps open the 
threshold, she “lives in the between-the-two” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 114), not only the 
two lovers, but between the sensible and transcendental, which returns us to 
ponder the notion of poïesis as that which transforms and continues the world 
beyond the temporal. 
 
Irigaray describes poetic language as capable of expressing “the most real of the 
real” (Irigaray, 2004a, p. 37), and therefore of the pre-Symbolic. It “becomes a 
medium that seeks to be available to everything that there is to say” (ibid., p. 30).  
She claims that the “beginnings – the real foundation? - of a culture are poetic, or 
at least artistic” (ibid., p. 29).  Luce Irigaray’s poetic language is a revelation of a 
feminine way of perceiving and thinking, (ibid., p. 31) a foundation of women’s 
culture.  She further defines a consistent difference in form between masculine 
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and feminine poets and poetics: the masculine is filled with suffering and tragedy, 
the feminine she expresses “prepare[s] a love more loving and happy” (ibid.), that 
does not dwell on suffering. She “calls on the poetic voice to speak the revival of 
nature, of meeting, in words that reunite differently earth and sky, the human and 
the divine” (ibid., p. 39).174 The reuniting “differently” of “the human and the 
divine” suggests the awakening of a feminine voice, a feminine logos, which Luce 
Irigaray recognizes in “the pre-Socratics, but in the feminine, a feminine which 
expresses itself at that time more than today” (ibid., p. 47). Of the pre-Socratics, 
one of her favoured thinkers is Sophocles, for his account of Antigone. For 
Irigaray, “Antigone’s example is always worth reflecting upon as a historical 
figure and as an identity or identification for many girls and women living today 
“(Irigaray, 1994, p. 70).  In my use of erotic logos, I argue that it is a retrieval of a 
feminine that is prior to being subsumed within the folds of the masculine 
symbolic.  
 
Poetry recalls the elements, and is therefore closer to nature and our material 
foundations.  Luce Irigaray contrasts this with “our day-to-day speech”, which 
steers “clear of the elements, moving through and forward with a language that 
forgets the matter it names and by means of which it speaks” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 
58).  Poetic language, by contrast, is where “I find the words which will allow a 
new stage in my thinking” (Irigaray, 2004a, p. 29).  The poetic writing of Luce 
Irigaray seeks to preserve and promote a “becoming, which does not divide itself 
from nature.  Form does not claim to dominate matter; it serves its blossoming, 
its growth. …The body becomes spirit and the spirit body, or, rather, they both 
become flesh, and each by the other” (ibid., p. 30). The “flesh” makes it clear that 
we are not talking about a disembodied notion of body, but a body which lives 
and breathes as living flesh. Thus, the feminine language, which she advocates 
for women, is not only poetic, but also a vehicle of the sensible/transcendental.  
 
                                            
174 Although unacknowledged by her, Irigaray is again clearly paraphrasing Heidegger’s fourfold, 
that is the earth, sky, human and divine, which is his concept of dwelling.  See also footnote 133. 
 137 
Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei speaks of an elusive aspect, accessed through 
poetics, which ruptures an “epistemological appropriative horizon” (Gosetti-
Ferencei, 2004, p. 238).  The glimpsing of this elusive aspect requires a dwelling 
in uncertainty, unknowing, and doubt because it is outside symbolic 
representation.  As Rimbaud noted of himself, “the poet makes himself a 
visionary through a long, prodigious and rational disordering of all the senses … 
he will need all his faith…For he arrives at the unknown!” (Rimbaud, 1957, p. 
xxx).  It is the arrival at the unknown/unconscious, where new thoughts (outside 
the Symbolic) are possible, and where a new framing of the feminine is 
possible.175 These are the “new forms that inventions of the unknown demand” 
(ibid., p. xxv), which allow new thinking for Luce Irigaray. Rimbaud also 
anticipates her intention with his remark that “poetry will no longer accompany 
action, but will lead it” (ibid., p. xxxii). This possibility of being led by poetry, 
suggests a locus outside the symbolic. Lockhart uses poesis to convey dreams 
into words, ”letting the dream go into poetic speech” (Lockhart, 1983, p. 105). 
Luce Irigaray also speaks of the still onieric quality of words, which allows 
language itself to dream, to be a dream that is not framed in the Symbolic. 
 
Scientific discourse engages the symbolic, and via rationality, represses the 
semiotic.  Conversely, “poetic text is one of the privileged sites of the 
semiotic…Poetry…will privilege and highlight the semiotic to the point of 
sometimes erasing any discernible symbolic framework” (Walker, 1998, p. 106). 
Kristeva claims that poetic language is “the only language that uses up 
transcendence and theology to sustain itself” and that it is “therefore knowingly 
the enemy of [patriarchal] religion” (Kristeva, 2000, p. 71). Unlike Kristeva, I 
argue that poetic language both revitalizes and situates itself in the 
crevice/interstices that then later become religion, or are appropriated by religion.  
This is seen in Peguy’s famous statement that ‘what begins in mysticism ends in 
                                            
175 Throughout this work, I use the terms unconscious and conscious in a Jungian sense, unless 
otherwise stated.  So the unconscious contains repressed material, but also all that which has not 
yet come into being, that has not been made conscious. 
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politics’ - or religion.176  However, can poetic language really be subsumed into 
religion, or does it resist being subsumed into theology, like ducks that live in 
water but are water-resistant? Moi takes up the theme of poetic language being 
profoundly a-theological, when she says that it “may appear as an argument 
complicitous with dogma” because religion makes frequent use of poetry, “but [it] 
may also set in motion what [patriarchal] religion represses.  In so doing [it] no 
longer acts as instinctual floodgates within the enclosure of the sacred and 
becomes instead protestor against its posturing” (Moi, 1986, p. 112). We could 
say that poetics, then, continually introduces the repressed (feminine) into 
(phallogocentric) language, including the language of religion, whereas logos 
would prefer to posture, and remain exclusively masculine/Symbolic.   
 
In defining what language in or for the feminine might be, I conclude that the 
poetic voice is suitable because of its approach to the unknown, that which is 
outside the ‘kingdom’ of the symbolic.  However, the notion of erotic logos 
enables all language to be touched by (Irigaray’s) angel’s wings and thus undoes 
language to speak again for each separate subject and the between.  
Erotic Logos 
The Persian legend of The Thousand and One Nights dates from the Islamic 
Golden Age (c.750 CE - c.1258 CE) and concerns Sheherazade, who marries a 
king who is known to execute his bride the morning after the wedding night.177 
                                            
176 Although often quoted, I have been unable to discover the original source of this quote. 
177 One Thousand and One Nights is a collection of Middle eastern and South Asian stories and 
folk tales compiled in Arabic during the Islamic Golden Age (c.750 CE - c.1258 CE). The story 
concerns a Persian king, Shahryar, who marries a succession of virgins only to execute each one 
the next morning, before she has a chance to dishonour him. Eventually the vizier, whose duty it 
is to provide them, cannot find any more virgins. Sheherazade, the vizier's daughter, offers 
herself as the next bride and her father reluctantly agrees. On the night of their marriage, 
Sheherazade begins to tell the king an intriguing tale, but does not end it. The king is thus forced 
to postpone her execution in order to hear the conclusion. The next night, as soon as she finishes 
the tale, she begins (and only begins) a new one, and the king, eager to hear the conclusion, 
postpones her execution once again. So it goes on for 1,001 nights. Her language is innovative 
and includes rich poetry and poetic speeches, chants, songs, lamentations, hymns, beseeching, 
praising, pleading, riddles and annotations. Notable is her knowledge and exposition of abstract 
philosophical principles or complex points of Islamic philosophy. (This synopsis is compiled from 
various internet sources, including: 
 http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/1999/12/Scheherazade-Feminist-Icon.aspx, and 
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Sheherazade, however, who is educated in all the wisdom of the land, spins a 
tale that is so compelling that her husband postpones her execution so he can 
hear the next episode the following night. 
 
Fabrice Dubosc describes Sheherazade’s language as erotic logos, that is, 
incorporating both logos and eros in the Jungian sense (Dubosc, 2000). If we 
apply the assignations of logos to men, and eros to women, then erotic logos 
provides a far too facile coniunctio, or marriage of these traditionally paired 
opposites.  However, if we imagine that this might be an eroticising of 
logos/language itself, then we have a far more interesting proposition; erotic 
logos could then be said to occupy the same paradoxical position as Irigaray’s 
sensible/transcendental, that is, embodied word.  Therefore I argue that these 
two terms are equivalent. Thus, I argue that language can carry the valence of 
both eros and logos, body and spirit.  In erotic logos, rather than the power/logos 
trope of phallogocentric language, from which women have been erased, 
love/logos creates a coniunctio,178 an embodied word.179 In the broadest sense, 
erotic logos encompasses both desire and belief, both libido and credo, and thus 
moves us towards a feminine divine.180 
 
                                            
 http://www.wisegeek.com/who-is-scheherazade.htm  
178 Jung borrowed the term coniunctio from the alchemists and applied it to the process of 
individuation, where traditionally paired opposites are harmonized, so that either/or categories 
become neither/both. 
179Judith Still takes up Luce Irigaray’s term, poetic nuptials, where Irigaray engages philosophy 
without entering into traditional philosophical critique.  As Still says,  “poetic nuptials are an 
alternative to ways of reading such as critique which demand a particular distance between what 
become subject and object” (Still, 2002, p. 7). Irigaray’s work consists of many different styles, 
with poetic expression, and multiple layers.  Likewise, Sheherazade’s erotic logos is ambiguous 
and varied. More importantly, for Still, poetic nuptials “is a term for a different thinking of 
relationality, not an oppositional one which claims no encounter is possible” (Still, 2002, p. 7)This 
relationality is not just between two ‘others’, but between the text and the reader, and between 
different aspects of the text.  As Still says of Irigaray’s writing,  “sections, even words or 
expressions, (such as that of poetic nuptials) can be lingered over at length so that layer upon 
layer of connotation becomes apparent and it is the relationship between these connotations 
which is crucial”.  She further suggests that poetic nuptials “can take place between elements of 
the text; they can be a mode of intertextual relationship” (Still, 2002, p. 7). Thus for me, erotic 
logos and poetic nuptials are parallel terms describing parallel situations. 
180 I take the Jungian meaning of libido as life-energy rather than sexuality exclusively. 
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When Luce Irigaray eroticizes traditional philosophic discourse through sensual 
poetic imagery, she demonstrates a marriage between eros and logos; she 
disrupts assumptions about both, and weaves instead a new relation between 
them. This is an effective way for women to “re-create alterity”, that is, they must, 
as Tilghman argues, “re-work from inside the language they already have” 
(Tilghman, 2008, p. 51)   Mary Daly also commits herself to use language against 
language and does it “within the horizon, which necessarily must change, of 
existing philosophical and theological discourses” (Gray, 2000, p. 231). This is 
what Sheherazade does. Erotic logos is itself a refashioning of language. Russell 
Lockhart says we need to “revivify our relation to the word by developing an Eros 
relation … in words” (Lockhart, 1983, pp. 89, my emphasis).  Lockhart holds that 
an essential aspect of Eros is “the great principle that connects us to things 
beyond our ego” (Lockhart, 1983, p. 89).  
 
I argue for erotic logos as a suitable language-form for women, which encircles 
their subjectivity and also performs the dialogue between two separate subjects. 
As Luce Irigaray says, “the becoming of consciousness, of culture, cannot be 
entrusted to one subject alone; it is engendered in the interaction between two 
subjectivities irreducible to one another: that of man and that of woman. Thus 
there no longer exists one sole logos” (Irigaray, 2002, p. 99). It is women’s logos 
that I am attempting to articulate. In this logos, eros and narrative are intertwined 
(Cavarero, 2000).181 
 
Sheherazade uses poïesis in its broadest sense, in bringing forth life. Ultimately, 
the poetic voice uses “words that reunite differently earth and sky, the human 
and the divine” (Irigaray, 2004a, p. 39). Sheherazade reunites differently the 
human and the divine, and also transforms the relation between two. She uses a 
(dialogic) language against (monologic) language; that is she develops a 
language that includes two, which incorporates women’s subjectivity and sexuate 
                                            
181 Adriana Cavarero also interrogates this story of the Arabian Nights to discover subjectivity. 
She says that “narration and conjugal love go together step by step … the tale not only stops 
death” but weaves a bond of love and respect on both sides (Cavarero, 2000, p. 123). 
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difference.  What did Sheherazade achieve in erotic logos? Dubosc utilizes this 
tale to discuss the masculine position, where the King is redeemed from his 
revenge against women by the feminine, thus seeing it as a story for men, and 
the traditional role of muse/saviour/inspiratrix is assigned to women.  In my 
reading, Sheherazade moves from masculine monologic totality, to female 
subjectivity, to discourse between two, through which the king is changed, 
transformed.  But the emphasis is that she does this on her own terms and 
creates her own subjectivity. Her language could be described as poetic, but 
more than that, she finds and uses “the poetic at the bottom of every word” 
(Lockhart, 1983, p. 97). This is because ‘the poetic’ represents a perspective or 
state of mind, and carries this valence.  Thus poetic use of words is more than 
representation, and brings us close to the unconscious, rather than distancing us 
from it. Poetic use speaks something that has not already been said, which has 
heretofore been hidden from view in plain sight – that is, unconscious.  The 
unconscious motives of the king are revealed to him through the narrative 
Sheherazade weaves. “Poetry”, (and poïesis) according to Cixous,  “exists only 
by taking strength from the unconscious … where the repressed [women] 
survive” (Cixous & Clément, 1986, p. 98).  Thus according to Cixous, women are 
close to poetry and the unconscious, and are therefore more than the 
symbolized.  Women and poïesis are able to bring forth that which has not 
already been spoken, and in so doing they will trouble that which is already 
codified or understood. This access also allows Sheherazade to speak that which 
is repressed; this is two-fold, firstly speaking her own position, and secondly she 
speaks to or for the unconscious of the King, because she sees from this 
perspective. Being close to the unconscious is an advantage for 
women/Sheherazade, because they/she can be outside the jurisdiction of the 
Symbolic and its (mis)representations. I remind the reader that I discussed Luce 
Irigaray’s idea that women can take on the anima-projections of men, and 
transform them.  The tale of Shererazade can be read as an example of this. 
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Sheherazade does not merely reproduce the many language-forms available to 
her, but weaves something unique, clever, and entertaining and reveals the 
unconscious of the king. I propose Sheherazade as an exemplar for women182, 
and an archetypal feminine, “older and newer than every history, [who] stays 
within beginning’s awakening” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 107). My emphasis here is on 
Sheherazade as lover; she is lover twice over - she is lover of the other, as well 
as ‘amateur’ philosopher, in that she engages philosophy in a learned way, albeit 
outside the academy. Le Doeuff (Le Dœuff, 1989) addresses the situation of 
women who have been relegated an amateur relationship with philosophy by the 
patriarchal institutional system.183  Here ‘amateur’ is a pejorative term, to mean 
less than serious, not skilful or professional, and possibly part-time and unpaid as 
well! However, I defer to the Latin origins of the word amateur, meaning ‘to do for 
the love of’, for pleasure, to be an admirer or devotee, which then returns us to 
the Latin roots of philosophy, which means lover of wisdom. Emmanuel Levinas 
likewise suggests that philosophy should be “the wisdom of love at the service of 
love” (Lévinas, 1991, p. 162). 
 
In the tale, Sheherazade’s discourse is nocturnal - she weaves her spellbinding 
stories till just before dawn. There is a risk in placing Sheherazade’s discourse 
quite literally in the night, however, because it too easily places her in a binary 
trope of male/day and female/night.  This is an instance of Luce Irigaray’s quest 
to protect the language, subjectivity and divinity of women, “this there, this she 
there, could be called night.  But to do so already would be to catch her up too 
much, or to invoke her too much, in a language that could not be her own” 
(Irigaray, 1999, p. 107). Yet Irigaray frequently uses images of the night.  For 
                                            
182 Some contemporary Muslim women claim the story of “Scheherazade demonstrates that 
women need not ‘Westernize’ to expand their rights and roles within their societies, and that 
Islamic history and literature may provide the most effective tools against Muslim zealots. … To 
look at Scheherazade anew is to see Muslim women's life before male-centred customs and 
interpretations of the Koran consigned girls and women to second-class citizenship” 
http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/1999/12/Scheherazade-Feminist-Icon.aspx. 
183 However, she also claims that we can use philosophy to undo or rethink the very same 
“masculine-feminine divisions that philosophy has helped to articulate and define” (Le Dœuff, 
1989, p. 101). This is important to my premise that transformation can and must occur from both 
within and without (language itself, philosophy as a practice, the institution, etc.). 
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example, “it is in darkness that we met with one another.  Scarcely having built a 
rudimentary common dwelling – thanks to a few words - we entered into the 
night” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 44). It is in this night, this darkness that ‘the between’ 
can begin to grow.  Irigaray speaks of “a manner of seeing, speaking and acting 
that is accompanied by a nocturnal luminosity” (Irigaray, 2010a, pp. 16-17, my 
emphasis). Such nocturnal luminosity lends itself to the other revealing 
themselves to us, rather than an impatient imposition upon the other.  It is in this 
nocturnal luminosity that Sheherazade spins her tales.   
 
For Luce Irigaray, the woman’s voice occurs “beyond his language [langue]. 
…She forever comes and recalls from her place of disappearance: she cries out 
at night” (Irigaray, 1999, pp. 49, my emphasis). It is not by chance that her 
disappearance and her emergence are at ‘night’. According to Marie Louise Von 
Franz, the soft reflected and reflective light of the moon,184 metaphorically 
speaking, does not hurt the feminine, while the harsh masculine light of 
day/rationality can be damaging.185  Many things need a dimmer form of light, lest 
becoming is destroyed. Plants germinate in the dark, and only when they already 
have a hold on life do they emerge into the light; too much light too soon will kill 
them. In Arabic al samar ‘speaks in the darkness of the night’, at the edge of 
‘normal’ discourse, where identity in the Symbolic is dimmed, and eros sweetly 
opens a way. This speaking in the darkness of the night is where heart, mind and 
body open (Calza, 2007).  The whole of Sheherazade’s opus is al samar, evening 
stories, and erotic logos.186  After 1001 nights, Sheherazade and the King emerge 
into full daylight; the King, representing patriarchal authority, has of his own 
accord changed many of his attitudes, especially to women, and Sheherazade 
has woven a subject-place for herself, which had not been available to her 
before.  
                                            
184 In chapter five I will engage with the motif of reflectivity, as a necessary activity for women in 
order to achieve subjectivity.  I associate this with the moon and silver, as does the fairy tale, 
which I analyse in that chapter. 
185 In conversation with von Franz’s archivist and translator, Dr Barbara Davies, Zurich 2006. 
186 This is reflected in the Arabic poem in relation to El Samar: “You are the dark of the night, and 
the hope of my imagination.” http://www.allthelyrics.com/forum/arabic-lyrics-translation/45605-
claudia-al-shemaly-la-yikadaouk.html accessed August 6th, 2013. 
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Sheherazade is not seized by the king and incorporated into his 
phallogocentrism; instead, she keeps a space open, a threshold. And according 
to Irigaray’s discussion of the role of the woman, ‘she’ “remains threshold. In 
what comes to pass in-between - that’s where she stays. … In this world of in-
between: light and dark, highest and lowest, this world of threshold where the 
whole entwines” (Irigaray, 1999, pp. 109-110, my emphasis). Sheherazade is a 
threshold dweller; she maintains her own subjectivity simultaneously with an 
awareness of his. To continue night-metaphors, her task is to ‘awaken’ the king; 
“she still draws him out of sleep: an interruption of present absence that rends his 
language” (ibid., p. 51).  That which rends the language of the king/symbolic is 
erotic logos; Sheherazade acts as the not-duped one and thus straddles the real 
and the Symbolic, and undoes the rule of the sky-Father, through a discourse of 
love, based upon exchange between two different subjects, rather than the 
monologue of a single subject under which all her predecessors were killed. The 
exchange is one of love and respect, through words that convey this, and have 
meaning to both. I argue that contemporary women can apply this understanding 
as follows: by keeping open a ‘threshold’ (to the real) women can remain in the 
symbolic, as does Sheherazade, and not be ‘killed’ by it, because one crafts 
one’s own subjectivity and insists upon it.187 Through this opening an exchange 
between two is possible, which is, or becomes, the place of love, through flesh, 
gesture and word. Cavarero argues, in relation to this tale, that “narration and 
conjugal love go together step by step … the tale not only stops death” but 
weaves a bond of love and respect on both sides (Cavarero, 2000, p. 123). 
 
Sheherazade’s simultaneous acceptance and tactical transgression of the Law is 
akin to Kristeva's technique of double writing in 'Stabat Mater', where she 
expresses her own subject-position at the same time as expounding the 
                                            
187 Cixous, following Lacan, notes that women and men enter into the Symbolic Order, into 
language as structure, in different ways, or through different doors, and therefore the subject 
positions open to either sex within the Symbolic are also different.  Sheherazade illustrates the 
way the subject sexed as female does so.  
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Law/Symbolic. Sheherazade practices a subtle form of double writing, in that her 
intriguing tales, all of which are taken from the lexicons of the time, also 
undermine the patriarchal structure from which they are taken. For instance, one 
of the tales Sheherazade tells is of "Hasib and the Queen of Snakes". It 
describes the difficulties a young man experiences in his psychological 
separation from his mother and is full of insights into the difficult confrontation 
between men and women.  The tale shows how Hasib moves from a collective 
masculine attitude to being able to make up his own mind, and not behave 
according to the conventions.  So Sheherazade has introduced a feminine 
subject-position, and the ethics toward this subject.  Her introduction of these 
positions simultaneously enables the king/Symbolic to change through his 
introjection of them.188 
 
Sheherazade avoids execution.  By keeping her stories going, she engages the 
masculine symbolic on her terms, that is by creating a subject-position for 
herself. And so she lives to see another day, another exposure to the blinding 
light of the symbolic.  The night provides renewal, through her discourse.  She 
ends each narrative with suspense; we must turn the page, must come again 
tomorrow night.189 The masculine has survived another night too.  She avoids the 
                                            
188 One of Luce Irigaray’s strategies to break open phallogocentric language to include feminine 
discourse is that of mimesis.  This inevitably alters the discourse - and the relationship - between 
men and women, which she intends as therapeutic.  As Jean Byrne puts it, “her idea is that by 
receiving and interpreting the male unconscious women/Irigaray can help man to know himself 
and break free from his narcissistic imaginary” (Byrne, 2008, p. 59).  In such a way, then, 
Sheherazade receives, interprets and enables the King to know himself and break free from his 
narcissistic imaginary. 
189 “Narrative is a seductive mode of discourse, persuading by an enticing invitation to take up the 
perspective of the narrator, which excites one's imagination and feeling. Its operations are more 
like love than war, and thereby follows a mode of persuasion considered to be more suitable for 
women. These phenomena raise numerous epistemological questions: does the quest for 
‘masculine’ prestige by using ‘masculine’ methods distort practices of knowledge acquisition? 
(Addelson 1983; Moulton, 1983) Are some kinds of sound research unfairly ignored because of 
their association with “feminine” cognitive styles (E. F. Keller, 1985)? Do ‘feminine cognitive styles 
yield knowledge that is inaccessible or harder to achieve by ’masculine’ means? (E. Anderson, 
2011; Duran, 1991) While there are undoubtedly different ways of acquiring knowledge - I am 
relying on different styles in this chapter for instance - I nevertheless believe that to construct 
these styles along gender lines is problematic; although sexuate difference could indeed account 
for such difference, (indeed Irigaray would prefer it so) I argue that such knowledge-acquisition is 
available to both sexes.  Furthermore, when certain such knowledge acquisition styles are 
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foreclosure of a system, which has excluded her and in which is inscribed her 
death. Sheherazade has created a “world that language ceaselessly would 
construct and reconstruct” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 124). Unlike phallogocentric 
language, this renewal is continuous – there is never a time when it is absolutely 
achieved. However, after 1001 nights the king officially acknowledges what he 
has been gradually accepting, that is, he acknowledges her separate existence 
and no longer seeks to kill her.   
 
In chapter one I introduced the idea of multiple archetypes of the feminine, and 
pause to consider the archetype which Sheherazade might represent. Is it a 
virginal archetype, such as Hestia?  Or a relational archetype such as Aphrodite? 
What might this tale, and the Handless Maiden in chapters five and six, say to 
women who identify as lesbian, or who have no relations with men? I argue that 
the whole phallogocentric culture to which both men and women, (Sheherazade, 
the handless maiden) are ‘wed’, is the problem, not individual men, marriage per 
se, or relations with men. Because Luce Irigaray posits sexuate difference as the 
first and fundamental difference, it enables women to separate from 
phallogocentrism, and to achieve subjectivity regardless of their sexual 
preferences.   I argue, therefore, that sexuate difference is primary, and the 
(other) feminine archetypes are secondary.  Luce Irigaray, because of her 
insistence on sexuate difference, has been accused of creating a feminine 
stereotype, by Amy Hollywood, for instance, who asks, “does Irigaray fetishize 
women and sexual difference?” (Hollywood, 2002, p. 340). Morny Joy, too, 
wonders if Irigaray’s insistence on “sexual difference becomes reified in a way 
that privileges women and their ‘feminine’ spirituality and identifies them with an 
affirmative ontological ideal” (Joy, 2006, p. 141).  Is Luce Irigaray proposing a 
new feminine stereotype, which is heterosexual and conservative, 
notwithstanding her earlier concerns for elaborating a multiplicity in the 
expression of female forms? On the one hand, Irigaray’s multiplicity of singular 
                                            
privileged, such as ‘pure reason’, and others such as narrative, myth and fairy tale are 
denigrated, and the denigrated styles are associated with women, this is problematic.  
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feminine experiences as genealogy contributes to the feminine imaginary, where 
an individual woman can see her own life as one of the many possibilities of 
female embodiment.  On the other, I contend that Irigaray’s project of 
establishing sexuate difference does run the risk of being prescriptive 
(proscriptive?) and definitive, in the following particular way.  
 
As Morny Joy says, “Denial [of any pairing that is not heterosexual] only serves 
to restrict the diverse ways in which a divine can become manifest in a world that 
respects differences, and that does not attempt to exclude them, because they 
threaten one’s own circumscribed worldview” (ibid., p. 160).  To imagine that her 
sexuate difference is heterosexual at all, limits Irigaray’s own definition of 
sexuate.  As Luce Irigaray states, sexuate difference “represents the most basic 
and universal place of otherness, and it has to be respected in order to respect 
the other kinds of otherness becoming possible” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 19). If, as 
Irigaray claims,  ‘sexuate’ is articulated through spiritual, bodily, social, linguistic, 
aesthetic, erotic, and political forms, it is describing women, (and men), not the 
sexual intercourse in which they may or may not be engaging. Irreducible 
difference between the sexes, does not equate to lack of difference within each 
sex. I conclude then, that Luce Irigaray has so reinforced sexuate difference that 
she appears to cultivate it by privileged heterosexuality.  However, a divine which 
is only, or preferably, modelled on the heterosexual couple risks being as 
exclusive of difference as a patriarchal, androcentric male God. I argue that a 
truly feminine subjectivity and divinity is inclusive of all difference.  I believe, 
however, that Irigaray is not as categorical as she appears, (or has been 
interpreted) but in her concern to develop sexuate difference as a necessary 
cornerstone to her work, other aspects of her work, which would qualify or modify 
this position, can be too easily overlooked or diminished. For instance, Irigaray 
argues for “at least two, male and female”, in regard to the sexes (Irigaray, 1996, 
pp. 37, my emphasis). This “at least two” is open to conjecture, articulation and 
development, outside of (or within) sexuate difference.  This opens the possibility 
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for fluid multiplicity in feminine sexuality, which is not merely the opposite of a 
man’s (Luce Irigaray, 1985, p. 139).   
 
Although my project centres around the feminine, in this chapter focusing on 
feminine language, and intentionally and inevitably privileges women, I argue that 
the renewal of language for women will inevitably free men as well, because it 
frees untapped resources of communication. In the speaking between two, erotic 
logos will inevitably “develop the relations with oneself and with the other rather 
than to master the world, especially the living world, through words” (Irigaray, 
2010a, p. 13). The King was open to Sheherazade’s speaking, his world-view 
was “questioned by the existence of other words, which open[ed] again the 
house of language in which [h]e dwells” (ibid., p. 12) My view is that it is in the 
opening of sexuate difference (and then to all other difference, as emphasized by 
Luce Irigaray), that psychic growth, flexibility and love can actually arise.190 
Furthermore, Sheherazade is finally seen as subject - the King sees her for and 
as herself, and in this subjectivity she is no longer objectified. He no longer sees 
her as representing all women who (might) betray him, but as this particular 
women who he is now able to love.  
 
I have based this analysis on two different sexuate identities, so we can view 
Sheherazade as a feminine mode or style, which simultaneously undoes and 
exists parallel to, the masculine symbolic. Although the symbolic serves a 
masculine purpose, men suffer various foreclosures of their own which must be 
undone so they are available for the encounter between two. As I have already 
articulated, each must “keep on hold one’s own becoming in order to lend 
assistance to the other’s becoming. …We have not yet reached such a 
coexistence with the other, or we have already forgotten it” (Irigaray, 2008b, pp. 
128-129).  In chapter six I argue fully for Luce Irigaray’s ideas on self-affection, 
                                            
190 In “Belief Itself”, Luce Irigaray’s positions angels as mediators of love, in the ‘between’ 
(Irigaray, 1993b, pp. 23-53). 
 149 
(one’s own becoming) as taking precedence; both parties need to attend to their 
own becoming, as well as being aware of the needs of the other. 
Conclusion 
This chapter evokes that which shimmers beneath language or that which 
constitutes the nativity of language.191  Without this discussion, the subjects I 
cover in the other chapters lack an anchor.  Yet a paradox remains; that while 
one is more than one’s words, in that much of experience is pre-linguistic, or non-
discursive, one is reliant on words to express or evoke.  Simultaneously, words 
can become the Gods, the fixed idols spoken of by Jung, which can only betray 
becoming.192  For Luce Irigaray ambiguity is necessary, so that the saying never 
gets completely said, so that both language and one’s self are ever coming into 
being, becoming.  This I place as the essence of feminine language.  Erotic logos 
communicates (between two), and does not merely transmit information in the 
manner of the language required and disseminated by science and technology.  
 
Is a radical departure from phallogocentric images of the divine possible, toward 
something specifically suited to women? In the next chapter, “Mysticism as the 
Feminine Divine” I return to the notion that men and women have different 
spiritual paths, and suggest that feminine spirituality must be founded on 
experiences, and framed by theories, that provide a container for the specific 
imaginary, language, interiority and psychology of women.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
191 A specific conflict arose while writing this chapter: the academy privileges objectivity, where 
the subjectivity of the writer disappears. Yet the task of Sheherezade was to insert her 
subjectivity, so she would not disappear within the Symbolic that excluded her.  Is it the case, 
then, that as a woman describes the experience of jouissance by speaking it, she re-enter the 
symbolic order and loses her jouissance? Is it “impossible to sing the dream of the Feminine 
within the inadequate masculine speech” (Schroeder, 1998, p. 290)?  
192 Jung sees the Word as a “pathologizing deity because religious literalism and historicism have 
severed the Word from the abyss which precedes it and so reduced it to an empty rationalism” 
(Dourley, 2006, p. 175). 
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Chapter Four: Mysticism as the Feminine Divine 
 
“Another world is not only possible, she is on the way. On a quiet day I can hear 
her breathing.” Arundhati Roy 193 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is a radical gesture towards stating a feminist philosophy of religion, 
namely one that does not posit a feminine subject within a masculinist religious 
framework or philosophy, which emphasizes instead the lived experience of an 
embodied feminine subject. I propose that mysticism is a direct response or 
access to the numinous, that is to say an affective, living experience that 
overflows the boundaries of the ego.  Rather than rely on customs and habits of 
the past, which are based on a masculine imaginary, I aim to use a female 
imaginary toward a new relation with the divine. We are endebted to Michèle Le 
Doeuff for her inquiry into the ‘philosophic imaginary’ in which she investigated 
“the problematic conception of women and the ideals of divine knowledge which 
have silenced women within the long tradition of western philosophy” (P. S. 
Anderson, 2012, p. 10).194 
 
I argue that mysticism as a feminine divine is a means by which women can 
discover a feminine divine which “establishes her contact with the divine outside 
the masculine framework” (Filipczak, 2004, p. 213), that is, a feminine 
transcendence.195 I define, discuss, and amplify mysticism as feminine spirituality. 
I contrast the possibility of a feminine divine apprehended and experienced in the 
mystical with a masculine divine enclosed within the symbolic and codified in 
religious dogma/ theory. I do not necessarily draw these distinctions on gender 
lines, however. I argue that mysticism is a manifestation of the feminine divine, 
                                            
193ThinkExist.com Quotations. “Arundhati Roy quotes”. ThinkExist.com Quotations Online 1 May 
2010.  
194 See Le Dœuff’s The Philosophical Imaginary (Le Dœuff, 1989). 
195 Pasolini, in his film Medea, “understands Medea’s ‘spiritual catastrophe’ - and it stands for the 
spiritual catastrophe of all women as they come under the subjugation of patriarchal tradition 
(King, 2009, p. 160). 
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and spell out what it means and how it is possible. I introduced the terms ‘divine 
feminine’ and ‘feminine divine’ in the Introduction. I defined the ‘feminine divine’ 
as that which Luce Irigaray calls for in the form of a divine of their own for 
women, and the ‘divine feminine’ as that which she calls for in “becoming divine” 
for women, namely their spirituality (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 68).196 Both of these 
concepts are integral to this chapter, and are related to the transformation of the 
divine, which I also explore. 
 
I have prepared the way for this discussion. In chapter one, I detailed the 
specifics of feminine experience as prelude to mysticism as spiritual experience. 
In chapter two I argued for the inclusion of women’s body and flesh in 
considering spirituality, to lay the foundations for a sensible aspect. A bodily 
experience - one’s own breath - underpins my current discussion. In chapter 
three I argued that jouissance is a feminine position, which enables direct access 
to the divine. 
 
I begin by providing a definition of (feminine) spiritual experience, and then 
proceed to discuss what ‘God-in-the-feminine’ might be. This leads us to a 
definition of mysticism and the numinous, which are both key concepts in this 
chapter and provide the fulcrum around which all other discussion is balanced. I 
equate a feminine mystical spirituality with libidinal energy, in contrast with the 
masculine spirituality of credo; I suggest that feminine jouissance is associated 
with divinity in the feminine. As I define it, mysticism is a body/spirit confluence, 
an experience of the sensible/transcendental as articulated by Luce Irigaray, and 
I argue that mysticism expresses a continuum between women and a (feminine) 
divine.  
                                            
196 Howie and Jobling note that, increasingly, the ‘divine’ is “emerging from feminist theology as a 
central category of critical thought” (Howie & Jobling, 2009, p. 2), so my discussion of the ‘divine’ 
contributes substantially to contemporary feminist theological inquiry. 
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Before I begin my discussion, let me note that there are many different mystical 
traditions, both theistic and non-theistic.197 Although my comments relate to 
Christian mysticism, it can be argued that mysticism is actively cultivated in the 
esoteric aspects of most, if not all, religious systems.198 The Sufis, for instance, 
constitute the esoteric branch of Islam, where direct experience of the divine is 
courted. In Hinduism and Buddhism, direct experience is part of the daily practice 
of cultivation.199 Broadly speaking,200 mystical traditions might be characterised by 
experiences of the numinous, ineffability,201 states of loss of ego-awareness often 
described as one-ness or unity, with a concomitant change in attitude to life as a 
whole,202 and possibly states of ecstasy.  
 
I am going to focus on the numinous, namely a strong spiritual quality indicating 
or suggesting the presence of a divinity, which seems to be present in many, if 
not all, traditions. I argue that the intense experience of the numinous does not 
equate with a belief in ‘God’, especially the male God of androcentric religious 
                                            
197 This is Eric Neumann’s assessment of mystical forms: “The mystical man [sic] may be 
designated as religious, since all his life he consciously or unconsciously confronts the numinous: 
but he need not necessarily be a believer in God.   Our insight into the scope and ubiquity of the 
mystical phenomenon shows that there are theistic, atheistic, pantheistic and panentheistic, but 
also materialistic and idealistic, extraverted and introverted, personal and transpersonal forms of 
mystical experience.  The experience of God as a sacred adventure represents only one specific, 
experimental, form of mysticism; it is by no means the most common and perhaps not even the 
most significant. But all mystical forms have in common the intensity of experience, the 
revolutionary, dynamic impetus of a psychological event, which takes the ego out of the structure 
of consciousness; and in all of them the numinous appears as the antithesis of consciousness. 
Mysticism is not a religious experience as such” (Neumann, 1969, p. 381).  
198 This is supported by Roberts Avens, when he says: “Historically, gnosis constitutes the 
esoteric in the official or exoteric religious traditions of the world” (Avens, 1984, p. 132).  
199 Direct experience does not necessarily presume direct experience of a divine object, however. 
Hinduism and Buddhism cultivate different modes of direct experience, and address different 
issues, for example seeing things as they really are in comparison to merging with Brahman. 
200 As outlined by William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience (James, 2008). 
201 “Ineffability is a nearly universal feature of mystical experience.  There can be no doubt that 
such experiences are indescribable in language.  Neither can it be denied that such experiences 
do not consist only in the expression of language” (Penner, 1983, p. 83).  I will question this 
assumption of ineffability. 
202 According to John Sanford, who uses a Jungian framework to discuss mysticism, “certain 
deep elements of the psyche can only be known through ecstasy, through experiences through 
which the ego, paradoxically, ‘loses’ its usual self in order to know its deeper Self” (Sanford, 
1995, p. 108), and from which a new perspective naturally arises. 
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systems,203 and this distinction helps to extract women’s spirituality from an 
androcentric system, while still retaining their experience of the numinous. As 
Eric Neumann points out, however, although an encounter with the numinous is 
often, if not invariably, described in religious language, it is an experience which 
is not religious as such (Neumann, 1969, p. 381). 
 
As I have already argued, woman’s spirituality necessarily encompasses the 
sensible/transcendental, and because this includes female sexuate difference, I 
argue that it will be intrinsically different from that of men. But, if mysticism is 
manifestation of the feminine divine, various questions must be asked. Is 
experience of the feminine divine available to men as well as to women? Is this 
question parallel to asking if the masculine divine is available to women as well 
as men? Are male and female divine then, to be drawn on sexual or sexuate 
lines? If we do not draw sexuate lines, do we create the confusion of men and 
women being ‘devil to each other’ as claimed by Jung? If not, what other 
differentiations are adequate? I pose these questions because they frame my 
inquiry, and acknowledge that this work will progress us towards provisional, 
rather than definitive, answers. 
Spiritual Experience 
I argue for the term ‘spiritual’ rather than ‘religious’, when investigating feminine 
spiritual experience, because the former allows for experience outside an 
established religious framework, while the latter relies upon it. I argue first for a 
spiritual experience that occurs to those with a developed interiority. Second, that 
this experience occurs in very different cultures.204 Third, that spiritual experience 
is not necessarily of a transcendent object, but that it directs us towards a 
horizon, which is in excess of the limited concerns of the personality. Fourth, that 
spiritual experience includes the body, and thus is not transcendent of the 
                                            
203 Monotheisms are inherently intolerant of other gods, and I have no desire to create another 
‘monotheistic’ approach, in regard to feminine spirituality. 
204 Barbara Newman cautions us that “experience of the divine is such that no historical 
reconstruction can be more than partial and provisional” (Newman, 1995, p. 17), therefore it is 
imperative that we do not imagine that the experiences of the medieval mystics, for instance, are 
contiguous with our own. 
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body.205 Fifth, that spiritual experience is different for men and women. I contend 
that this difference has been masked because women have been included, and 
subsumed, in masculine religious systems. This has led to certain experiences - 
more likely to be had by women - to being viewed pejoratively, such as that of 
women mystics. I will refer back to these points as I develop this chapter. 
 
If we imagine that the notion of spiritual experience is not an empty idea, but 
rather an experience that all kinds of people have, what might this be? Is it an 
experience of an external, absolute other? Luce Irigaray observes that we 
attribute to some eternal “Other - God, Ideal, Idea – what we discover about 
ourselves” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 127). So do we, as Luce Irigaray suggests, 
experience ourselves, perhaps on a different ‘horizon’, in spiritual experience? 
Seen from this perspective, spiritual experience is a matter of inner experience, 
mediated as it might be by symbolic or archetypal factors, and attributed as it 
might then be to the external Other, to God. It is also therefore, a matter of 
interiority. I agree with Anne Ulanov’s view, when she claims that we “receive our 
authority on the basis of actual experience” (Ulanov, 1981, p. 133),206 and in so 
doing I privilege experience over theory, and personal experience over collective 
views.207 I also privilege experience over logos, as does George Bataille when he 
says “words have something of quicksand about them. Only experience is the 
rope that is thrown to us”.208  
 
                                            
205 As Janice Soskice asks, “why should disengagement from the society of the emotional and 
sensual world be our path to spiritual excellence?” (Soskice, 2004, p. 215).  Rather, “let us 
suppose that our affections and even our animal responses, properly attended to, are not 
distractions but guides to what we are and to the love of God” (ibid., p. 206). 
206 In a similar vein, C. G. Jung argued that “all the old ideas of God, indeed thought itself, and 
particularly numinous thought, have their origins in experience” (C. G. Jung, 1977, Volume 11, § 
469, emphasis mine). This infers that that new ideas of ‘God’ are also based upon experience. 
207 In addition to theory or doctrine arising from experience, we could also say that theory assists 
us in integrating experience, that is, that theory works both ways.  Iris Marion Young says 
explicitly that theory, to be valid, “must help people understand and describe their experience” (I. 
M. Young, 2005, p. 15). 
208 Quoted in http://www.examiner.com/article/the-real-power-of-meditation, accessed August 6th 
2013. 
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Let me spell out what I mean by ‘women’s spiritual experience’, because 
retrieving spiritual authority for and by individual women is important. Irigaray 
places this same emphasis: “Becoming divine is … a passage that everyone 
must realize by oneself, alone. Nobody can accomplish this process in my place, 
for me” (Irigaray, 2004b, p. 165). For her, “divinity is what we need to become 
free, autonomous, sovereign” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 62). But what kind of divinity? 
Which paradigm, which archetype of spirituality? Perhaps becoming divine is 
related to becoming “one’s ownmost possibilities”, following Heidegger. Thomas 
Merton posited the existence of “some point at which I can meet God in a real 
and experimental contact with his [sic] infinite actuality” (Merton, 1972, p. 37). I 
would also add ‘finite actuality’, in agreement with the sensible aspect of Luce 
Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental. It is this personal experience for which I 
argue, in relation to women’s spirituality.209  
What do I Mean by Mysticism and Numinous? 
Before we go any further, we need to explore more fully what is meant by 
‘mysticism’ and ‘numinous’, and upon this foundation I will lay my particular use 
of these terms.  
Mysticism 
Bernard McGinn defines the response of an individual to immediate divine 
presence as the proper use of the term mysticism (McGinn, 1987, p. 7).210 Yet 
what might this immediate divine presence be? The sixth century writer, 
Dionysus, applied the word mystical in his Theologia Mystica. He describes 
Moses as climbing the mountain and entering into darkness. According to William 
Johnson, “this Dionysian darkness is what we would now call an altered state of 
consciousness. It is the state of a mind emptied of discursive and conceptual 
                                            
209 According to Pamela Sue Anderson, “the fascinating specificity of mystical feelings depend 
upon the sexually specific relation of male and female to the mother” (P. S. Anderson, 1998, p. 
108). Whether this “fascinating specificity” can actually be drawn on male/female lines 
exclusively, or is as much informed by individual psychology, or relations between any specific 
mother/child dyad, is another question.  
210 Other theorists are less certain about the definition of mysticism: “The various attempts at 
defining mysticism clearly suggest that there is simply no identifiable subject to study” (Ching, 
1983, p. 94).  
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thinking and remaining silent and empty” (W. Johnston, 1993, p. 228).211 
Johnston does not frame the mystical in terms of divine presence, but rather a 
silent state, which is cultivated through breathing and meditation, as advocated 
by Irigaray and as practiced in yoga and other mind/body disciplines. We can 
deduce from this that the mystical mind can be cultivated and developed, and 
that it involves an “altered state of consciousness”. This idea sounds very 
esoteric, so I prefer the notion of a change in perspective. The essential 
distinguishing feature of the mystic is that (s)he lives and thinks non-dualistically, 
and thinking non-dualistically is what actually constitutes mysticism (Rohr, 
2009).212 This non-dualist thinking results in an entirely different experience of 
being. (Conversely, the experience of the numinous results in non-dual thinking.) 
We could say then, that mysticism is the capacity to live and think from the 
perspective of non-duality. So, when Jean Byrne argues for non-dual oneness 
she is using those terms to argue for what I understand to be the perspective or 
attitude of the mystic (Byrne, 2008).  How, then, might non-dual thinking and a 
radical change in perspective be related to the numinous and embodied 
transcendence? 
The Numinous 
When Rudolph Otto, German philosopher and historian of religion, wrote of the 
numinosum, (from numen, spirit) he was attempting to understand the ultimate 
non-rational dimensions of religious experience, which “entrances the soul” (Otto, 
2004, pp. 12,26,42).213 The mysterium tremendum is one of the forms which the 
numinous takes, and is the non-rational encounter that is “beyond conception or 
understanding, extraordinary and unfamiliar” (ibid., p. 13) which causes 
astonishment, awe, and sometimes fear. In Otto’s view the numinous was ‘wholly 
                                            
211 The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy defines mysticism as: “A (purportedly) super 
sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual experience granting acquaintance of realities or states 
of affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense perception, somatosensory modalities, 
or standard introspection” (Gellman, 2011). 
212 Could someone who thinks non-dualistically not be a mystic?  This question is beyond the 
scope of my present inquiry. 
213 Otto used the Latin mysterium tremendens et fascinans to cover all or some of the following: 
awe or dread in the face of the numinous; overpowering presence of majesty; intense unbearable 
energy; the sense of a wholly other; a fascination with or attraction to the numen followed by 
rapture in contact with it.  
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other’ and experienced by affect rather than intellect; he said “the nature of the 
numinous can only be suggested by means of the special way in which it is 
reflected in the mind in terms of feeling” (ibid., p. 12). However, it is not only the 
‘wholly other’ that evokes astonishment and even fear, and which could then to 
be said to be numinous. 
 
Pamela Sue Anderson argues that “feelings of fascination and horror are 
produced by awareness of one’s differentiation from the other and one’s finitude; 
this fascination recalls the experience of undifferentiated being as the earliest 
sense of the infinite” (P. S. Anderson, 1998, p. 107). Julia Kristeva also speaks of 
“the fascination and horror that a different being produces in us” (Kristeva, 1995, 
pp. 29-30). Otto’s notion of the mysterium tremendens et fascinans covered the 
fascination and horror experienced in relation to the ‘wholly other’. Could it be, 
then, that enduring the experience of radical otherness engenders a tolerance of 
that otherness? Thus is it possible that the experience of the numinous enables a 
toleration of otherness (of the human other, of the Self as other), or perhaps the 
converse – does the radical toleration of human otherness opens one to 
numinous experience? I conjecture further that a radical understanding of one’s 
self – one’s differentiation, as argued by Anderson - gained through, for instance, 
spiritual contemplation, yoga or meditation practices, and personal application of 
depth-psychology including dream analysis, enables one to withstand the radical 
awareness of the otherness of (any) ‘other’, where the ‘fascination’ and ‘horror’ 
are, or become, endurable and transformed.  
 
The particular aspect of mysticism that I am investigating here from a feminist 
point of view is the numinous. Notwithstanding the difficulty of discussing the 
numinous, primarily because it resists both logos and rationality, it is essential to 
my argument.214 Lucy Huskinson cautions that “an intellectual pursuit of [the 
                                            
214 A fundamental question is whether numinosity is a quality of interiority or whether it is 
something external to one’s-self. Or is it something that we discover about ourselves, and then 
presume the source to be outside ourselves? Or is it something of ourselves, which we then 
project onto an external object or person outside ourselves? When we say ‘interior’, do we mean 
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numinous] will push it further away from ego-comprehension” (Huskinson, 2006, 
p. 200). An intellectual pursuit of the numinous is exactly what I am undertaking 
here, however, and I argue that it is possible to make clear what is 
understandable by ego, and what is understandable by soul or Self. Huskinson 
further suggests that “the numinous is an affective, living experience that 
overflows the boundaries of the ego” and although “it cannot be understood on 
an objective level, it can be known subjectively, in a personal relationship 
pregnant with meaning” (ibid., my emphasis). She adds a point that is most 
integral to my argument: “One’s relationship with the numen can be 
communicated effectively to another person, who is also in a living relationship 
with it” (ibid., my emphasis). If we attempt to communicate the numinous - or the 
mystical - to someone embedded in rationality, or using the language of 
rationality, it will be incomprehensible to that other. However, I believe that one’s 
living relationship with numen, can, as Huskinson suggests, be communicated, 
because it represents a perspective, or, as Johnston said, above, an “altered 
state of consciousness,” that is, a move away from ego-orientation, towards non-
duality. In this way, while experiences of the numinous might resist description, 
they are not ineffable, as often claimed, for instance by Otto. Rather, they resist 
rational comprehension. This situation arises when we are too eager to take 
‘logically deviant’ (Gellman, 2011) language at its most literal. For the researcher 
William Alston, mystics have much to say about their experiences and about God 
(Alston, 1991), though they refer to the difficulty of speaking in literal terms, and 
prefer metaphor, analogy, and symbols. Alston contends that this difficulty of 
speaking in literal terms is common in diverse fields - science, philosophy, and 
religion.  
 
A productive example of cross-disciplinary benefit is a critique of the thinking of 
feminist philosophy of religion by the psychology of enlightenment, where the 
                                            
inside the specific psychic confines of an individual, or do we mean interior as a quality of life that 
requires a particular attitude of mind - interiorly-oriented – in order to perceive? For my purposes 
here, I argue that ‘interiority’ is a way of perceiving, and as such neither interior nor exterior to 
that person, but both. 
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ineffable and numinosity are examined. One of the earliest female thinkers to 
investigate mysticism, Evelyn Underhill, for example, emphasizes the mystic way 
as an arduous psychological process that entails a complete remaking of 
character (Underhill, 1955, p. 57). Various researchers have focussed on the 
difference between delusional states and the ‘enlightened’ ones of ‘true’ 
mysticism.215 P. S. Anderson argues that “without a balance of equality and 
reciprocity between male and female subjects to ensure the justice of 
interpersonal relations, theism can easily reinforce the problem of a self-
annihilating mysticism within patriarchal societies” (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 62).  
Rather than promoting self-annihilation, which is undoubtedly present in 
mysticism within patriarchal societies and is well documented by many 
researchers,216 what I am proposing in this chapter is one of self-transformation. 
Nor is my argument theistic, because I am arguing for an encounter with the 
numinous as a spiritual, rather than religious experience, which is not predicated 
upon, or framed within, theism or the belief in ‘God.’ It is not based on belief, but 
experience. 
 
Returning to the necessity for intersubjectivity for the ‘true’ mystic, St Teresa of 
Avila taught that there is a kind of pride and human self-conceit in wanting by 
deliberate effort and technique to attain to an experience of the divine essence 
while bypassing the person of one’s fellow human being (the Man-God, in her 
words) as though he were an obstacle. She claimed that one of the first dangers 
of mystical experience is flight from ordinary life and withdrawal into one’s own 
world. Yet it seems to me that the mystical process requires an extreme 
introversion, while the result of experience of the numinous is a return to 
extraversion, a return to the world. The transformed states of being are shown or 
demonstrated and given form through all kinds of work. We could even say that 
                                            
215 For instance Kenneth Wapnick (Wapnick, 1972) and David Lukoff (Lukoff, 1985). 
216 See the first-hand account of many mystics, including St Teresa of Avila, (Saint Teresa of   
Avila, 1980) and the Beguines (Newman, 1995), (Bynum, 1987) as well as the analysis given to 
this subject by McGinn (McGinn, 1987, 2004, 1997) and Jantzen (Jantzen, 1994, 1995, 1998, 
2000). 
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the major wellsprings of creative work lie in the experience of the numinous, 
regardless of the field in which they occur.  
 
Before continuing my discussion of the numinous, I pause to consider the notion 
of the ineffable, because it has been such a central element in discussions within 
philosophy of religion, including contemporary debate,217 as shown by P. S. 
Anderson’s assertion: “Serious attempts to communicate the ineffable in new 
ways have become part of the productive project of feminist philosophy today” 
(P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 86). Ineffability is considered to be an essential part of 
apophatic mysticism, whereas in kataphatic mysticism what is experienced is 
indeed expressible.218  According to Fr. Thomas Keating, Christian mysticism has 
strongly endorsed God's being unknowable (Gellman, 2011) and therefore is 
presumed to be ineffable. For some philosophers, ineffable seems to constitute a 
derogatory term signifying obfuscation, refusal, denial or absence (perhaps of 
rationality). Grace Jantzen, for example, critiques ineffability as an intentional 
removal of rational scrutiny, placing mystical experiences, perhaps correctly, into 
the realm of feelings (Jantzen, 1995, p. 344). This would concur with 
Feuerbach’s idea that “religious feeling is the organ of the divine” (Feuerbach, 
1844, p. 29, my emphasis), which I will visit again shortly. 
 
Is the ineffable a trustworthy source of knowledge? I contend that it is indeed 
valid and the gender, and therefore the specific material bodies of the 
experiencer do influence their approach to and experience of both the infinite and 
the ineffable. In this I concur with the project of P. S. Anderson “to expose the 
unacknowledged role of gender in timely matters such as ineffable knowledge 
and mystical practice” (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 79). Undoubtedly, new 
knowledge and new concepts can be gained from examining these experiences, 
                                            
217 According to William James, (James, 2008, pp. 380-381) “ineffability” or indescribability is an 
essential mark of the mystical. It is not always clear, however, whether it is the experience or its 
alleged object, or both, that are to be ineffable (Gellman, 2011). 
218 Apophatic from the Greek, “apophasis,” meaning negation or “saying away”, and kataphatic 
from “kataphasis,” meaning affirmation or “saying with” (Gellman, 2011). 
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especially from the perspective of feminist philosophy of religion. P.S. Anderson 
conducts a lively debate on this subject, with many nuances, which I do not 
presume to engage in here (ibid., pp. 75-79). 
 
However, one debate I would like to enter is the question P. S. Anderson poses. 
Referring to the binary thinking of western philosophy where the masculine is 
equated with the limited, and the feminine with the unlimited, she asks: “are men 
always associated with one side of this binary? Gender theorists might have 
expected an affirmative answer. Their assumption would, then, be that men are 
linked to the limited and the effable, while women are associated with the 
unlimited and the ineffable” (ibid., p. 76). Thus, a linking of “ineffability and 
(female mysticism) raises all sorts of significant ontological, metaphysical and 
epistemological issues” (ibid., p. 79). If we take ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ to be two 
sides of a duality, my argument here dismantles this duality by positioning ‘true’ 
mysticism as embracing and embodying both poles, the ‘finite’ or bodily aspect, 
and the ‘infinite’ or transcendent aspect, which is evident in my term embodied 
transcendence, and Luce Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental does likewise. 
Another approach to the question of duality is to argue for the masculine and 
feminine spiritualities as two different archetypes, rather than two poles of a 
duality. When I argue for mysticism as a feminine divine, I am not implying that 
the gender of the experiencer is female, as will become evident as I proceed. 
 
Before I leave this section on the ineffable, I suggest that there has been a major 
confusion between the ineffable and the confrontation with the numinous itself.  If 
we read “the numinous” or “contact with the numinous” i.e. the cause, in the 
place of ineffability i.e. the effect, I believe we can shed some new understanding 
on this subject. However, it is far beyond the scope of this present work to take 
this discussion any further, and I now return to my consideration of the numinous. 
 
Let us look at Jung’s understanding of the numinous. He took up Otto’s notion of 
the numinous, and used it in his own way. In his opinion it was not essentially 
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religious, but claimed that the numinosum is “a dynamic agency or effect not 
caused by an arbitrary act of will… that causes a peculiar alteration of 
consciousness” (C. G. Jung, 1977, Volume 11, § 6). Huskinson is critical of what 
she terms Jung’s misappropriation of the numinous, believing he “is too quick to 
incorporate Otto’s term into his own theory” (Huskinson, 2006, p. 202), primarily 
because Jung did not differentiate sufficiently between the numinous and the 
‘holy’, or exhibit an understanding that the latter incorporates the unification of 
both the rational and non-rational, in a way which would have been very useful to 
Jung’s own idea of individuation.  
 
Notwithstanding this criticism, Jung’s approach to the numinous is useful 
because, rather than privilege an androcentric transcendence where the bodily is 
evaded or transcended, he claims that the numinous constitutes a “creative 
undoing of the rule of the Sky-Father over texts in the widest sense of cultural 
signifying” (Rowland, 2006, pp. 104, my emphasis). Implicit in the “creative 
undoing of the rule of the Sky-Father”, is the removal of logocentrism. Thus, Jung 
sees the Word as a “pathologizing deity because religious literalism and 
historicism have severed the Word from the abyss which precedes it and so 
reduced it to an empty rationalism” (Dourley, 2006, p. 175). Inasmuch as the 
Logos/Word is the “central figure of the Christian faith”, it has alienated the 
“individual and society from the numinosity of their roots” (C. G. Jung, 1977, 
volume 10, §265).219 One may conclude that the removing of the rule of the Sky-
Father paves the way, certainly for women, for an immanent feminine divine 
where the ‘numinosity of our roots’ is prior to culture, prior to social construction, 
and prior to logos.  
 
The feminine divine as mysticism, as direct access to the numinous, constitutes, 
then, a return to their roots for society in general and women in particular. The 
radical removal of the “pathology of logocentrism” in current religion and society 
                                            
219 As corollary to the logos-myth, “transcendent mind is a ‘masculine’ creative principal working 
on inert ‘feminine’ matter” (Rowland, 2006, p. 101). By undoing the logos, we also free 
feminine/matter. 
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would entail the rewriting of the Gospels, or thinking about them differently, 
however. “In the beginning” could no longer be the Word. “In the beginning would 
be the silence of the nothing from which the Word and the world proceed and in 
whom they continue to dwell”, as John Dourley argues (Dourley, 2006, p. 177). 
Thus the beginning, here posed by Dourley as ‘silence’, could be experienced as 
numinous, rather than logos.220 This silence enables the return to the pre-logos 
numinous and a feminine divine. In chapter six I spell out how Luce Irigaray 
advocates ‘silence’ for feminine becoming.  
 
Feminist thinkers such as Daly (Daly, 1973) and Goldenberg (N. Goldenberg, 
1979) point out the dichotomy between the holy and the creaturely that underpins 
Otto's androcentric analysis; that is, that andocentric analysis privileges the 
transcendent at the expense of the sensible. Feminist theologians stress the 
immanent nature of numinous experience, and emphasize women's experience 
of the holy in their fleshly embodiment. There is much scope for the further study 
of gender in spiritual experience and mysticism.221 
 
My last words in this section are to argue that feminine experience of the 
numinous is indeed through the flesh; Cedrus Monte proposes flesh itself as 
numen (Monte, 2005). She argues that matter can be a source of the numinous 
experience. This recalls Brown’s notion of two streams of mysticism, the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian. The Apollonian in his terms is sublimated and 
flees from the body, and the Dionysian is that “which stays with life, which is the 
body, and seeks to transform and perfect it” (Brown, 1959, p. 310). Brown argued 
for, “in tradition Christian terms, the resurrection of the body” (ibid., p. 307, 
emphasis mine). Monte’s view is that for anyone “who has spent so much time in 
the Absolute, perhaps embodiment and reconnecting with instinct and feeling is 
the resurrection” (Monte, , emphasis mine). This represents a return to, or the 
achievement of, the sensible/ transcendental. An example of this is seen in 
                                            
220 For Otto likewise, silence is numinous, and the response to the numinous is silence.  
221 Jerome Gellman acknowledges the gender difference in mystical experiences, for instance  
(Gellman, 2011). 
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Ramakrishna, a man, whose cultivation through bramachrya or breathing 
practice resulted in an experience “in which it seemed that all the pores of the 
skin were like female sex organs and intercourse were taking place over the 
whole body” (cited by Sovatsky, 1987, p. 41). Let me explain how this is an 
example of the sensible/transcendental. For the moment let us put aside the 
question of sexuate difference, and instead concentrate on the numen of the 
flesh. It is clear that Ramakrishna’s experience of the numen is bodily, in the 
present time, and not transferred to a transcendent object. Could it be that the 
cultivation of the breath specifically, and the body in general, leads to 
experiencing the numen of the flesh? The notion of the numen of the flesh is very 
different to that of Otto or Jung, for whom the numinous comprised the ‘Wholly 
Other’, which took one outside oneself. The numen of one’s own flesh, or in 
one’s own flesh, combines the notions of bodily jouissance and transcendence 
as evident in my term for women’s spirituality, ‘embodied transcendence’. I will 
return to jouissance later in this chapter. Is it possible that ‘embodied 
transcendence’, especially if we keep in mind the notion of numinosity in relation 
to one’s incarnation, evades interpretation or mediation in or from the Symbolic? 
Is there a relationship between embodied transcendence and unmediated 
experience?  
Transformation of Divinity 
I now consider the idea that divinity is shaped by human, thus sexuate, 
experience. As such, this opens the way to a divine in feminine terms.222 Jung 
and his contemporaries, Edward Edinger and Erich Neumann, proposed that 
divinity itself is shaped by human experience, just as much as the divine shapes 
human experience.223 Edinger argued that “the ego and the Self make overtures 
to each other, the end result of which is the transformation of God through a 
double process of the humanizing of the Self and the deifying of the ego” 
                                            
222 In patriarchal religious forms, “that which women shall represent has been designated not by 
she herself but by man” (Hampson, 2009, p. 179). 
223 This is not to say that the ‘divine’ is a projection - it could equally be an introjection. 
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(Edinger, 1996, p. 80).224 Likewise, Luce Irigaray asks if “God undergoes his [sic] 
own process of development” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 70)? I argue that we can allow 
that previous god-images, including that of a phallogocentric Judeo/Christian 
tradition, can be transformed by our own (feminine) ‘dialogue’ with the divine, and 
our own experience of the ego. This can be done, according to Jung, by 
confronting the ‘untransformed’ or ‘evil’ aspect of God (in Jung’s terms, the 
devil)225 in our own psyche and events around us. According to Jung, God’s 
development or individuation process requires assimilation of unconscious 
(shadow) aspects, which, importantly for my argument, includes the feminine 
alongside the finite, and evil. If God needs to integrate the feminine, as Jung 
asserts, and our development influences God’s, then the labours employed by 
philosophers, eco-feminists, and all those working for the liberation of the 
feminine, are influencing God in this integration. Jung argues that this conscious 
transformation modifies both ‘God’ and self by humanizing divinity and 
spiritualizing the ego (C. G. Jung, 1977, Volume 11, §553-758).226 In this process, 
the assumed human/divine divide is dissolved. I argue that this dissolution of the 
human/ divine divide, the annulment, is the site of mystical experience, which 
was also expressed by Neumann, who claims that in “the two poles of the 
                                            
224 I use Self in the Jungian sense, as the supraordinate aspect of the psyche, which is most often 
that which is projected onto ‘God’ or external transcendent objects. It might equally be called the 
"God within us" (C. G. Jung, 1977, volune 7, §399). The ego is the functioning personality.  
225 Jung discusses the question of ‘evil’ extensively throughout “Answer to Job”, so an ultimate 
definition is not possible, however a working definition in this context is that evil signifies that 
something previously good has turned into something harmful, particularly by becoming 
unconscious (C. G. Jung, 1977, pp. 355-475).  This is true of ‘the feminine’.  
226 Jung’s “Answer to Job” (C. G. Jung, 1977, pp. 355-475), is one of Jung's most controversial 
works, and his most extensive commentary on a biblical text. In my Introduction, I proposed a 
“critique of masculine epistemologies, and the underlying unconscious assumptions”. Jung’s text 
is essentially psychoanalysis of the Old Testament Jahveh. Jung aligns the psyche of God with 
that of his subjects, and of particular importance to my argument here, he indicts God for his lack 
of the feminine, and charges both God and humankind to address this imbalance by assimilating 
the feminine. Jung describes the feminine that needs integrating, “Sophia”, as having a 
“pneumatic nature” and “as the cosmogenic Pneuma she pervades heaven and earth and all 
created beings” (C. G. Jung, 1977, §611, 613). I have already made the connection between the 
feminine, and pneuma, and cultivating the breath as a specific act of becoming, in the earlier 
section, “Cultivating the Breath” in chapter two. In a joint paper with Zeena Elton (Elton & Gersch, 
2012), I take up Jung’s proposal that the proclamation of the dogma of the Assumption of the 
Virgin in 1950 was a necessary development because, in Jung’s words, “the feminine, like the 
masculine, demands an equally personal representation”  (C. G. Jung, 1977, Vol. 11, § 753), both 
in the human and divine realms. 
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encounter which we designate as mystical, the ego as well as the non-ego, are 
transformed in a process by which the dividing line between them is annulled 
from both sides” (Neumann, 1969, p. 382). Thus the transformational space - for 
‘God’ and ego – is the encounter with the numinous, or better the numinosum 
itself. This gives me grounds to argue that the confluence of body/ego and 
spirit/non-ego, is possible, and they come together in an intersection and pivot 
around each other.  
 
Another way in which the concept of God can be transformed is through the 
removal of parental imagos. In other words, if our notion of divinity is based upon 
ideals of father and mother, we remain governed by father and mother 
archetypes. Of this notion of Gods as parental imagos, Luce Irigaray has this to 
say: “We set them up in some way as idealized parental authorities, we take 
them as unattainable models for our evolution, we submit ourselves to their 
decisions, real or presumed” (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 355). For women particularly, it 
is necessary to remove themselves from the father imago, from a paternal God, 
so at the very least they can become a mother’s daughter. In this way a woman 
is oriented to a feminine, rather than, masculine divine, and feminine subjectivity, 
rather than subjectivity founded on masculine terms. 
 
I consider that monotheism - the father God - is a very limited lens through which 
both masculine and feminine spirituality might be viewed, or through which we 
might view our spirituality. Mike King reminds us that our Western religious 
monotheism is a specific archetype of spiritual life, which is by no means 
universal. Furthermore, we need to be careful that women’s spiritual experience 
is not framed as a translation of male transcendence. King says “for a proper 
understanding of the spiritual life and the nature of, and possibilities for, women’s 
spirituality, we need a broader language of the spiritual than monotheism can 
provide” (King, 2009, p. 153).227 In this context, King questions the sexuate 
                                            
227 Women “have different sensibilities, employ different paradigms.  Indeed, one could well read 
women’s involvement in past religion as a straining at the leash to be allowed to conceive of 
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delineation of spirituality. For him, “the transcendent modality of the spirit 
requires that gender as ‘a modification of the mind’ is suspended altogether in 
ecstatic absorption (or enstatic as Georg Feuerstein prefers it). Why should 
women (or men, for that matter) be deprived of any of these modalities of the 
spirit?” (King, 2009, p. 169).228 While King is arguing for a context in which to 
understand women’s spirituality as different from men, he is also saying that 
certain spiritual states go beyond the sex/gender differences. Luce Irigaray 
prefers the terms enstasis or standing within, a term of internality, rather than 
ecstasies or standing without, a term of externality, as I noted earlier. In 
focussing on mysticism as feminine divine, I am, in effect, not choosing the 
archetype of Patriarchal Monotheism, but I am directed instead by the mystical/ 
shamanic. My position is therefore not merely in opposition or counterpoint to the 
masculine/ patriarchal/ monotheistic, that is, not merely positing, say a Goddess, 
but proposing a different spiritual archetype for women through mysticism. This is 
important because I can speak on sexuate lines, but also allow for diversity, 
which may include men, and here I can agree with King. Diversity celebrates 
plurality, for which I argued in my Introduction. Put another way, diversity 
incorporates the simultaneous activity of more than one archetype.  
 
How, then, does the development of God, the transformation of divinity, relate to 
the spiritual experience of women and a feminine divine? Before I proceed, I 
need to make a distinction between the transforming of God and divinity, and 
transformation of human concepts of God and divinity.229 While I will be 
emphasizing the latter, in terms of a feminine face of God as a human concept, 
                                            
things otherwise: consider Julian of Norwich’s metaphors.  We must surely employ the paradigms 
of wholeness, not those that imply opposition or separation” (Hampson, 2009, p. 185). 
228 Enstasis is borrowed from the Greek, and means ‘standing into’, in contrast with ecstasy, 
which means to stand outside of (Friesen, 2011).  
229 Ideas of the divine, the “concrete imagery and form of the religion are not incidental, but rather 
intrinsic to what ‘God’ has been for us” (Hampson, 2009, p. 173).  Conversely we can argue that 
for God to be different for women - that is a divine suited to a woman subject - imagery and form 
must be transformed. It is not so much that redemption is required, but that our concepts of the 
divine to be redeemed. Daphne Hampson agues that a feminine sense or presence of ‘God’ 
would be open, amorphous, and ‘translucent’, rather than the fixed boundaries and borders of a 
masculine divine which has prevailed in masculine thought (Hampson, 2009, p. 175).   
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underneath this is the idea that ‘God’ actually changes as human beings 
change.230 Irigaray relies on the Feuerbachian argument that “progressive 
development of religion is identical with the progressive development of human 
culture” (Feuerbach, 1844, p. 20).231 Irigaray extends this argument to women 
having divine ideals as a necessary prelude to women becoming subjects and 
subverting the singular logic of patriarchy. Thus the relevance of her claim that a 
woman’s “not becoming God is a loss for herself and for the community. Perhaps 
for God” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 71). For Feuerbach “religious feeling is the organ of 
the divine” (Feuerbach, 1844, p. 29) and is more to do with personal experience 
than with the abstractions of philosophy. Feuerbach opposed any ideas that 
estranged the human from the divine, or predicated a human/ divine schism, and 
Luce Irigaray has developed her notion of a female divine on this premise. 
Irigaray also built on Feuerbach in her insistence that women need a divine of 
their own. For her to “posit a gender, a God is necessary” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 
61). And “if she is to become woman, if she is to accomplish her female 
subjectivity, woman needs a god who is a figure for the perfection 
of her subjectivity” (ibid., p. 64).232 What kind of God, then, could do this?  
What Kind of God is ‘She’? 
What kind of a divine ideal would not be estranged from the woman subject? 
Which would not depend on parental imagos? Which would be personally 
experienced? Which would allow for development, fluidity and change? I propose  
a feminine divine (and a divine feminine) which can be found in the experience 
that is mysticism itself.  
 
                                            
230 The Old Testament can be seen as the interactions between an erratic deity and his people, 
as Joan Dallett examines (Dallett, 1998), as does Edward Edinger (Edinger, 1996). Again, this is 
not to say that the ‘divine’ or ‘God’ is a projection of human ideas.  
231 Jung develops a similar idea to Feuerbach’s. Rudolf Otto, whose ideas on the numinous I 
develop shortly, likewise develops this idea. 
232 Frances Gray argued for Feuerbachian (and Platonic) projection theory in the development of 
Irigaray’s notions of the feminine divine. Feuerbach’s emphasis that God is a mirror of man is 
extended to God as necessarily a mirror of women, as articulated by Irigaray (Gray, 2008). I am 
not, however, relying on projection theory in my proposal of a feminine divine. 
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In order to determine this ideal, we need to bring into focus some traditional 
characteristics of (masculine) divinity. In Irigaray’s view, following Feuerbach, 
man is dependent on identification with the masculine divine “in order (for man 
not) to be mirrored in his absence (of self)" (Luce  Irigaray, 1985, p. 314). I argue 
that women do not need a mirror (of, or from, the divine) so much as the ability to 
be present as a self, as intimated by Irigaray. Specifically, I argue that a woman 
does not need a reflection of/ from a feminine divine in order to attain subjectivity, 
but conversely, she does need to be present as a self. According to Penelope 
Deutscher, the masculine “divine is an ideal of self-coincidence and self-
sufficiency of which the masculine inevitably falls short” (Deutscher, 1994, p. 94) 
In my view, the projecting, constructing, or resurrecting (particularly in the 
concrete form of Goddesses)233 of a female divine runs the same risk; a divine-
ideal mirror-in-the-feminine could provide a static reflection of which the woman 
falls short, forcing her into abjection and dereliction not markedly different from 
her previous situation. A matriarchal monotheism is still a monotheism, which 
precludes ‘other Gods’ or other spiritual modalities. Therefore, it does not follow 
that, because the man’s God provides redemption in order to reinstate a 
masculine divine ideal, this approach should be repeated in the feminine. So, I 
am not arguing for the achieving of feminine subjectivity through being reflected 
by a female divine image. But I am nonetheless arguing for a feminine divine. In 
what other ways might this be done? 
 
Could a feminine divine be discovered in an “easy pluralism” (King, 2009, p. 
169), where multiple modalities of the spirit are available to both men and 
women? King proposes five different modalities of the spirit, five different 
archetypal forms, namely Goddess polytheism, Warrior Polytheism, (Abrahamic) 
Monotheism, Unitive/ Transcendent and Shamanic/ Animism, which he claims 
are all “present in our psyches today” (King, 2009, p. 155). This approach has 
                                            
233 The polytheism of goddess spirituality would “merely transpose a male monotheism into a 
female monotheism, a single ‘God’ into a single ‘Goddess’” (King, 2009, p. 159).  
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several advantages, one of them being that it removes us from a God/Goddess 
trope. 
 
Irigaray approaches the idea of a feminine divine by arguing for a ‘God’ for 
women and a ‘woman God’, but she does not intend this God to be the 
personification of divinity. Rather, the feminine divine will not be a “fixed 
objective, not a One postulated to be immutable but rather a cohesion and a 
horizon that assure, for us, the passage between past and future” (Irigaray & 
Green, 2008, p. 146). She will be fluid and mutable, changeable, a ‘passage’; this 
is a logical corollary to the changeless god of the masculine ideal; such a divine 
is more aligned with the notion of (feminine) becoming. Thus, I concur with 
Irigaray that a fluid concept of feminine divinity will be reflected in a fluid concept 
of women’s becoming (divine). The idea of a feminine divine as being a ‘passage’ 
suggests a conduit, an experience, a process, an exchange, a pathway, 
something which exists between, but not a fixed object. 
 
As I see it, the divine for women is an experience, a living process, rather than an 
image. Luce Irigaray holds that the “goal that is most important is to go on 
becoming, infinitely” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 61), and that a feminine divine must also 
incorporate a “field of infinite, open-ended feminine identities in which a woman 
could situate herself” (Deutscher, 1994, pp. 100-101). ‘Infinite’ here is clearly not 
referring to the transcendent, but that which is not fixed, or foreclosed and is thus 
open-ended. Penelope Deutscher stresses that the most important difference 
“between the traditional masculine God and the Irigarayan divine is that women 
would not be severed from their ideal” (ibid., p. 101). What does Irigaray mean by 
becoming, infinitely? In what way would infinitely becoming be related to feminine 
mystical experience?  
 
For Luce Irigaray, it is fundamental that, “if we are to escape slavery, [in the 
symbolic] it is not enough to destroy the master [patriarchal structures]. Only the 
divine offers us that freedom - enjoins it upon us. Only a God constitutes a 
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rallying point for us that can let us free - nothing else” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 68). 
What kind of God can actually provide this rallying point? What kind of new order 
can be thought, “in which both women and men remember their respective divine 
and sexual ancestries in myths, representing the difference in their sexual 
desires” (P. S. Anderson, 1998, p. 148)? What might women find, outside the 
masculine symbolic, and, indeed, is it possible? 
 
As I have already argued, the acknowledgement of sexuate difference is far-
reaching, affecting “women’s self-appraisal and self-naming”. Elizabeth Johnson 
argues that this in turn “creates a new situation of language about divine mystery” 
which “takes female reality in all its concreteness as a legitimate finite starting 
point for speaking about the mystery of God“ (E. Johnson, 1992, p. 75). I propose 
that a feminine divine is a necessary component of the feminine imaginary, which 
prefigures a feminine, rather than masculine symbolic. I argue that, as Johnson 
puts it, an encounter with divine mystery “brings persons to birth as persons” 
(ibid.). Thus having a divine ideal is necessary for giving birth to ourselves as 
women, but I argue further, that an encounter with divine mystery is required. 
Echoing my earlier point regarding reciprocity between divine and human, 
Johnson also claims that this is a “real encounter with divine power and glory” 
and that this is a “reciprocal relation” (ibid., p. 75). In chapter one, I linked 
feminine connectedness with genealogy as a means of developing feminine 
subjectivity and the lived bodily experience of women. Here I reiterate that 
women’s development and psychology, their ways of knowing, loving and living 
bodily are all inflected by an intrinsic connectedness, demonstrating their specific 
sexuate difference. Thus spirituality in the feminine, which draws on a young 
girl’s identification with and differentiation from her mother, is “structured not in 
dualistic opposition to the other but in intrinsic relationships with the other” (ibid., 
p. 68), even when this other is divine. 
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Let me develop further the idea of a continuum between experience of self and 
experience of the divine.234 When we (re) name and affirm ourselves, we are (re) 
naming and affirming the divine. When we have new experiences of ourselves as 
women, we simultaneously experience the divine possibility in new ways. I 
propose that apprehension of the numinous enables both a renewed experience 
of self, as well as of the divine. Johnson puts it this way: “the silent, nonverbal 
encounter with infinite mystery constitutes the enabling condition of any 
experience of self at all” (ibid., p. 65), affirming Luce Irigaray’s proposal of divinity 
preceding subjectivity.  
 
As I mentioned earlier, feminine embodied transcendence is intertwined with 
relationality, which, in Johnson’s words again, “ensures that feminist ethics 
presses ultimately toward the flourishing of all people, children as well as men, 
and the earth and all its creatures” (E. Johnson, 1992, p. 69), thus extending 
relationality to a global dimension. The flourishing of all is approached through 
the perspective that the mystical provides. Contrary to claims that mysticism is 
narcissistic, I argue that the perspective from which the mystic sees the world 
reflects an ethical attitude toward the ‘whole human family’.235 To borrow a phrase 
from William Johnson, “every step of the way, the mystics are close not only to 
God but to the whole human family” (W. Johnston, 1993, p. 257). It follows that 
the numen of the flesh, that is mystical experience in one’s own body/ flesh, 
leads to or is synonymous with an appreciation of the divinity of all flesh. I take 
up the numen of the flesh again shortly. 
Is Unmediated Experience Possible? 
By unmediated I mean unmediated by the culture, not constructed by the culture. 
In chapter one, I discussed various aspects of experience, including the notion of 
                                            
234 Karl Rahner’s ontological theology claims a seamless connection between “the unity of the 
experience of God and the experience of one’s self, on the one hand, and in the unity of the 
experience of the self and encounter with the neighbour, on the other hand”. Rahner 
http://ttj.sagepub.com/content/62/3/352.full.pdf. Accessed August 6th 2013. 
235 Grace Jantzen sees this as the specific form of mysticism known as “Bhakti devotional 
mysticism”, which is “bound up with social relations and the pursuit of justice in a common life” 
(Jantzen, 1994).  
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experience qua experience, and asked whether it is possible to have experience 
that is not mediated in some way by the symbolic. Here I argue that unmediated 
experience as not only possible, but necessary in accessing the feminine divine 
as or in mysticism. Thandeka proposes that “the experience of a lived moment of 
creation is not mediated” (Thandeka, 1997, pp. 95, my emphasis). I argue that, if 
a “lived moment” is not mediated (by culture and the symbolic), it is indeed 
creation or becoming in action. It is possible that (in that moment, or from that 
perspective) I am not ‘interpreted’; I am not enclosed within the folds of the 
symbolic. Jung, in talking about ‘God’ speaking through us, as direct, rather than 
borrowed experience, speaks of “our only too understandable fear of the primary 
experience” (Letters to Oskar Schmitz C. G. Jung, 1975, p. 82). Yet this primary 
experience is a release of “all that is wild and free in the human soul” (Sanford, 
1995, p. 111). I argue that “all that is wild and free”, that is primary experience, is 
that which is outside the symbolic, and is therefore a fearful and awesome 
experience, and poses some risks (to the ego). As Luce Irigaray says, “the 
prophets feel that, if something divine can still come to us, it will do so when we 
abandon all calculation. All language (langue) and all meaning already produced. 
In risk. Only risk, of which no one knows where it will lead” (Whitford, 1991b, p. 
281). Therefore the divine that “can still come” will be outside “all meaning 
already produced”, that is, outside the Symbolic. Thus the unsymbolized divine is 
the mystical, and it is accessible through unmediated experience. The question 
then arises as to how the mystical, and the numinous, might be communicable, if 
it is unmediated (by language, cultural conventions, religious symbols, the 
symbolic). I will now explain how and why the mystical is unmediated. Various 
metaphors have been used to attempt to carry the import of the experience, or to 
convey the perspective thus gained.  
 
For many mystics, direct and primary experience was framed in terms of ‘union’, 
or unitive experience.236 What, exactly, did the mystics consider ‘union’ to be? 
                                            
236 I am not implying a union between two, but a state of consciousness characterized by non-
dual thinking, of a union within, so to speak. 
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Using the terms of the extant Christianity, their union was with God or Christ. The 
elevation of love was their aim; “a love so attentive that it is divine" (Irigaray, 
1993b, pp. 18-19).237 The Irigarayan idea that “love is in and by itself essentially 
feminine by nature” (ibid., p. 70) finds fulfilment in the Minne of the Beguines, and 
their belief “in the feminine principle as divine” (ibid.). Is their experience of union 
an unmediated experience, or is ‘union’ an interpretation or mediation in itself? In 
order to answer this question, we turn to the notion of nuptial bliss found in the 
writings of the Beguines. Hadewijch for instance, claimed that after a life spent 
immersed in minne/ love, the soul can demand union with God (Hadewijch, 1980, 
letters 12, 22). However, when trying to describe the incommunicable 
experiences of her mystical union, Hadewijch attributes her own inability to 
communicate to the inadequacies of the language. In my view, her experience 
was of the semiotic, and thus did not yield readily to language, as I have 
discussed in chapter three. For Hadewijch, the capacity for love, which she sees 
as a female power, is inextricably tied to her capax dei, her capacity for God, 
something that potentially makes the female capacity for love, in Hadewijch’s 
view, the most powerful thing possible. That the images used by the Beguines is 
similar, if not the same as the extant Troubadour’s images of courtly love, lends 
weight to nuptial images being a conventional interpretation conveniently at hand 
(Hadewijch, 1980). 
 
I submit that the nuptial bliss of the women mystics, and the particular union 
implicit therein, must be read through the mediating filter of the religious and 
social conditions of the time; that is, it is both mediated and interpreted. Yet I 
claim that the unsymbolized divine is the mystical, and it is accessible through 
unmediated experience. Let’s approach this through Michael Murphy’s idea that 
the “’mediated’ aspect of all experience seems an inescapable feature of any 
epistemological enquiry, including the inquiry into mysticism, which has to be 
properly acknowledged” (Murphy, 1993, p. 166). The problem is that a wordless, 
                                            
237 Irigaray is referring to the love between beloved lovers, the human couple, and for her this 
represents one aspect of the divine. 
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objectless experience of bliss, an encounter with the numinous, is inevitably 
framed in language and images already available in the masculine symbolic.238 
Thus, even objectless experiences would still be framed within the masculine 
symbolic, and further, and perhaps more importantly, an inquiry into mysticism 
itself, including its language and interpretation, constitutes an inquiry into the 
workings of the Symbolic, and even a deconstruction of it (Cupitt, 1998). Is an 
acknowledgment of the conceptual and interpretative framework (we all use) the 
best we can do? Berman comments, “because of our biology, ecstatic 
experience is ecstatic experience; what system of symbols it gets translated into 
is a matter of context” (Berman, 1988, p. 169). I necessarily press further towards 
the primary experience, rather than the language/symbolic aspect. Irigaray asks 
us to question “the image and all that hides behind it” to investigate “the 
transmutational or transfigurational states that may be represented therein” 
(Irigaray, 1993b, p. 56)? It is exactly this transmutational or transfigurational state 
that I am investigating, and which I see behind interpretations, including that of 
‘union’.  
 
Bridal or nuptial union is only one interpretation of what the Beguines considered 
to be union. A unity within one’s-self is described by Hadewijch of Brabant, 
(1220-1260) for example, who spoke of having two selves, akin to a human 
nature and a divine nature, which “become one in the bridal union, which is a 
union of equals, of lovers both full-grown in their eternity” (Newman, 1995, p. 
147).239 Hadewijch can be seen as incorporating both the sensible - the human - 
and transcendental - the divine nature - in her love, in which no aspect of herself 
is seen as inferior - or superior. This ideal envisions a time which Luce Irigaray 
proposes, “of women’s law, in the present or yet to come, [when] the human and 
divine will not be separate” (Irigaray, 1994, pp. 10-11). Here the ego is in proper 
                                            
238 One of the reasons Luce Irigaray privileges the mystic’s body is because speech is limited in 
the face of the numinous.  
239 William Johnston believed that love between persons was the way to the divine.  He said love 
“between persons differentiates.  It is this person to person love that is the road to enlightenment” 
(W. Johnston, 1993, p. 71). Thus, for Johnston, differentiation was more important than union, or 
at least prior to it.  
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relation with the Self/divine; the ego is still ego, and the Self is still Self, but the 
relation between them is seamless.240 As I see it, this is a living of the implications 
of Luce Irigaray’s sensible/ transcendental, the human and divine relations in 
seamless contiguity.  
 
As Jung also conceived of the unconscious as the absolute Other, the notion of 
unmediated experience, and ‘union’ could also be interpreted as a relation 
between the conscious ego-self and unconscious possibility. In each of these 
interpretations of the notion of mystical union, the emphasis is on relation. This 
relation provides a perspective from which our view of self, the divine and the 
other is inexorably changed. Thus, seen in this way, the feminine divine as 
mysticism provides a perspective, a relation, not an object, but rather something 
one can speak from, rather than about. This is reiterated in Huskinson’s remark 
that “the value of the numinous is determined by the impression made by the 
numinous object on consciousness, and not by the numinous object itself, or by 
the subject’s disposition to it” (Huskinson, 2006, p. 204). Otto confirms that 
encounters with the numinous result in a “strange and mighty propulsion towards 
an ideal good known only in religion and is in its nature fundamentally non-
rational, which the mind knows of in yearning and presentiment” (Otto, 2004, p. 
36). It follows that an encounter with the numinous is not teleological, but 
positional. That is, the numinous encounter creates a radical re-orientation of the 
individual to a perspective from which ethical relations emanate. 
 
From what I have been arguing, it seems that we can construe the feminine 
(mystical) divine as a perspective, rather than a theory. Inasmuch as this 
perspective colours every moment of life, it allows each moment to be an 
epiphany, a birth, a becoming, filled with new life. Viewed in this way, mysticism 
leads to gnosis or direct knowledge, which is not mediated by culture, is not a 
                                            
240 This is seen as the coniunctio in individuation. 
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product of the symbolic.241 It follows that if women are seeking a feminine divine 
not mediated by the masculine paternal, then direct encounters with the 
numinous are both necessary and inevitable. I now approach feminine mystical 
experiences, including experience of the numinous, through the alternative ideas 
of Kristeva and de Beauvoir, to discover if and how a woman’s life and body 
provide ground for numinous encounters. 242  
Kristeva, the Feminine Divine and the Semiotic 
The work of Kristeva deserves more consideration than I am able to provide 
here. The particular aspects relevant to my argument in this chapter are her 
discussions of the maternal and the semiotic. Let me explicate how this relates to 
my discussion of a feminine divine, and numinosity. Speaking of that which is of 
concern to women, in her terms “the sacred” - Julia Kristeva says this: 
Not religion or its opposite, atheistic negation, but the experience 
that beliefs both shelter and exploit, at the crossroads of sexuality 
and thought, body and meaning, which women feel intensely but 
without being preoccupied by it and about which there remains 
much for them – for us – to say. Does a specifically feminine sacred 
exist? (Julia Kristeva in the Preface, Clément & Kristeva, 2001, pp. 
148, my emphasis).  
 
                                            
241 June Singer confirms that gnosis in our present time still corresponds with our own, rather 
than acquired, knowledge.  She says: “Gnosis, as first enunciated two millennia ago by heretical 
sects who refused to be bound by institutionalized ‘truths’, was understood by Jung as a spirit of 
inquiry that is independent of dogma and that requires confirmation through personal experience 
and reflection.” (Singer, 1990, p. 48).  Roberts Avens, who has written extensively on mysticism 
and gnosis, including The New Gnosis, asks: “But what is gnosis?  John Keats refers to an ability 
to work with imagination without the necessity of seeking out fact and reason as Negative 
Capability, that is, when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any 
irritable reaching after fact and reason” (Avens, 1984, p. 2). 
242 It is through their embodiment, through the experiences of menstruation and childbirth, that 
women “find themselves equipped with insight into a central element of religion” (Ulanov, 1981, p. 
25), through their own bodies. Birthing, for instance, can be “an ecstatic initiation” (Gaskin, 2002, 
p. xiii), a numinous event. Janet Soskice argues for an interface between, rather than polarization 
of, feminine body and mind: “Nothing convicts one more graphically of the implausibility of a 
sharp distinction between our rational and deliberate capacities, on the one hand, and the bodily 
appetites and responses on the other, than the experiences of pregnancies and attending to an 
infant” (Soskice, 2004, pp. 206-207). 
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Here, Kristeva is placing an experience - the sacred - at a crossroads of non-
duality, an inclusive category, which contains the body and sexuality and thought 
and meaning. And does, indeed, a “specifically feminine sacred exist?” 
 
This returns us to the debate as to whether a feminine divine, however 
construed, is accessible to both men and women. I began this chapter by 
claiming that the spirituality of men and women is different, and have argued for 
a differentiated feminine divine. A central theme in Kristeva’s work is that of the 
maternal, and with it the semiotic. She says, “let us call the ‘maternal’ the most 
ambivalent principle that …is the most intense revelation of God, which occurs in 
mysticism, is given only to a person who assumes himself as ‘maternal’” 
(Kristeva & Moi, 1986, pp. 161-162). For Kristeva a mystical divine is accessible 
through ‘the maternal‘. However, she is adamant that “both men and women can 
experience, and so seek to give expression to, the maternal” (P. S. Anderson, 
1998, p. 157). If we accept that “the most intense revelation of God”, which 
occurs in mysticism according to Kristeva, is accessible through “the maternal”, 
and if both men and women can “experience, and seek to give expression to, the 
maternal”, then it follows that mysticism as feminine divine is accessible to both 
men and women. Reinforcing this opinion, Barbara Newman points out that 
Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179), with “her frequent cross-sexual imagery and 
inversion, instinctively avoided the peril of associating the feminine exclusively 
with women” (Newman, 1987, p. 270). While this might seem to confuse the 
issue - that the experience of divinity in the feminine is not exclusive to women - 
it avoids dichotomies along gender lines. This is borne out by Kristeva’s assertion 
that access to the semiotic is not drawn on gender-lines. I will draw these issues 
together in my Conclusion; suffice to say for the moment, that sexuate difference 
is a necessary distinction, which enables women (and men) to escape the 
singular subjectivity of the masculine, but that does not, in my view, mean that 
certain experiences are not available to both sexes. A way of approaching this 
debate is to say that multiple archetypes are functioning at the same time: one 
archetype could be that of sexuate difference, another the specifics of a 
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shamanic/mystical spirituality rather than a patriarchal monotheism. Therefore, a 
similar experience could be available to both women and men and yet it will have 
some different qualities and effects due to sexuate difference. 
 
I return my discussion to contemporary critique of medieval mystic women to 
progress my argument for mysticism as feminine divine. 
 
Beauvoir, Irigaray and Mystic Women 
Both Irigaray and Beauvoir question if, or how, female medieval mystic women 
were able to subvert the dualistic patriarchal structure in which they lived. I begin 
with Beauvoir who sees the woman mystic in problematic terms. She associates 
mystic love and fervour with delusion; “either the woman establishes a relation 
with an unreal: her double or God; or she creates an unreal relation with a real 
being” (de Beauvoir, 2009, p. 734). In each case, Beauvoir is presuming that an 
object, an elevated or unreal object, is the focus of the woman lover’s experience 
- whether mystic or not. This reflects Hegel’s notion, that desire is intentional, and 
thus “that it is always desire of or for a given object” (P. S. Anderson, 1998, p. 
88). However, is it possible to love -- or desire -- without an object?   
 
Earlier, I argued that mysticism is essentially an experience without an object, but 
is it possible? Simone Weil argued, “we have to go down to the root of our desire 
in order to tear the energy from its object. That is where the desires are true in so 
far as they are energy. But there is an unspeakable wrench in the soul at the 
separation of a desire from its object” (Weil, 1995, p. 20). Weil is saying that the 
desire itself is the important thing - not the object of desire. As I have argued, 
mystical experiences of numinosity do not require an object. Beauvoir, however, 
will have nothing of this. Speaking of the characteristics of the woman in love, 
she says she “is not first the prey of a desire without an object that then fixes 
itself on an individual” (de Beauvoir, 2009, pp. 729, my emphasis). Beauvoir does 
not therefore allow for the possibility of love, or desire, without an object. I 
maintain that if we attach our desire to an object, or project it towards an object 
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(person) we attribute it to the object as desirable, rather than claim desire as our 
own experience. This is also Luce Irigaray’s point when she advocates that our 
desire and fulfilment not be ever-deferred to a transcendent object.243 This point 
is important because Irigaray develops the notion of a feminine divine as horizon, 
not object. I am further associating experiences of the numinous with objectless 
desire, and infer that Irigaray’s perspective is mystical on this point, that is, her 
notion of horizon rather than object. But Beauvoir has more to say, so let us 
return to her. 
 
Beauvoir says of a specific mystic, St Teresa, that she “seeks to unite with God 
and experience this union in her body” (ibid., p. 730), which suggests a union of 
the sensible and the divine, the sensible/ transcendental. However, earlier in the 
same chapter on “The Mystic”, Beauvoir conflates ‘human’ and ‘divine’ love, 
because she argues that they both move towards an absolute. This is how she 
puts it: “Human love and divine love melt into one another not because the latter 
is a sublimation of the former but because the former is also a movement 
towards a transcendent, towards the absolute” (ibid., p. 726). Beauvoir is saying 
that all love is transcendent, and moves toward an absolute, distanced from the 
fleshly experience. Irigaray, however, differentiates transcendence by saying 
there is vertical transcendence (with ‘the divine’) and horizontal transcendence 
(with the human other). Both ‘transcend’ the ego. Nonetheless, for Irigaray, both 
of these unions are experienced in the flesh, they are never transcendent of the 
flesh. ‘In the flesh’ brings us to the consideration that what is experienced by the 
body subverts or evades phallogocentrism. In order to discover who might evade 
or subvert the symbolic, let us examine the hysteric, who has been the subject of 
much analysis, for instance by Beauvoir, Irigaray, Kristeva, Freud, Lacan, Cixous 
and Clement. 
 
                                            
243 This is borne out in her argument of “I love to you”, rather than “I love you” (Irigaray, 1996). 
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Beauvoir argues that the mystic is hysteric and that “both adversaries and 
admirers of mystics think that giving a sexual content to St. Teresa’s ecstasies is 
to reduce her to the rank of hysteric”(ibid., p. 729). She laments the lack of 
freedom available to the hysteric. However, from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
what the hysteric expresses through her body, albeit in an incomplete form, is the 
freedom of being unclassified, unclassifiable and unsymbolized. That is, she is 
outside the masculine/Symbolic. Thus, I aver, she is claiming an inestimable 
freedom, from which much can be developed in terms of a subject position, and 
specific female perspective, including a divine not already framed in 
phallogocentrism.  
 
A way in which the body speaks, as I have just mentioned, is through hysteria; 
that is, the body expresses that which culture forecloses. Here the body has 
come to substitute for the psyche, to stand in for it and to display that which 
cannot be said. The hysteric in a Freudian/Lacanian context is intrinsically 
problematized and pathologized; “she” is “the problem” ("Femininity", Freud, 
1953-1974, p. 116), because she has not submitted to the implicit order. 
However, I argue for a loosening of the context of hysteria in order to interpret 
her outside, rather than from within, phallogocentrism. To return to the medieval 
mystics, Carolyn Walker Bynum gives examples of “religious women who spoke 
of striking music from their flesh through extravagant asceticisms” (Bynum, 1995, 
p. 15). I propose that their experience, in modern terms, is hysteria; namely that 
their spirituality was bodily in the extreme, and not dependent upon sublimation 
or transcendence.244 Arguably, the climate of medieval mysticism gave women a 
legitimate expression of desire through the body. Thus, they were not 
marginalized or pathologized. 
 
But what about a contemporary woman? Is the ‘hysteric’ - the she that is all 
women - unconsciously expressing desires which are not attainable within the 
                                            
244 Both mystics and hysterics describe similar, if not the same, psychological experience of 
dissociation from their egocentric experiences of the world, that is, the world constructed 
according to masculine principles.  
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masculine/Symbolic?245 Is the hysteric, then, averting the “normativizing 
injunctions” cautioned by Judith Butler, but at the same time not averting the 
simultaneous attributions of “psychosis, abjection, psychic unlivabilty” (Butler, 
1993, pp. 14-15)? While I am not advocating hysteria as such, because it is an 
unconscious formation, I argue that the same position, when achieved 
consciously, is mysticism.246 If the hysteric is demonstrating a love that 
culture/symbolic will not allow, or has no opening for - it has been foreclosed - 
then mysticism is that which creates the opening and undoes the foreclosure. If 
we allow the possibility that the ‘mysteric’ does know God in her body, the 
material and spiritual are inextricably interwoven, and she is experiencing 
embodied transcendence.247 Clearly, however, the God she “knows” is not the 
patriarchal God of logos. 
 
Continuing the theme of embodied transcendence, Luce Irigaray claims that her 
concept of the female divine is not mystical,248 and I infer that this is because she 
associates ‘mystical’ with an ecstasis, which takes one out of the body, into 
dissociating transcendence, to a ”solitary exile where an essential proximity with 
the god presses near” (Luce Irigaray, 1999, p. 112), and indeed this does 
                                            
245 Cixous, Clément and Irigaray all discuss the hysteric and what her body might be expressing. 
Anorexia, including the ‘holy anorexia’ of certain mystics, including Catherine of Sienna, can be 
considered a manifestation of hysteria, although the term describing it was changed from 
“anorexia hysterica” to “anorexia nervosa” in 1873 by Gull, because anorexia was diagnosed in 
men as well as women.  
246 I am not arguing here for a deliberate taking on of the hysteric’s position of bodily enactment, 
but by conscious cultivation of a perspective other than the phallogocentric.  The hysteric’s 
position is one of reaction to, but what I am suggestion is an action on one’s own behalf. 
247 ‘Mysteric’ is Irigaray’s own term which conflates ‘hysteric’ and ‘mystic’ (Luce  Irigaray, 1985). 
For Irigaray, the mysteric is the figure of the hysterical female mystic who manages to occupy a 
place in patriarchy, which is not subsumed within it.  However, Irigaray also claims that the 
mysteric’s ecstatic passion is still tied to masculine reason, by being in excess of it.  This 
somewhat accords with Grace Jantzen’s view, but not with mine.  My view is that libido is 
naturally a threat to credo, and it is inevitable that patriarchy would see this as an excess (of 
representation), which I argue that it indeed is, and needs to be, and will remain so. 
248  “Alison Martin says: “Irigaray … is less concerned with stating what the divine is (or should 
be) than with setting out the structural possibility or necessity of the divine; she is more 
concerned to elaborate the ontological possibility of the divine as an existential-hermeneutic 
condition, than to list its features as if it were a being, ontically conceived. That said, as this divine 
is not mystical, she does on occasion offer ways of interpreting, appropriating and creating it, at 
least for the female divine!” (Martin, 2003, p. 133)  Martin claims that Luce Irigaray’s divine is not 
mystical. 
 184 
represent the patriarchal/ androcentric emphasis on transcendence.249 It is 
dissociating from the body, and from the other. However, what I am arguing here 
is an enstasis (Whitford, 1991b, p. 17), which is a manifestation of the sensible/ 
transcendental. For Irigaray, emphasis on the experiential or lived body better 
evades phallogocentrism, and a feminine divine must likewise evade 
phallogocentrism.  
 
Before I move to the next section, let me reiterate that the crux of my argument is 
that a feminine divine and the apprehension of that divine are contiguous, and 
this contiguity is mysticism. This proposition of a feminine divine is intimately tied 
to the sensible/transcendental of Luce Irigaray, and her idea of a divine horizon 
or passage. Notwithstanding Irigaray’s claim that her feminine divine is not 
mystical, Amy Hollywood summarizes that for Luce Irigaray, “the mystical is both 
dependent on the existence of a female deity and the site on which she can be 
apprehended” (Hollywood, 2002, p. 188). A divine object is not posited here, but 
a paradoxical apprehension. This paradoxical position allows for an apparent 
contradiction to coexist. I can therefore conjecture that such apprehension 
coalesces as a spiritual attitude, which informs and transforms one’s person, 
one’s relationship with others, and one’s way of living on this earth. As such I 
argue that mysticism (and, by implication the feminine divine) is not a perspective 
exclusive to women.250 This goes some way to answering the question I posed 
earlier, regarding the possibility that divinity-in-the-feminine might also be 
available to men, but is more ‘natural’ to women. I realize that any mention of 
‘natural’ in relation to women runs the risk of attracting critique along essentialist 
lines. So, what do I mean by ‘natural’ in this context? 
                                            
249 According to Luce Irigaray: “Transcendence, then, is no longer ecstasy, leaving oneself behind 
… Neither simple nature nor common spirit beyond nature, this transcendence lies in the 
difference of body and culture that exists between us and nourishes our energy, its movement, its 
generation, and its creation” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 18).  
250 Although I fully subscribe to Luce Irigaray’s call for a separate spirituality and subjectivity for 
women, to claim that such a position is absolute in its exclusivity is, in my view a form of 
fundamentalism, or stereotype, and I develop this thought in the Conclusion.  Briefly, having 
established that sexuate difference is essential, the experiences within these two  - at least two, 
says Irigaray – could well demonstrate much variation. 
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What is ‘Natural’ to Women?  
Fundamental to what is ‘natural’ to women is the establishment of sexuate 
difference when all women are extricated from the logic that has subsumed them. 
So, when I argue that an attitude is more ‘natural’ to women, I remove a woman’s 
spirituality from what Irigaray calls “the logic of the essence of man” and replace 
this with imagining a god which is a “place or path whereby the self could be 
coalesced in space and time: unity of instinct, heart,251 and knowledge, unity of 
nature and spirit” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 67, my emphasis).252 In this way women are 
removed from a masculine logic and consequently have the possibility of 
discovering what is ‘natural’ to them when assuming their autonomy. This 
emphasis on the self, which consists in “faith in the possibility of our own 
autonomy” (ibid., p. 68), is, I contend, a first step in feminine spirituality. This faith 
is explicitly not dependent either on god as object, or the masculine logic of 
spirituality. Autonomy, which is our salvation according to Irigaray, results in 
more than redemption. It allows for “a love that would not just redeem but glorify 
us in full self-awareness: thought directed at the self and for the self that is free to 
love but not obliged” (ibid., p. 68).253 Thus feminine spiritual autonomy results in a 
move outwards, through love, (not obligation) toward the other, because “love of 
neighbour is an ethical consequence of becoming divine” (ibid.).254 However, it 
begins by being oriented to and in the self as self-affection. Love of neighbour as 
ethical consequence moves us into the community. As Irigaray says, “It is 
essential that we be God for ourselves so that we can be divine for the other” 
(ibid., p. 71), as I have already suggested earlier in this chapter.  
 
                                            
251 Irigaray is speaking of a quality of heart, namely love, that is not sentimentalized, but rather is 
a “quality of soul”, as described by Roberts Avens thus: “I am not referring here to “common 
religious piety, (in which) the heart has become a sentimentalized and prettified version of the 
ego, but rather a quality of soul” (Avens, 1984, p. 194).  
252 Irigaray is basing her comments on Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (Feuerbach, 
1844). 
253 Irigaray is referring to Levinas and his emphasis on the “unfulfillable obligation” toward the 
other. In this way, obligation takes the form of an estrangement of the self.  This is totally opposite 
to the intention of Irigaray, which I am discussing here.   
254 St Augustine said something similar:  “love God and do what you will”, (in Latin it is Ama Deum 
et fac quod vis), namely that we cannot but behave ethically when our centre is in “the divine”.  Of 
course St Augustine and Irigaray had radically different notions of what this divine might be.  
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My second point is that spirituality not directed toward objects, but founded on a 
mandala of sorts, is ‘natural’ to a woman’s psychological development. Recall 
Luce Irigaray’s understanding of the difference in development between girls and 
boys. When she observes the different ways in which a little girl and a little boy 
manage separation from their mother, she notes that for the boy this is done 
when he plays with an object and pulls it towards him.255 He displaces “a 
substitute object from one place to another” (ibid., p. 99). This focus on objects, 
especially as replacement for the lost mother, is, I argue, the foundation of a 
masculine spirituality based on objects. “The little girl, however, “manages to 
organize a kind of symbolic space. She dances… this dance is also a way for the 
girl to create a territory of her own in relation to the mother” (ibid., p. 98). She 
creates an “energetic circular movement …There is no object here, in the strict 
meaning of the word, no other that has had to be introjected or incorporated” 
(ibid.).256 One may conclude that the spiritual movement of a woman follows a 
similar circular movement, beginning with herself, as this movement is ‘natural’ to 
her. Her focus is not on an objectified god/ idol, but on the space created. Thus 
the way girls “describe a space around themselves” (ibid., p. 99) relates to a 
mystical space, rather than a substitute object. “The girl-subject does not have 
objects as the boy does. …Women do not try to master the other but to give birth 
to themselves” (ibid.). Following on from this difference, it is ‘natural’ that the 
feminine divine is not found in an object, but rather as an experience, a space.  
 
As a third point, I argue that a spirituality natural to women is evident in Luce 
Irigaray’s notion of the enigma of women as residing in “her lips and all they keep 
unmanifested” (ibid., p. 102). Irigaray deploys a woman’s morphology, her two 
lips, to differentiate her from a man psychologically and spiritually, as well as in 
her physiology. It is ‘natural’ (and necessary, for Irigaray) for her to find within the 
closed lips the solitude and silence she associates with virginity. I utilize these 
                                            
255 Luce Irigaray is commenting on the observations by Freud of his grandson - the fort-da game, 
and comparing and contrasting this with her observation of little girls. 
256 I take these differences in relating to objects and space between boys and girls as being 
intrinsic; I do not investigate the possibility that these differences are social and cultural, due to 
space constraints.  
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concepts further in chapter six. It is outside my argument to discuss Irigaray’s 
discourse on the lips, but the aspect of the enigma that I am interested in here is 
the “unmanifested”, that which is not seen clearly, has not yet become, is not 
objectified. The mystical as related to female morphology, as unmanifested, 
could be seen as intrinsic or natural to women, because of its unmanifestability - 
an extension of the enigma of the lips, as it were.257 For this reason the feminine 
divine can never be in opposition, competition or even equi-valence with the 
masculine divine. It is of an entirely different nature, seen through a different 
perspective which, I have argued, comes more ‘naturally’ to women, because it is 
related to women’s bodies and movement. 
 
Earlier I argued that women’s desire and jouissance are intrinsic to divinity in the 
feminine, specifically as mysticism. I now develop this idea more fully. 
Jouissance, Desire and the Feminine Divine 
Jouissance is important to my discussion for two primary reasons; the first is that 
it is experienced in, or even because of, the body, the second is that it is 
specifically feminine. The French feminist writer Hélène Cixous uses the term 
jouissance to differentiate women from men - and masculine jouissance from 
feminine jouissance – and to describe a form of women's pleasure, or sexual 
rapture that combines mental, physical and spiritual aspects of female 
experience, in a metaphysical fulfillment of desire, bordering on mystical 
communion (Cixous & Clément, 1986). Cixous maintains that jouissance is the 
source of a woman's creative power, and the suppression of jouissance prevents 
women from finding their own fully empowered voice.258 Jouissance is what 
women have but know nothing about, according to Lacan; it is the embodied 
                                            
257 “There is the belief that the mystical truth is always there, but that ordinary experience stands 
in the way and must be put aside just as one removes a veil to reveal a treasure which existed all 
along” (J. E. Smith, 1983, p. 253).  I believe women are taught to wear that veil, and that it 
consists in the masculine symbolic. 
258 Cixous argues that only women could produce feminine writing, because it must come from 
their bodies, but she also argues that men could occupy a structural position from which they 
could produce feminine writing. Thus she espouses sexuate difference, but also a kind of 
bisexuality, or sexual fluidity, where both men and women can occupy a masculine or feminine 
‘structural position’.  This is close to my own view.  
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sense of that which cannot be spoken. Lacan refers to the ecstasy of St Teresa, 
and says unequivocally that this is an expression of 'coming’, or orgasm, of 
sexual bliss. To him sexuality and mystical ecstasy are related; that is, mysticism 
is the site of a jouissance that goes beyond the phallus, in other words beyond 
representation (Lacan, 1982, p. 47). While Lacan goes on to chide women for 
going beyond or outside language in jouissance, I applaud jouissance as that 
which women have which is uncontaminated by symbolic/phallic processes. 
Beauvoir also recognized the conflation of the mystical and the erotic, as I have 
already mentioned, although she does not recognise jouissance as evading the 
symbolic.  
 
In order to build a post-patriarchal feminine philosophy of religion, I argue that we 
need to introduce female desire/jouissance, which is eclipsed or foreclosed in 
patriarchal religions.259 The desire of the medieval mystics was clearly evident, 
although Carolyn Walker Bynum cautions that desire as expressed by them is 
“both like and unlike” our modern notions (Bynum, 1995, p. 26). Nevertheless, I 
draw on Bynum’s claim that their “devotional writing, as in medieval love poetry, 
body and desire are connected” (ibid.). In the mystical transports demonstrated 
by these women, “all their senses are in play” (ibid.), in other words their 
experience is with and through their bodies, it is ‘sensible’ and expresses 
desire.260 
 
Consequently, the spirituality of the medieval mystics is not ‘disembodied’. Desire 
is an ever-present part of their bodily experience. As Bynum comments, in the 
“poetry and visions of mystical women, heaven was ever-expanding desire” 
                                            
259 Irigaray summarizes this, when she says, “woman has sex organs more or less everywhere.  
She finds pleasure almost anywhere” (Luce Irigaray, 1985, p. 28).  In this view, woman is not the 
stable lens through which man reflects himself, but the unstable, multifaceted prism through 
which she manifests herself, through her body and through jouissance.  
260 For As discussed by Carolyn Walker Bynum, in medieval theology, the lived fleshly body was 
important because of the spiritual importance of the flesh, namely that the flesh would be present 
at the resurrection; “in my flesh will I see God.” The doctrine that the same body we possess on 
earth will rise at the end of time and be united to our soul was part of the Christian creeds from 
the early third century on (Bynum, 1995, p. 20). 
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(ibid., p. 25). Rather than the notion of a static beatitude which, once attained, 
remains unchanged, for these women, even in heaven, their desire would “never 
be stilled” (ibid). Mechthilde of Magdeburg is recorded as wanting to remain in 
her body forever so that she could continue in her desire for God, thus 
expressing a very embodied experience of spirituality, a jouissance, a sensible/ 
transcendental,261 or embodied transcendence. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I posited a necessity for women’s spirituality to 
be removed from the masculine/Symbolic. This necessity is met in women’s 
mysticism when embodiment and transcendence are embraced simultaneously. I 
have demonstrated that female evaluation is not the “irritable reaching after facts 
and reason” associated with androcentric evaluation. Rather, women mystics’ 
autonomy and subjectivity is conferred through the authority of their own 
experience, not by religion; mysticism and the numinous are not religious in the 
first instance, because they consist of direct rather than mediated or interpreted 
experience. Neither does Lacan’s notion of jouissance need a religious setting, 
but bypasses it entirely. Therefore, Lacan can say that the jouissance of the 
female mystic is an experience of the Real,262 rather than the interpreted world of 
the Symbolic. Inevitably, mysticism, direct knowledge and unmediated 
experience are threatening to the notion that the symbolic and phallogocentricity 
are the only source of knowledge.263 If feminine mysticism is the return of the 
                                            
261 Carolyn Walker Bynum Walker says:  Mystical women such as Hadewijch, Mechthild of 
Magdeburg, Angela of Foligno, and Marguerite of Oingt spoke of selves (body and soul together) 
yearning in heaven with a desire that was piqued and delighted into ever greater frenzy by 
encounter with their lover, God. Angela described Jesus as "love and inestimable satiety, which, 
although it satiated, generated at the same time insatiable hunger, so that all her [that is, Angela's 
own] members were unstrung." My point is not merely that writing about desire becomes more 
complex and fervent in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, although this is true. It is that such 
desire is not only for bodies; it is lodged in bodies (Bynum, 1995, p. 26).  
262 For Lacan, the Real is that which is ultimately authentic, an unchangeable truth. It is opposed 
to the imaginary and beyond the symbolic; that is, it precedes or exceeds, language. It consists in 
a pre-Oedipal realm, which can never be symbolized. As Bruce Fink articulates, “Women can 
step beyond the boundaries of language and the pittance of pleasure allowed by it because [they 
join with] the Real” (Fink, 2010). Fink goes on to say that “a woman is related to the Real”, 
because “the feminine jouissance raises the ordinary object to … a Real satisfaction”. 
263  Nancy Frankenberry asks the important questions: “What has the status of knowledge? What 
gets valorized as worth knowing? What are the criteria evoked? Who has the authority to 
establish meaning? Who is presumed the subject of belief? . . . What do we learn by examining 
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repressed (feminine desire), and jouissance is not excluded from epistemology, it 
follows that mysticism constitutes a language or expression that either subverts, 
or exists alongside, the masculine-Symbolic.  
 
Mysticism Saves us From (Patriarchal) Religion 
I have argued that patriarchal belief-systems can be undermined or subverted by 
the perspective of the mystic.264 For feminists, this subversion of patriarchal 
religion is useful. As mysticism is a direct response or access to the numinous, 
necessarily this is a means by which women can avoid the constructs of meaning 
of the masculine symbolic in order to discover a feminine divine. From the 
perspective of patriarchal religious forms as magisterium, (established church 
teaching) mystical piety is therefore often, although not invariably, seen as 
subversive.265 Since the body and the words of mystics reflect a direct personal 
relation to the divine, their experience cannot be mediated by ecclesiastical 
structures. As noted by McGinn, this subversive position is variously seen as 
something to applaud or condemn, (McGinn, 2004, p. 200) and is two-fold, 
namely as a protest against dogmatic theology, and as a female critique of male-
dominated religion. My argument for mysticism as feminine divine contains these 
elements and more, namely the site and experience of feminine divinity itself.  
 
Don Cupitt argues that mysticism is what saves us from religion (Cupitt, 1998). I 
rephrase this and say “mysticism as feminine divine removes us from the sphere 
of influence presumed by patriarchal religion”. Cupitt argues that mystical writing 
was - and presumably continues to be - the forerunner of deconstruction and 
                                            
the relations between power, on the one hand, and what happens as evidence, foundations, 
modes of discourse, and forms of apprehension and transmission, on the other 
hand?”(Frankenberry, 1998, p. 192).   I am focussing on apprehension of what is worth knowing, 
especially in chapter four. 
264 On the other hand, mystical transcendent realities have, within monotheisms, been 
marginalized, and mystics persecuted, because, in King’s terms, their language calls for “a 
language of personal transcendence foreign to monotheism” (King, 2009, p. 165). 
265 As Grace Jantzen says: “The power of the church would be severely threatened if it should be 
acknowledged that access to divine authority was possible outside its confines” (Jantzen, 1994, 
p. 187). 
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radical theology (Cupitt, 1998, p. 93). He says: “the mystic has to be a 
deconstructor, because religious orthodoxies were all constructed with the aim of 
making final religious happiness (or salvation, of the Vision of God) impossible in 
this life” (ibid., p. 4). In his own deconstruction of religion and mysticism, he 
describes religious alienation as ’normal’ within the masculine religious construct, 
and mysticism, which he frames as feminine, as bridging that alienation (ibid., pp. 
88-89). He says, “mystical writing may be seen as attempting to deconstruct at 
least some of the great distinctions established by dogmatic theology, and 
especially the ideas of God, the human self and the quantitative difference 
between them” (ibid., p. 83). He argues for a mysticism which is minus 
metaphysics, that is fluid, mortal and changeable (ibid., pp. 8-9). This point 
warrants emphasis: If we equate established religion with patriarchal logos-
dependent forms, that is, the masculine symbolic, then mysticism is what ‘saves’ 
us from this; mysticism introduces a subversive element. That mysticism is seen 
as a feminine critique, allows for mysticism as a feminine spiritual position that is 
outside the masculine/Symbolic. As Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray noted, the 
medieval mystics were able to discover a degree of autonomy, even within a 
system that suppressed them; namely, they had authority in ecclesiastical as well 
as secular life, their opinion was tolerated and even sought and respected.266 This 
is an important point for women, and for a development of the feminine divine, in 
all periods of history. 
   
Notwithstanding that mystics have often been viewed as subversive, many of the 
key mystics of history have maintained a life within religious institutions. This too 
is important: in the idea of mysticism as subversive of patriarchal/ Symbolic, 
there is an inherent danger of creating an unbridgeable duality, with male divinity 
and established religion on one side, (credo) and female mystical experience on 
the other (libido). I argue that it is more likely that conflict arises within 
individuals, male or female, between libido and credo, which may or may not be 
                                            
266 There was enormous variation in the lives of medieval mystics, and generalizations are 
therefore impossible.  However, I refer here to women such as St Teresa of Avila and Hildegard 
of Bingen. 
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easier for women to resolve than men. For example, Barbara Newman argues 
that “Sister Catherine” sometimes acclaimed as ‘Meister Eckhart’s daughter’, 
puts forward a feminine, or non-logos way of being, in contrast with Eckhart 
himself, because of “its exaltation of the beguine’s all-absorbing love (libido) at 
the expense of her confessor’s churchly prudence” (Newman, 1995, p. 172, 
interpolation mine), or adherence to credo. Mystical experience, as a direct 
apprehension of the divine, is inherently personal and characterized by a change 
in perspective, not related to one’s position in society. Historically, prevailing 
authorities have closed ranks against women mystics.267 As McGinn emphasizes, 
such conflicts “do not hinge essentially on the personality or doctrines of the 
mystic" (McGinn, 2004, p. 202). They are external, imposed by the context. If 
mysticism was expressed within a religious tradition, using the language and 
symbols already available and understood by consensus, then it was accepted 
as religious renewal. If it was democratized, secularized, or feminized, the 
magisterium was alerted to heresy (ibid., p. 209). I believe that this is still the 
situation today; that by proposing - and experiencing – mysticism as feminine 
divine, we inevitably run counter to that which is already established.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that mystical experience is non-discursive, or 
pre-discursive and as such is not logos-valued and not easily, or initially, 
expressed or symbolized in language. For this reason, Luce Irigaray reads the 
body, rather than the text of the female mystic. (Or the female mystic’s body as 
text.)268 Therefore I have placed my emphasis on the body. Like Irigaray, I favour 
the body, touch and feminine desire because it escapes “the dangers of 
                                            
267 One means of closing ranks is through scape-goating the experiencer. As Luce Irigaray says, 
most new discoveries are achieved by sacrificing something. “Only rarely”, she says, “does some 
initiative serve to inaugurate a new rhythm, a new mode of social living, a covenant that needs no 
scapegoat” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 76). The one bringing in the new message, the new vision, the 
new theory, could be the mystic. In contradistinction to Hegel and Heidegger, Irigaray aims at a 
new structure without scapegoat, without sacrifice, without war or revolution.  She speaks of this 
kind of functioning reflecting a masculine model described by Freud: tension, discharge, return to 
homoeostasis, etc.  In other words, it is not an inevitable style for women. 
268  Amy Hollywood comments that Luce Irigaray “highlights the bodies of women mystics, going 
to the point of suggesting that their eloquence is less a feature of language than of the inscription 
of their bodies” (Hollywood, 2002, p. 196). 
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language and the emphasis on the visual and representation which serve to 
reinscribe the (woman) mystic within a male economy”, as Hollywood says of 
Luce Irigaray (Hollywood, 1994, p. 169).  
 
I have argued that a mystical element is at the centre of feminine becoming, and 
without it women become robotic, functioning by means of already-established 
ideals (idols) which are not their own, and therefore intrinsically misrepresent 
them. Is it possible then, that if one does not become a mystic, one “will not exist 
at all?”269 It follows that mysticism enables women to exist as spiritual individuals, 
rather than through a collective ideal of God. The problem with the collective idea 
(of ‘God’ or ‘Goddess’) is that it is a projection of the divine,270 rather than a 
realization of the divine (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 353). Here I have linked personal 
mystical experience with a “descending theology” (ibid., p. 354) which is not 
associated with an ever-transcendent other, but rather “descends into the body of 
the experiencer. I have argued that mystical experience allows for a free-flowing 
release of energy, within one’s self and between beings, an open “exchange with 
the other, in search of a future even more spiritual than that in which each one 
believes” (ibid., p. 356). For a woman, freeing herself from a masculine spiritual 
ideal enables a respect for herself as well as respect for the different other.  
 
I argued that jouissance is a manifestation of libido as developed by Jung, and 
therefore includes more than sexual energy, and is rather “life energy”.271 When 
the medieval mystics experienced the pleasure of God’s presence this was a 
libidinal experience, a jouissance. Thus Bynum speaks of the feminine medieval 
                                            
269 “The future Christian will be a mystic or he or she will not exist at all, if by mysticism we 
mean…a genuine experience of God emerging from the very heart of our existence” (Karl 
Rahner, in Lehmann & Raffelt, 1986).  
270 In this way, we can say, with Meister Eckhart: “So therefore let us pray to God that we may be 
free from ‘God.” (Eckhart, 1981, p. 200).  Or Goddess. In any case, God/ess is a projection, not a 
realization. 
271 An aspect of the role and experience of female mysticism, which I would like to explore on 
another occasion, is the notion that mysticism and hysteria occupy “a cusp” in Western culture 
where the feminine imaginary is displayed. From both an analytical psychology and philosophical 
point of view, I believe that each is expressing an existence outside of the masculine/symbolic, in 
a form that refuses symbolization.  
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mystic’s desire for the divine as the desire that would “never be stilled” (Bynum, 
1995, p. 25). One may conclude that she is speaking of an extended sense of 
jouissance, of libido. The making of credo in the masculine/ Symbolic is in part an 
attempt to distance from libido, hence Luce Irigaray’s question, “why and how 
long ago did God withdraw from carnal love?” (Irigaray, 1993a, p. 16) Carnal 
love, one of the expressions of libido, is something that credo cannot contain. 
Thus, in developing the notion of a feminine divine, I have argued that it is 
mysticism that saves us from religion, or, more particularly, it is libido that saves 
us from credo. So the place, horizon and experience of the feminine divine, 
which is proposed by Luce Irigaray, is achieved in mysticism, where the 
numinous, the threshold of that which is yet to be symbolized, is accessed.  
 
In the next two chapters, I focus on the fairy tale of “The Handless Maiden”. I 
revisit themes of the previous chapters, and explore their application to this myth. 
For instance, in chapter three, I proposed that poetic and allegorical language 
can convey more than the text, and “The Handless Maiden” illustrates this 
point.272 In applying philosophy, analytical psychology and theological analysis to 
myth, I reunite the logos/ mythos split of phallogocentrism, and apply this reunion 
to feminine subjectivity (Cavarero, 2000). This is not an exhaustive analysis of 
“The Handless Maiden”; I will pass over motifs that are not directly related to my 
previous discussion. I will begin chapter five with the first part of the narrative 
itself. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
272 Luce Irigaray is cautious about the benefit of narrative – she contends that no narrative is 
enough to “produce a change of discourse. If anything narratives risk repressing sexual and 
affective freedom by moralising - unless, that is, they can manage to create a new style, unless 
they go beyond the utterance into the creation of new Forms” (Irigaray, 1993a, p. 177) However, 
Terry Threadgold is less doubtful. She says “narrative is a way of telling different stories or of 
telling stories differently” (Threadgold, 1997, p. 82).  I argue that both this narrative and the 
discussion I provide, tell this story differently.   
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Chapter Five: The Handless Maiden - Femininity Derogated 
The Tale: Part One 
A miller, who has fallen into poverty, meets an old man - who turns out 
to be the devil - in the forest. The old man promises to solve the 
miller’s financial problems if he gives him what stands behind the mill, 
which is his daughter, who is both beautiful and pious, not the apple-
tree as he assumed. In three years the devil returns to collect his 
bargain, and tries to take the daughter, but he cannot come near her 
because of her weeping. Furious, he then demands that the miller cuts 
off his daughter’s hands. Initially the miller refuses, but the devil says 
he will then take the miller instead. So the daughter says, “dear father, 
do with me what you will, for I am your child”, and he cuts off both her 
hands. However, the devil gives up his intention to take her, because 
of her continued weeping. The girl’s father wants to continue to 
provide for her, but she refuses. She has her arms bound behind her 
back and then sets out on a journey.  
Tired and hungry she finds herself in the pear-orchard of a King, and 
there, observed by the King, she sustains herself by eating pears. He 
takes her into his palace, “loves her with all his heart”, has silver hands 
made for her and then makes her his wife. 
Not long after, the King goes to war, during which time messages 
which are sent between him and his mother, who is caring for his wife 
and child, are intercepted and changed by the devil, with the result 
that, fearing for her life, the woman, this time with the baby on her 
back, flees the castle, again piteously weeping.273 
Introduction 
In this chapter I interpolate my arguments from previous chapters into an 
analysis of this fairy tale, namely that subjectivity can be achieved outside of 
patriarchal structure, embodied transcendence as constitutive of women’s 
spirituality, and sexuate difference for men and women. First, however, I 
introduce the importance of myth as a source of knowledge. I then interrogate the 
myth itself, and apply and develop my discussion. I pass over many motifs, 
because they are not directly related to the subjects I have developed in previous 
chapters. 
                                            
273(Grimm, 1884). There are many translations and interpolations of this tale, and this synopsis 
contains the most important motifs in the tale. Grimm’s own version is available on 
http://www.surlalunefairytales.com/authors/grimms/31girlwithouthands.html. Accessed August 
6th, 2013. 
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Myth and Fairy Tale 
“The most we can do is to dream the myth onwards and give it a modern dress. 
And whatever explanation or interpretation does to it, we do to our own souls as 
well, with corresponding results for our own psychic well-being” (C. G. Jung, 
1977, volume 9, part i, §271). My task here is to give the tale a modern dress of 
contemporary philosophy.  
 
I have already argued for an interface between the disciplines, especially 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and feminist theology, and this 
fairy tale enables such an interface. Pamela Sue Anderson advocates “building 
upon psycholinguistic readings of myth in their relation to philosophical texts” (P. 
S. Anderson, 1998, p. 153). According to Anderson, the thus transfigured 
“mythical meaning can aim to disrupt the male configurations of rationality and 
patriarchy which have excluded women and sexual difference from philosophy of 
religion. Disruptive refigurations will offer new images from old myths of women 
in nature” (ibid.).274 Taking up Anderson's point, I argue that this disruption has 
been part of my project thus far, and is further advanced in this chapter as I 
propose a new position for all women, through the figure of the young maiden. 
Myth and fairy tale are not generally privileged in the academy, but Anderson 
promotes their inclusion by arguing that “some philosophers might imagine that 
myth and myth-making were left behind with the emergence of ancient Greek 
philosophy and its rational discourse; but arguably, myth has always 
accompanied philosophy in constituting the identities of men, women and the 
divine” (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 3).  Likewise, in Luce Irigaray’s view, myths are 
the poetry of history, and we need to discover some good positive myths, which 
include a spiritual level that will reveal women’s entrenchment in patriarchal 
restraints.275 This myth/fairy tale does exactly that. Mythical meaning can supply 
for women a horizon, a culture of difference.  
 
                                            
274 Some myths “remind us of the way other cultures [have created] a culture of difference” 
(Ingram, 2000, pp. 53-54).  This myth/fairy tale clearly instates sexuate difference. 
275 Luce Irigaray, seminar at Nottingham University, 2010. 
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I argue that our embroidering of a personal myth upon the collective story is a 
version of genealogy - the way we live the myth changes it. As such this myth 
reveals our past, present and future selves, (Huskinson, 2008, p. 5) that is, it 
provides women with a continuum upon which they can situate or identify 
themselves.276 Women have taken up fairy tales to speak their condition for them, 
so to speak. In 2008, Marina Warner, researcher into fairy tales (Warner, 1996), 
writes in the cover notes of the movie, “La belle and la bête” (Cocteau, 1946), 
“Aristocratic French women (such as) Mme D’Aulnoy, Mme de Murat, and 
Villeneuve created a vogue for fairy tale in their salons in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries in Paris.  They were reinventing the form as a 
vehicle to attack conventions of their day, especially those concerning their 
condition as women”. I am using the Handless Maiden for a similar purpose. 
When fairy tales were part of an oral tradition, subtle changes and inflections in 
each telling revealed changes in the culture over time, as well as the individual 
psychology of the narrator. As this tale has been written - and therefore static – 
for 200 years, it runs the risk of being a dead story. My reading and analysis here 
bring it to life for contemporary women, by using concepts that inform modern 
inquiry. On the other hand, fairy tales often suffer the fate of being ‘modernized’, 
sanitized, or revised so that they suit collective values, and are therefore more 
socially acceptable; in their unexpurgated version they are considered too 
graphic or violent, especially as stories for children. Such changes inevitably 
demonstrate thinking that is rational rather than imaginal. I reproduce here a 
reasonably unexpurgated version.277 
 
                                            
276 Lucy Huskinson outlines one of the qualities of myth as the “dual function of describing our 
understanding of the world, and revealing how we might change that understanding” (Huskinson, 
2008, p. 1). “Myth …is a narrative that shapes and affects us, it is the order in which we make 
sense of ourselves and it reveals to us, through this ordering, how we might develop into 
something different” (Huskinson, 2008, p. 2).  
277 While the first edition of the Grimm tales proclaimed, “no particular has been either added 
through our own poetic recreation, or improved and altered,” the second edition of 1819 admitted 
“we have given many tales as one insofar as they complemented each other and no 
inconsistencies had to be excised”. From the Grimm brother’s own annotations 
http://www.surlalunefairytales.com/authors/grimms/31girlwithouthands.html, accessed August 6th, 
2013. 
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I employ myth as part of my project to re-imagine the irrational.278 In this way 
fantasy, literature, and myths/ fairy tales use “language to conjure visions of other 
worlds without asserting their empirical reality” (Rowland, 2002, p. 151). 
Subjectivity imagined outside the claims of authority and truth of the patriarchal 
symbolic is an aid to the feminine imaginary.279 I argued in chapter four for a 
feminine divine as a horizon towards which one extends. Myth proposes another 
horizon of meaning. As Hans-Georg Gadamer says, “the gift of myth is the gift of 
a horizon stretching out just as far as the inhabitants of that myth require 
meaning to extend. A dwelling place” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 217). He adds, “a 
horizon is not a rigid frontier, but something that moves with one and invites one 
to advance further.” I do indeed use this fairy tale to invite the reader towards a 
horizon, and to extend beyond previous limits. 
 
Myth and legend are essentially archetypal, that is, they are filled with 
archetypes.  Archetypes represent potentials and possibilities within the culture 
as well as within the individual personality. No archetype has precedence over 
the others, and can exist simultaneously – they represent polyphonic possibility.  
The archetype of the Self, however, incorporates all other archetypes in the 
Jungian view. The Self appears in dreams, myths, and fairytales in the figure of 
the "supra-ordinate personality," such as a king, queen, etc (C. G. Jung, 1977, 
volume 6, §790).  Thus the feminine archetypes, such as the Virgin Mary, the 
maiden and the virgin, which we will meet in this chapter and the next, are not 
subordinate to any masculine archetypes.  However, the King, representing the 
totality of the psyche, incorporates all other archetypes.  This is not a gendered 
assumption, as the Queen can equally represent the Self.  Another way of putting 
this is to say that the supra-ordinate archetypes represent that which is not the 
ego - a spiritual dimension - while the other archetypes represent ways in which 
                                            
278 Susan Rowland comments “feminist fantasy literature is the attempt to imagine women and 
the feminine beyond the social constraints of both existing societies and the dominant genre of 
literary realism” (Rowland, 2002, p. 151).  My use of this fairy tale is toward the same end. 
279 To read both fiction and fairy tale is to “submerge and reimagine subjectivity through 
narratives not claiming the authority of truth” (Rowland, 2002, p. 151).  Rather, fairy tales and 
myths show us how to live a fully human life, according to Jung.  And what is truth? I argue that 
fairy tales and myths offer a different way of approaching truth. 
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the ego/personality might develop. 
 
Myths, like the archetypes they employ, change over time, and in this way are 
historical. They also take us towards a new horizon of meaning, which transgress 
the limits of the constructed horizon.280 Joseph Campbell called myths a ‘cultural 
dream’, and I argue that this dream both informs the culture, and the culture 
informs the dream/ myth.281 Roland Barthes believes that “myth has in fact a 
double function: it points out and it notifies, it makes us understand something 
and it imposes it on us” (Barthes, 1984, p. 117). So the myth/ dream both informs 
and reflects the culture. As such, myth reflects the cultural imaginary, in a 
different, although equally potent form, to scientific discourse. The Jungian idea 
of amplification is to link individual psychic events to mythology, fairy tales or 
religious narratives and this is my intention - to amplify, and link the personal with 
the mythological.  
 
This fairy tale clearly stresses the need for, and process of, descending theology, 
embodied transcendence, or the sensible/transcendental, by navigating a path 
for both men and women towards their own sexuate spiritualization of desire and 
subjectivity, to a point where they can properly speak to each other, and for the 
woman, to speak at all.282  
The Fairy Tale of “The Handless Maiden” 
Philosophy has not, in general, taken into consideration the unconscious, either 
personal or collective. Fairy tales provide access to aspects that are 
unconscious, which can either aid or thwart. Marie Louise von Franz, the Swiss 
Jungian Analyst who is an expert on the interpretation of Fairy tales points out 
                                            
280 Luce Irigaray, in seminar at Nottingham University 2010. 
281 This is a similar question to whether dogma creates or constricts belief, or whether experience 
creates dogma and belief; the latter is what Jung suggests. If we take the unconscious into 
account, both experience and dogma are informed by elements outside culture and belief. 
282 Luce Irigaray says, “without descending theology, there is no possible incarnation of the divine 
within us and between us. No divinization of the body, breathing, love, speech” (Irigaray, 2007a, 
p. 2, emphasis mine). 
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that the fairy tale brings to light unconscious processes.283 Von Franz says: “Fairy 
tales are the purest and simplest expression of collective unconscious psychic 
process. Therefore their value for the investigation of the unconscious exceeds 
that of all other material” (von Franz, 1996, p. 1). 
 
Clarissa Pinkola Estes (Estes, 1992) gives a detailed and lengthy analysis of 
“The Handless Maiden”, and I pause to include her reasons for using 
myth/fairytale: 
In this [story-telling] tradition a story is 'holy,' and it is used as 
medicine. The story is not told to lift you up, to make you feel better, or 
to entertain you, although all those things can be true. The story is 
meant to take the spirit into a descent to find something that is lost or 
missing and to bring it back to consciousness again.284  
 
In this chapter we do indeed descend into the unconscious, and bring back what 
is missing - the subjectivity and spirituality of women - and find a place for it. I do 
not draw further upon Estes’ work here, however, as I choose to focus my 
analysis on contemporary philosophical issues especially as raised by Luce 
Irigaray, which focuses on instating women’s subjectivity and spirituality. 
Ultimately, the story maps the way to sexuate difference, by imagining women 
(and men) outside current cultural and psychological constraints. “The Handless 
Maiden” has a message for women’s emergence, coded in a way that evades 
conflict with our Christian foundations.  
 
In fairy tales, something is being righted; as von Franz says, “this ‘rightness’ 
could perhaps be better defined as being in complete accordance with the 
wholeness of the situation” (von Franz, 1980, p. 20). The wholeness of the 
situation implies that no element is advantaged, disadvantaged, or favoured over 
the others, and thus is truly ethical. In a fairy tale, the path to ethical relations will 
not be a conventional one, convention being the problem. Fairy tales also 
                                            
283 As Dubosc says of mythological forms: “The emergence of consciousness in its relationship 
with life, death and sexuality are represented in most cultures as a funding mythological event” 
(Dubosc, 2000, p. 44). We see consciousness emerging, specifically about sexuate difference, in 
this fairy tale. 
284 Clarissa Estéshttp://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/901977.Clarissa_Pinkola_Est_s, 
accessed August 6th, 2013. 
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compensate, that is, if there is too much ‘lightness’ in the conscious attitude in 
the family or the culture, the fairy tales will be very dark (Davies, 2006). In “The 
Handless Maiden” the compensation or correction addresses the secondary 
place accorded to the feminine and women in patriarchal cultures; this is where 
the darkness lies. Fairy tales often involve trickery, which will create some radical 
change, which in the end is beneficial to all. In this particular fairy tale, I relate 
‘the wholeness of the situation’ to Luce Irigaray’s insistence that feminine as well 
as masculine subjectivity be equally represented, that is, sexuate difference.285 
So, although this fairy tale is about the predicament of women, it is also 
applicable to men.286 
 
Some commentators, such as Midori Snyder (Snyder, 1995), take the story to be 
one of a girl surviving incest at the hands of her father, and some versions of the 
tale are explicit on this detail. This is a very valid way of reading the story, but I 
take the ‘abuse’ as being universal to women, and about a lack of sexuate 
identity in patriarchy rather than physical sexual abuse.287 When we take a 
sexual, rather than sexuate, emphasis, we miss the deepest most fundamental 
abuse of the feminine. As a depth psychologist I observe that the psychological 
sciences in general run the risk of focussing on sexual abuse as the ultimate 
betrayal of women, and thus foreclose the possibility of further examining 
women’s experience. Donald Winnicott said that rape is a “mere bagatelle as 
compared to the violation of the self’s core, in the alteration of the self’s central 
elements” (Winnicott, 1965, p. 187).288 Luce Irigaray’s emphasis on sexuate 
identity goes to the heart of protecting ‘the self’s core’ of women, their ‘central 
elements’. This is not to say that physical rape is not a violation of the self’s core, 
                                            
285 Women’s subjectivity is also important in relations between women, including mothers and 
daughters. 
286 “Fortunately, myths are not locked into univocal meaning or timeless configurations.  Neither 
strictly patriarchal nor strictly matriarchal meanings have to dominate” (P. S. Anderson, 1998, p. 
148). 
287 Other scholarly references are: “The Psychoanalytic Study of the Grimm’s' Tales with Special 
Reference to The Maiden without Hands” (Dundes, 1987); Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion 
(Zipes, 1983); The Brothers Grimm: From Enchanted Forests to the Modern World  (Zipes, 2002). 
288 If Winnicott were a woman I have no doubt that he would have framed his claim differently! 
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however, as Susan Brison (Brison, 2002) makes clear in her personal narrative 
of recovery from rape, and philosophical exploration of trauma. Indeed, Brison’s 
examination can be applied to physical trauma other than rape, as perpetrated by 
men/patriarchy against women, and psychological violence/intrusion as well. I 
argue that “The Handless Maiden” maps a story of gender or sexuate abuse 
universal to women. 
 
This tale is about belief, which is embodied.289 That is, one’s body is as engaged 
in one’s belief as one’s mind. So the maiden’s body enacts her belief, and the 
beliefs of the culture/patriarchy are enacted upon her.290 Enacted belief is instilled 
through childhood, and consists in the deferred (unconscious) thoughts of a 
social system, that which we take on unknowingly, and later experience the 
consequences. In chapter six, I will show that it is through the young woman’s 
(interior) work that these deferred thoughts, the unconscious maiming, are 
challenged. She re-members her body. As I have already argued, women must 
transform their imaginary, and following this, their belief, especially about 
themselves as women.  
 
At this point, I need to make a distinction between fate and destiny regarding the 
maiden’s situation: A person who is fated is interred in an internal world, which 
endlessly repeats the same scenarios, and has little capacity to imagine a 
different future (Bollas, 1989, p. 41). “I have no choice”, we say when we are in 
the grips of fate. We are subject to fate when we are enclosed in a complex – 
any complex – because we are held in the grip of that complex, rather than 
                                            
289 Bourdieu suggests, “practical belief is not a ‘state of mind’, still less a kind of arbitrary 
adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and doctrines (‘beliefs’) but rather a state of the body”. 
Further, that “belief is a state of the body not of the mind” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 68, my emphasis). 
290 Hysteria speaks in “the mode of a paralysed gestural faculty, of an impossible and also 
forbidden speech” (Irigaray & Whitford, 1991, p. 138).  We could imagine the maiden’s absent 
hands as a hysterical symptom, and as such it is the task of the myth to reveal her handlessness 
as a symptom of repressed femininity within the patriarchy. I read “The Handless Maiden” as a 
new form of feminine expression, which arises out of an imposed condition. In a similar way, 
Kristeva achieves a double writing in “Stabat Mater”, because she inserts the personal into the 
collective belief. Even when we imagine the handlessness to be a hysteric formation, it still 
ultimately leads to autonomy and freedom. 
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acting freely.291 The sense of fate is a feeling of despair over the impossibility of 
influencing the course of one's life, as is demonstrated by the maiden. In the first 
scene we are introduced to fate, through the motif of the mill, which represents 
the equalizing effect of fate, and is reflected in the saying “it’s all grist for the mill”. 
The sense and meaning of destiny, however, is evident when the person feels 
she is moving in a progression that gives a sense of steering her own course, of 
exercising subjectivity. We can apply this to the tale by saying that the maiden/ 
every woman can move from being in the grips of fate to taking charge of her 
own life. 
Female Subjectivity and the Patriarchy 
Women’s subjectivity is the foundation of the work of Luce Irigaray. The 
fundamental questions are: Can a woman be a subject or citizen without 
adapting to masculine norms? Can a woman be a full feminine subject, with full 
agency (to do and be) and independence, without sacrificing herself as woman? 
At the core of the story is the maiden’s lack of subjectivity; she is treated as an 
object. The (inevitable) lack of subjectivity for all women - to some degree or 
other - in patriarchal culture, is a feature of Luce Irigaray’s critique of the 
masculine paternal, because it recognizes only the masculine subject. 
Objectification can be roughly defined as seeing and/or treating a person, usually 
a woman, as an object. Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257) has 
identified seven features of objectification, (1-7) and Rae Langton (Langton, 
1993, pp. 228-229) has added three more (the last 3): let me now demonstrate 
how each of these features apply to the young woman/all women in the process 
of moving from the “other of the same” in phallogocentric culture, to autonomy 
and subjectivity. 
 
                                            
291 A very useful idea of C. G. Jung is that of complexes.  There are many complexes, mother, 
father, puer, inferiority, superiority, etc. Briefly, a complex is a set of ideas, assumptions, beliefs 
and behaviours which are largely, if not entirely unconscious.   We might have a vague idea that 
there are certain subjects which, when confronted, drive us into a frenzied state (C. G. Jung, 
1977, volume 8, §96). As Jung notes, in actuality, we don’t have complexes; they have us (ibid., 
volume 8, §200).  A complex is a painful subject area in the psyche which, when activated, acts 
autonomously, arbitrarily, and usually contrary to the wishes of our conscious selves.  
 204 
1. Instrumentality is the treatment of a person as a tool for the objectifier's 
purposes; the maiden is used for both the devil’s and her father’s purposes. It is 
not until later in the story that she refuses to be a tool for others, and acts upon 
her own desire; for instance when she refuses the ‘care’ her father might give her 
and leaves his house. If we read the tale as one of sexual abuse, she is the tool 
of her father in a specifically sexual way.  
 
2. Denial of autonomy and denial of self-determination are features of the young 
woman’s life. She does not really have a say in her dismemberment, and even 
when the king marries her, we are told how he “loves this girl with all his heart”, 
but we are not told of her independent feelings.292 As a means of discovering 
autonomy and subjectivity, Luce Irigaray asks women to discover “a relation of 
intimacy with ourselves” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 6). This is elaborated in her concepts 
of self-affection, and virginity, which I discuss fully in chapter six.  
 
3. Inertness is the treatment of a person as lacking in agency, and perhaps also 
in activity. In her father’s house, the young woman is speechless, totally inert and 
unable to exercise independent choice - she defers to her father as a ‘dutiful 
daughter’, as if this is the only course open to her, even when this means that her 
hands will be cut off. How often do women in contemporary culture feel inert and 
helpless in the face of the masculine/symbolic? 
 
When the young woman says to her father, “I am your child”, she confirms that 
she is her father’s daughter, (not her mother’s daughter), the daughter of the 
patriarchy (masculine/symbolic), and it is his psychology she relates to and 
complies with. She is less inert when she leaves her father’s house. She is 
leaving the attitude of pleasing ‘father’ or unthinkingly complying with patriarchal 
dictates. She is separating out, an application of Jung’s alchemical separatio, 
                                            
292 Irigaray sets out the “conditions for the ‘amorous exchange’ in which women would be the 
desiring subject too” (Irigaray & Whitford, 1991, p. 159).  As Robert Johnson says, “to gain 
affection from another person without providing one’s own part of the relationship is a devil’s 
bargain” (R. Johnson, 1993, p. 62).  Feeling values cannot be traded - they are not commodities.  
Both partners must be desiring subjects for an ‘amorous exchange’. 
 205 
which insists that there is a separation before a coniunctio, or marriage. This 
theme is emphasized by Luce Irigaray because in order to choose “we have to 
know something about what could be an identity of our own” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 
91).  
 
4. Fungibility is the treatment of a person as interchangeable with other objects; 
the maiden is indeed interchangeable with a tree! She is also required to fit a role 
- that of ‘dutiful daughter’293 – where any daughter would do, so to speak, 
demonstrating fungibility. Roger Scruton poignantly argues against the fungibility 
or exchangeability of both human beings and the environment. “We deal with the 
world by pricing it. Things that are valued only for their use can then be 
compared with, exchanged against, and sold for other things of the same kind. 
They can be consumed, depleted and thrown away, by the person who 
nevertheless acknowledges the only value that they have, which is the cost of a 
replacement. That is what we now do to each other and to the earth. Yet the 
earth is irreplaceable, just as we are” (Scruton, 2012, p. 127). Scruton continues 
by arguing for a sense of the sacred, to put a brake on that instrumental attitude.  
 
5. Violability is the treatment of a person as lacking in boundary-integrity. The 
handless maiden is open to violation, most particularly when her hands are cut 
off. Do women find it difficult to set boundaries around the amount of energy and 
time which they expend in the service of others? Irigaray has countered this by 
advocating ‘virginity’ and ‘self-affection’, which I discuss in the next chapter. 
 
6. Ownership is the treatment of a person (and the environment) as something 
that is owned by another, and a commodity that can be bought or sold. I will 
spend some time on this theme, as it is so important to the tale, and has far-
reaching implications in regard to subjectivity.  
 
                                            
293 The first volume of Simone de Beauvoir’s autobiography is entitled, Memoirs of a Dutiful 
Daughter, (de Beauvoir, 1963b) perhaps ironically. 
 206 
The first scene introduces us to the miller, who represents “the commercial 
outlook of collectivity which has exhausted itself”, according to von Franz, (von 
Franz, 1993, p. 88) or the commodification of life, via culture as we know it, the 
patriarchal/Symbolic. This results in exhaustion of spiritual values and with it the 
feminine. Yet, in this story the renewal is posited as coming through the feminine. 
The young maiden is an object of exchange between her father and the devil for 
business reasons, based on opportunity and expediency rather than ethics. How 
often is a betrayal of ethics excused because it is ‘just the way business is 
done’? We all find ourselves in a culture that is spiritually impoverished - 
ironically, because it lacks ‘the feminine’ - and where nature is depleted. The 
whole family - the entire culture, the environment - suffers from this 
impoverishment. The emphasis here is that the patriarchy is no healthier for men 
than women.  
 
We might be tempted to excuse the miller’s mistake - that which is promised 
stands behind the mill, and is thus posited as unconscious, not in the forefront of 
the miller’s/patriarchy’s mind. However, a tree symbolically represents that which 
is in both heaven and earth, and depends on each equally for its existence, thus 
introducing an image of Luce Irigaray’s sensible/ transcendental, an embodied 
spirituality. In various parts of Europe it was traditional to plant an apple tree on 
the birth of a child, and the good care of it was related to the good growth of the 
child. 294 (In Switzerland a pear tree was planted for a girl.) The miller, who was 
willing to trade the tree, has thus neglected either his spiritual values, or the good 
care of his feminine/ daughter, or both. Von Franz aligns psychological values 
with the value we put upon nature, (the miller presumes that his bargain involves 
the tree) and the loss of one equates to a loss of the other (ibid., p. 87). Luce 
Irigaray also says of the distress of the ecology and the distress of women that it 
is not a question of which comes first, it is a simultaneous situation. Nature itself 
is commodified in contemporary culture, which profits from its appropriation and 
                                            
294 Other meanings can be attributed to the apple.  For instance, apples are the sacred fruit of 
Aphrodite, the goddess of love. Apples are said to be the fruit that Eve ate in the Garden of Eden. 
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exploitation. The ecofeminist Carolyn Merchant discusses the commodification of 
nature, and links this with the commodification of women (Merchant, 2010, p. 21 
and throughout), as does Irigaray. So the betrayal of nature in the form of the 
apple-tree is already a betrayal of the feminine, and of women. Thus, if nature 
continues to be commodifed and exploited, women will continue to suffer a 
similar betrayal. An apple tree specifically (as well as a pear tree, as we see 
later) represents feminine spirituality. The archetype of the number three (the 
devil will return in three years) represents the move away from duality, by 
introducing a third. This demonstrates a move from simplistic either/ or 
dichotomies to something inclusive and complex. The trope of (male) subject, 
and (female) object is about to be radically overturned in the narrative, to be 
replaced by relations between subjects.  
 
Of the commodity exchange, Irigaray says that “the important thing is that they 
(the commodities) be preoccupied with their respective values, that their remarks 
confirm their exchangers plans for them” (Luce Irigaray, 1985, p. 179). The 
young woman certainly confirms her father’s ownership of her; “I am your child”, 
she says. According to Irigaray, “commodities thus share in the cult of the father, 
and never stop striving to resemble, to copy, the one who is his representative. It 
is from that resemblance, from that imitation of what resembles paternal 
authority, that commodities draw their value - for men” (Luce Irigaray, 1985, pp. 
178, emphasis in the original). The young woman has no value except that which 
is conferred upon her as object/ commodity. Only when she/all women and 
nature are valued in their own right, and resist any ownership by another or the 
culture, will the devil’s bargain be contravened.  
 
Morny Joy argues further that this commodification includes a spiritual aspect, 
associated with women’s role as scapegoat and sacrificial object. She says: 
“Women thus represent a medium in transactions that sustain an economy of 
bartered objects – sacred or otherwise. Since they have not had a say in these 
negotiations, women are neither in control of their bodies nor their destiny” (Joy, 
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2009, p. 101). Even anthropologists such as Levi-Strauss, did not question why 
the exchange of women was ‘necessary’, reflecting a patriarchal world-view 
where the sacrifice of women is taken for granted (Levi-Strauss, 1969, p. 481). 
We can also apply the notion of the scapegoat in another way. According to a 
Jungian intrapsychic interpretation of both fairy tales and dreams, all characters 
are taken to be aspects of one’s own psyche, both conscious and unconscious. 
So to understand the situation where the daughter’s hands are cut off, we need 
to be aware that unless we consciously incorporate all aspects of our psyche, 
they become split off and are projected upon someone or something else,295 that 
is, they are scapegoated.296 This splitting occurs on both a collective/cultural and 
individual/personal level. 
 
I ask, with Penelope Deutscher, when women will not be a means of exchange 
between men? The daughter is not seen for herself, but as property. That the 
father/patriarchy has possession of the daughter is not questioned. It is notable 
that the devil threatened to take the miller instead of the daughter, but this is a 
sacrifice that the miller was not willing to make. It is the young feminine that 
he/patriarchal culture, is willing to sacrifice. The commodification of women has 
been taken up by Luce Irigaray, who argues that “the law that orders our society 
is the exclusive valorization of men’s needs/desires, of exchanges among men” 
(Luce Irigaray, 1985, p. 171). And further, that “the circulation of women among 
men is what establishes the operations of society, at least of patriarchal society” 
(ibid., p. 184). This is clearly the case in our fairy tale.   
                                            
295 As has been done to women by men who project their split-off or dissociated carnality and 
materiality upon women, according to Beauvoir (de Beauvoir, 1989). This situation is overcome 
by Luce Irigaray’s sensible/transcendental, where men are required to recognize their own 
carnality and women their own transcendence, hence my term embodied transcendence.  
296 The notion of the scapegoat has two different aspects.  Briefly, the scapegoat is the one who 
carries the sins of the people in the Old Testament Azazel, and the New Testament Christ, and is 
thus the saviour.  The scapegoat is also the one who carries the ‘inferior function’, (the unwanted 
an despised aspects) in Jungian terms, for a family, organization, or culture, and it could be 
argued that the two aspects are ultimately the same thing. Women have been scapegoated by 
phallogocentric culture, in being required to carry the ‘inferior’ pole of the dichotomous 
spirit/matter, transcendence/immanence trope.  Irigaray is concerned with the cultural sacrifice of 
women as the scapegoat (1993a, p. 75; 1993b).  However, I argue that the feminine scapegoat, 
as presented in the form of “The Handless Maiden”, creates balance not by sacrifice and 
disappearance, but by restoration and return. 
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The maiden says to her father, “I am your child”, that is she is her father’s 
daughter, (not her mother’s daughter), the daughter of the patriarchy 
(masculine/symbolic), and it is his psychology she relates to and complies with.297 
By adapting to the patriarchy she has become its daughter; she has internalized 
the patriarchy. We could say that therefore she is the victim of the patriarchy, but 
the tale gives does not end here.  
 
A person gains subjectivity when they have a face. When persons are denied a 
face, they are denied subjectivity, and are then able to be treated as objects of 
and for exchange. As Roger Scruton points out, this is “the deep explanation of 
the burqa: it is a way of underlining the exclusion of women from the public 
sphere. They can appear there as bundles of clothing, but never as a face” 
(Scruton, 2012, p. 105). When we see the face of a person, we are called into 
ethical relations. Much of the philosophy of Levinas is dependent upon “the face”. 
He says, “the face speaks .... The first word of the face is the ‘Thou shalt not kill’. 
It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a 
master spoke to me” (Lévinas, 1969, pp. 87-89). To recognize the face of nature 
means that we recognize our responsibility towards it as another subject, and it 
carries the same injunction. To have a face, to be seen as a subject, the earth 
needs to be seen as an animate being. Scruton also expresses this view, when 
he says “the environmental problem arises because we have treated the earth as 
an object and an instrument, in something like the way that we have treated the 
human being as an object and an instrument. And surely it is not unrealistic to 
connect the two developments” (Scruton, 2012, p. 127). When we behold the 
face of nature we see a subject, just as we do when we behold the face of a 
human being, and are called into ethical relations between subjects. 
 
7. Denial of subjectivity is the treatment of a person as something whose 
                                            
297 It is beyond the reach of my discussion to elaborate the action of complexes, in this case the 
father complex.  Briefly, the patriarchy operates as a father complex, for both men and women.  
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experiences and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account. The maiden is 
not consulted as to how she feels, or what independent plans she might have. 
The daughter is subject to the desires of her father (the masculine symbolic), and 
she, as a dutiful daughter, is blinded to her own welfare and her own spirituality 
as a result. A definition of ‘spiritual values’ is useful here; for Irigaray spiritual 
values are “qualities and resources of our energy, our creative capacities, our 
capacity of meeting and exchanging with other(s), while remaining ourselves, our 
real tolerance towards difference(s), the nature of our desires” (Luce Irigaray, 
2008c, p. 105). She comments, pertinent to the daughter’s situation: 
Patriarchy has imposed silence upon the daughter. It has 
dissociated her body from her speech, and her pleasure from her 
language. It has dragged her down into the world of male drives, 
a world where she has become invisible and blind to herself, her 
mother, other women, and even men, who perhaps want her that 
way. Patriarchy has thus destroyed the most precious site of love 
and its fertility (Irigaray, 1994, p. 112).  
 
In our tale the patriarchy does indeed want the daughter that way. The daughter 
lives a masculine femininity, (a femininity based on masculine/patriarchal ideal) 
which alienates her from her body. We can extrapolate that women of our own 
culture are ‘dutiful daughters’, even if unintentionally/unconsciously. The 
daughter has no awareness of her own desires, and therefore her own 
subjectivity. Versions of this tale exist in countries as diverse as Japan, Africa, 
Russia and Central Europe, thus reflecting a universal predicament of women 
that is not culture-specific and certainly not Western-specific.  
 
8. Reduction to body: A differentiation is needed here between the treatment of a 
person as identified with their body (or body parts) as an object, and an 
experience of one’s own body as subject. A woman is often reduced to the body, 
where she is subjected to her own or other’s gaze and seen as an object/body for 
sexual gratification. Modern industries such as the fashion and so-called beauty 
and sex industries commodify a woman’s body, and make their exchanges upon 
its value to them. More subtly, however, dieting and exercising can reduce a 
woman’s attitude to herself as body. To counter this, Luce Irigaray promotes self-
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affection, that mode in which she might best regard herself, and at the same time 
creates a limit in respect to the gaze of the other. Irigaray is advocating an 
experience of one’s own body, in contradistinction to be identified as body. 
 
Scruton argues that the effect of pornography, “amounts to a marginalization, 
indeed a kind of desecration, of the human face. And this desecration of the face 
is also a cancelling out of the subject. Sex, in the pornographic culture, is not a 
relation between subjects but a relation between objects” (Scruton, 2012, p. 107). 
Not only does pornography deal in objectification, but when the face disappears, 
“the human being disintegrates into an assemblage of body parts” (ibid., p. 111). 
When we engage in sexual activity, in prostitution or elsewhere, where the other 
is faceless, or when any face will do, we reduce ourselves to an object also. This 
is reflected in Robert Johnson’s argument that “the demand for sexual 
experience outside the frame-work of relatedness, whether by a man or a 
woman, carries a terrible cost paid by everything feminine” (R. Johnson, 1993, p. 
63). 
 
9. Reduction to Appearance is the treatment of a person primarily in terms of how 
they look, or how they appear to the senses. Our young woman is described as 
‘beautiful’, thus conforming to some masculine/Symbolic ideal of feminine 
appearance.  
 
10. Silencing is the treatment of a person as if they are silent, lacking the 
capacity to speak; the maiden is mute - does not speak until the end of the 
narrative (Papadaki, 2011). She/every woman has a long way to go before she 
achieves subjectivity, yet in the course of the narrative, she moves from being 
silenced, to intentionally being silent or keeping her own counsel. I develop the 
theme of silence in chapter six. 
 
I will now take up other motifs from the tale, in order to amplify themes I have 
developed in previous chapters, and I begin with the devil’s bargain. 
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The Devil’s Bargain 
What is the devil’s bargain? This motif can be approached in many useful ways.  
Firstly, rather than face up to the exhaustion of that which funds his life, his 
‘poverty’, the miller/patriarchy tries to find an easy way out; one is readily at hand 
in the form of ‘the devil’, who can be interpreted in several ways. ‘He’ can 
represent an aspect of the unconscious, the trickster archetype, Mercurius, who 
will bring the underlying truth to the surface, often through sly dealings and 
malicious pranks. Mercurius brings to light the pathology of a situation in ways 
that are abhorred by the rational consciousness. If we see the devil in this light, 
‘he’ hastens the tale towards an ultimately better direction, that is, towards a 
woman’s subjectivity and individuation.298 I note many parallels between Luce 
Irigaray’s articulation of women’s subjectivity and Jung’s opus of individuation. 
However, there are differences too, as Frances Gray (Gray, 2008)299 and others 
(El Saffar, 1994)300 point out, specifically that women’s individuation is predicated 
upon their subjectivity and subjectivity is not assured in the patriarchal situation, 
which intrinsically undermines individuation for women. 
 
I am arguing that the internalizing of patriarchal values endangers women. As 
Irigaray says, women, “without realizing it, or willing it, …constitute the most 
terrible instrument of their own oppression: they destroy anything that emerges 
from their undifferentiated condition and thus become agents of their own 
annihilation, their reduction to a sameness that is not their own” (Irigaray, 1994, 
                                            
298 The ‘devil’ can also represent split off parts of the psyche, or, in Jungian terms a shadow 
aspect, which we no longer imagine we are responsible for, and then claim that, an outside 
agency caused our actions.  If we take up the incest theme, the devil represents the father’s 
disavowed sexual approach to his daughter.  
299 Gray says: “For Luce Irigaray, whose work I interpret as offering a process through which 
women can become individuated, individuation is not simply a matter of conforming to the 
demands of some pre-set pattern exhibited in a neutral symbolic. Rather it means a radical 
reinterpretation and appraisal of that symbolic, its structure and content.  … Thus individuation for 
women involves producing a feminine symbolic ontologically distinct from the masculine 
symbolic” (Gray, 2008, p. 2).  This distinct difference I enunciate in this chapter. 
300 “I have been led to call into question the process of individuation described by Jung, at least 
as that process is applied to women” (El Saffar, 1994, p. 5), and “I came more and more to 
suspect that no theory yet exists that can incorporate the full expression of female autonomy” (El 
Saffar, 1994, p. x). However, by applying Jungian analysis and the theories of Luce Irigaray to 
this tale, I argue that we do indeed “incorporate the full expression of female autonomy”.  
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p. 88). Contemporary Jungians approach this as “animus obsession”, and I 
provide here a brief summary of contributions to this approach, because it 
supports Luce Irigaray’s idea of women being the instrument of their own 
oppression.  Robert Johnson likewise identifies the “tyranny that the masculine 
side [animus] of a woman exerts over her often helpless femininity” (R. Johnson, 
1993, p. 57). Von Franz considers that the girl is faced with obsessive activity, 
based on patriarchal ideals.  She gives the example of a talented young woman 
who took up various things quite obsessively, including playing the piano (von 
Franz, 1993, p. 93). The young woman realized that she had no capacity to do 
anything moderately, with her own needs in mind. So she gave everything up, 
and for a time did nothing. Sometimes doing nothing is a lot better than doing 
something, at least until a woman can find her own desire, rather than mimic 
patriarchal standards. The problem with obsessive ideas is that they replace the 
freedom to choose. The maiden dare not touch these values lest they destroy 
her. Irene Claremont de Castillejo claims that the voice of the negative animus is 
male aggression against women, which women have internalized.  Marion 
Woodman develops the idea that a woman can be driven by an impossible 
perfectionism which she focuses on her body.  Then distortions arise, based 
upon a masculine ideal, which the woman applies to herself via the animus, or to 
phrase it differently, via the male gaze. In Luce Irigaray’s terms, the maiden 
sheds her complicity in the patriarchy by refusing her status as commodity (de 
Castillejo, 1997; Luce Irigaray, 1985; Rowland, 2002; Woodman, 1982).  
 
Robert Johnson, who also analysed “The Handless Maiden”, proposes another 
view of the devil’s bargain; “to gain a bargain at the expense of some inner value 
is extremely dangerous. To buy material comforts at the cost of feeling values is 
the devil’s bargain” (Johnson, 1993, p. 62). How might the devil’s bargain 
manifest itself in the day-to-day life of contemporary women? We have already 
seen that being driven by compulsive activity attached to achieving 
cultural/patriarchal standards can be the devil’s bargain. Robert Johnson is even 
more specific:  
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One faces the devils’ bargain frequently when planning the structure of 
one’s day. How much can one crowd into the day? How much can I 
get with minimum payment? How many times in the day does the 
feeling (the daughter’s hands) take second place to practicality? How 
many days go by without music or the gym or a sunset walk? How 
many vacations are half-spoiled because the energy has been spent in 
a dozen devil’s bargains before one even gets there? (R. Johnson, 
1993, pp. 63-64). 
 
Luce Irigaray counters these compromises with her proposal of self-
affection, which we will meet fully in the next chapter. I now consider the 
meaning of the motifs of ‘beauty’ and ‘piety’? Do these contribute to the 
young woman’s subjectivity? 
The Beautiful, Pious Daughter 
The maiden is known and recognized for her piety, suggesting that it conforms to 
a patriarchal ideal of spirituality, which helps her, but only to a limited extent. As 
we have seen, Von Franz describes the girl’s avoiding the devil as a way of 
avoiding a repetition of her father’s values and to do this she sacrifices 
participation in her own life. While this evasion might seem to be a negative 
withdrawal at first, she later converts her solitude to a means of becoming, which 
is not contaminated by her father’s (the patriarchy’s) values (von Franz, 1993, p. 
89). The motif of the beautiful young woman is so universal in fairy tales as to 
hardly require noting. But what is meant by this notion of beauty? My provisional 
answer is that it represents an ideal for women’s becoming, a ‘beautiful’ ideal. 
However, the most salient interpretation of beauty in this context is that it 
represents a collective rather than differentiated ideal. The specific subjectivity of 
the maiden - and with it her truly individual beauty - are yet to evolve. 
 
Her value as commodity is presumably increased because she is both ‘beautiful’ 
and ’pious’. Her ‘piety’ can be assumed to include her virginity - she is described 
as a ‘maiden’. However, this maidenhood or virginity would inevitably be based 
upon her intact hymen, where she would be a means of exchange among men. 
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This is not the virginity of psychological and spiritual dimensions, of being entire 
in one’s self, advocated by Irigaray, where one ‘becomes’ virgin.  
 
A woman invariably attempts to find a spiritual home within a religious tradition 
that alienates her, because it is not differentiated as feminine, (Reilly, 1995) and 
does not incorporate sexuate difference. Jung’s insistence that unless men and 
women have separate spiritual paths they become devil to each other is 
applicable here. If the piety which the girl demonstrates serves to impede her 
ability to become, it is not truly spiritual by Luce Irigaray’s definition; she is 
neither truly remaining with herself and her own desires, nor with her meeting 
and exchange with others. Luce Irigaray says of her own Christian beliefs that 
she “was wounded by them, then distanced myself from them. I have come back 
to them, but to question and no longer to submit to them blindly. To me this task 
seemed a necessary one, but also for all women and men seeking their 
liberation” (Irigaray, 2004b, pp. 150-151). The maiden’s piety is unquestioning, 
however, and does not yet represent autonomy; she is not questioning, she is 
submitting. In spite of all the compromises it exacts, the position of women in the 
patriarchy provides a kind of comfort, perhaps infantile in its dependency, but 
nevertheless a (pseudo) identity, as Simone de Beauvoir has outlined for us (de 
Beauvoir, 1989).  
 
Is her piety and concomitant avoidance of the devil ‘a good thing’ or ‘a bad 
thing’?  Robert Johnson repeatedly asks the question, ‘is this a good thing or a 
bad thing’ in order to determine if events are evolving towards individuation or 
ego-orientation in his interpretation of myths, fairy tales and Shakespearean 
tragedies. This is a fruitful way of handling this part of the story, especially if we 
take the view that the story is one of creating truly ethical relations. If the girl’s 
avoidance of the devil means that she is not repeating her father’s values, and is 
moving towards her own it is a good thing, even if it means, for a time, that she 
simultaneously sacrifices participation in her own life. It seems like a good thing, 
when the girl creates a space where the ‘devil’ of patriarchy will not be able to 
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intrude upon her, when she draws a circle around herself. Luce Irigaray 
observes, as I discussed earlier, how a little girl will describe a circle around 
herself, or spin in a dance, in order to create a measure of self-affection, comfort 
and good feelings that cannot be assailed. This protects her from abandonment, 
attack, depression and loss of self (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 98). Jung, who compares 
them to Tibetan mandalas, gives graphic examples of the shape of these 
territories. Of the mandala, Jung says, “it is an archetypal image whose 
occurrence is attested throughout the ages. … This circular image represents the 
wholeness of the psychic ground or, to put it in mythic terms, the divinity 
incarnate in man” (C. G. Jung, 1963, pp. 334-335). In drawing the circle, the girl 
is indicating an orientation towards the “wholeness of the psychic ground”, or 
indeed the wholeness of the situation, to which I have already referred. This 
would seem then, to be ‘a good thing’.  
 
From a psychological perspective, if the drawing of the circle to keep the devil at 
bay is actually a defence, that is it defers or deflects change and transformation, 
is this a good thing or a bad thing? Could it be that transformation, if it comes too 
early, (when we are too young developmentally, or when the situation is not yet 
able to support it) is a bad thing? Could we therefore say that while the achieving 
of autonomy and subjectivity is a good thing for women, it is a process that will 
weave its way through the internal and external environment that is unique and 
different for each woman, and will evolve as psychological dependencies are 
revealed and removed? With this in mind, let us interrogate the motif of the 
severed hands. 
Her Hands are Severed  
The image of the cutting off of hands is indeed bizarre.301 However, in my 
experience as an analytic psychotherapist listening to the dreams of many 
women, it is a recurrent theme: sometimes the cutting off of the hands is done by 
another, sometimes by oneself, sometimes the whole hand is cut off, sometimes 
                                            
301 We could see the severed hands as a castration motif, in which case I would propose this as 
‘a good thing’, in that she has been deprived of the phallus, as quilting signifier. 
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only one digit, sometimes the dreamer finds herself inexplicably without hands.302 
The motif also appears in popular culture: In the movie The Piano, (1993) the 
woman’s finger is cut off, and replaced with a silver one.303 The woman is also 
mute. It is notable that the motif of not having hands applies only to women in 
fairy tales, never to men.  
 
The whole tale can be thought of as taking what was unconscious and 
externalized, and making it conscious and internalized as specific psychological 
awareness. How often does the achieving of subjectivity for a man depend on the 
disavowing of it for a woman? As demonstrated in this narrative, we may be 
shocked when we see the workings of the patriarchal system, but the momentum 
of it is nevertheless hard to resist. It is taken for granted that it is a woman, and 
her ability to be and do, which will be sacrificed, in order for the patriarchy to 
continue as it always has. However, rather than follow in her father’s footsteps - 
the attitude that lead to his ‘impoverishment’ - the story provides the maiden with 
a form of escape; having no hands keeps her out of (patriarchal) trouble.304 If the 
trouble is a masculine subjectivity in which she has no real part, then this gives 
her the potential of finding her own (von Franz, 1993, p. 89). Thus the work of the 
‘devil’ is also that which enables a radical retrieval of her own becoming, 
although she fears it. 
 
One way in which we can read this fairy tale is as a mapping of women’s 
psychological development. In this reading, we can see the trusting young girl as 
malleable and open to maiming influences, through which she gains autonomy 
and maturity. In my view, this reading has some advantages, namely that it does 
not pathologize or blame, but rather acts as a commentary and guide. James 
                                            
302 Freud was delighted when the symbols that appear in fairy tales also appeared in the dreams 
of his patients. Dreams in Folklore, 1911, Freud and Oppenheim, joint paper. 
303 This fairy tale has evoked much creative response, in art and literature, including poems by 
Margaret Atwood and Martha Landman (Landman, 1012).  Attwood’s poem, “The Girl Without 
Hands” (Attwood, 1995) speaks to a young woman isolated in the “ruins” of her office-worker 
landscape. 
304 Grimm, in their notes on this fairy tale, comment that some versions say that her tongue was 
cut out as well.  
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Hillman proposes that being without hands, not having a grip on one’s own life 
demonstrates a naive child, a puer, in the midst of collective life. Thus this tale 
can be seen as outlining the development of all women. However, the task of the 
maiden is not to adapt to Symbolic life, but to bring her own unique freshness to 
it, and for this she needs her inviolable subject hood. The maiden displays the 
broken hands of the child, out of touch. She has yet to discover a place in the 
world for herself, to reach out for life herself, to move forward from her own 
libidinal impulses. Could it be that suicidal wrist-slashing or the particular self-
harm of cutting one’s own flesh, often in the area of the wrists and arms, is an 
attempt to cut off the maiming influences of animus/patriarchy, so that one is not 
it’s unwitting tool? (Hillman, 2005, pp. 218-222)  Hillman has further thoughts on 
the handlessness, which the maiden suffers. Why is it that both the father and 
the mother escaped the devil’s intentions and therefore do not suffer the fate of 
having their hands severed? They, presumably, know how to ‘handle’ such a 
thing as evil. But the puella has fragile hands, an unformed psychology, and she 
must learn this for herself (Hillman, 2005). A decisive developmental moment 
occurs when she leaves her father’s house. 
Leaving Her Father’s House 
The girl rejects ‘care’ in her father’s home, because it would be holding her in a 
regressive psychology.305 We can presume that she knows that the care he 
promises would not foster her subjectivity. Women face many precarious 
moments, when any care at all might seem preferable to a lone journey, so this 
act of leaving her father’s/the patriarchy’s house is a powerful autonomous 
gesture. 
 
That which is unvalued - or devalued - feeling-quality, the virgin self, that which is 
no use to commerce - is unconsciously projected upon the daughter, by both the 
miller and his wife, and she becomes the scape-goat (Johnson, 1993, p. 65). 
                                            
305 The Mother Complex is that regressive part of our psychology that wants to return to an earlier 
level of adaptation and be cared for by a mother (or any system that purports to take care of us) 
who gives all and requires no effort in return. 
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When the daughter leaves her father’s house,306 she is leaving the attitude of 
pleasing ‘father’ or unthinkingly complying with the patriarchal dictates. By 
leaving the house of the patriarchy, she refuses its strictures, although she is 
simultaneously homeless.307 For Irigaray, a feminine identity is based on freedom 
from definition through relationship with men and instead is based on 
inwardness, introversion, solitude and silence. The maiden, without hands, is 
unable to do usual feminine activities, and is forced to introvert. Are modern 
women capable of introverting, of “gathering and collecting” (Luce Irigaray, 
2008c, p. 94) themselves, of cultivating an inner life? Introversion means to go 
inwards for our identity, rather than accept a false identity that is conferred. 
Women create this for themselves, and in so doing transform their fate into 
destiny.  
 
When the daughter walks all day and stops at nightfall, she enters into a liminal 
space, night. In chapter three, I argued that nightfall heralds al samar, speaking 
in the soft and indirect light of the feminine. Night requires a different vision from 
the bright sunlight of the day, of rationality. Al-samar is the language of lovers, 
the speaking of the heart and feeling, which rely on eros rather than logos for 
communication. This soft light opens the way to a different kind of 
communication. According to Luce Irigaray, the caress that enables us to truly 
meet the other functions in the ‘night’. This ‘night’ evokes the mystic’s path, which 
I discussed in chapter four, that thrives in ‘darkness’, away from bright rational 
light.308 
 
Guided by an angel, the maiden finds sustenance from pears in a very well 
tended garden. This garden can therefore be seen as a place where the feminine 
(the pear-tree) is valued, unlike the father’s carelessness about both the tree and 
his daughter. The motif of the pear is especially curious: the pear has long been 
a symbol of the Virgin Mary and is a very feminine form (R. Johnson, 1993, p. 
                                            
306 Marion Woodman devotes an entire volume to this question (M. Woodman, 1993). 
307 We can also attribute this necessity to leaving a Father Complex, which suppresses every 
impulse a woman might feel on her own behalf. 
308 Luce Irigaray, in seminar Nottingham University, 2010. 
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82). Her nourishment comes from the pears in the orchard and, via the Virgin 
Mary; this is a double intimation of the ‘virginal’ process that she is about to enter. 
The maiden eats the pears with her mouth, and the ‘two lips’ of Luce Irigaray 
come to mind here, as representing feminine becoming. 
 
In this garden, the maiden has been observed in her handless distress by a man 
of noble birth, who out of compassion has a pair of silver hands made for her, 
and marries her. This could be a commentary on marriage where the partners 
are not psychologically equal, or when the bride is valuable because she is 
empty of her own self, that is, in a situation based exclusively on masculine 
subjectivity. Now let us see how the motif of silver hands might be associated 
with subjectivity. 
Silver Hands 
Could it be that women do not even know when they are being patronized and 
deprived of their own growth? Could it be that “women are trapped in their silver-
handed way of life and never know that this is the cause of their weeping”? (R. 
Johnson, 1993, p. 91). Naturally enough, at various points in the story when she 
is suffering loss, the maiden falls into weeping, depression and despair, severed 
as she is from her own spirituality and intuition. For example, the maiden’s 
weeping protects her against the ‘devil’, at least for a time. Once a woman is able 
to have her own feelings, and, by implication, desires, she is protected from 
acquiescing to the desires of others or the obsessions of her own 
animus/internalized patriarchy. This weeping is something that women know all 
about;309 depression is so common among women,310 and in our culture 
particularly. What is noteworthy is that this depression is a necessary response 
to a very real deprivation, and, if our fairy tale is to be trusted, is a part of a 
                                            
309 I am implying here that this is a specific kind of weeping, not weeping per se. 
310 That women are more prone to depression than men is the subject of much research and 
speculation, for instance (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1999). 
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woman’s suffering of, and separation from, patriarchal values. On a spiritual 
level, this is the suffering woman, who “saves the world”.311  
 
A woman cannot expect the collective culture, the patriarchy, and the symbolic 
order, to confer upon her an inner status. As Toyoda says, “It is important to 
remember that the male can never give a woman the feminine spirituality that she 
has lost. It is a woman’s task to recover it” (Toyoda, 2006, p. 24). She must, 
indeed, stand against patriarchal norms, and anything which stands in the way of 
her own thinking, writing, and divine ideals. And when she is able to recover her 
spirituality, she is able to discover her subjectivity. Whatever a woman might find 
for herself within the Symbolic - the silver handedness - will only be a facsimile, a 
fake, even although a clever one, but it will not convey flesh and blood 
humanness and specific femaleness. Women are taught, often subliminally, “the 
manners, customs and gracefulness of acquired femininity… which makes such 
a good substitute for flesh-and-blood femininity (this) artificial function is often 
more prized than the natural one” (R. Johnson, 1993, p. 86). When a woman 
stands on a par with men in the business world because she has developed her 
intellect, it is often at the expense of her feminine feeling-self; she has silver 
‘man’ made hands. The maiden now has silver hands, but they cannot be warmly 
connected to her humanness - they are cold. As Robert Johnson says, “the first 
effect that one sees from a silver-handed atmosphere is that it is terribly isolating” 
(R. Johnson, 1993, p. 87). Women who are skilled in various professions speak 
of feeling isolated, when men in the same profession feel part of a convivial club. 
In this situation women, consciously or unconsciously, are ‘silver-handed’ and 
subsumed in patriarchal values. Indeed, they have become part of the club. 
When the handless maiden is asked if she is a spirit or a human, Luce Irigaray 
would answer for her that she is both, in reference to the sensible/ 
transcendental. That she herself replies that she is an abandoned human reflects 
the position of women not being subjects in patriarchal culture.   
                                            
311 “I think that women have suffered, as much as Christ, to save the world” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 
103). 
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The theme of silver hands deserves further attention. James Hillman (Hillman, 
2012) discusses silver from the point of view of “soul-er”, moon-based non-
rational consciousness, rather than “solar” or sun-based, rational consciousness. 
He approaches this through the language of alchemy, when ‘the’ feminine, soul, 
moon, silver and whiteness are conjoined. It is here that growth takes place. 
Hillman describes the moon’s body as air, and air itself as the nourishing 
principle. In a metaphorical (non-literal) operation in the psyche, which he calls 
“mining silver”, the lead of depression releases a silver bird. In this way, 
depression is the price of silver, that is, depression is the mine from which silver 
is extracted, and silver enables reflection. However, air, the nourishing principle, 
tarnishes or “blackens” silver, so the silver requires rubbing, worrying and 
attention to still remain reflective, or for one to continue to reflect. Hillman relates 
the blackness to silence and stillness, when imagination flourishes, where 
intuition grows, where sparkles of bright insight are nourished. Historically, both 
the mining and value of silver decrease the more material the culture. 
Metaphorically, then, in a grossly material culture, it requires more silver (silence, 
contemplation, reflection) to exert an influence on our personal psyche and the 
culture. Following Hillman, the more absent ‘the’ feminine, the more resistant the 
culture to the methods of mining or retrieval of ‘silver’.  
 
Let me spell out the significance of these views in relation to the Handless 
Maiden narrative. The masculine/ Symbolic provides hands made of silver for the 
young queen. While in a rational way, these are cold and useless, and an 
apparently poor compensation for the loss of her flesh and blood hands, if we 
listen to the non-rational thread of meaning, then silver is related to her soul and 
by extension, the soul of culture. Her depression is the mine from which the 
silver, her ability to reflect, arises, and in turn that silver is darkened by silence 
and solitude. It requires some work, some attention, to return the silver to being 
able to reflect and shine. The relationship between air and its effect of blackening 
silver, or engendering solitude and silence, is a curious one. Although a reflective 
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process, it is not passive. The handless maiden/a woman, is required to actively 
work in an interior way, as Luce Irigaray reminds us when she emphasizes “the 
responsibility to work at each instant for our own evolution, transformation, 
transfiguration or transubstantiation” (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 3). This work I relate to 
polishing the silver so that we/it remain(s) reflective.  At the beginning of the 
narrative we are shown the materiality of the culture by the miller who is willing to 
make a devil’s bargain for material gain. We can rely on Hillman’s assertion that 
this situation will take a lot of blackening (solitude/silence) and polishing 
(reflection) of silver for both the restoration of inner values in the culture, and in 
instating of ‘the’ feminine. Hillman does not make a distinction between ‘the’ 
feminine and women, in fact he does not mention women at all in this context. 
For my purposes here, I have elided them, because the images of Hillman’s 
discussion of sliver and the images in “The Handless Maiden” are so strikingly 
similar. I do not, however, intend that elision throughout this work. 
 
I will now discuss the motif of handlessness and silver hands with specific 
reference to speech and dialogue. In chapter three I stressed the importance of 
language in articulating the situation of women, and in achieving erotic logos. In 
chapter four I introduced the necessity of a feminine divine through which an 
open-ended dialogue is possible, where the last word is never spoken. This 
might seem far from the theme of silver hands, but bear with me. I begin by 
referring to Mikhail Bakhtin’s assessment of the importance of dialogue. Bakhtin 
noted: 
…authentic human life is the open-ended dialogue. Life by its very 
nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask 
questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue 
a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his 
eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He 
invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the 
dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium (Bakhtin, 1984, 
p. 293). 
 
I introduce this question of dialogue here because the handless maiden is not 
involved in dialogue, but is a witness to the monologue of the patriarchy. If “to live 
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means to participate in dialogue”, she is not alive at all. This dialogue must 
include one’s whole person, eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, and one’s whole body. 
Note that for Bakhtin, the hands are involved. So, we can say that the young 
woman’s capacity for dialogue, for reciprocity, is intentionally cut off by the 
patriarchy. Then her natural capacities - her own hands - are replaced by silver 
hands, made by and for the patriarchy. This image shows how serious the 
situation is, and the seriousness is emphasized by Bakhtin’s final contention, that 
one’s whole-body “discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the 
world symposium”. It is clear that if women are deprived of dialogue, a dialogue 
which involves their whole being - their sexuate difference - they cannot enter 
into the full fabric of human life, and in the world symposium. A symposium that 
therefore operates by monologue rather than dialogue is thus not a symposium 
at all. In this reading of the tale, the silver hands are a great deprivation, for 
women, dialogue and the full fabric of human life. True discourse can only take 
place between independent subjects, between those who have achieved 
subjectivity, whether male or female. I argue that true independence – and 
interdependence - can only be achieved when logos is tempered by eros, in 
dialogue. Otherwise the discourse is not true discourse, but mono-logos. This 
goes back to an insistence on sexuate difference; “the philosophical implications 
of insisting on the irreducibility of sexuate difference are enormous” (Leeuwen, 
2010, p. 124).   
 
As I have discussed throughout this thesis, Luce Irigaray intervenes in ontology, 
when she insists upon the inclusion of women in order to retrieve sexuate 
difference.312 She takes issue with Heidegger, who conflates the unity of identity 
with the subsumption of parts within sameness: (Irigaray, 2004c, p. 69) he claims 
that “two are not needed’’ (Heidegger, 2002, pp. 22-23). Heidegger allows for no 
co-belonging together of two that are irreducibly different, that is, no sexuate 
difference. For Irigaray, then, Heidegger refuses to consider ‘‘that there does not 
                                            
312 To answer the charge that she is not really a philosopher, she herself insists, that ‘‘the 
philosophical dimension of [her] writing is not sufficiently taken into account’’ (Irigaray, 2000, p. 
10) 
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exist a world proper to all subjects,’’ (Irigaray, 2004c, p. 8) but rather only the 
male subject, Heidegger’s insistence that Dasein is “neither of the two sexes” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p. 36) notwithstanding. Following Heidegger’s insistence on 
the univocity of Dasein, he construes thinking/ discursivity as mono-logical or 
homo-logos. Thus, speech between two is ‘‘already bound in a same that nullifies 
their differences and reduces their exchange to a tautology, an already 
programmed scenography, a monologue in two voices’’ (Irigaray, 2004c, p. 47) 
So, ‘‘dialogue is then limited to a complicity in the same saying, the same world, 
and not considered a novel production of speech determined by the context of an 
exchange of difference’’ (ibid., p. 35).  Thus far in our fairy tale, the monologue 
excludes the maiden/woman’s voice; she has no voice of her own. But how is 
this implicated in her handlessness?  
 
I continue to connect two themes from our story, that of handlessness/carnality 
and voicelessness/discourse. To do this, I move to Derrida’s essay, “Geschlecht 
II: Heidegger’s hand“ (Derrida, 1988),313 where, in his reading of Heidegger, he 
claims that ‘we’ are a monstrous sign - a sign that ‘‘shows or signifies nothing, 
the pas de sens, no-sense, and announces the loss of the tongue’’ (Derrida, 
1988, p. 167). 314   
 
To Heidegger, thinking and the hand are related thus: 
  
Perhaps thinking, too, is just something like building a cabinet. At any 
rate, it is a craft, a ‘handicraft.’ ‘Craft’ literally means the strength and 
skill in our hands. The hand is a peculiar thing. In the common view, 
                                            
313 Geschlecht can be translated variously as sex, gender, race, organ, generation, house, family, 
and lineage, that is, a collective. 
314 To understand the implications here, we need to go to the Latin, monstrare, from which arises 
“monstrate”, which itself has two meanings.  Firstly, to show something true without yielding any 
knowledge of the cause, and secondly, “the ability to turn into an inhuman creature”, that is a 
monster. http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=monstrate. Accessed August 6th, 
2013.  The aspect of “monster” even appears in our story, in that the devil changes the letters 
between the queen mother and her son, to read that his wife has given birth to “a monster”. 
According to Heidegger, it is the hand that shows the we of humanity to be the we of monstration: 
‘‘the hand is a monstrasity, the proper of man as the being of monstration. This distinguishes him 
from every other Geschlecht, above all from the ape’’ (Derrida, 1988, p. 169).  Going back to the 
fairy tale, we can conclude that “we” in an undifferentiated collective, becomes a “monster”, and 
our individual sexuate ‘handedness’ is an obligation towards subjectivity. 
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the hand is part of our bodily organism. But the hand’s essence can 
never be determined, or explained, by its being an organ which can 
grasp. Apes, too, have organs that can grasp, but they do not have 
hands (Heidegger 1968, p. 16).   
 
Heidegger is saying the hand is more than an organ, an object. Derrida confirms 
this idea when he links thinking the we of Geschlecht as handedness with 
thought itself as ‘‘handiwork, a work of the hand’’ (Derrida, 1988, p. 171). To 
describe thinking as handiwork is to implicate thinking in carnality, but as more 
than a biological determinant (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 122). Likewise, for Merleau-
Ponty, “a handless or sexless man (sic) is as inconceivable as one without the 
power of thought” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968a, p. 197). 
 
Thus thinking is bound to the ‘‘situation of the body,’’ while simultaneously the 
body is not reducible to a conglomeration of organs. Derrida suggests that the 
concept of thinking as ‘handed “will permit us to glimpse a dimension of 
Geschlecht as sex or sexual difference apropos what is said or not said about the 
hand. Thinking is not cerebral or disincarnate; the relation to the essence of 
being is a certain manner of Dasein as Leib” (Derrida, 1988, p. 171).315 Rather, 
thinking is a kind of handiwork, inextricably bound to the body, and therefore 
sexuate.  
 
Let me specify the implications of the notion of the handedness of thinking in our 
tale.  The maiden’s hands are cut off, and thus her thinking. The thinking is left ‘in 
the hands of’ the univocal being, man. No dialogue is possible. Thinking, though, 
for women, (and for men) is dependent upon sexuate difference, upon 
handedness, which in turn enables dialogue between two sexuate others, rather 
than monologue.  If we follow Irigaray, then women have no position in 
phallogocentric discourse, they have no meaning; that is, to say “woman” is to 
say “nothing”, because women are denied subjectivity in the symbolic. This is 
clearly demonstrated by the young women’s handless state; she is denied the 
                                            
315 The exact meaning Derrida has in mind is uncertain: in addition to a literal “Being and body”, 
Leib is translatable as ‘life’ and ‘heart’.  It is also related to ‘hand’ in various expressions, such as 
‘first hand experience’, am eigenen Leib erfahren. 
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craft of thinking, and excluded from discourse and therefore subjectivity. 
Irigaray’s parler femme provides for women a subject-position, because it is 
through language that subjectivity is achieved in the symbolic. This parler femme 
counters the situation in phallogocentrism where, as soon as a woman speaks, 
she fails to speak as a woman (Luce Irigaray, 1985, p. 265). Our young woman 
cannot afford to speak until she can speak as a woman.  This is why achieving 
subjectivity and autonomy are so important, because she can, then, truly speak 
for herself, as a woman. Bahktin, and his insistence upon discourse provide an 
additional emphasis. That is, she does not just speak, she speaks with.  Her 
sexuate position as women enables the between, relatedness. 
 
Having established the philosophical import of ‘handedness’, we can return to the 
tale. After she marries, the devil appears again, in a more devious guise. It is in 
relation with the other in a committed relationship that the underpinnings of 
patriarchal culture, specifically the lack of sexuate difference and concomitant 
lack of subjectivity for women, are laid bare. She will still, and even more 
particularly, need to become herself (von Franz, 1993, p. 94). Through the 
garbled messages it is easier to see the workings of patriarchy, and the 
subsuming of the young girl within it.  Although she is ‘cared for’, she is still 
without voice and freedom; the devil brings out the precarious nature of her 
situation. Of the motif of the king, von Franz says:  
If we interpret the king on a subjective level, not as the husband but 
as an inner figure in the heroine, he would represent a collective 
dominating positive spirit. The woman would then adopt all the 
prevailing ideas concerning religion, and duty and behaviour, and 
would live in accordance with collective standards (ibid., p. 95).  
 
This constitutes an adaptation to the status quo, the patriarchy, without reference 
to what she herself might need or prefer. However, each trauma shocks her soul 
awake. Women can easily miss out on the first half of life, as Jung says, but the 
meaning of it can be saved, and enable them to heal their hands and stretch out 
for what they want and love (C. G. Jung, 1977, volume 9 part i, §185). 
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Most versions of the tale specify that the young woman has not said a word since 
she left her father’s house, so the symbolism of the tongue emphasizes that she 
still has no language of her own, and, literally, cannot speak for herself. The girl 
realizes that the situation is contaminated, and once again she needs to take the 
situation into her own hands, although literally she has none. We can apply the 
handedness of thinking here, in emphasizing her need for a sexuate 
differentiation in thought, for her to be able to think for herself. 
A Second Departure 
Up until now, the maiden’s self-worth (and her fate) has been dependent on the 
opinions and actions of others. This is demonstrated by the exchange of letters 
between the young queen’s husband and her mother-in-law, which are 
intercepted by ‘the devil’ who changes their meaning. Does the mother-in-law’s 
action save her life or plunge her into a further alienation? Is the mother-in-law 
alert to the treacherous nature of the patriarchy, or is she complicit with it? Le 
Doeuff reminds us that a feminist is “someone who knows that something is still 
not right in the relations between a woman and someone else, in other words 
men, other women, the supposedly impersonal agents of institutions, and anyone 
else: some hitch …which you must learn to identify in everyday situations and 
conversations” (Le Dœuff, 1989, p. 28). In this case it is in a relationship with 
another woman, her mother-in-law, that something is not right and the hitch is 
discovered.  The figure of ‘the devil’ can be seen as carrying the disavowed 
motives of the mother-in-law.  That is, she projects her own complicity with the 
patriarchy upon someone else, (her daughter-in-law) in much the same way as 
we saw the father doing. It is an individual responsibility of the handless 
maiden/all women to discover when something is not right. 
 
Dependence on outer opinion, whether affirmative or derogatory, is a 
dangerously fickle place to rest one’s fate and life. The young woman’s life truly 
rests in other’s hands - she has none of her own - via their words, via their 
opinions. Marguerite la Caze comments on Descartes’ notion of generosité, and 
says that this “protects us from dependence on what others think of us … 
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because what we think worth pursuing depends only on ourselves” (La Caze, 
2002, p. 12). As Toyoda says, “a handless maiden is unable to evaluate the 
results herself. Moreover, she has no words of her own” (Toyoda & 2006, p. 26). 
She is in the situation that I have already discussed in chapter three, that of 
needing to discover a language through which to articulate herself. This last point 
is especially important – the handless maiden has no language through which 
she can express and incarnate herself. She can only be a ventriloquist of the 
patriarchal voice. She remains speechless till she truly has a voice in/with which 
to speak. Being without hands she cannot write, or, if silver hands allow writing, 
they would symbolically at least, be only able to write what is mechanical, 
technological, predictable, non-original, non-creative ‘man-made-ness’, dictated. 
This motif of hands represents how, unconsciously, against her own intent, a 
woman’s project is contaminated by the patriarchal order, and through language 
or logos specifically.  
 
That which has been spoken thus far has not actually included her - she has not 
yet given utterance. Luce Irigaray laments that “nothing is able to be seen 
through language any longer” (Irigaray, 1999, p. 131) because that which is 
invisible to the symbolic order, that which is worth uttering, is that which remains 
but that it “remains silent” (ibid. p. 137). Yet, paradoxically, it is through (a 
different kind of) silence that that which is worth uttering is found, as we shall 
soon see.   
Conclusion: 
In this chapter I have argued for the inclusion of the analysis of fairy tale in 
feminist philosophy, giving it the modern dress advocated by Jung. I have shown 
how women are invisible and voiceless in patriarchal culture, via the first part of 
the fairy tale of The Handless Maiden. The tale specifies many ways in which the 
subjectivity of women is foreclosed, and I have demonstrated how the ten 
categories of objectification proposed by Nussbaum and Langton can be applied 
to the maiden/ contemporary women.   
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In the next and final chapter, the young woman’s journey continues, and we shall 
see how, through being sequestered in a cottage in the forest, and via the motif 
of her hands growing back, she demonstrates the retrieving of women’s 
subjectivity and spirituality. I begin the chapter with the second part of the tale. 
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Chapter	  Six:	  The	  Handed	  Maiden	  -­‐	  Femininity	  Transformed	  
The Tale: Part Two 
In the forest she prays. An angel appears and leads her to a little 
cottage, over the door of which is a shield inscribed with the words: 
“Here may everyone live freely.” A young virgin comes out to meet the 
queen and the child, and she sees to their every need. Seven years 
pass.  
One day, as the young queen bends over a stream to drink, the child 
falls from her back into the water. Because she has no hands she is in 
despair, but when she plunges her arms in the water and reaches for 
her child, her hands regenerate and the child is saved.  
Meanwhile, back at the castle, the King returns from war and is very 
upset to find his wife and child missing. He vows to find them, and 
spends 7 years doing so. Finally he comes upon the cottage in the 
forest. A white angel invites the king inside. The angel calls the queen 
and her son and they look upon the king as he is resting. She says, “I 
am your wife, and this is your child”. The king sees the young woman’s 
hands and doesn’t believe her. When the angel brings the silver hands 
that the king had made for the queen, he finally believes that he has 
found his long-lost wife and child and is overcome with joy.  
The three of them return to the home of the king’s elderly mother, and 
the king and his wife are married once again.  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I continue to analyse the fairy-tale of the Handless Maiden: the 
tale has taken her from the outside world, from which she has now been 
banished twice - firstly from the home of her father/patriarchal culture, and 
second from her husband’s home where her own desires were not considered - 
to an interior world, where the project of attaining subjectivity is quickened. My 
primary interlocutor is Luce Irigaray, and the notions of virginity, self-affection, 
solitude and silence are highlighted in this chapter. 
 
I have chosen to begin this chapter with the young queen’s sojourn in the forest, 
because, in the mysteries of its depths, this is where we witness a radical 
change. As I intimated in chapter five, our fairy tale guides us as to what attitude 
to take. 
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Retreat into the Forest 
After she receives the garbled messages, and is sent away from the castle, the 
young queen enters a liminal space – the forest. Von Franz speaks of her retreat 
and the gathering together of herself and her interior life, as follows: 
To retire to the forest would be to accept loneliness consciously, 
and not to try to make relationships with good will, for that is not the 
real thing … The virgin soil would be that part of the psyche where 
there was no impact of collective human activities, and to retire to 
that would be to retire not only from all animus opinions and views 
of life, but from any kind of impulse to do what life seems to 
demand of one. The forest would be the place of unconventional 
inner life (von Franz, 1993, p. 97). 
 
So it is here in the forest that things begin “to turn and grow again; it is a healing 
regression” (von Franz, 1993, p. 97). Both Luce Irigaray and von Franz see the 
importance of nature in the healing of women as it represents - and actually is -
that which is uncontaminated by any ideas of any culture. It is virgin in itself. As 
von Franz says:  
Frequently women say that the only way in which they can enjoy life 
a little and not feel so bad over their difficulties is by taking long 
walks in the woods, or by sitting in the sun. This is a genuine 
tendency, for it seems as though only nature in its virgin beauty and 
essence has the power to heal (ibid., p. 98). 
 
Likewise, Luce Irigaray says that frequenting nature “revirginilizes the body and 
the mind, and gives new perspectives on what has been thought and what is still 
to think” (Irigaray, 2004a, p. 29). This frequenting nature is not so much 
“wandering in nature”, but rather “communion with it” to find “paths other than 
those of rationality” (ibid., p. 38). She insists that nature remain an “autonomous 
living being”, that we leave it to be, to “give it back its place in the economy of the 
real and in the workings of consciousness” (ibid., p. 45). Irigaray’s intention is to 
preserve a becoming, which “does not divide itself from nature. Form does not 
claim to dominate matter; it serves its blossoming, its growth. … The body 
becomes spirit and the spirit body, or, rather, they both become flesh, and each 
by the other” (ibid., p. 30). For Irigaray, respect for nature, by both men and 
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women, is one aspect of achieving a divine horizon and sexuate difference, as 
well as embodied transcendence.   
 
In the early work of Irigaray, to which I have already referred, she argues that 
women have been commodified as a mainstay of patriarchy. However, she also 
asks what modification would the social order “undergo if women left behind their 
conditions as commodities – subject to being produced, consumed, valorized, 
circulated, and so on, by men alone – and took part in elaborating and carrying 
out exchanges?” She answers her own question by saying: “Not by reproducing, 
by copying, the ‘phallogocratic’ models that have the force of law today, but by 
socializing in a different way the relation to nature, matter, the body, language, 
and desire” (Luce Irigaray, 1985, p. 191). It is remarkable that a fairy tale should 
so clearly map the same process, whereby the woman finds a new relation to 
nature, desire, language and her body.316 To find this relation, the maiden stays 
alone, that is she cultivates interiority. Rather than being guardians of outer 
temples with associated wealth and power, I argue that women are the guardians 
of the temple within - at least their own temple within - that is, their interiority. 
This interiority most certainly does not need to be mediated by patriarchal 
authority. Luce Irigaray reminds us that in a young girl’s development she 
“manages to organize a kind of symbolic space” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 98). Her task 
is not to master another (as the boy does) but rather to give birth to herself (ibid., 
p. 99). It is in giving birth to herself that she refuses commodification. 
 
Her first act in the liminal space of the forest is to pray. 
She Prays 
Why does she pray? What is the language of prayer? Is going into the forest 
already an act of prayer? Is it logos? Poiesis? Does it have words at all? Is it 
what one does or says, or what one is? Or becomes? Jung suggested that wise 
                                            
316 In terms which I used in chapter three, that of the phallus being considered the dominant 
signifier in phallogocentrism, we see that by giving birth to herself the young woman displaces the 
universal signifier, and establishes a position for herself in and through language. 
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prayer consists in determining the correct attitude to take. Is she contemplating 
her own attitude? Or is prayer primarily doxicological, that is, in praise of the 
divine? Luce Irigaray argues for “‘praise’ as a way of praying in the feminine” 
(Irigaray, 2008a, p. 99). For Jung, prayer is the motion of the ego towards the 
Self, that is, towards the imaginal divine core, from the ego/personality. For Luce 
Irigaray, this is an orientation towards possibility, the possibility of divinity, and 
therefore subjectivity.  
 
Some versions of the story have the young queen praying to the Virgin Mary,317 
which serves to intensify the importance of the virginal nature of this part of the 
journey, and the importance of the archetype of the Virgin Mary for women. It is 
not the ‘natural’ or nature mother to whom she turns for help, but the spiritualized 
mother, the one who is already virgin;318 in other words she has been 
‘immaculately’ conceived without the lack implied by the masculine symbolic. It is 
an attractive idea that a woman might discover her feminine spirituality from the 
matrilineal line, from the mothers, from a female genealogy. However, Irigaray 
cautions that mere naturality “cannot work towards feminine liberation” (ibid., p. 
90). Sharon Moloney also argues this point, when she says that the natural 
processes of menstruation and birth “do not automatically confer reintegration 
and maturity. To become transformative, they require the conscious sacrifice of a 
previous psychological state and sense of identity” (Moloney, 2009, p. 9). The 
previous identity, which the handless maiden must sacrifice, is alignment with 
patriarchal values within which she was dismembered.319 
 
                                            
317 “I would prefer that Mary’s spiritual virginity could evolve according to her becoming divine” 
(Irigaray, 2008a, p. 98). Irigaray is advocating a spiritual ideal for women, rather than an intact 
hymen. 
318 See joint paper, Elton and Gersch, on the importance of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary for 
both the subjectivity and divinity of women (Elton & Gersch, 2012). 
319 “The ‘accomplished interiority’, which Irigaray elsewhere suggests should be the goal of 
spiritual life, may well be achieved by a systematic exploration of other archetypal forms” (King, 
2009, p. 169).Her spirituality does not follow that of patriarchy, or of it’s opposite or complement, 
matriarchy, but something different, an archetype of interiority. 
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In interpreting fairy tales, the absence of certain figures is as important as the 
presence of others. In the context of this tale, where the mother is largely absent, 
I argue that this is because the mother herself is not virginal.320 Luce Irigaray 
posits that the virginity of Mary “requires that she escapes a maternal incest” 
(Irigaray, 2008a, p. 89).321 This maternal incest is an over-identification with the 
mother, which precludes autonomy for the daughter. Kristeva also sees some 
difficulty with mother-daughter identification. In her work with patients, she saw 
“the actual difficulties of oedipal identity, that is, of achieving a healthy separation 
from the mother, for the girl-child, for women” (A.-M. Smith, 1998, p. 85). Or, put 
in reverse, an over-identification or merging of the mother with the child mitigates 
against the child’s autonomy. The way Irigaray overcomes this dilemma is to 
configure the mother herself as immaculately conceived, as in the Catholic 
doctrine regarding Mary. In the case of the Virgin Mary, her own mother, Anne, is 
‘virginal’ and autonomous, that is not enclosed in patriarchal meaning.322 Irigaray 
advises that women place a Leonardo da Vinci painting of the Virgin Mary with 
her mother Anne in their homes; her intention is to rely on a feminine genealogy 
uncontaminated by the patriarchal order. Irigaray claims, “it is impossible to ask a 
woman to be holy, absolved of blame, as long as she is unable to recognize the 
potential holiness of her own mother” (Irigaray, 1994, p. 77).   
 
I argue that the mother is not present in any significant way in the tale, because 
she has not been ‘immaculately conceived’; she has not ‘become divine’ and 
cannot help her daughter attain her own virginity. Thus she is unable to intervene 
effectively, when we might imagine that this would be the role of the mother. She/ 
every woman is directed towards an internal, spiritualized attitude: she prays. 
The theme of a spiritualized attitude is reinforced by the appearance of an angel. 
                                            
320 It is risky for a woman to identify with her mother, because the mother is (almost inevitably) the 
object of the very male imaginary - or anima projection -, which she is trying to avoid.   
321 Irigaray discusses virginity in many different places, including the following: Thinking the 
Difference for a Peaceful Revolution (Irigaray, 1994, p. 60) Je, tu, nous: Towards a Cultural 
Difference (Irigaray, 2007b, pp. 86, 117) Between East and West (Irigaray, 2003, pp. 68, 93) 
322 “It is possible to understand the virginal pregnancy of Mary and the role of God the Father in 
its conception as a stage in the attempt to overcome a relationship with the mother that is too 
close and experienced only as natural” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 102). 
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An Angel Appears 
Thus, while immersion in nature is liberating for women, the spiritual horizon - 
indicated by the presence of the angel – is equally important. There are many 
possible ways of understanding what angels might represent, as they feature in 
Christian, Jewish and Islamic religious writings where they predominantly act as 
messengers between God and human beings, mediators between these 
traditionally paired opposites. However, I invoke a particular meaning here: Luce 
Irigaray allows angels to evoke a coming together in the trembling between their 
wings and asks, can she “make or remake a body from it?” (Luce Irigaray, 1991a, 
p. 176) This is an especially poignant question for the handless maiden, who 
indeed needs to ‘remake a body’. Irigaray indicates that the angel is beyond all 
binaries, beyond all duality; paired angels are “neither like nor other, they guard 
and await the mystery of a divine presence that has yet to be made flesh” (Luce 
Irigaray, 1986, p. 45). She continues to theorize the mediating role of the angel 
as enabling “the possibility of presence and of sharing in something divine that 
cannot be seen but can be felt, underlying all incarnation” (ibid.). This is the 
embodied transcendence that I have proposed. 
 
Von Franz specifies that “only a religious experience can help the woman out of 
her difficulty” (von Franz, 1993, p. 98). Jung was persuaded that no one was able 
to individuate without what he called a spiritual attitude. This idea accords with 
Luce Irigaray’s project of women’s subjectivity/spirituality. It gives weight too, to 
Irigaray’s ground of the sensible/ transcendental, or spiritual corporeality: it is this 
interval between the sensible and the transcendental which, she says, can be 
mediated by ‘angels’ which are an evocation of potential. Tilghman complains of 
“the term’s slipperiness and refusal of closure,” (Tilghman, 2008, p. 48) which I 
take to be exactly what Irigaray intended. Thus ‘angels’ offer continuous 
potential, and operate against a foreclosure. The symbolic order acts as the 
foreclosure, angels open it up. Thus angels can be seen as that which mediate 
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restoration of the continuum of divinity and flesh, in the body.323  
Our young woman has left her father’s house, (the patriarchy, the law of the 
father) has left her mother-in-law’s house, (the unvirginized feminine) and is still 
looking for her own dwelling-place. I refer here to my challenge to Heidegger, as 
to whether language offers a house of being to women as assuredly as it does to 
men. I argue that, as guardians of language we create our own dwelling. Irigaray 
stresses “that the inscription of viable dwellings for both the female divine and the 
embodied female can only be realized by modifying the deep structure of 
language” (Tilghman, 2008, p. 42). So one of women’s tasks is to renovate the 
structure of language. The work of Irigaray’s angels intersect here; Tilghman 
suggests that their “gestures herald the embodiment of a multiplicity of ideas and 
figures that will never be contained by ordinary language or orthodox 
representation” (Tilghman, 2008, p. 47). Thus ‘ordinary language’, or the 
language of the masculine/ paternal, will not serve as an adequate dwelling for 
being, but rather women need to develop “a discursive system which will reclaim 
for women a ‘dwelling’ within their bodies while it acknowledges their potential as 
transcendent beings” (ibid. p. 41), thus maintaining the sensible/ transcendental, 
and the confluence of immanence and transcendence, so that the female body 
imbues transcendence with carnality. A woman, in the realization of sexuate 
difference, finds access to language, and to a feminine divine. Thus we can 
postulate that, by restoring the continuum of divinity and flesh in embodied 
transcendence the handless maiden will find a language-home for herself. The 
arrival of a virgin white as snow further announces the divinization of the flesh. 
The Virgin White as Snow 
How does the maiden/every woman, discover her specific feminine identity in a 
patriarchal culture? Christine Downing laments that there “are few explicit rituals 
                                            
323 An alternative reading of the presence of the angel would be to question whether the angel 
represents an interpolation of Christian values and attitudes, as does P.S Anderson in her 
analysis of Virginia Wollf’s Angel in the House (P. S. Anderson, 2012). This would serve to 
reinforce patriarchal views of female piety. Because the angel does not represent a moral 
authority in the tale, I have chosen to see this figure as an entirely positive potential for women. 
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of female initiation among us” (Downing, 1992, p. 22), which would facilitate this. 
I argue that in our tale the virgin and the angel take the role of initiators. The 
young woman’s own body also takes this role - her lost hands, and finally 
regrown ones, demonstrate embodied truth, which cannot deceive her, or be 
taken away from her (again!). If we imagine a woman’s own body as initiator, 
women need to pay close attention to their actual experience, rather than what 
they imagine or expect it to be, especially as formulated by patriarchal standards. 
Marion Woodman, in her notion of ‘addiction to perfection’ (Marion Woodman, 
1982) discusses addiction to (phallogocentric) ideals, which she observes is 
common among women; the way to overcome this addiction is to stay close to 
one’s own desires and one’s body. However, as Luce Irigaray argues, the 
feminine ”body is not educated to develop its sensible perceptions with a spiritual 
aim in mind, but to detach itself from the sensible dimension” (Luce Irigaray, 
2010, p. 15). Therefore the maiden is courageously going against her received 
education, towards her senses, toward her body. Staying close to the body 
through the senses enables women to avoid phallogocentrism, by remaining with 
their flesh, rather than deserting their bodies through logos. Otherwise we 
succumb to “automatism” (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 145). It is this ‘automatism’ that the 
young woman in our story is about to overcome, that is, she is finding a way to 
regrow with flesh her silver ‘man-made’ hands.324 She is ‘coming to her senses’ 
and these senses are conditions for her spiritual as well as her physical 
autonomy. The maiden is moving from automatism to autonomy. 
 
The arrival of ‘the virgin white as snow’, who ‘takes care of her every need’, tells 
us that the young queen needs to be educated, informed and protected by a 
virginal attitude. It is during this period of ‘virginity’ that her hands grow back. She 
gains her own subjectivity, grown from within, not conferred from without and 
through it she ‘re-members’ her lost capacities. The young virgin’s arrival 
                                            
324 This can also be seen as learning to discriminate between what is authentic for one’s self, and 
what is culturally predicated. Irigaray puts it this way: “In the ways in which men and women act, it 
is possible to distinguish what belongs to an identity and what is induced through social 
stereotypes” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 91). 
 239 
facilitates the “gathering and collecting” (Luce Irigaray, 2008c, p. 94) of the 
maiden, which requires solitude and silence.325 It is especially interesting that 
there is still no mother figure around; the virgin and the angel sustain her.326 I 
argue that this is an important point for contemporary women; that is, while still 
within a patriarchal system, women can and must find their own virginal way by 
educating and sequestering themselves. While this process might have external 
evidence, it is primarily one of internalization, where a woman gathers herself 
towards her becoming. If we associate the ‘virgin white as snow’ with ‘purity’, 
specifically meaning untouched sexually, as the Christian tradition has done, we 
are subscribing to an androcentric view of both sexuality and purity.  Indeed, my 
reading of the ‘virgin white as snow’ is that she is ‘pure’ (although this is not 
mentioned in the tale) specifically because she is not subsumed within 
androcentic culture and ideals, and is symbolically separated by living in the 
cottage in the forest. Her ‘purity’ relies on not being part of androcentric views of 
sexuality, rather than being judged by them. So, virginity is part of a specifically 
feminine ethic, rather than being judged by a specifically masculine ethic. Luce 
Irigaray proposes that women develop “an ethics that is ours” (Irigaray, 1993a, p. 
129, my emphasis), and I pose virginity as part of this ethic.  
 
Luce Irigaray poses a trio of ideas, namely the breath, solitude/silence and 
virginity/self-affection, as constituting the path to women’s becoming. I 
considered the cultivation of the breath in chapter two,327 and present the 
                                            
325 “I suggest remaining quiet, only keeping silent, as a way of gathering or collecting oneself. … I 
more insist on the necessity of turning back before all representations and words to find or find 
again one’s own self” (Irigaray, 2008a, pp. 94-95). 
326 In some versions there is an angel and a virgin, in others a virgin who is an angel. 
327 Pamela Sue Anderson is critical of Luce Irigaray’s emphasis on the breath as a means 
towards self-affection, autonomy and the sensible/transcendental. She says that Irigaray’s 
account of breathing, “excludes all questions of social and historical relations making up the real 
oppression of a woman’s situation. …How many women would agree that a woman’s bodily 
subordination to men and to a masculine divine can be completely sorted out by learning to 
breathe differently?” (P. S. Anderson, 2009, p. 41). My perspective is that social constructions 
and conventions must be challenged in order to maintain and create freedom, by both men and 
women, as a constant vigilance. Anderson too easily dismisses, however, the importance of a 
woman centring her locus of action in herself, rather than attributing it to an outside agency. In the 
defining and achieving of sexuate difference, a woman’s position is in relation to herself, initially, 
rather than to another. Anderson determines self-affection as ‘narcissistic’, which runs the risk of 
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remaining ideas here. We can imagine each of these occurring during the young 
queen’s 7 - year residence in the cottage. I suspend the narrative while we 
consider. 
Virginity  
Arguably, Luce Irigaray’s most far-reaching contribution to feminist theology and 
philosophy is her ethics of sexuate difference. One of the most significant means 
of achieving this is through her discussion of virginity and self-affection.328 She 
provides a modern voice for, and development of the theme of virginity, 329 which 
was proposed by Esther Harding in the 1930s.330 Harding made a clear distinction 
between the psychology of ‘married women’, to whom libidinal life flows from the 
other, and the ‘virgin’. She describes “married women” as oriented to men, living 
their lives around their relationship, whether they are married or not. A virgin, on 
the other hand, is a woman who, whether in relationship or not, retains her own 
sovereignty. It is a psychological and spiritual state, not a matter of sexuality, 
which concurs with the view of Luce Irigaray.331 Harding analysed various 
goddesses of antiquity in an attempt to discover the archetypal basis for a 
virginal feminine.332 
                                            
isolation, whereas Irigaray establishes virginity, self-affection, the breath and silence as modes 
that extricate a woman’s energy and orientation from the masculine/symbolic as well as 
masculine subordination. 
328 Russell Lockhart interrogates the word for virginity in Greek texts, parthenion; para meaning 
“alongside of” and thenion meaning abundance. In this sense, virginity has the literal meaning of 
“to be near abundance” (Lockhart, 1983, p. 156). 
329 Others, such as Marion Woodman (Woodman & Dickson, 1997), have taken the virgin 
archetype and developed it somewhat differently.  For Woodman, the virgin is a transformative 
energy for women, which creates the mid-ground between spirit and matter, and is that which 
holds these two together (Woodman & Dickson, 1997, pp. 185, 189).  In this way virginity and the 
breath are related; or, for Woodman, virginity achieves the same transformation as that of the 
sacred breath. 
330 Although Irigaray’s work on virginity can be viewed as a development of ideas that are found 
in Harding’s work, there is no evidence that Irigaray has read Harding, or was directly influenced 
by her. Given that Harding took a Jungian, (rather than psychoanalytic) and archetypal view, an 
actual connection is unlikely. 
331 A woman who is actually married might have a ‘virginal’ attitude, and likewise a woman who is 
single can be ‘married’ to the patriarchy. It is important that this discussion of virginity is not 
confused with sexuality.  
332 The figure of mythological figure, Echo, is pertinent here: “Echo’s love for her own fullness 
angers Pan, and her music excites envy even in him who plays so well. … he does not see that it 
is possible for something virginal to be complete in itself - to love itself” (Lockhart, 1983, p. 157). 
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The chief characteristic of the goddess … is that she is a virgin… She 
remains virgin, even while being goddess of love. She is essentially 
one-in-herself. …. She bears her divinity in her own right…The woman 
who is virgin, one-in-herself, does what she does – not because of a 
desire to please, not to be liked, not to be approved, even by herself; 
but because what she does is true (M. E. Harding, 1990, p. 125). 
Similarly, Luce Irigaray claims that “if a woman does not keep her virginity, she 
loses her identity” (Irigaray, 2002, p. 68). Irigaray goes so far as to call this 
present age, potentially at least, ”the era of virginity…as a dimension of 
preservation of spiritual identity and becoming” (Irigaray, 2004b, p. 163). 
Although elsewhere she claims that virginity should be a legal right, (Deutscher, 
2002, p. 50; Irigaray, 2004b, p. 206) she also emphasizes virginity as a metaphor 
of integrity, as a mental or even spiritual state.333 Luce Irigaray ascribes to women 
a state of ‘becoming virgin’. She writes: 
There is no doubt we are born virgins. But we also have to become 
virgins, to relieve our bodies and souls from cultural and familial 
fetters. For me, becoming virgin (devenir vierges) is synonymous with 
women’s conquest of the spiritual (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 117).   
It is clear that neither Luce Irigaray nor Harding are extolling the value of an 
intact hymen, (being born a virgin) but rather an intact psyche (becoming virgin). 
Luce Irigaray’s virginité psychique is something that a woman cultivates and 
conserves, an inviolability of identity. What I am arguing for here is a very specific 
cultivation of the feminine body/mind, one that enables “mastering oneself 
without sacrifice, amputation [!] or self-annulment” (Irigaray, 2001, p. 72).   
 
In light of this idea, we might consider the remarks of German poet Rainer Maria 
Rilke in the early 1900s (Rilke, Kappus, & Mitchell, 1987, pp. 76-78). He calls for 
a new paradigm of relationship between women and men, not predicated upon 
commodification, not dependent upon that which “flows from man to woman” and 
                                            
Thus we see that the masculine/patriarchal, even one as ‘feminine’ as the figure Pan, is likely to 
find the notion of virginity infuriating, because it does not serve phallogocentric purposes. 
333 “When I speak of a spiritual virginity, I allude to the capacity of gathering, keeping and 
transforming an energy of one’s own” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 105). 
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that, in a future time, women “will only in passing be imitators of male behaviour 
and misbehaviour”. Rilke finds any imitation a “ridiculous disguise” and a 
“deforming influence”. He feels it is necessary for women to strip “off the 
conventions of mere femaleness” and the position that “will no longer mean the 
mere opposite of the male” and be “something in itself, something that makes 
one think not of any complement and limit.” This sense of a woman being 
something in herself is in keeping with the virgin status proposed by Harding and 
Luce Irigaray. Rilke certainly recognizes the separate subjectivity of women, not 
as imitation of male behaviour, but something in itself, ‘without complement’. It is 
clear that, expressed from a masculine point of view, he realizes that he as a 
man cannot have free and ethical relations with a woman, unless she is free 
herself; this is a full realization, by both men and women, of Luce Irigaray’s ethics 
of sexuate difference. 
 
I argue that the love relationship that would result from this transformation of 
women would no longer be dependent upon the libidinal flow from man to 
woman, but that which exists between them, as Irigaray has articulated in her 
‘amorous exchange’ in which women would be the desiring subject too” (Irigaray 
& Whitford, 1991, p. 159). If we are in any doubt, Rilke emphasizes the solitude, 
the separate identity of each partner which allows for “the love that consists in 
this: that two solitudes protect and border and greet each other.” Luce Irigaray’s 
comments also evoke encircled solitude: “It is not something which we must 
exchange, but perhaps a dwelling, a place to remain, a circle to inhabit, a limit in 
which to rest” (Irigaray, 2001, p. 116). 
 
What I am arguing for is a contemporary concept of virginity that goes beyond 
the literal, but which likewise effects an escape from the Symbolic. Not only this, 
but the perpetual virginity of the Virgin Mary affirms, as Tina Beattie claims, 
“’woman’s eternal liberation from the power of the phallus’, for the virgin has not 
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been violated, despoiled” (Tina Beattie, 2001, p. 134).334 The Phallus of Lacan, as 
the chief signifier in the Symbolic, is deposed in this account, and in the same 
gesture, virginity is achievable. Virginity is thus essential for all women, and is not 
predicated upon relations with men. 
 
What might be some of the difficulties in achieving virginity? Luce Irigaray is 
concerned that women and girls are inclined to be relational, (Irigaray, 2004b) 
and therefore ‘give themselves away’ too easily, psychologically and otherwise. 
Kristeva relates this to the ‘fusional bliss’ which is ‘characteristic of the mother-
daughter’ relationship, which must therefore be overcome (A.-M. Smith, 1998, p. 
84).335 She, like Irigaray, advocates “women’s solitude and its vital 
importance…to preserve the singularity of each woman and to prevent it being 
swallowed up by the common cause” (ibid., p. 86). Both Kristeva and Irigaray are 
saying that it is easier to slip into a collective fantasy of any kind, than to think 
and feel for one’s self. This is the virgin psyche - the thinking and feeling through 
for oneself, without inclusion (in family, culture, groups of other women) or 
exclusion (from family, culture, groups of other women), and therefore not being 
beholden to others for that thinking and feeling. Closely associated with virginity 
are Irigaray’s ideas on self-affection. 
                                            
334 Tina Beattie has been criticized for developing a model of feminine spiritual embodiment 
based on implicit Mariology, leaving Protestants to analytic disembodied ideas. Yet I believe that, 
as Jung says, the imagery which Catholicism has embraced gives ample scope for the 
imagination to play with these traditional concepts in new ways; ways that do not simply reinforce 
the patriarchal patterns which we are consciously working to dismantle. For example, Jung 
provocatively argues that “the logical consistency of the papal declaration [of the Assumption of 
Mary] cannot be surpassed, and it leaves Protestantism with the odium of being nothing but a 
man’s religion which allows no metaphysical representation of women… The feminine, like the 
masculine, demands an equally personal representation” (C. G. Jung, 1977, Vol. 11, § 753)..Julia 
Kristeva has a similar view when she says that the Virgin Mary “is one of the most powerful 
imaginary constructs known in the history of civilizations” (Kristeva, 1987, p. 237). We can, I 
believe, read old texts, dogmas and doctrines in a new way, as I have done here and elsewhere. 
In no way am I supporting an exclusively heterosexual view of spirituality, however, as P. S. 
Anderson claims that Beattie has done (P. S. Anderson, 2012, p. 184). 
335 For Irigaray also, the fusional nature of mother-daughter relations can stand in the way of 
virginity. She says: “To keep her breathing free, Mary needs her mother to have also reached 
autonomy and the internalization of her breathing. Otherwise, Mary ought to separate violently 
from her mother and could then attain virginity with difficulty” (Irigaray, 2008a, pp. 89-90). 
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Self-affection 
Luce Irigaray describes the interiority of women as the return to themselves and 
staying with themselves, “despite a culture in the masculine, the attraction for 
man, the traces of pregnancy, the strength of maternal love” (Irigaray, 2004b, p. 
161). In other words, self-affection/ virginity is her most important task, overriding 
that of culture, biology and desire.  
 
It is clear that self-affection is an ethical self-relation for women. Irigaray asks us 
to discover “a relation of intimacy with ourselves… an ability to remain within 
oneself, as in a home before any other sort of dwelling. Self-affection alludes to a 
state of gathering with oneself and of meditative quietness” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 
6). In gathering herself, a woman stores, rather than squanders, her energy.336 
Irigaray says it is “not always a matter of gaining something more but one of 
being capable of something less. Feeling more free vis-à-vis your fears, fantasies 
about others, freeing yourself from useless knowledge, possessions, and 
obligations” (Irigaray, 2007b, p. 117).337 She admits that self-affection “is still to be 
discovered or rediscovered and cultivated by each of us” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 6). 
So a woman needs to guard against losing herself in her tendency to be 
relational, in the “attraction for the other, not letting oneself be ruled by the other 
... It is to give oneself a feminine mind or soul, an internal dwelling which is not 
only physical but also spiritual: linked to breath, to speech, to the mind” (Irigaray, 
2004b, p. 161). Therefore, before sexual relations can exist, each sexuate 
identity is to take care of their own self-affection. It is not only in relations with 
men that a woman risks ‘letting oneself be ruled by the other’, as it can occur in 
any relations.  
 
                                            
336 “It is genius to store energy”, says Robert Johnson, rather than be exhausted all the time. The 
physical, psychic, and spiritual energy of modern people is “mortgaged into the next decade” (R. 
Johnson, 1993, p. 93). 
337 Robert Johnson says that “easier, faster, more is the great seduction for the modern mind” (R. 
Johnson, 1993, p. 58). Thus Irigaray’s advocacy for self-affection goes against this seduction of 
contemporary culture, of the situation of the miller. 
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I propose that self-affection is the relation a woman must have with herself. As 
such it is the prelude to relationship with others, and cannot be circumvented by 
focussing on, or substituting, the other. As Irigaray comments, men stay with 
themselves too much, in contradistinction to women, who leave themselves too 
much (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 92). That is, a man needs to be taught not to prioritize 
himself, while a woman needs to learn to do exactly that. This is the beginning of 
a true ethics between two. Other (male) philosophers, Levinas for instance, focus 
their philosophy of ethics on being-for-the-other before being-for-oneself. 
Foucault, too, defined his ethics as the “kind of relationship you ought to have 
with yourself” (quoted in Cooper & Blair, 2002, p. 513), but, by inference, usually 
have with the other instead.338 This reflects the psychology of the masculine 
subject, based on a sense of hierarchy, superiority, and entitlement and with it a 
heightened sense of obligation. What I am arguing here, however, is an ethics 
between, which is predicated upon equal subjectivity, not an ethics toward. The 
Levinasian stance is that the face-to-face with the other is “based upon an 
unfulfillable obligation” (Hand, 1989, p. 190). Thus Levinas is representing a 
man’s education in ethics, which is towards the other, and Irigaray is 
representing a woman’s education in ethics, which is towards herself. A sexuate 
difference in both thinking and ethics is revealed. He places the other “right at the 
beginning”, and takes “upon oneself the destiny of the other” (Hand, 1989, p. 
206). My position is quite to the contrary: in advocating self-affection and ethics 
towards oneself as being primary, one cannot take responsibility for the other, 
only ones-self.	  A woman must know how to return to herself, to her self-affection 
(Irigaray, 2010a, p. 5). This then leads to an ethical relation with others. 
 
Solitude and Silence 
Irigaray tells us it is in this silence that we enable, and bear witness to, the 
advent of the other, while simultaneously maintaining self-affection. She says 
                                            
338 In this regard Foucault is more like Irigaray in his approach than Levinas. 
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that if we are not capable of solitude we are incapable of loving.339 This is 
something to be cultivated, because it is not given from the beginning (Irigaray, 
2010b).  
 
Silence also implies a distancing from the contamination of the Symbolic Order, 
and being open to renewal from what Lacan would describe as the Real.340 That 
which is invisible to the symbolic order, that which is worth uttering, is that which 
“remains silent“ (Irigaray, 1999, p. 137). The paradox is that it is through silence 
that that which is worth uttering is discovered. The Virgin Mary’s presence is 
received in silence.341 Irigaray says that “attaching too great an importance to the 
word renders us unable to appreciate the value of Mary’s gestures, including her 
silence” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 98). I point out that in many cultures, women’s 
mysteries have involved a time of solitude and silence, a setting apart.342 The 
young queen of our story is separated from patriarchal culture in the isolation of 
the cottage. 
 
For Luce Irigaray, silence “is the speaking of the threshold” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 
5). Language would seem to point beyond itself, beyond what can be said. T.S. 
Eliot writes: “Words, after speech, reach into the silence” (Eliot, 1944, p. 17). At 
various stages in the maiden’s journey, she enters into solitude and silence. It is 
silence that “allows an exchange of words between two different subjects. It is 
thanks to silence”, says Luce Irigaray, “that the other as other can be maintained.  
                                            
339 “But it is true that in order to provide a home in herself for the different other, she has to have 
at her disposal a sort of language, be it only silence, which allows her to coexist with the different” 
(Irigaray, 2008a, p. 98). 
340 The Quakers, in their form of worship, come together in silence. As such, they do not rely on 
logos. 
341 The Virgin Mary is sometimes known as “Our Lady of Silence”, and “a spoken silence” is 
attributed to her. It is that “silence which enables us to listen to the small, still voice”, rather than 
the clamour of external, ego concerns. The forms this silence takes are many, see for instance 
http://www.squidoo.com/thesilenceofmary, accessed August 6th, 2013, but are primarily based on 
the Annunciation where Mary “kept these things, and pondered them in her heart” (Luke 2:15-19). 
Otto says that the numinous is most often encountered and manifests itself in silence, which he 
terms ‘sacramental’(Otto, 2004, p. 217), thus emphasizing the spiritual nature of silence. 
342 This point coheres with the views of Jung, for whom “the demand for individuation … means 
farewell to personal conformity with the collective, and stepping over into solitude” (C. G. Jung, 
1977, Volume 18, §1097) 
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Relations between two different subjectivities cannot be set up starting from a 
shared common meaning, but rather from a silence, which one agrees to respect 
in order to let the other be” (Luce Irigaray, 2008a, p. 5). In this way, taking care of 
another means letting the other be, and to become. Of this becoming, “that is still 
to be elaborated - for the one, for the other and for their relations”, Luce Irigaray 
says that it is an “always virginal space safeguarded through the attention that 
each one accords to the other in their transcendent alterity” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 
61). She continues to elaborate how each being is modified by the other, and that 
our ability to be “is not received once and for all but evolves according to our 
relation with the other, an other who both limits and increases our ability to be” 
(ibid., p. 75). This approach epitomizes ethics in the feminine; nothing is 
prescribed or proscribed, but a silence, a threshold. She stresses that “if this 
silence does not remain present and active, the whole of discourse loses its most 
important function: communicating and not merely transmitting information” (ibid., 
p. 5). It is likely that Irigaray’s experience as a psychoanalyst has shown her the 
effectiveness of remaining silent, so that both the other, and the depths of one’s 
self, can be revealed.  
Her Hands Grow Back  
Let us now return to the narrative, and the remarkable motif of the young queen’s 
hands growing back. I remind the reader of Heidegger’s notion of the 
handedness of thinking, and Derrida and van Leeuwen’s emphasis on the 
sexuate nature of Being. The achievement of sexuate difference has allowed her 
to think as a woman. She has become a thinking and desiring being. She is 
capable of dialogue. It is no coincidence that the king, representing the sexuate 
other with whom she is now capable of engaging in discourse, now re-enters the 
tale. 
The king’s Search 
Both the young queen and the King have undergone seven years of 
development; neither avoid this task, both require transformation, although the 
seven years are spent very differently. The transformation is rooted in the 
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seeking of one’s own self, for both man and woman.343 For men the external 
gathering is needed in order to leave his mother - or a mother complex.344 Robert 
Johnson reminds us that if a wounded woman can keep faith in the feminine 
curative power to be found in solitude, she will, as if by a miracle, find her way to 
feminine healing (R. Johnson, 1993, pp. 83-84). I contest Jung’s idea of the 
contra-sexual anima in a man’s psyche and his reliance on women as a muse on 
which his own creativity could be projected. This story indicates that in order to 
discover her own spiritual nature, it is not through being muse to man but neither 
is it due to incorporating what Jung termed the animus, which he posited as the 
inner capacity for spirituality in a woman.345 In so saying, the notion of animus I 
discussed in chapter one is reduced to being of limited value for women. Rather, 
in our story, her 7 years sojourn in the cottage in the forest with the virgin white 
as snow, are achieved with the only masculine presence being that of her son. 
This suggests that rather than depending on culture to provide a model for her 
animus development, she must, quite literally, give birth to it herself. The boy 
baby is an unthreatening form of masculinity, not a version of patriarchal culture, 
which has previously betrayed her. The boy, too, in these 7 years, is able to 
develop freely; the inscription over the cottage is, “here all dwell freely.” We 
associate this story with liberation from the father complex. The father complex is 
synonymous with the patriarchal/ Symbolic and this story therefore directs 
women to an uncontaminated subjectivity and spirituality. The process of (re) 
discovering female subjectivity continues through the motif of the veil.  
 
                                            
343 “We have to make our way, letting men make their own, and finding crossroads and places 
where we could share with respect for one another” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 103). 
344 “In our culture, gathering refers to constructing a world of one’s own rather than gathering 
oneself. It is thus yet not a question of internalization. This construction of an external gathering is 
needed by man to leave the maternal world” (Irigaray, 2008a, p. 95). 
345 El Saffar is concerned that the concepts of both animus and anima tie a woman to patriarchal 
notions: “Does individuation mean adaptation to one or several of the images of the feminine 
offered up in the cultures of patriarchy...Seldom do we suspect the images, or question the ways 
in which they reflect the ancillary roles women play in relation to the dominant male culture” (El 
Saffar, 1994, p. 5). 
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The Angel Invites the King 
Luce Irigaray comments, “I have yet to unveil, unmask, or veil myself for me - to 
veil myself so as to achieve self-contemplation, for example, to let my gaze travel 
over myself so as to limit my exposure to the other and repossess my own 
gestures and garments thus nestling back into my own vision and contemplation 
of myself”(Irigaray, 1993b, p. 65). She is defining her own self-affection, that 
mode in which she might best regard herself, and at the same time create a limit 
in respect to the gaze of the other. Yet in the tale, it is the husband who is veiled, 
so the young queen is protected from a penetrating gaze from her husband/ 
androcentric culture, which might disrupt her newfound subjectivity. This veiling 
allows her to be in the presence of her husband without the penetration of his 
gaze. (von Franz, 1993, p. 102) This indicates that her subjectivity needs a 
gentle approach or she could be frightened into a regressive reaction. That is, 
she must not be drawn out of her own subjectivity. He/ anrocentric culture must 
be covered lest his rationality be too bright.346 Irigaray also cautions that, “on 
attaining subjectivity, women must not fall into narcissism, as she believes men 
have done (Irigaray, 1996, p. 118). The motif of the king being veiled suggests 
that his own narcissism is subdued, or humbled, in order to be present for the 
queen. 
 
To further ponder the motif of the veil, some things need to be half-veiled or seen 
in a subdued light; samar and erotic logos are the forms of communication, rather 
than rationality. This represents a version of ‘the feminine’ and of the nature of 
women as a way of living which does not engage patriarchal constructs. As Luce 
Irigaray puts it: 
                                            
346 Lockhart says this of rationality: “The literal blocks the flow of psyche as cool and moist air. 
Breathing becomes laboured and the air hot ... If here the literal impulse tries to constrain or 
restrain the psyche’s natural tendency towards the imaginal, then it behaves wrongly” (Lockhart, 
1983, p. 172). I see a relation between the king’s need to veil himself and the protecting of female 
subjectivity from the bright light of rationality - her own, or other’s. Lockhart also makes the 
connection between rationality, air, and the ability to breather freely, which I have discussed in 
chapter two.  
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The gesture that we direct toward the other cannot be inspired by 
a mere moral obligation. Such an attitude does not allow 
comprehensive and reciprocal exchange between two different 
subjects. In order for this sort of meeting to happen, each one 
must rest oneself and stay within oneself...opening one’s own 
world, opening one’s own self requires the ability to return home. 
… It is our human identity that we have to return (Irigaray, 2010a, 
p. 5). 
 
In our tale, this comprehensive reciprocal exchange between two is now possible. 
Luce Irigaray’s notion of cultivation includes being able to see another person as a 
subject different to one’s self, not appropriating the other to one’s own perception, 
not possessing the other in any way. Through cultivating a manner of seeing, 
through the eyes of the soul, we are able approach the core of the other (Irigaray, 
2010b). This is the situation that the king and queen have now engendered, 
thanks to their separate journeys. 
 
I note that it is the angel who invites the king to enter. As we have seen, the 
angel, for Luce Irigaray, represents the terms that negotiate sexuate difference, 
as we have seen. What is most remarkable in most versions of the narrative is 
that this is the first time the woman speaks. Luce Irigaray reminds us that the 
“one cannot speak the truth of the other, and that obliges the one and the other 
to speak and to listen so as to take account of being in its wholeness” (Irigaray, 
2004a, p. 47). The woman has had to find her own voice – no one, including the 
king, can speak for her. ”Putting myself in search of my word, my words, seems 
to be the first fidelity to a theology of Incarnation…Women have to discover their 
word(s), be faithful to it and, interweaving it with their bodies, make it a living and 
spiritual flesh” (Irigaray, 2004b, p. 151). Her language is bodily, and spiritual, it 
articulates the sensible/transcendental. 
 
She has not been able to speak as woman to this point, because she has not 
occupied a subject position, and therefore could not be heard.347 Hence, when 
                                            
347 Ranciere is instructive on this point: “the plebs do not speak. [We can substitute ‘women’ for 
plebs] They do not speak because they are beings without a name, deprived of logos - meaning, 
of symbolic enrolment” (Ranciere, 1999, p. 23). Ranciere goes on to discuss using the master’s 
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Luce Irigaray proposes parler femme, she is speaking of both a psychological and 
linguist position that she claims is in the future.348 Parler femme, the dwelling in 
language, which the handless maiden has found for herself, is not Heidegger’s 
house of being. She is not speaking like a woman, but as a woman. According to 
Irigaray: 
If we don’t invent a language, if we don’t find our body’s language, it 
will have too few gestures to accompany our story. We shall tire of the 
same ones, and leave our desires unexpressed, unrealized. Asleep 
again, we shall fall back upon the words of men (Luce Irigaray, 1985, 
p. 214).   
 
Not only does the young queen speak, but another motif speaks for her too, and 
that is the name of her child, ‘Sorrowful’, or “rich in sorrows”. In the child’s name 
we understand the affect, the sorrow, which his mother has not expressed - a 
common theme in analytic practice is that the repressed or unexpressed passions 
of the parents are lived out by the child. If not a literal child, then that which we 
(are unable to) create in our daily lives. However, “rich in sorrows” carries more 
than grief and sadness; it conveys fullness, depth and the wealth of the life of the 
soul. This sense of richness is carried over to the richness of the sexuate 
difference of the couple. 
The Second Marriage 
The young queen has been discovered in her sexuate difference - likewise the 
king, which they have achieved through their respective, very different, labours. 
The young woman has been relieved of her value as commodity. This sexuate 
difference initiates what Luce Irigaray terms “the establishment of another era of 
civilization, or of culture, in which the exchange of objects, and most particularly 
of women, would no longer form the basis for the constitution of a cultural order” 
(Irigaray, 1996, p. 45). Irigaray requires that the partners in the couple establish 
sexuate difference, which means “that men and women do not belong to the 
same subjectivity, that subjectivity itself is neither neutral nor universal” (Irigaray, 
                                            
tools to dismantle the master’s house. Women’s language dismantles the non-position that they 
have occupied. 
348 However, it could be agued that because she can write it, it does indeed exist, as the feminine 
imaginary at least - we begin with the imaginal. 
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2004b, p. xii). She stresses that male and female “have to discover a new way of 
differing as human by entering into communication as two different subjectivities.” 
I claim that, because of this discovery, they now go forward to a very different 
future, because they now enjoy “the mystery of a divine presence that has yet to 
be made flesh” (Luce Irigaray, 1986, p. 45). Their second marriage is a contrast 
to when the king married her out of pity and to provide for her. Her feminine 
jouissance is something she has for herself, “as opposed to the feminine object 
as the object of exchange of masculine subjectivity” (Schroeder, 1998, p. 288).  
Rather, they are now ‘realizing a horizontal couple’, as advocated by Irigaray. 
The “new envelopes of identity” which Luce Irigaray (Luce Irigaray, 1993a, p. 82) 
proposes are reflected in both the young queen and the returning king. They are 
able to yield to each other, without appropriation, through an interval that sets 
limits. This interval allows for the distance - and difference - which paradoxically 
allows for relatedness. This situation is described by Irigaray thus: 
Interdependency between subjectivities is no longer reduced to 
questions of possessing of exchanging or sharing objects, cash, or an 
already existing meaning. It is, rather, regulated by the constitution of 
subjectivity. The subject does not vest its own value in any form of 
property whatsoever. No longer is it objecthood, having or the cost of 
having that governs the becoming of a subject of subjects and the 
relation among them. They are engaged in a relationship from which 
they emerge altered, the objective being the accomplishment of the 
subjectivity while remaining faithful to their nature (Irigaray, 1996, p. 
120).   
 
While Irigaray is talking of the sexuate subjectivities, having achieved this 
between two, male and female, it also can then be applied to all relations. We 
can imagine the young queen entering into all relationships on this basis, 
including with her mother-in-law. 
Conclusion 
I have shown that we can trace contemporary psychological, philosophical, social 
and feminist issues in a fairy tale, which has been a part of cultural myth in 
diverse cultures for hundreds of years. Through interpreting this narrative, I have 
shown the need for, and development of, both the male and female subject. As a 
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final gesture, I demonstrate how the three phases of Luce Irigaray’s work are 
revealed by this story. She says: 
1. I “had to start with criticizing a tradition that does not recognize the 
existence of two different subjects and does not care enough about ethics 
in their relations” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 3). The handless maiden 
demonstrates her lack of subjectivity in the first part of the tale when a 
devil’s bargain is made and her hands are cut off.  
2. “Then, I had to propose means for a woman to constitute herself as an 
autonomous subjectivity, a subjectivity appropriate to her natural 
belonging” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 3). Through many twists and turns, 
including 7 years living in the forest, the handless maiden achieves or 
reaches her ‘natural belonging’, through solitude and silence, and through 
this process achieves subjectivity.  
3. “It is in the third phase of my work that I approach the positive definition of 
gestures that can favour ethical relations between man and woman, this 
relation representing the most basic and universal place where ethics 
must be exercised in order that it could become effective in all human 
relations in difference” (Irigaray, 2010a, p. 3). I emphasize that sexuate 
difference must be founded prior to coniunctio, indeed to enable the 
coniunctio. This approach to ethical gestures toward the other is 
demonstrated in the final scene, where the king and queen marry for the 
second time, having established sexuate difference and thus the basis of 
ethical relations.  
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Conclusion	  
From the outset, I proposed to extract thought from dependence on the 
masculine symbolic and to simultaneously work to expose the necessity for a 
new feminine identity not embedded in it. Have I been able to situate my view 
outside the masculine/symbolic? Part of the problem is that women have framed 
their enquiry and their theories as the antithesis of androcentric ones. The 
wording of my original aim reveals this problem. As I discussed in chapter one, 
this is attempting to solve a problem at the same level as the problem itself. That 
is, we are trying to solve the problem of duality by framing it in terms of that 
duality. I depart from feminist theorists such as Mary Daly, who propose the 
perspective of the single (female) subject.349 While this is a necessary starting-
point, it is incomplete because it constitutes a reversal of androcentrism, which 
operates on the basis of one circumscribed (male) subject - Mary Daly is merely 
replacing this with a single, circumscribed (female) subject. Much of my project 
has been to articulate female and feminine subjectivity, but I have also 
emphasised the ethics between two, as does Irigaray. This fulfils my intention to 
not replace androcentric ideals with equivalent feminine notions, which would 
merely be another side of the existing dualism. I have taken up Luce Irigaray’s 
proposal for two separate subjectivities as sexuate difference, which effectively 
eliminates this duality-schism between the masculine/symbolic and women who 
are excluded from it. My arguments articulate a feminine that stands alone.  
 
I have pointed out that if we think in styles that are inherited from the patriarchy, 
which are patriarchal, we see only what these styles are constructed to see - the 
masculine/ symbolic. This vision privileges the patriarchal/ symbolic. What I have 
achieved here is to create a perspective by and for ‘the feminine’. Lacan 
proposes the ‘not-duped-er’, who sees that the Emperor/ symbolic does not wear 
                                            
349 In an interview in 1999 Mary Daly said, “I don't think about men. I really don't care about them. 
I'm concerned with women's capacities… I really am totally uninterested in men's capacities” 
(Quoted in Rodkey, 2009, p. 302). 
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clothes, and this represents the feminine position, which sees from another view-
point (Lacan, 1992, p. 231). In order to achieve this position, I have used a 
perspective that is tethered to the body, to women’s lived feminine bodies 
because it better evades phallogocentrism, according to Irigaray. I referred to 
Simone Weil, who also recognized that thought alone is an illusion, that 
transformative intellectual work is incomplete if the body has not participated in 
the change. (Weil, 1956, pp. 23-24) I considered that belief itself becomes 
embodied; to accept a theory is to live it, through one’s body, in embodiment. A 
theory is not something that can remain transcendent, or be a disembodied 
mental exercise. So I am therefore cautious about claiming that the flesh evades 
the phallogocentric. I have argued that it would be necessary for a woman to 
cultivate her own belief and her ideals, so that which she embodies is truly 
‘feminine’, rather than deploying the dualistic terms of phallogocentrism, even if 
by denial or evasion. I have demonstrated that the seeds of cultivation can be 
seen in Beauvoir, where woman “is not a fixed reality but a becoming” (de 
Beauvoir, 1989, p. 66). And likewise for Luce Irigaray, she becomes a woman: “I 
am born a woman, but I must still become this woman that I am by nature“ 
(Irigaray 1992, 168). She more pointedly directs women to cultivation, to “the 
transformation of ourselves into a work of art” (Irigaray, 2010a, pp. 15, my 
emphasis). The point that I have argued is that women must be engaged in a 
conscious project of their own becoming, lest what they live is merely a 
ventriloquising of given, andocentric, (or even feminist) forms. In this way I have 
questioned – and perhaps sidestepped - the dogma of feminism, and promoted 
‘the feminine’ and women in a way that is not dictated to by ‘feminism’. I have 
done so, not to be contentious, but to represent more than the rights of women in 
what remains an androcentric culture. 
 
I argued that a ‘feminine’ perspective could be viewed as an inner-orientation, 
rather than the external orientation of patriarchal concerns. I have demonstrated 
that female spirituality does differ from male spirituality, and my specific 
contribution is the notion of mysticism as feminine divine. I explicated the 
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implication of this difference in chapter four through my discussion of the 
numinous, and proposed a fundamental difference between feminine and 
masculine mysticism. While the numinous can be seen as the foundation of 
experience in both, in the masculine the divine numinosity is posited - and 
presumably experienced - as absolute other, as a spiritual agent arising outside 
of the individual. Kristeva, for instance, comments on the affects of encounter 
with the other. Irigaray and Beauvoir critique the ecstasis implied in mysticism, 
which takes a women away from her subjectivity. Yet Weil worked towards 
discovering god in her body. Thus, in my view, the feminine experience of the 
numinous is indeed through her flesh, and I have argued for flesh itself as the 
numen. I proposed that the cultivation of the breath specifically, and the body in 
general, leads to experiencing the numen of the flesh, to embodied 
transcendence.  
 
My interrogation of the debate between social construction and essentialism 
convinced me that its usefulness is limited. Rather I deferred to Luce Irigaray 
who summarizes the situation: “We are not only culturally determined, we remain 
natural, and nature is the basis from which we can continue to create culture” 
(Irigaray, 1991b, p. 113). This also recalls Beauvoir’s brilliant assessment, that “it 
is not nature that defines woman; it is she who defines herself by taking on 
nature in her affectivity” (de Beauvoir, 1989, p. 69). I thus discovered a middle 
position between nature and culture, and the notion of cultivation was one way in 
which I achieved this middle position.   
 
A further reason I have taken up cultivation is because it can be approached 
through spiritual views both East and West and the Jungian depth-psychology 
view of individuation. Both Jung and Irigaray (Irigaray, 2003) had ‘an Eastern 
turn’, and were influenced by Eastern philosophy, religion and mythology. 
Arguably, Jung‘s idea of individuation and Irigaray’s of cultivation were fertilized 
by this ‘Eastern turn’. In my view, Jung’s depth-psychology can be compared with 
the sensible/ transcendental, because it is, as Yuasa says, “positioned between 
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the mental and biological world” (Yuasa, 1987, p. 238), that is, it is aligned with 
the natural material world, as well as the mind. Jung’s project of cultivation, via 
individuation, intentionally incorporates a spiritual attitude as well as attention to 
the elements. According to Yuasa the cultivated or authentic self, “advances 
through one’s inner experience toward nature” (Yuasa, 1987, p. 240). Thus, a 
cultivated or authentic self would have a transformed relation to the natural world, 
when exploitation and commodifcation would be impossible to contemplate.  
 
How, then, should a woman begin her cultivation? I agreed with Irigaray that 
cultivation “should be the first gesture in a spiritual journey. Without this 
cultivation, our spirituality remains paralysed and idolatrous inevitably” (Irigaray, 
2007a, p. 359). I further agued that the cultivation of sensible perceptions assists 
“reaching autonomy, for spiritual becoming and better relations with the other(s)” 
(Irigaray, 2010a, pp. 15-16), as does Irigaray. This concept of cultivation does not 
remain theoretical, because it escapes from the confines of philosophy and 
creates a bridge to psychology and the social sciences, and at times, verges on a 
pedagogical approach. While I see Irigaray’s teaching as primarily beneficial to 
women’s autonomy and subjectivity, it nevertheless has didactic and prescriptive 
tendencies about which I am cautious. For example, her presumption that a 
heterosexual couple best demonstrates sexuate difference, and her view that 
women can, or maybe even should lead men via the breath. 
 
I expanded upon cultivation in several chapters. In chapter two, I utilized Luce 
Irigaray’s vision of a love to be cultivated between two, based, I believe, upon her 
own experience of the sensible/transcendental, which she has gained through 
her practice of yoga and meditation. In my view, she demonstrates how to move 
from every-day awareness to cultivated awareness, and it is from this latter 
perspective that she writes and teaches. Thus, as Jean Byrne comments, it is 
most useful to think about difference “not before the realization of oneness, but 
after the experience or realization of oneness” (Byrne, 2008, p. 235), when the 
relations between two are transformed. I have shown that after mystical or 
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coniunctio experiences, ethics become a vital practice, and instances of 
oppression, denial, exploitation and cruelty are keenly perceived. From this 
perspective, no form of appropriation, projection or exploitation is tolerable, 
whether that be on the basis of personal psychology, gender, race, education, 
religion, economic status or anything where one side is favoured over the other; 
my exposition on the tale of the Handless Maiden in chapters five and six, 
explicates the necessity for truly ethical relations. I have argued, therefore, that 
much of what has been observed as ‘the feminine’ and the traditional roles, and 
experience, of women, whether from an essentialist perspective, socially 
constructed, and the sex/ gender debate, arises from a pre-cultivation, or an 
uncultivated state, or the inauthentic self. Thus cultivation, in the sense I am 
using it here, culminates in the individuated self, which is an orientation of the 
ego to the Self. In Irigaray’s terms, this is ‘becoming divine.’ 
 
I have demonstrated that it is the cultivation of a spiritualized attitude that 
enables reciprocal exchange, enabling ethical relations with the sexuate other, 
the same-sex other, all others. As Irigaray stresses, “the responsibility to work at 
each instant for our own evolution, transformation, transfiguration or 
transubstantiation” (Irigaray, 2007a, p. 3), is required for any ethical relations. 
This is a major shift from ego-orientation, when the other serves our needs, to a 
solicitude for the other which amounts to “suspending all projections or plan 
about them” (Irigaray, 2008b, p. 79). It is clear that the first position is that of a 
subject towards an object, the second a relation between subjects, female 
subjectivity being a necessary achievement for women themselves, and relations 
between. 
 
I have applied the notion of cultivation in chapter two where I argued for the 
cultivation of the breath as a mindfulness or yogic practice, but also as a tool 
towards carnal transcendence, the sensible/ transcendental. This encompasses 
the breath literally (pneuma), but also the movement of the spirit (Pneumatikos) 
as it infuses the body. Cultivation, in Irigaray’s view, is evidenced in gestures and 
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what she calls ‘presence’.350 By this I do not imply a learned femininity, equivalent 
to having silver hands, but something which arises naturally from a perspective 
grounded in feminine divinity, which I have ascribed to body-affirming, 
(Dionysian) mysticism, and embodied transcendence. Cultivation can be 
summarized as an attitude to life, which involves mindfulness.351  
 
Throughout this work I have visited the question of whether men can have 
experiences of a feminine divine through body-based mysticism, or indeed other 
‘feminine’ experiences. This question is fundamental to Luce Irigaray specifying 
sexuate difference as predicating different spirituality for men and women.  
Before I venture further, my position is that nothing that follows weakens my 
argument for a feminine divine, accessible by and as mysticism, or for sexuate 
difference between men and women. I cannot, however, limit my argument to 
absolutes of any kind. My defence is several: firstly, in the Introduction I argued 
for the idea of a human continuum, “at least in part” and for the possibility that 
men might access ‘feminine’ experiences, and vice versa, because humanity is a 
continuum separate from, or more primary than, sexuality. (Irigaray would 
disagree). I must, indeed, allow for this possibility. Secondly, I argued for 
diversity, which acknowledges the differences between men and women, as well 
as the differences within the sexes. There is a great deal of latitude in this 
“within”. Furthermore, I uphold that there are limits to the application of sexuate 
difference when approaching spirituality. I have proposed that “each individual 
tends to gravitate toward the spiritual life that suits them. More than this, each 
individual has a spiritual impulse and temperament that aligns itself within these 
categories and has a right to adhere to them without interference” (King, 2009, 
pp. 165-166), as King argues. It is important that we do not deny such 
polyvalence, such a variety of archetypes. This leads to my third point, that while 
                                            
350 At Nottingham University in 2010 she commented, for instance, that she had not observed any 
women students on campus who demonstrated ‘presence’.  
351 “Mindfulness is a pre-symbolic function. You can play with word symbols all day long and you 
will never pin it down completely. We can never fully express what it is. However, we can say 
what it does.” (Accessed on August 6th, 2013, Bhante Gunaratana, Voices of Insight 
http://www.shambhala.com/html/learn/features/buddhism/basics/mindfulness.cfm) 
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a feminine/ feminist “we” is a fantasy, so is a masculine “we”. That is, I cannot 
speak collectively for either women or men, and what a singular woman or man 
might be capable of as part of their individual becoming could well go against a 
sexuate identity, or sexuate ‘sameness’. This introduces my fourth point, namely 
that I set out to discover “a voice beyond dualisms” and a blurring of the lines 
drawn on sexuate difference precludes the developing of another duality, a 
categorization that becomes absolute. This continuum does nothing to diminish 
the necessity for sexuate difference itself. My fifth point is that Irigaray argued for 
“at least two, male and female”, in the diversity of nature (Irigaray, 1996, pp. 37, 
my emphasis).  
 
There is room in the “at least two” for those men, for instance, who experience 
certain things attributed to the feminine sexuate identity, and conversely for 
women to experience in a way attributed to the masculine sexuate identity; I 
argued for polyphonic variation. The “at least two” is open to conjecture, 
articulation and development. In serving multiple influences, something that is a 
reflection of the polyvalence of the human being, Irigaray’s notion of sexuate 
difference can only take us so far. Further, as I intimated in the Introduction, I 
uphold that diversity and a continuum of human expression are also important in 
framing women’s - and men’s - experience. My final point is that Irigaray’s 
development of sexuate difference is a relatively young philosophic idea. In its 
maturity, it may well look different, due to explorations and amplifications, such 
as I have made here. For instance, in chapter six I have emphasized the 
necessity for women to develop self-affection in order to establish subjectivity.  
How might women well grounded in self-affection think about sexuate difference? 
 
A specific and unique contribution that I have made in this work is the 
development of the notion of erotic logos, which I have advanced to install the 
sensible/ transcendental in language, where eros and logos fecundate each 
other. The notion of erotic logos enables me to bypass, and work parallel with, 
‘scientific’ styles, with their reliance on rationality. These scientific styles have de-
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mythologized the irrational, while I re-introduce and re-mythologize the irrational 
through the use of narrative, poetics and myths to recharge language and 
imagination.352 Through erotic logos I have proposed an eros-based renewal of 
feminine language, which was used by Sheherazade to save her own life. As 
Dubosc summarizes, “Sheherazade spells out the thousand possible 
conjugations of the conflict between power and desire allowing the king access to 
repentance, forgiveness and justice. From their complex intercourse the one 
thousandth and first night is born when the implicit order of narration finds its 
fulfillment in the acknowledgement of Sheherazade as Queen and saviour of the 
kingdom” (Dubosc, 2003). It is through language, through the specific form of 
eros/ logos, that she transforms the monologue of the king/patriarchy into a 
dialogue between subjects. My point is that this erotic logos is woven through a 
phallogocentric system, indicating that the feminine can and will prevail, not only 
for herself, but also for the ‘between two’, as does Sheherazade, who also 
mediates the salvation of the kingdom/patriarchal culture. The Handless Maiden 
likewise achieves this. Thus my work builds upon and advances Luce Irigaray’s 
project of sexuate difference, because there are two separate systems, one 
arising out of the female body and mode of living in the world, the other from the 
male. I have argued that once Sheherazade and the Handless Maiden achieve 
their sexuate identity, two parallel systems operate, through which men and 
women can then truly come together.  
A final word on difference, the couple and the in-between. Difference cannot be 
abandoned in the search for parity; neither is parity a reason to neglect 
difference.  In my view, Luce Irigaray has privileged sexual difference along 
heterosexual lines, and in so doing is in danger of creating the very kind of 
prejudice she seeks to avoid.  A divine which is only, or preferably, available to 
the heterosexual couple risks being as exclusive of difference as a patriarchal, 
androcentric male God. I believe we must therefore be alert to the dangers of 
                                            
352 Innumerable writers seek to re-enchant, in various fields, and I mention here a few: David 
Tacey (Tacey, 2000)Thomas Moore (Moore, 1996), Thomas Berry (T. Berry, 1988), David Abram 
(Abram, 1997; Abram & Jardine, 2000), David Jardine (Jardine, 1998). 
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foreclosure at every turn, and in order to achieve this, we must restrain our 
conclusions as provisional, not definitive.  Furthermore, I believe that a truly 
feminine divine is inclusive of all difference.  Thus, Luce Irigaray, in my opinion, is 
in danger of falling back into the same style of androcentric certainty that she 
claims to eschew. I have referred to mysticism as the feminine divine by 
discussing Mediaeval women mystics for the reason that religious, 
psychoanalytic, and feminist philosophical discussion is available in plenty on this 
subject.  When in that space, which I claim is the feminine divine, no form of 
hierarchical thought is available, and both difference and the connectedness of 
all things are present in a continuum.  From this perspective, no form of 
appropriation, projection or exploitation is tolerable, whether that be on the basis 
of personal psychology, gender, race, education, religion, economic status or 
anything else which seeks to classify and implicitly create dualisms where one 
side is favoured over the other.  Thus, I claim that an acute social conscience 
arises as a consequence of the kind mystical experience that I am discussing.  
Perhaps the claims by some that the mediaeval mystic women were not active in 
righting the oppressions that surrounded them and the world in which they lived 
are based, not on an intrinsically solipsistic passivity, but as Grace Jantzen 
claims, on the way in which gender inequality was enforced by the magisterium. 
No matter what era we live in, the vested interests of those with power will be 
opposed to the all-inclusive view, which, in my opinion, the feminine divine 
represents.  This is a daunting reality, and I personally would abandon the task, if 
it were not for the concomitant realization that through the intrinsic 
interconnectedness of all things, radical change is a constant possibility, and 
each small choice that I, or any other makes, does make a difference - in either 
direction. 
 
Thus, it must be clear that my work towards this doctorate is far more than the 
great privilege of standing on the shoulders of many others who have undertaken 
the hard labour of scholarship, and who have thus made a difference, but it is the 
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vehicle which carries my passion and desire to understand and give voice to The 
Feminine, through Body, Language and Spirituality. 
	  
 265 
Bibliography	  
Abram, David. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-
Than-Human World. New York: Vintage, 1997. 
Abram, David, and David Jardine. "All Knowledge Is Carnal Knowledge." 
Canadian Journal of Environmental Education 5, no. 1 (2000): 167-78. 
Adorno, Theodor, W. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B Ashton. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. 
Alston, William. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Anderson, Elizabeth. "Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science." edited 
by Edward N Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011. 
Anderson, Pamela Sue. "Feminist Challenges to Conceptions of God: Exploring 
Divine Ideals." Philosophia 35 (2007): 361–70. 
———. A Feminist Philosophy of Religion: The Rationality and Myths of 
Religious Belief: Blackwell, 1998. 
———. "Re-Visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion: Reason, Love and 
Epistemic Locatedness." Ashgate, 2012. 
———. "Transcendence and Feminist Philosophy: On Avoiding Apotheosis." In 
Women and the Divine: Touching Transcendence, edited by Gillian Howie 
and J'annine Jobling. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Anderson, Pamela Sue, and Beverley Clack, eds. Feminist Philosophy of 
Religion: Critical Readings. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Attwood, Margaret. "The Girl without Hands." (1995), http://www.endicott-
studio.com/cofhs/cofgwoh.html. 
Avens, Roberts. The New Gnosis: Heidegger, Hillman and Angels. Dallas, 
Texas: Spring Publications, 1984. 
Avila, Saint Teresa of  The Collected Works of Teresa of Avila. Translated by 
Otilio O.C.D.  Rodriguez and Kieran  O.C.D.  Kavanaugh. Vol. 2. 
Washington: Washington Province of Discalced Carmelites Inc 1980. 
Avila, St Teresa of. "The Interior Castle." In Lightworkers. 
Aylesworth, Gary. "Postmodernism." edited by Edward N Zalta. The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012. 
Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language, and the 
Cosmos. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. 
Bakhtin, M. Problems of Dostojevskij’s Poetics: Theory and History of Literature 
(Vol. 8). Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1984. 
Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. Translated by Annette Lavers. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1984. 
Beattie, Tina. God's Mother, Eve's Advocate: A Gynocentric Refiguration of 
Marian Symbolism in Engagement with Luce Irigaray2001. 
Beattie, Tina "Redeeming Mary: The Potential of Marian Symbolism for Feminist 
Philosophy of Religion." In Feminist Philosophy of Religion, Critical 
Readings, edited by P.S. & Clack Anderson, B. New York: Routledge, 
2004. 
 266 
Berman, M. Coming to Our Senses. Seattle: Seattle Writier's Guild, 1988. 
Berry, Patricia. Echo's Subtle Body. Dallas: Spring Publications, 2008. 
Berry, Thomas. The Dream of the Earth. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 
1988. 
Bolen, Jean Shinoda. Goddesses in Every Woman. New York: Harper Collins, 
1984. 
Bollas, Christopher. Forces of Destiny: Psychoanalysis and Human Idiom. New 
Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc, 1989. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. The Logic of Practice. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990. 
Briggs, Sheila. "A History of Our Own: What Would a Feminist History of 
Theology Look Like?" In Horizons in Feminist Theology: Identity, Tradition, 
and Norms, edited by R. S. Chopp, & Davaney, S. G. Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997. 
Brison, Susan J. Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Brown, Norman Oliver. Life against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of 
History. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1959. 
Burke, C., N. Schor, and M.  Whitford. Engaging with Irigaray: Feminist 
Philosophy and Modern European Thought. New York: Columbia 
University Press., 1994. 
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits Of "Sex". New York: 
Routledge, 1993. 
Bynum, Caroline Walker. Holy Feast, Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of 
Food to Medieval Women. Berkeley  University of California Press  1987. 
———. "Images of the Resurrection Body in the Theology of Late Antiquity." The 
Catholic Historical Review 80, no. 2 (1994): 215-37. 
———. "Why All the Fuss About the Body? A Medievalist's Perspective." Critical 
Inquiry 22, no. 1 (1995): 1-33. 
———. "Wonder." The American Historical Review 102 no. 1 (1997): 1-26. 
Byrne, Jean. "Enlightenment between Two: Luce Irigaray, Sexual Difference and 
Nondual Oneness." Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Queensland, 
2008. 
———. "Who Am I? A Response to the Koan “Woman”." Woman-Church: An 
Australian Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 35, no. November 
(2004): 38-43. 
Calza, Gracia. "Dark Kissing." Cairns: Seminar presentation, 2007. 
Campbell, Joseph. The Power of Myth. New York: Public Broadcasting Service, 
1988. Film series. 
———. Primitive Mythology: The Masks of God. New York: Penguin, 1959. 
Cavarero, Adriana. Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. New York: 
Routledge, 2000. 
Ching, Julia. "The Mirror Symbol Revisited." In Mysticism and Religious 
Traditions, edited by Steven Katz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Cixous, Hélène, and C.  Clément. The Newly Born Woman, Theory and History 
of Literature. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 
 267 
Clément, Catherine. Syncope: The Philosophy of Rapture. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1994. 
Clément, Catherine, and Julia Kristeva. The Feminine and the Sacred, European 
Perspectives. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 
Cocteau, Jean. "La Belle and La Bête." 1946. 
Cohen, Andrew. "The Holy Life." (2012), http://click.enlightennext-
mail.org/?qs=12800282a5e702a10cc1fbfb90d8157eca534da9ed9dbf581b
20cd15aa4f978e. 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: 
Biographia Literaria. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
Collins, Mary. "Naming God in Public Prayer." Worship 59 (1985): 291-304. 
Cooper, Martha, and Carole Blair. "Foucault's Ethics." Qualitative Inquiry 8, no. 4 
(2002): 511-31. 
Cornell, Drucilla. At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex and Equality. 
Princeton: Princeton Unviersity Press, 1998. 
Craig, E. "An Encounter with Medard Boss." The Humanistic Psychologist 16, no. 
1 (1988): 24-58. 
Cupitt, Don. Mysticism after Modernity. Malden: Blackwell, 1998. 
Dallett, Janet, O. The Not-yet Transformed God –Depth Psychology and the 
Individual Religious Experience. York Beach: Nicola-Hays, Inc, 1998. 
Daly, Mary. Beyond God the Father: Towards a Philosophy of Liberation. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1973. 
Davies, Barbara. "The Jungian Interpretation of Fairy Tales." Seminar 
presentation, Cairns, Australia, 2006. 
de Beauvoir, Simone. L’existentialisme Et La Sagesse De Nations Paris: Editions 
Nagels, 1963. 
———. Memoires of a Dutiful Daughter. London: Penguin, 1963. 
———. The Prime of Life. Translated by Peter Green. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1981. 
———. The Second Sex. Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-
Chevallier. London: Jonathan Cape, 2009. 
———. The Second Sex. Translated by H.M Parshley. London: Vintage Books, 
1989. 
Derrida, Jacques. "Geschlecht Ii: Heidegger’s Hand." In Deconstruction and 
Philosophy, edited by John Sallis, 161–96. Chicago University of Chicago 
Press, 1988. 
———. "The Paregon." In The Continental Aesthetics Reader, edited by Clive  
Cazeaux. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Works of Descartes / Rendered into English 
by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1955. 
Deslauriers, Marguerite. "Lucrezia Marinella." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2012. 
Deutscher, Penelope. "The Only Diabolical Thing About Women…: Luce Irigaray 
on Divinity." Hypatia 9, no. 4 (1994): 88-111. 
 268 
———. A Politics of Impossible Difference: The Later Work of Luce Irigaray. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
———. Yielding Gender: Feminism, Deconstruction and the History of 
Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 1997. 
Douglas, Claire. Woman in the Mirror: Analytic Psychology and the Feminine 
Boston: Sigo Press, 1990. 
Douglas-Klotz, Neil. The Hidden Gospel: Decoding the Spiritual Messages of the 
Aramaic Jesus. Wheaton: Quest Books, 1999. 
———. Prayers of the Cosmos. New York: HarperCollins, 1990. 
Dourley, John. "Rerooting in the Mother: The Numinosity of the Night." In The 
Idea of the Numinous: Contemporary Jungian and Psychoanalytic 
Perspectives, edited by Anne Casement and David Tacey. New York: 
Routledge, 2006. 
Downing, Christine. Women’s Mysteries: Towards a Poetics of Gender. New 
York Crossroad, 1992. 
Dubosc, Fabrice Olivier. "Thus Spoke Sheherazade: Gender Repression and 
Imaginal Recollection in the One Thousand and One Nights." Milan: 
Unpublished work, 2000. 
———. "Thus Spoke Sheherazade: Gender Repression and Imaginal 
Recollection in the One Thousand and One Nights." Milan: Unpublished 
work, 2003. 
Dundes, Alan. "The Psychoanalytic Study of the Grimms' Tales with Special 
Reference to the Maiden without Hands." Germanic Review 62, no. 2 
(1987): 50-. 
Duran, Jane. Toward a Feminist Epistemology. Savage, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield., 1991. 
Eckhart, Meister. The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and 
Defense. Translated by Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn, Classics 
of Western Spirituality. New York: Paulist Press, 1981. 
Edinger, Edward. The New God-Image: A Study of Jung's Key Letters 
Concerning the Evolution of the Western God-Image. Wilmette: Chiron 
Publications, 1996. 
El Saffar, Ruth Anthony. Rapture Encaged: The Suppression of the Feminine in 
Western Culture. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Eliot, T. S. The Four Quartets. London: Faber, 1944. 
Eller, Cynthia. The Myth of Matriarchal Prehistory: Why an Invented Past Won’t 
Give Women a Future Boston: Beacon Press, 2000. 
Elton, Zeena, and Kaye Gersch. "The Assumption of the Virgin." Brisbane: 
Unpublished Paper, 2012. 
Emerson, R.W. Self-Reliance and Other Essays. Nashville: American Reliance, 
2010. 
Estes, Clarissa Pinkola. Women Who Run with the Wolves: Contacting the 
Power of the Wild Woman. Sydney: Random House, 1992. 
Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas. The Essence of Christianity. London: Johan 
Chapman, 1844. 
 269 
Filipczak, Dorota. "Autonomy and Female Spirituality in a Polish Context: 
Divining a Self." In Feminist Philosophy of Religion: Critical Readings, 
edited by P.S. & Clack Anderson, B. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Fink, Bruce. "The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance."  
http://avoidingthevoid.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/notes-from-the-lacanian-
subject-between-language-and-jouissance-by-bruce-fink/. 
Firestone, Shulamith. The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution 
New York: Morrow, 1970. 
Foucault, Michel. On the Ways of Writing History. In Aesthetics, Method and 
Epistemology. Translated by Robert Hurley, The Essential Works of 
Michel Foucault Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967. 
Fox, Matthew, ed. Hildegard of Bingen's Book of Divine Works. Santa Fe: Beare 
and Company, 1987. 
Frankenberry, Nancy. "Feminist Philosophy of Religion." edited by Edward N 
Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011. 
———. "Philosophy of Religion in Different Voices." In Philosophy in a Feminist 
Voice: Critiques and Reconstructions, edited by J.A. Kourany. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998. 
Frankenbury, Nancy. "Philosophy of Religion in Different Voices." In Feminist 
Philosophy of Religion: Critical Readings, edited by Elizabeth Anderson 
and Beverley Clack. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Freud, Sigmund. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud. Translated by James  Strachey. 24 vols. Vol. 15. London: 
Hogarth, 1953-1974. 
Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. New York: Norton and Co, 1963. 
Friesen, J. Glenn. "Enstasy, Ecstasy and Religious Self-Reflection: A History of 
Dooyeweerd’s Ideas of Pre-Theoretical Experience." (2011), 
http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Enstasy.pdf. 
Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957. 
Fuegi, John. Bertolt Brecht: Chaos, According to Plan Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987. 
Fuss, Diana. Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature & Difference. New York: 
Routledge, 1989. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. Translated by Garrett Barden and 
John Cumming. Second ed. New York: The Seabury Press, 1975. 
Garry, Ann. "Analytic Feminism." edited by Edward Zalta, N. The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011. 
Gaskin, Ina May. Spiritual Midwifery. Summertown: Book Publishing Company, 
2002. 
Gellman, Jerome. "Mysticism." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
edited by Edward N.  Zalta, 2011. 
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychologicaltheory and Women's 
Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Faust, Part Ii. Translated by Leopold Bernays. 
London: John Wertheimer and Co, 1839. 
 270 
Goldenberg, Naomi. The Changing of the Gods. Boston: Beacon Press, 1979. 
———. "Dreams and Fantasies as Sources of Revelation: Feminist Appropriation 
of Jung." In Womanspirit Rising, edited by C. P. Christ and Judith 
Plaskow. San Fransicso: Harper, 1992. 
Goldenberg, Naomi R. "Archetypal Theory and the Separation of Mind and 
Body." In Weaving the Visions: Patterns in Feminist Spirituality, edited by 
Judith Plaskow and C. P. Christ. San Francisco: Harper, 1989. 
Gosetti-Ferencei, Jennifer Anna. Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic 
Language: Toward a New Poetics of Dasein. Edited by John. D Caputo, 
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy. New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2004. 
Gray, Frances. "Elemental Philosophy: Language and Ontonology in Mary Daly's 
Texts." In Feminist Interpretations of Mary Daly, edited by S. L. Hoagland, 
& Frye, M. University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2000. 
———. Jung, Irigaray, Individuation: Philosophy, Analytical Psychology, and the 
Question of the Feminine. London: Routledge, 2008. 
Graybeal, Jean. Language And "The Feminine" In Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. 
Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm. Household Tales. Translated by Margaret Hunt. 
London: George Bell, 1884. 
Grosz, Elizabeth. "The Force of Sexual Difference." In Sex, Breath, and Force:  
Sexual Difference in a Post-Feminist Era, edited by Ellen Mortensen. 
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. 
———. Space, Time and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies. New 
York: Routledge, 1995. 
———. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, Theories of 
Representation and Difference. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994. 
Hadewijch. Hadewijch: The Complete Works. Translated by O.S.B. Mother 
Columba Hart, The Classics of Western Spirituality. New York: The Paulist 
Press, 1980. 
Hampson, Daphne. "That Which Is God." In Women and the Divine:Touching 
Transcendence, edited by J'annine Jobling and Gillian Howie. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Hand, Seán. The Levinas Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. 
Harding, M Esther. Woman's Mysteries, Ancient and Modern. Boston: 
Shambhala, 1990. 
Harding, Sandra, ed. The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and 
Political Controversies. London: Routledge, 2004. 
———. Whose Science?  Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives. 
Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Harris, Judith. Jung and Yoga: The Psyche-Body Connection. Toronto: Inner City 
Books, 2001. 
Hartsock, Nancy. "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a 
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism." In Discovering Reality: 
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and 
 271 
Philosophy of Science, edited by S. Harding and M. Hintikka. Boston: 
D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1983. 
Haynes, Patrice. "The Problem of Transcendence in Irigaray’s Philosophy of 
Sexual Difference." In New Topics in Feminist Philosophy of Religion: 
Contestations and Transcendence Incarnate, edited by P. S. Anderson. 
London: Springer, 2008. 
———. "Transcendence, Materialism, and Reenchantment." In Women and the 
Divine: Touching Transcendence, edited by Gillian Howie and J'annine  
Jobling. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Heidegger, Martin. Basic Writings. Translated by David Farrell Krell. London: 
Harper and Row, 1977. 
———. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Translated by Michael Heim. 
Bloomington: The University of Indiana Press, 1984. 
———. Poetry, Language, Thought. Translated by Albert  Hofstadter. London: 
Harper and Row, 1971. 
———. "The Principle of Identity." In Identity and Difference. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2002. 
Heideggger, Martin. Poetry, Language, Thought. Translated by Albert  
Hofstadter. London: Harper and Row, 1971. 
Hein, Hilde. "Liberating Philosophy." In Women, Knowledge, and Reality: 
Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, edited by A. Garry, & Pearsall, M. 
London: Routledge, 1996. 
Heinämaa, Sara. Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. 
Hillman, James. Alchemical Psychology. Uniform Edition Vol. 5. Dallas: Spring 
Publications, 2012. 
———. A Blue Fire: Selected Writings. London: Harper Perennial, 1989. 
———. "An Inquiry into Image." Spring: An Annual of Archetypal Psychology and 
Jungian Thought  (1977): 62-88. 
———. Puer and Senex. 3 vols. Putnam, Connecticut: Spring Publications, 2005. 
Hirsh, Elizabeth, and Gary Olson, A. ""Je--Luce Irigaray": A Meeting with Luce 
Irigaray." Hypatia 10, no. 2 (1995): 93-114. 
Hollywood, Amy M. "Beauvoir, Irigaray, and the Mystical." Hypatia 9, no. 4 
(1994): 158-85. 
———. Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of 
History. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
Hood, Raph W Jr., and James R.  Hall. "Gender Differences in the Description of 
Erotic and Mystical Experiences." Review of Religious Research 21, no. 2, 
Spring (1980): 195-207. 
Howie, Gillian, and J'annine Jobling, eds. Women and the Divine: Touching 
Transcendence. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Hughes, Aaron. "Judah Abrabanel." edited by Edward N Zalta. The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008. 
Hunt, Harry T. Lives in Spirit: Precursors and Dilemmas of a Secular Western 
Mysticism Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 
 272 
Huskinson, Lucy. "Holy, Holy, Holy: The Misappropriation of the Numinous in 
Jung." In The Idea of the Numinous: Contemporary Jungian and 
Psychoanalytic Perspectives edited by Ann  Casement and David  Tacey, 
200-12. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
———. "Ordinarily Mythical." In Dreaming the Myth Onwards: New Directions in 
Jungian Therapy and Thought, edited by Lucy Huskinson. New York: 
Routledge, 2008. 
Hutton, Sarah. "The Cambridge Platonists." edited by Edward N Zalta. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2008. 
Ingram, Penelope. "From Goddess Spirituality to Irigaray's Angel: The Politics of 
the Divine." Feminist Review 66 (2000): 46-72. 
Irigaray, Luce. Between East and West: From Singularity to Community, 
European Perspectives. Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2003. 
———. "Beyond Totem and Idol, the Sexuate Other." SpringerLink  (2007): 453-
361. 
———. Conversations. London: Continuum, 2008. 
———. Elemental Passions. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
———. "Ethical Gestures Towards the Other." Poligrafi 15, no. 57 (2010): 1-30. 
———. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
———. Everyday Prayers. University of Nottingham: Maisonneuve & Larose, 
2004. 
———. The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger. Translated by Mary Beth 
Mader. 1st ed, Constructs Series. London: The Athlone Press, 1999. 
———. I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History. New York: Routledge, 
1996. 
———. Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference. New York: Routledge, 
2007. 
———. Key Writings, Athlone Contemporary European Thinkers. New York: 
Continuum 2004. 
———. Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991. 
———. "Questions to Immanuel Levinas: On the Divinity of Love." In Re-Reading 
Levinas  edited by R.  Bernasconi and S  Critchley. London: Athlone, 
1991. 
———. "Seminar." Nottingham University, 2010. 
———. Sexes and Genealogies. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
———. Sharing the World. London: Continuum, 2008. 
———. Thinking the Difference, for a Peaceful Revolution. Translated by Karin 
Montin. London: Athlone Press, 1994. 
———. This Sex Which Is Not One. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. 
———. To Be Two. New York: Routledge, 2001. 
———. To Speak Is Never Neutral. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
———. The Way of Love, Athlone Contemporary European Thinkers. London: 
Continuum, 2004. 
———. Why Different? A Culture of Two Subjects. Translated by Camille Collins. 
New York: Semiotext(e), 2000. 
 273 
Irigaray, Luce Speculum of the Other Woman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1985. 
Irigaray, Luce, and Mary Green, eds. Luce Irigaray: Teaching. London: 
Continuum, 2008. 
Irigaray, Luce, and Margaret Whitford. The Irigaray Reader, Blackwell Readers. 
Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human 
Nature. Rockville: Arc Manor, 2008. 
Jantzen, Grace. Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. 
———. "Feminists, Philosophers and Mystics." Hypatia 9, no. 4 (1994): 186-206. 
———. Julian of Norwich: Mystic and Theologian. Trowbridge: The Cromwell 
Press, 2000. 
———. Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
Jardine, David. "Birding Lessons and the Teachings of Cicadas." Canadian 
Journal of Environmental Education 3 (1998): 92-98. 
Jaspers, Karl. Philosophy, Volume Two. Translated by E. B Ashton: University of 
Chicago, 1969. 
Johnson, Elizabeth. She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological 
Discourse. New York: Crossroads Publishing, 1992. 
Johnson, Robert. The Fisher King and the Handless Maiden. San Francisco: 
Harper, 1993. 
Johnston, Adrian. "Jacques Lacan." edited by Edward N. Zalta: The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013. 
Johnston, William. The Mystical Way: Silent Music and the Wounded Stag. 
Revised and edited by William Johnston ed. New York: Harper Collins 
1993. 
Jones, Rachel. Irigaray: Towards a Sexuate Philosophy. Cambridge: Polity, 
2011. 
Jones, Serene. "Women's Experience between a Rock and a Hard Place: 
Feminist, Womanist, and Mujerista Theologies in North America." In 
Horizons in Feminist Theology: Identity, Tradition, and Norms, edited by 
Rebecca S. Chopp and Sheila Greeve Davaney. Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1997. 
Joy, Morny, ed. After Appropriation: Explorations of Intercultural Philosophy and 
Religion. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011. 
———, ed. Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion. New York: 
Sprkinger, 2011. 
———. Divine Love: Luce Irigaray, Women, Gender and Religion. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2006. 
———. "Women, Sacrifice, and Transcendence." In Women and the Divine: 
Touching Transcendence, edited by Gillian Howie and J'annine Jobling. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Jung, Carl Gustav. Apects of the Feminine. London: Ark, 1982. 
 274 
———. The Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Translated by R.F.C.Hull. 20 vols, 
Bollingen Series. London: Routledge, 1977. 
———. "Letters to Oskar Schmitz." Psychological Perspectives Spring (1975): 
82. 
———. Memories, Dreams, Reflections. New York: Vintage, 1963. 
———. "Seven Sermons to the Dead."  
http://www.hsuyun.org/chan/en/essays/guest-essays/603-the-seven-
sermons-to-the-dead-written-by-basilides-in-alexandria-the-city-where-the-
east-toucheth-the-west.html. 
———. The Visions Seminars, Bollingen Series Xcix. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997. 
Jung, Emma. Animus and Anima: Two Essays. Putnam: Spring Publications, 
1957. 
Jung, Emma, and Marie Louise von Franz. The Grail Legend. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998. 
Kallhoff, Angela, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum: Ethics and Political Philosophy: 
Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 2001. London: Transaction Publishers, 
2001. 
Keller, Catherine. "Seeking and Sucking: On Religion and Essence in Feminist 
Theology." In Horizons in Feminist Theology: Identity, Tradition, and 
Norms. , edited by & Davaney R. S. Chopp, S. G. . Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1997. 
Keller, Evelyn Fox. Reflections on Gender and Science. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985. 
King, Mike. "Cutting "God" Down to Size: Transcendence and the Feminine." In 
Women and the Divine: Touchng Transcendence, edited by J'annine 
Jobling and Gillian Howie. New York: Pulgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Korsmeyer, Carolyn. "Feminist Aesthetics." The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2008. 
Kristeva, Julia. "From One Identity to Another." In Postmodern Literary Theory: 
An Anthology, edited by Lucy Niall. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. 
———. New Maladies of the Soul, European Perspectives. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995. 
———. The Revolution in Poetic Language. Translated by Margaret Waller. 1984 
English ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 
———. Revolution in Poetic Language. Translated by Margaret Waller, A 
Columbia Centennial Classic. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984. 
———. Tales of Love. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 
Kristeva, Julia, and Toril Moi. The Kristeva Reader. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986. 
Kruks, Sonia. Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist 
Politics. New York: Cornell University Press, 2001. 
Kruse, Felicia E. "Luce Irigaray's Parler Femme and American Metaphysics." 
Transactions 27, no. 4 (1991): 451-64. 
 275 
La Caze, Marguerite. "Seeing Oneself Though the Eyes of the Other: 
Asymmetrical Reciprocity and Self-Respect." Hypatia 23, no. 3 (2008): 
118-35. 
Lacan, Jacques. Ecrit: A Selection. Translated by Alan Sheridan. London: 
Routledge, 1977. 
———. Feminine Sexuality Translated by Jacqueline Rose. Edited by J  Mitchell 
and J. Rose. Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1982. 
———. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis New York: Norton, 
1994. 
———. On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. New York: 
Norton, 1998. 
———. Seminars Book 7, the Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Translated by Denis 
Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Landman, Martha.  http://www.witsnq.blogspot.com.au. 
Langton, Rae. "Beyond a Pragmatic Critique of Reason." Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 71, no. 4 (1993): 364-84. 
Le Dœuff, Michèle. Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, 
Philosophy Etc. Translated by Trista Selous. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007. 
———. The Philosophical Imaginary. Translated by C Gordon. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1989. 
Leeuwen, Anne van  "Sexuate Difference, Ontological Difference: Between 
Irigaray and Heidegger " Continental Philosophy Review 43 (2010): 111–
26  
Lehmann, K., and A. Raffelt, eds. The Practice of the Faith: A Handbook of 
Contemporary Spirituality New York: Crossroads, 1986. 
Levi-Strauss, Claude. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Translated by J. H. 
Bell. Boston: Beacon, 1969. 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence. Translated by 
Alhonso Lingis. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991. 
———. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969. 
Lloyd, Genevieve. "The Man of Reason." In Women, Knowledge, and Reality: 
Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, edited by Anne Garry and Marilyn 
Pearsall. London: Routledge, 1989. 
Lockhart, Russell A. Words as Eggs. Dallas: Spring Publications, 1983. 
Lukoff, David. "The Diagnosis of Mystical Experiences with Psychotic Features." 
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 17, no. 2 (1985). 
Mader, Mary Beth. "The Forgetting of Feeding: Luce Irigaray's Critique of Martin 
Heidegger." In In between the Psyche and the Social: Psychoanalytic 
Social Theory, edited by K.E. Oliver and Steve Edwin. Lanham: Roman & 
Littlfield Publishers, 2002. 
Martin, Alison. "Luce Irigaray and Divine Matter." In Women and Representation, 
edited by D Knight and J Still, 132-41. Nottingham: WIF Publications, 
2003. 
 276 
———. Luce Irigaray and the Question of the Divine. Leeds: Maney Publishing, 
2000. 
McGinn, Bernard. ""Evil-Sounding, Rash, and Suspect of Heresy": Tensions 
between Mysticism and Magisterium in the History of the Church." The 
Catholic Historical Review 90, no. 2 (2004): 193-212. 
———. "Love, Knowledge, and Mystical Union in Western Christianity: Twelfth to 
Sixteenth Centuries." Church History 56, no. No. 1. (March) (1987): 7-24. 
———, ed. Meister Eckhart and the Beguine Mystics. New York: Continuum, 
1997. 
Merchant, Carolyn. "Ecological Revolutions : Nature, Gender, and Science in 
New England." Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge, 
1968. 
———. The Visible and the Invisible. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1968. 
Merton, Thomas. New Seeds of Contemplation. New York: New Directions, 
1972. 
Michaelson, Jay. God in Your Body: Kabbalah, Mindfulness and Embodied 
Spiritual Practice. Woodstock, Vermont: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2007. 
Mikkola, Mari. "Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender." In Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2012. 
Moi, Toril "From Femininity to Finitude: Freud, Lacan, and Feminism, Again." 
Signs 29, no. 3 (2004): 841-78. 
———, ed. The Kristeva Reader. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
———. What Is a Woman?  And Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999. 
Moloney, Sharon. "Female Body as Sacred: Australian Women's Bio-Spiritual 
Experiences of Menstruation and Birth." Doctor of Philosophy, James 
Cook University, 2009. 
Monte, Cedrus. "Numen of the Flesh." Quadrant: Journal of the C. G. Jung 
Foundation for Analytical Psychology 2005, no. Summer (2005). 
Moore, Thomas. The Re-Enchantment of Everyday Life. New York: 
HarperPerennial, 1996. 
Moulton, Janice. "A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method." In 
Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphyics, 
Methodology and Philosophy of Science, edited by S Harding and M. B 
Hintikka. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kelwer Academic Publishers, 2003. 
Mulder, Anne-Marie. Divine Flesh, Embodied Word: ‘Incarnation’ as a 
Hermeneutical Key to a Feminist Theologian’s Reading of Luce Irigaray’s 
Work. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam 2006. 
Murphy, Michael. The Future of the Body. New York: The Putnam Publishing 
Company, 1993. 
Needleman, Jacob. Lost Christianity: A Journey of Rediscovery  to the Center of 
Christian Experience. New York: Harper and Row, 1980. 
Neumann, Eric. The Mystic Vision, Papers from the Eranos Year Books. London  
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969. 
 277 
Newman, Barbara. From Virile Woman to Womanchrist: Studies in Medieval 
Religion and Literature, Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1995. 
———. Sister of Wisdom: St Hildegard’s Theology of the Feminine. Berkeley Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1987. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Susan. "Explaining the Gender Difference in Depressive 
Symptoms." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77, no. 5 
(1999): 1061-72. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. Love’s Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
———. "Objectification." Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, no. 4 (1995): 249-91. 
———. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Oksala, Johanna. "Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of 
Experience." Hypatia 19, no. 4 (2004): 99-121. 
Otto, Rudolph. The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in 
the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational. Translated by J. W.  
Harvey. Oxford: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. 
Papadaki, Evangelia (Lina). "Feminist Perspectives on Objectification." edited by 
Edward N Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2011. 
Parry, Richard. "Episteme and Techne." edited by Edward N Zalta. The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008. 
Penner, Hans. "The Mystical Illusion." In Mysticism and Religious Traditions, 
edited by Steven Katz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Pirruccello, Ann. "Making the World My Body: Simone Weil and Somatic 
Practice." Philosophy East and West 52, no. 4 (2002): 479-97. 
Pluhacek, S. "To the Other as Other-Hearing, Listening, Understanding." 
Paragraph 25, no. 3 (2002): 45-56. 
Prud’homme, Johanne, and Lyne Légaré. "Kristeva: The Subject in Process." 
(2006), http://www.signosemio.com/kristeva/subject-in-process.asp. 
Ranciere, Jacques. Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy Translated by Julie  
Ross. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 
Reeve, C. D. C. "Plato on Friendship and Eros." edited by Edward Zalta, N. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011. 
Reilly, Patricia Lynn. A God Who Looks Like Me: Discovering a Woman-Affirming 
Spirituality. New York: Ballantine 1995. 
Rich, Adrienne. Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution. New 
York: Bantam, 1977. 
———. A Wild Patience Has Taken Me This Far: Poems 1978-1981 New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1982. 
Ricoeur, Paul. Time and Narrative. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David  
Pellauer. 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984-1988. 
Riley, Denise. Am I That Name? Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in 
History. London: Macmillan, 1988. 
Rilke, Rainer Maria, Franz Xaver Kappus, and Stephen Mitchell. Letters to a 
Young Poet. 1st Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1987. 
 278 
Rimbaud, Arthur. Illuminations and Other Prose Poems. Translated by Louise 
Varese. New York: Penguin Books, 1957. 
Robinson, Howard. "Dualism." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2012. 
Rodkey, Christopher Demuth In the Horizon of the Infinite: Paul Tillich and the 
Dialectic of the Sacred. Ann Arbor: ProQuest, 2009. 
Rohr, Richard. The Naked Now: Learning to See as the Mystics See. New York: 
Crossroad, 2009. 
Rowland, Susan. "Jung and Derrida: The Numinous, Deconstruction and Myth." 
In The Idea of the Numinous: Contemporary Jungian and Psychoanalytic 
Perspectives, edited by Ann Casement and David Tacey. New York: 
Routledge, 2006. 
———. Jung: A Feminist Revision. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002. 
Sanford, John. Fate, Love and Ecstasy New York: Chiron Publications, 1995. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. London: Peter Owen, 
1962. 
Schemen, Naomi. "The Unavoidability of Gender." In Women, Knowledge, and 
Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, edited by Ann Garry and 
Marilyn Pearsall. London: Routledge, 1996. 
Schimmel, Annemarie. Mystical Dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2011. 
Schor, Naomi. Bad Objects: Essays Popular and Unpopular. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1995. 
Schor, Naomi, and Elizabeth Weed. The Essential Difference, Books from 
Differences. Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1994. 
———. The Essential Difference. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
Schroeder, Jeanne Lorraine. "The Vestal and the Fasces: Hegel, Lacan, 
Property, and the Feminine." Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998. 
Schüssler Fiorenza, Elizabeth. In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological 
Reconstruction of Christian Origins. New York: Crossroad, 1995. 
Scott, Joan Wallach. "Experience." In Feminists Theorize the Political, edited by 
Judith Butler and Joan Scott, 22-40. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
Scruton, Roger. The Face of God: The Gifford Lectures 2010. London: 
Continuum, 2012. 
Shiva, Vandana. Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development. London: Zed 
Books, 1988. 
Singer, June. Seeing through the Visible World: Jung, Gnosis and Chaos New 
York: Harper and Rowe, 1990. 
Smith, Anne-Marie. Julia Kristeva: Speaking the Unspeakable. London: Pluto, 
1998. 
Smith, John E. "William James’s Account of Mysticism: A Critical Appraisal." In 
Mysticism and Religious Traditions, edited by Steven Katz. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983. 
Snyder, Midori. "Armless Maiden." In The Armless Maiden: And Other Tales for 
Childhood's Survivors, edited by Terri Windling: Tor, 1995. 
 279 
Soskice, Janet Martin. "Love and Attention." In Feminist Philosophy of Religion: 
Critical Readings, edited by P. S. Anderson, & Clack, B. London: 
Routledge, 2004. 
Sovatsky, Stuart. "The Pleasures of Celibacy." Yoga Journal March (1987): 41-
76. 
Spelman, Elizabeth V. Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist 
Thought. Boston: Beacon Press, 1988. 
Still, Judith. "Poetic Nuptials." Paragraph 25, no. 3 (2002): 3-7. 
Stone, Alison. "Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy." 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 1, no. 2 (2004): 135-53. 
Tacey, David. Reenchantment: The New Australian Spirituality. Sydney: 
HarperCollins, 2000. 
Taliaferro, Charles. "Philosophy of Religion." The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2011. 
Thandeka. "The Self between Feminist Theory and Theology." In Horizons in 
Feminist Theology: Identity, Tradition, and Norms, edited by Rebecca S. 
Chopp and Sheila Greeve Davaney. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997. 
Threadgold, Terry. Feminist Poetics: Poesis, Performance, Histories. London: 
Routledge, 1997. 
Tilghman, Carolyn M. "The Flesh Made Word: Luce Irigaray’s Rendering of the 
Sensible Transcendental  " Janus Head 11, no. 1 (2008): 39-54. 
Tong, Rosemarie , and Nancy Williams. "Feminist Ethics." edited by Edward N 
Zelta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011. 
Toyoda, Sonoko. Memories of Our Lost Hands: Searching for Feminine 
Spirituality and Creativity. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 
2006. 
Ulanov, Ann Belford. The Feminine in Jungian Psychology and in Christian 
Theology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971. 
———. Receiving Woman: Studies in the Psychology and the Theology of the 
Feminine. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981. 
Underhill, Evelyn. Mysticism. New York: Meridian, 1955. 
von Franz, Marie-Louise. Animus and Anima in Fairy Tales. Toronto: Inner City 
Books, 2002. 
———. Archetypal Patterns in Fairy Tales. Toronto: Inner City Books, 1997. 
———. The Feminine in Fairy Tales. Boston: Shambhala, 1993. 
———. The Interpretation of Fairy Tales. Boston: Shambhala, 1996. 
———. The Psychological Meaning of Redemption Motifs in Fairytales. Toronto: 
Inner City Books, 1980. 
Walker Bynum, Caroline "Wonder." The American Historical Review 102 no. Feb 
(1997): 1-26. 
Walker, Michelle Boulous. Philosophy and the Maternal Body: Reading Silence. 
London: Routledge, 1998. 
Wapnick, K. "Mysticism and Schizophrenia." Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology 6, no. 1 (1972). 
Warner, Marina. From the Beast to the Bolnde: Fairy Tales and Their Tellers. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux., 1996. 
 280 
Weil, Simone. First and Last Notebooks. Translated by Richard Rees. London: 
Oxford Universit Press, 1970. 
———. Gravity and Grace. London: Routledge, 1995. 
———. Notebooks. Translated by Arthur Wills. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1956. 
———. Simone Weil: An Anthology. Miles, Sian ed. New York: Gove Press, 
2000. 
———. Waiting for God. Translated by Emma Craufurd. New York: Harper 
Colophon, 1973. 
Whitford, Margaret, ed. The Irigaray Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991c. 
———. "Irigaray's Body Symbolic." Hypatia 6, no. 3 (1991a): 97-110. 
———. Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine: Routledge, 1991b. 
Winnicott, D.W. Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: 
Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development. London: Hogarth, 1965. 
———. "Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena—a Study of the First 
Not-Me Possession." 1953. 
Wisnewsk, Jeremy Heidegger: An Introduction. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2013. 
Wolff, Toni. Structural Forms of the Feminine Psyche. Translated by P 
Watzlawik. Zurich: C.G. Jung Institute, 1956. 
Woodman, Marion. Addiction to Perfection: The Still Unravaged Bride. A 
Psychological Study. Toronto: Inner City Books, 1982. 
———. The Pregnant Virgin: A Process of Psychological Transformation. 
Toronto: Inner City Books, 1985. 
Woodman, Marion, and Elinor Dickson. Dancing in the Flames: The Dark 
Goddess in the Transformation of Consciousness. Boston: Shambala, 
1997. 
Young, Iris Marion. Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political 
Philosophy, and Policy. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1997. 
———. On Female Body Experience: ”Throwing Like a Girl” and Other Essays, 
Studies in Feminist Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005. 
Young, Julian. Heidegger's Later Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002. 
Yuasa, Yasuo. The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory. Translated by 
Nagatomo  Shigenori and T. P.  Kasulis. Albany, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1987. 
Zakin, Emily. "Psychoanalytic Feminism." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N Zalta, 2011. 
Zipes, Jack David. The Brothers Grimm: From Enchanted Forests to the Modern 
World. New York: Pulgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
———. Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion. London: Heinemann, 1983. 
 
 
 
